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BARRE, CHIRAC, LE PEN ET AL: FRANCE'S FRAGMENTED RIGHT
James G. Shields

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BARRE, CHIRAC, LE PEN et al: FRANCE'S FRAGMENTED RIGHT

224

by James G. Shields

NEVER since the foundation of the Fifth Republic by General de Gaulle in 1958 has the French Right found itself in such a state of disarray. In the half-year that has elapsed since the presidential and parliamentary elections of summer 1988, the major parties of the Right, the neo-Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) and the centre-right *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF), have had time to reflect upon the resounding defeat of Jacques Chirac at the hands of the incumbent President Mitterrand and on the loss of the parliamentary majority which the Right had won only two years earlier in the legislative elections of March 1986. As the standard-bearer of the Right in the second ballot run-off with François Mitterrand on 8 May, the Gaullist Jacques Chirac should have been able, in principle, to draw upon a statistical majority, adding to his own voters those of his right-wing rivals, Raymond Barre and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Chirac had polled 19.9% in the first round, Barre 16.5% and Le Pen 14.4%, giving an aggregate 50% plus to the Right. Instead of securing victory, however, Chirac was defeated by one of the most emphatic margins (54% to 46%) in the history of presidential elections under the Fifth Republic, a margin which recalls de Gaulle's 55% to 45% defeat of the Socialist challenger in the second round of the 1965 presidential election. The then challenger's name was none other than François Mitterrand.

There is no little irony in the fact that a conservative candidate capable of mobilising the whole of the right-of-centre electorate would have had no need even to confront the outgoing President Mitterrand in a second ballot. With an absolute majority of the votes cast, such a candidate would have set a precedent by being elected outright on 24 April. The

fact of the matter, however, is that the Right emerged from the first round of this presidential election cloven into the roughly comparable constituencies of three mutually antipathetic leaders. The rivalry between Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac is often cited as a cause of the Socialist victory in 1981. The Left, it is argued, did not win the presidency: the Right lost it. Now, almost a decade later, the rivalries and divisions on the Right, far from being patched up, are more open and more potentially damaging than ever. Dramatised in the confrontation of 24 April between Chirac, Barre and Le Pen, they threaten severely any prospect that the Right can effect a ready transition from opposition to power in a country which had, prior to 1981, been dominated by right-wing government throughout the Fifth Republic.

From 1958 to 1969, de Gaulle presided over a French Right whose divisions he succeeded in burying beneath a semblance of unity. Since then, however, no conservative leader has proved strong enough to hold the various factions of the Right together under a single banner. It was a measure of things to come when, in the second ballot of the presidential election of 1969, de Gaulle's mantle was disputed not between Right and Left but between the Gaullist Georges Pompidou and the centre-right Alain Poher. Pompidou won the contest and held the presidential office until his death in 1974, when Jacques Chaban-Delmas was unable to sustain the Gaullist ascendancy and the centrist Valéry Giscard d'Estaing went on to defeat the ever-present François Mitterrand in the run-off. Only two years later Giscard was to find himself in open conflict with his Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, who resigned office and concentrated his efforts on building a strong power base as Mayor of Paris and replacing the Gaullist UDR with the new RPR party, an organisation which he clearly intended to use as a launch pad for his candidacy in the 1981 presidential election. Splitting the right-wing vote on that occasion and refusing to throw his full support behind the outgoing President Giscard d'Estaing in the second round, Chirac contributed substantially to the Right's first defeat in twenty-three years.

The shock of being thrust into opposition did nothing to heal the divisions on the Right. A discredited Giscard d'Estaing left his two ex-Prime Ministers, Chirac and Barre, to dispute the right-of-centre ground and mount a challenge to a Socialist government which soon ran into serious difficulties over its handling of the economy in particular. What the heavyweights of the conventional Right did not foresee, however, was the arrival of another challenger, the leader of the far-right Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen. In 1981, the latter was an electoral nonentity. Three years later, his party astonished the political establishment by polling almost 11% in the European elections of June 1984. Since then, Le Pen and the Front National have gone from strength to strength, securing almost 10% of the vote in the parliamentary elections of March 1986 and entering the National Assembly for the first time since the party's foundation in 1972. Le Pen's finest hour, however, was reserved for the first round of the presidential elections on 24 April 1988.

With the support of a staggering 4.4 million voters, he finished within 6% of Jacques Chirac and a mere 2% behind Raymond Barre, a performance unprecedented by any extreme right-wing figure in post-war France.

The mechanics of French presidential elections are simple enough. The two candidates with the highest results at the first ballot go through to a second round contest, where the support of voters of eliminated candidates becomes crucial. The effect of Le Pen's presence on 24 April may be measured by the fact that Chirac's disastrous 19.9%, though it saw him through to the second round, was barely an improvement upon the 18% which had caused him to be eliminated at the first round in 1981. Whilst a *pax* with Raymond Barre might have improved Chirac's prospects of harnessing the centrist vote, a three-way split of the centre-right electorate left him with an insurmountable task. An electorate as heterogeneous and as volatile as Le Pen's — with its admixture of right-wing radicals, 'moderate' conservatives and protest voters — was never to be recovered by a single mainstream candidate in the second round. From the moment Le Pen's 14.4% score was announced, Chirac's bid to unseat Mitterrand was destined to fail.

The cause of Chirac's defeat lies squarely, then, in his inability to mobilise the whole of the French Right, to secure the crucial middle ground while extending his appeal to the radical fringes where Le Pen has forged a new constituency. The problem is one which has been with the leaders of the conventional Right ever since the emergence of the Front National as a force at the local level in the municipal elections of 1983. To ignore Le Pen's electorate is to accept the loss of a large and clearly critical segment of the right-wing vote; to court this vote, on the other hand, is to put at risk the crucial centre-ground without which no leader of the Right can hope to mount a significant challenge for the presidency. Squeezed between the centrist Barre and the extremist Le Pen, Chirac fell victim in his presidential campaign to an acute strategic dilemma. Whilst a fragile truce might be tenable with Barre, no such overtures could be safely entertained with Le Pen. Chirac's response, since the first electoral successes of the Front National, has been to refuse co-operation with Le Pen at the national level, while giving tacit endorsement to a number of deals at the local and regional levels. This has greatly enhanced the role of Le Pen's party as a power-broker. Jean-Pierre Stirbois, the hard-line secretary general of the party, had, until his recent death in a car crash, been deputy mayor in the town of Dreux ever since the municipal by-election of September 1983 in which the UDF and RPR won victory only at the cost of an alliance with the Front National. Following the regional elections of March 1986, the Right won control of five of France's 22 Regional Assemblies only by dint of co-operation with Le Pen's party, which was duly rewarded with a number of influential posts.

Embarrassing collaboration of this sort has, however, been kept to a minimum. The question of how to respond to Le Pen has proved deeply damaging to the cohesion of the Right, demonstrating something of the

distance that separates moderates such as the former President of the European Parliament, Simone Veil, from hard-liners like the ex-Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, or the UDF leader in the National Assembly, Jean-Claude Gaudin. A survivor of Auschwitz, Mme. Veil came to political prominence in the 1970s as Giscard d'Estaing's Minister for Health. In that capacity, she alienated a considerable segment of the hard Right by steering through the legalisation of abortion in 1975. She it was who headed the joint list of UDF and RPR candidates for the European elections of June 1984, a factor which may have contributed to the emergence of the Front National as a vehicle for the ultra-conservative vote. A prime target for Le Pen, who rails against the 'creeping socialism' of the mainstream Right, Mme. Veil remains resolute in her opposition to any deals with the Front National.

Pasqua and Gaudin, on the other hand, represent much more the face of political opportunism in their attitude to Le Pen. As Chirac's Interior Minister between 1986 and 1988, Pasqua led an ostentatious government crack-down on crime and illegal immigration. The populist appeal of his reforms in these domains — tougher sentencing of criminals, new anti-terrorist measures, increased police powers, stricter border security, the summary expulsion of immigrants whose papers had expired — could be seen as a direct challenge to Le Pen's hegemony on the law and order and immigration issues. As much was confirmed by Pasqua himself when, between the two rounds of the recent presidential election, he made a pitch for Le Pen's electorate by insisting upon the affinities — the 'shared values', as he put it — between mainstream and far-right voters.

What Pasqua sought to achieve in the presidential elections, Jean-Claude Gaudin pursued by an altogether more direct route in the parliamentary elections which followed in June. Gaudin is a leading Marseille conservative who agreed to withdraw mainstream candidates of the Right in any Marseille constituency where the Front National was better placed to defeat the Left in the second ballot. The agreement, though restricted officially to a city where support for Le Pen is particularly strong, was denounced not only by the Left but by a number of prominent conservatives, among them Raymond Barre. Though the Front National won none of the Marseille seats in question, demonstrating clearly the difficulty which this party faces when acting as the *pôle de rassemblement* for the right-of-centre vote, such a deal lends a new degree of respectability to Le Pen and presages the choice with which the mainstream Right will be faced in a considerable number of constituencies in the municipal elections of spring 1989.

That the Socialist President, François Mitterrand, should have anything to do with this state of affairs looks on the face of it unlikely. Yet it is to Mitterrand that much of the credit must go for the current state of the French Right. A consummate tactician, the President has ably exploited the readiness of the Right to indulge its penchant for internecine feuding. At a moment when the fortunes of his Socialist government were at their nadir, Mitterrand saw the possibility of using the Le

Pen phenomenon to his own ends. Breaking with a tradition as old as the Fifth Republic itself, he abandoned two-ballot majority voting for proportional representation in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of March 1986. The change to the voting system greatly reduced the Right's majority and allowed a 35-strong cohort of Front National *députés* to enter the National Assembly. Though Chirac was able to piece together a slender majority (of only three seats out of 577) without recourse to Le Pen's party, he presented a much less forbidding partner in 'cohabitation' with a President bereft — for the first time under the Fifth Republic — of his parliamentary majority. Chirac's swift abolition of PR and return to the voting system of old ensured the collapse of Le Pen's parliamentary representation in the elections of June 1988. By then, however, Mitterrand had reasserted his claim to the Elysée and steered his Socialists towards the relative majority which they now boast in the National Assembly.

Nor has Mitterrand's influence ended there. The President's political lexicon has undergone dramatic change since 1981. No more is the talk of a 'rupture' with capitalism, or of a stark 'choice' between two radically opposed societies. Mitterrand-speak is given over nowadays to the virtues of *rassemblement* (national unity) and *ouverture* (an opening of French politics towards the centre). By extending an encouraging hand towards the middle ground, Mitterrand continues to play upon the divisions of the Right in two very obvious ways. In the first place, the enduring spectre of Le Pen has prompted a number of more moderate conservatives to declare their readiness to ally with the Socialists rather than the extreme Right. Secondly, the centre-right UDF remains a fragile coalition of parties which electoral expediency alone has held together since its formation in 1978. Formerly overshadowed by its weightier and more efficient counterpart, the neo-Gaullist RPR under Jacques Chirac, the UDF sees itself being hailed now as the potential key to a realignment of French politics around the centre. Though leading UDF figures continue to demur before Mitterrand's talk of redefining the political landscape, the minority Socialist government of Prime Minister Michel Rocard already includes a number of moderate conservatives (such as the Labour Minister, Jean-Pierre Soisson, and the Minister for Foreign Trade, Jean-Marie Rausch) who have opted for participation in power in preference to rancorous opposition.

Is the break-up of the French Right, then, at hand? The more cynical among political observers might reply that the Right in France has never been other than fragmented, and that the 1980s have merely exposed its divisions for what they are. Certainly, as the Socialists are launched on their second presidential term, the leaders of the Right are having to come to terms with the fact that they are not the natural repository of power. The years 1981 to 1988 were no passing aberration. This realisation of itself must lead to some redefinition of the Right's political and strategic posture. Established politicians in France do not give way easily to young pretenders. Chirac is down but far from out: at 56, the energetic leader of the RPR and Mayor of Paris could mount more than one further

challenge for the presidency. While Barre makes a virtue of unpredictability and of his lack of relish for the political treadmill, he too cannot be ruled out. Even Giscard d'Estaing is working his painstaking passage back to the centre of national political affairs. Yet there are a host of aspirants lining up to challenge for the leadership of the mainstream Right in what is most euphemistically termed a period of transition. Foremost among what can be seen as a new generation of centre-leaning conservatives is the leader of the *Parti Républicain,* the most powerful component of the UDF, François Léotard. A rising star on the centre-right, Léotard would hitch his fortunes to a continued alliance with Chirac's RPR — though as Minister for Culture in Chirac's 1986-88 government, Léotard found relations with his Prime Minister less than harmonious on occasions. Others, such as the ex-Minister for Foreign Trade, the RPR's Michel Noir, have stated bluntly that, whatever the evolution wrought in the political landscape over the course of the 1980s, the Right must tread a path which does not lead to deals with the Front National. On the left of the UDF, Pierre Méhaignerie, the leader of the CDS *(Centre des Démocrates Sociaux),* has turned his viewfinder in the other direction. Demonstrating the fragility of UDF-RPR ties, Méhaignerie seized the post-election initiative in summer to form a so-called 'Union of the Centre' group which, though severely limited as a power base, has laid some of the ground for a potential *rapprochement* with the Socialist Left. Basking in a new limelight after years of relative obscurity, Méhaignerie and Co intend now to sell their favours at a price — and they are looking to the centre-left as potentially the most viable market.

All of this makes a French Socialist Party well known for its factionalism seem decidedly homogeneous. No longer constrained by the need to court the support of its much weakened Communist neighbour, the Socialists have shown that they can alternate — even co-operate — in government with the Right, with neither paralysis nor constitutional crisis as a result. If French politics in the 1980s have one overriding success story to tell, it is this. Should Mitterrand serve out his term, he will occupy the Elysée until 1995. If Rocard steers a judicious course, France should have a Socialist-dominated National Assembly until the next parliamentary elections due in 1993. As the leaders of the Right seek to rationalise the unprecedented political failures of the 1980s, they may reflect ruefully upon the fact that, by the time the next presidential elections come round, they will have been out of France's highest office for longer than the entire period during which the Elysée was occupied by the towering figure of President de Gaulle.

[James G. Shields is a Lecturer in French at Aston University. He has published articles and book chapters on contemporary French politics. See also his 'France: Civil Liberties on the Agenda' in *Contemporary Review,* No. 1470, Vol. 253 and 'A New Factor in the French Political Equation', No. 1464, Vol. 242.]

NO MORE TITOSLAVIA?

by Leo Muray

EVENTS in the Soviet Union and in other Soviet Bloc countries over the last six months have shown that the regimes everywhere are going through a tense and confusing spell of change and uncertainty and none of the leaders, and this is highly significant, can tell where it is going to lead to. An incident in Baku, the capital of Azerbaidjan late in November illustrates this. A crowd of students demonstrated carrying the green banners of the Islamic fundamentalists demanding the expulsion of all Armenians, Russians and Jews from the republic. Azerbaidjan, of course, is Moslem.

One fundamental reason for this developing situation is that the Communist parties, Marxist-Leninist, in all these countries are losing their moral and political authority. The parties are still in power but the system itself has failed to deliver, in the first place in the economic field. Having pledged a steady rise in the standard of living on the basis of medium-term directed central planning the widespread shortages in food and consumer goods have proved to party members and others that the system is slowly grinding to a halt.

This has produced political instability throughout the region and especially in the Balkans. In Romania the Marxist-Leninist party has produced a personal dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu who is trying to apply the plans of 'agro-industrial settlements' to replace villages that, in fact, brought about the downfall of Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow 25 years ago. In Romania the Communist Party is dead as a political force and only the Secret Police is keeping Ceausescu in power. A harsh winter will bring the test of survival.

In Bulgaria an aging and ailing leader Zhivkov, is groping for successors that can keep the regime moving reluctantly along the path of Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow always aware of the risk he would run if Gorbachev were to fail.

But the key country is Yugoslavia. This because its leaders, from Marshal Tito onwards, have been experimenting with economic policies and changes of the Marxist-Leninist system for the last 30 years or so on very much the same lines President Gorbachev is trying out at present. There are the same efforts to dismantle the central planning system, there is the same growing and increasingly passionate conflict between the various ethnic groups or nationalities and there is also the burden of the memory of the 'Great Leader', Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito. They are, of course, quite different personalities. But both have created the system of government that is now being changed. It has taken the Soviet Union more than 30 years to dismantle the image of Stalin and he is still seen as a war hero by many. The questioning of Tito and his image has only started.

Gorbachev has recognised the active existence of the various nations

and ethnic groups, 23 of them from 137 million Great Russians to 1.9 million Bashkirs. But Yugoslavia is different. It started 70 years ago as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1929 it became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945. In 1963 it became the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But all the time, since it emerged after the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, Yugoslavia has tried to become a Yugoslav nation. But at the last census only 1,220,000 of the 23.3 million described themselves as Yugoslavs in the column about nationalities. Most stuck to being Serbs, 8, 140.00, million, Croats, 4.45, Slovenes, 1.9, Macedonians, 1.5, Albanians 1.8 and 428,000 Hungarians, 181,000 Gipsies and 18 other 'ethnic groups' like Turks, Germans and Romanians. The half million Montenegrians are closely linked to the Serbs.

The religious groupings are also essential. In addition to the Albanians there are two million Moslems in Bosnia. They are emotionally inclined towards the Moslem Albanians. There are nine million Greek Orthodox, mostly Serb, and seven million Roman Catholics, mostly Croats and Slovenes with around 310.000 Protestants and a few Jews. All, of course, are allowed to have their clergy.

There are six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia with Serbia having two autonomous regions, Kosovo in the south and Voivodina in the north. Everyone has ethnic groups of the others living there. The most homogenous is Slovenia with 1.7 million Slovenes in a population of 1.93 million. In the key republic of Croatia there are three-and-a-half million Croats and half a million Serbs and among the Croats the people of the coastal area of Dalmatia regard themselves as rather separate, as Dalmats — 'without spots' — with ancient links with Italy while the 1.3 million Macedonians, whom their Bulgarian neighbours claim as Bulgarians have 86,000 Turks. Bosnia is the most mixed with 1.35 million Serbs and 780,000 Croats mixing with the Moslems.

Nobody was more aware than Marshal Tito of the vastly different and often conflicting historical and cultural background of the ethnic groups that make up Yugoslavia. The Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians are Greek Orthodox and had lived under the Turks for centuries. The Moslems in Bosnia are Slavs of the Greek Orthodox Bogomil Sect who turned Moslem because the conquering Turks allowed their noble landowners to keep their lands if they turned Moslem. The Slovenes and Croats are Roman Catholic and have lived under the Hapsburgs for centuries. The Serbs have the Cyrillic script the Croats and Slovenes the Latin. Their languages are slightly different. In the Yugoslav armed forces the language is Serb. There is, inevitably, the memory of the savage World War II, when the German-sponsored Croat Republics guards massacred tens of thousands of Serbs living there.

The Serbs regard themselves as the elite warrior nation that fought in two World Wars to create Federal Yugoslavia against fearful odds as the 1941 invasion by Germany proved. The Albanian issue must be seen also

against this background. Kosovo is the autonomous republic within Serbia with an overwhelming Albanian majority, 1.4 million Albanians against 200,000 Serbs.

Kosovo is an historic place of supreme emotional significance for the Serbs. It was there that 600 years ago four savage battle were fought against the conquering Turks. In the decisive one a young Serb, Milosh Obilic, plunged his dagger into the heart of the victorious Sultan Murad thus ensuring the survival of the Serb nation. It was Obilic also who served as an example to Gavrilo Princip, the young Serb who assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Hapsburg throne, on the Vidovdan Serb holiday in June 1914 in Sarayevo thus initiating World War I. The Serbs cannot give up Kosovo emotionally.

Marshal Tito was always conscious of the tensions produced by history. Because of Kosovo the victorious powers of World War I did not let the new state of Albania have that region despite its Albanian majority. He, of course, was a Croat serving in the Austrian army in World War I and taken prisoner by the Russians. There he became an active communist and it was the communist party that could overcome the tensions among the Yugoslavs in that war. Standing up against Stalin in 1948, his Serb Chief of Staff tried to defect across the Rumanian border and was shot, made him a hero in the whole country but he remained a Croat.

With tensions always bubbling below the surface Marshal Tito changed his first constitution of 1946 three times before he died. One reason was the gradual development of his self-management system under control of his League of Communists and it was his self-management system in industry and agriculture that enabled him to balance the various nations within the country. The obligatory self-management of all public enterprises introduced in 1953 after the break with Moscow allowed him in 1963 to make Kosovo and Voivodina autonomous republics within Serbia and to set up an assembly system in 1974, in a further change of the constitution. This gives the self-managing bodies and enterprises in all sectors the right to own their enterprises, run them and pick candidates and representatives for them from the Trade Unions or the League of Communists.

Yugoslavia has a two Chamber Federal Constitution, each of the six republics sending 30 delegates from their self-managing bodies and the two autonomous regions of Serbia 20 each. There is also a Senate type Chamber of Republics with 12 from each of the six and eight from the autonomous regions. There is a Federal Presidium of nine members, one from each of the republics and autonomous regions and a top member of the League of Communists. Before his death Tito introduced the rotation each year of the actual President to ensure nobody is left out. There is also a Federal Executive Council, the government, 18 ministries and 13 additional members. But the six republics have their own Assemblies or Chambers with their own governments and so have the two autonomous regions. There are three Chambers in each. The republics trade with each other and few Federal laws can be passed before

all republics have agreed. That applies especially to the Budget and the only budget that so far has not been questioned is the defence budget.

Each government can relax control of its own League of Communists which has 2,167,000 members of whom only 30,3% are actual workers and 25% under 27 years of age. Self-management has in practice produced enormous differences between the efficient and prosperous north, Slovenia and Croatia, and the struggling 'under-developed' south, Serbia, Macedonia. The two northern republics resent having to support the south and the 1974 Constitution lists key subjects on which agreement between the Republics must be obtained from their assemblies before the Federal legislation can be enacted. Since it is now admitted that too many of the self-managing enterprises do not work properly, there were 800 strikes last year, it is, as one senior official remarked, a fight of everybody against everybody but essentially between those who want to drop the traditional Titoist economic management based on his version of proper Marxist-Leninist policy and those who cling to the chance that it will eventually work out and, above all, preserve the control of the Party that is of themselves.

The latest reform programme lays down that from now on the basic objective of the self-managing enterprises must be profit and not income. This means that wages — the average is now £60 a month — should be kept low and enterprises should respond to taxation and liquidity pressures rather than to suggestions of the Central planning authorities. As for regulations the developing private sector should not be discriminated against in favour of the public one. There should be more competition to encourage private and foreign capital investment and import control should be relaxed so as to allow consumer goods in. There is even the strong suggestion that gradually direct central planning should be restricted to energy and transport in the first place. But now, it is said in Belgrade, those who have the power want as little change as possible and those who want the change have so far only very little power. But Yugoslavia has 21 billion dollars worth of foreign debts, an inflation rate of over 200% and 1.3 million unemployed with dramatic differences between north and south. This is also shown in the differences in price rises between north and south after the freeing of prices, 100% in Zagreb, Croatia, 150% in Skoplye, Macedonia. There are 30,000 government controlled undertakings in the country and a growing number are practically bankrupt. One of the moderate Serb leaders, Mr. Markovic, has warned that 'no one can hold power indefinitely and forever only on the ground of earlier victories'.

Yugoslavia is constantly negotiating readjustments of its foreign debts and interest payments. For the last eight years reform of the 'Democratic Centralism' system invented by Lenin has been discussed saying that the Party, the League of Communists, must be separated from the state and stop interfering in the economy. But the Party is still in charge.

The present prolonged crisis seen against this complex background is thus one of the survival of the Communist Party as the central controlling

authority in the country. The mass demonstrations of tens of thousands against the Party authorities and regional governments that led to the public resignation of the government in the Voivodina show that the authority of the Party is dangerously undermined. For a non-party — and Party — crowd to force the resignation of the Communist government in a one party state is without precedent in the Communist world. It was not linked with the conflict in the other autonomous region of Serbia — Kosovo. There the Albanian majority wants to have its own Republic, independent of Serbia and equal to it within the Federal Republic.

And it is significant that the leader of the Serbs, Slobodan Milosevic, whose family incidentally, had to leave Kosovo to Belgrade for safety, during the German occupation in 1941, is also applying the new weapon of mass demonstrations in his fight to re-establish strict Serb authority over Kosovo which Marshal Tito had cut in the new Constitution of 1974 to limit potential Serb dominance. But Milosevic quotes Tito in support of his arguments while his adversaries in the Praesidium accuse him of violating the Tito heritage.

In fact Tito has left a vacuum and it may not be filled. No nationally recognised leading personality has emerged and this vacuum has been widened by the campaign to purge the leadership. This has not happened on a large scale but again the acceptance of having to have a purge has shown up the weakness of the Party as an authority. The fantastic corruption case of the Agrokommerc enterprise in the small town of Velika Kladira in Bosnia has spectacularly corroded the authority of the Party. The case involved the issue of 900 million dollars worth of uncovered drafts and the loss of 14,000 jobs. A Bosnian member of the Praesidium had to resign and bank managers involved in dealing with the drafts hinted that political leaders must have tolerated it. Slovene and Croat bankers said they had banned investments in Bosnia.

The Bosnian corruption case, and it is not the only one, has strengthened the hand of the Serb leader as the incorruptible man of action with the public in Belgrade where he could muster a million demonstrators. But it has also forced the leaders of the north, Milan Kunic of Slovenia and Stripe Suvar of Croatia to come out against him. Kucan attacked 'totalitarian populism' and it was Stupar who got the right hand man of Milosevic dropped from the key Presidency Council. While embarrassed Bosnia and Macedonia, the poorest republic, are keeping on the sidelines and tiny Montenegro gives restrained support to Milosevic's effort to establish real control by Serbia over Kosovo the Slovene and Croat leaders, in full charge of their own Parties in their own republics, as Milosevic is in his, have decided to challenge him and to prevent him from dominating the Federal government. The north against the south.

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THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN PAKISTAN

by Frances Harrison

TO commemorate the birthday of the Prophet, in 1979 the late President of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, first introduced Islamic law in the form of the 'Hudood Ordinance'. Stoning to death *(hadd)* became the punishment for a convicted rapist. Oddly, exactly the same punishment was introduced for adultery, whilst unmarried fornicators were to receive one hundred lashes. To convict a rapist or an adulterer of *'hadd'* requires four male adult Muslim eye-witnesses to the act of penetration. No matter how many hundreds of women or Christians watch a rape, their evidence can never be accepted for the maximum sentence *(hadd)*, though their testimony might be deemed sufficient proof for a prison sentence ranging from four to twenty-five years.

The 'Hudood Ordinance' prevents women from testifying in rape cases. A woman can report her rape, but if she does not provide sufficient proof, her own admission makes her liable to be prosecuted for adultery, whilst the rapist goes free for lack of evidence. In July 1983, this happened to Safia Bibi, an eighteen year old, virtually blind girl. She was sentenced to a public lashing (fifteen lashes), three years in prison and a fine of one thousand rupees (more than the average man's annual earnings) on charges of adultery. According to Safia's statement she was raped first by the landlord's son and then by the landlord himself in the house where she was employed as domestic help. As a result she had an illegitimate child. Safia's father registered the rape case. The judge acquitted both the landlord and his son as there was insufficient evidence under the 'Hudood Ordinance' to prove rape, but took it upon himself to use Safia Bibi's self confessed pregnancy as automatic evidence of her adultery. He even thought he was letting Safia Bibi off with a light sentence because of her youth and near blindness. A rapist, careful not to leave too many adult Muslim male witnesses, can effectively get away with his crime and even see his victim punished instead.

Whatever one's views on abortion, few people would deny rape victims, such as Safia Bibi, the option of an abortion, but Islamic law in Pakistan declared abortion under any circumstances illegal and punishes both the mother and the abortionist with seven years imprisonment. This is particularly harsh to both mother and child since Pakistani society is hostile in its attitudes to illegitimate children. Even a mother whose health is threatened by prospective childbirth is prohibited from having an abortion.

Five years after the 'Hudood Ordinance' in October 1984, the Council of Islamic Ideology introduced a new 'Law of Evidence'. This effectively made the evidence of one man equal to that of two women. Except in specifically 'female' matters, 'which do not usually come within the direct knowledge of men' such as menstruation or child birth, everything must be proved by the evidence of two Muslim men, or one man and two

women. If these are not available then the evidence of one man and one woman can be accepted only at the discretion of the court. A woman's eye-witness evidence is reduced to circumstantial status in all cases of murder or bodily injury and her evidence is not admissible for the maximum sentence in theft, rape or adultery.

An explanation for women's evidence being discounted occurs in Article 17 of the 'Law of Evidence', which states that:

> In all matters pertaining to financial or future obligations, providing these are reduced to writing, the evidence of two men or one man and two women will be required so that if one should forget, the other may remind her!

Not only is the intelligence of a woman rated at half that of a man, but so too is the value placed on her life. In 1980 the law of *Diyat* was drafted: *diyat* means blood money for murder and financial compensation for physical injury. The law proposed that the blood money for the death of a man would be 30.63 kg. of silver (or its equivalent) but only half this for a woman. In cases of injury a woman would also receive half the compensation of her male equivalent. However, women guilty of murder or causing bodily injury would still be liable to the same punishment as men, rather than half. Whether or not it is right to place a financial value on human life, it must be wrong to rate a woman's life at half the cost that of a man's.

One reason commonly given for reducing the *diyat* for women is that a man is the sole breadwinner for his family and with his death or injury an entire family loses its means of financial support. This disregards the financial contribution of women's labour. Long hours of unrewarded toil are exacted from rural women either in agricultural production or in household tasks, which are vital to the existence of whole families. Rural women, who form the majority in Pakistan, work on average a fourteen to sixteen hour day and probably seventy to eighty percent of them work in recognised economically productive tasks. Despite this they never have any share in decisions concerning their work, never receive payment personally for their work (the male head of the family collects salaries), and are never credited in the popular imagination with being an essential part of the labour force. The census of 1981 stated that a total of 148 women work in agriculture in all of Pakistan, which is blatantly absurd, when women are so visibly engaged in work in the fields. Most peasant families cannot afford to do without the unpaid labour of their womenfolk, but because traditionally they are unpaid, women are not considered as supporting their families. There are professional women, whose economic contribution is not denied, but whose replacement value is still half that of a man's.

There is only one new piece of legislation which supposedly protects women; this is the 'Crimes Ordinance' of 3 June 1984. The 'Crimes Ordinance' is odd: it was passed in response to a specific incident. This was a horrifying crime in Nawabpur in Southern Punjab where a carpenter, suspected of having had an affair with the local landlord's daughter, was beaten to death by the landlord and his accomplices in his own home. The women in his house, the only witnesses of the crime, were stripped,

dragged out of their home, molested and forced to march naked down the street. Women in rural Pakistan are often the targets of retaliation in vendettas; indeed, historical novels on the Hindu-Muslim violence at the Partition of India in 1947 describe many such processions of the other side's naked and abused women. The women's organisations made efforts to publicise the barbaric nature of these crimes against women and barely a week after their campaign, the 'Crimes Ordinance' was passed. It assigns the death penalty or life imprisonment as punishment for 'assaulting or using criminal force against a woman, to strip her naked and in that condition expose her to the public'. The only snag about this law is that it does not apply if women are raped or killed within the confines of a house. Merely a response to the agitation aroused over the Nawabpur case and a pacifying sop to the women's movement, the 'Crimes Ordinance' is insufficient in the protection it affords to women.

The issue of whether women should be allowed to hold public office under Pakistani law is much debated. One conservative, Maulana Maududi, advocated that women should not be allowed to take up any public office where they were likely to come into contact with men and that women should not be allowed to have any important position such as head of state. He also recommended that only men and educated women be given voting rights. Dr. Israr Ahmed, a member of the 'Council of Islamic Ideology' actually said in an interview in March 1982 that in a truly Islamic state all working women would be retired and pensioned off. A year later he went so far as to say it was better to embrace death than to live in an age where women were running affairs of state. In the elections of 1965, Ayub Khan, the president in power, tried to disqualify his main opponent on the grounds that she was a woman, albeit the sister of the founder of Pakistan, Fatima Jinnah. Ayub Khan had various religious leaders give edicts condemning Fatima's canditure as un-Islamic on grounds of her sex. The late President Zia had the same trick up his sleeve to use against his most serious opponent, Benazir Bhutto. His recent attempts to pass the 'Shari'ah Ordinance' were partly aimed to prevent Benazir standing against him in an election, because she was a woman. Similarly, in 1983 his 'Ansari Commissions' report recommended that the position of head of state be reserved for a Muslim male. It also required that female candidates for the elected assembly obtain the written permission of their husband before standing for election and that they retire ten years earlier than the men. Zia's other wheeze, hardly more subtle, was to schedule the elections for the month when Benazir was supposed to give birth to her first child, so as to impede her election campaigning.

The most right wing Islamic political party in Pakistan is the 'Jamaat-e-Islami', whose manifesto is crucial because it seems to have contained the guidelines for Zia's process of 'Islamisation'. It calls for the abolition of co-education and advocates strictly enforced segregation of the sexes at work places. It also successfully advocates a ban on extra-marital sex, drinking and gambling, birth control and pornography. Conservative

thinking influenced public opinion sufficiently for women to be banned from participating in spectator sports in 1980. Even a woman's right to drive a car was questioned in the Sind assembly. Nowadays no women serve as waitresses in public, and very few in shops and, unlike countries in Africa and the Far East, women in Pakistan are never to be seen in vegetable and cattle markets. President Zia made it compulsory for all women in government service to wear the 'chador', a huge shawl over their heads and upper body. He declared the sari 'un-Islamic' dress, which is a curious epithet for a dress worn by Muslim women in the Indian sub-continent for centuries. The 'chador' became compulsory for all girls within the confines of a college establishment, although almost all colleges are single sex.

In Islamabad, the most progressive city of Pakistan, at a meeting of the Historical Society in May 1982 some girls attending the lecture sat in the front row only to be told by the speaker that this constituted un-Islamic behaviour. In the same month, the government in its campaign against obscenity, issued a directive forbidding women to appear for more than twenty-five percent of the span of a commercial. If they did appear, women had to be well covered in high-collared, full-sleeved clothing. In 'Ramadan', the Muslim month of fasting, advertisements with women have to be withdrawn. Alarmingly, women became virtually synonymous with obscenity and men felt entirely justified to harassing strange females about their supposedly indecent clothing whilst semi-naked male beggars walking the streets were overlooked. Dr. Israr of the 'Jamaat-e-Islami' went one step further and recommended that women should not go outside their homes except in emergencies. Until women were visibly absent from the streets, he claimed no one should be punished for assaulting or raping a woman. Despite Israr's eccentricity — he also advocated the abolition of cricket, which thankfully ensured his political doom — he managed to stir up considerable controversy by his definitions of what was Islamic or un-Islamic behaviour. Dr. Israr's brand of eccentricity is not unrelated to Zia's, who to take one example, dictated that the villain in a film should be clad in western clothes, whereas the hero must sport the Pakistani national costume, the *shalwar kameez*.

Clearly, the emancipation of Pakistani women has been set back by the recent legislation and the political mood of 'Islamisation'. Within the various women's movements, debate rages as to whether opposition should be rooted within or without the boundaries of Islam. Some opponents to Islamic laws that discriminate against women tend to produce proof that the Koran is not essentially sexist, but has been misinterpreted by chauvinist scholars or political opportunists. Alternatively, some Pakistani women believe the Koran does discriminate against women and that women's rights can only be achieved by abandoning an Islamic framework.

The problem is that Islam in Pakistan is to some extent an artificially cultivated affair. No longer so much a religion, but more of a cult. In the absence of a long standing Pakistani culture and history, Islam has

been made to serve as a focus of national identity for a country that was originally an artificial construct, as artificial as its very name, a conglomeration of all the initial letters of the districts its comprises. The name and outward show of an ancient religion replace the roots Pakistan lacks, or shares with the arch-rival, India.

Some Pakistani men do in fact criticise feminism as a Westernised concept, alien to Pakistan's own culture and customs and only advocated in Pakistan by an educated elite of highly privileged women. It has to be noted that these men find little to object to in other Western imports. The women's movement needs to decide if it is trying to import Western feminist ideas wholesale into Pakistan or if it should attempt to adapt them to suit a developing country whose state religion is Islam. At present an organisation like the 'Women's Action Forum' merely acts as a pressure group reacting to the government's more extreme measures against women. It comprises both women who just want less discriminatory treatment of women within the legal system and women who go further and demand total social equality of the sexes and changed attitudes. The other problem of women's organisations in Pakistan is that most Pakistani women suffer the dual oppression of class and sex: whereas the women who have the leisure and education to think in feminist terms belong to a ruling class which implicitly benefits from the exploitation of the lower classes, be they women or men. The women who protest most loudly are those who are least oppressed: but one has to remember that some of these ruling-class women activists make great sacrifices to help rural women and indeed every time they go out on a protest march, risk being beaten up by the police, tear gassed, lathi-charged and put into prison; as happened in February 1983 in Lahore.

Will anything change for women in Pakistan? In some ways the situation is very depressing. Even if the Islamic laws were abolished and replaced with legislation identical to that of Great Britain, it is doubtful that such changes would actually filter down to the traditional rural sectors of the country, which follow tribal customs rather than the nation's laws. In the less populated provinces of Baluchistan, the North West Frontier and Sind, a woman seen talking to a man she is neither related nor married to, or a woman who tries to run away from home, brings such shame upon her family that her father is obliged to track her down and kill her himself. There was a case recently of a girl who was caught in the company of a man, though not having an affair with him. She was put under guard in the village chief's house, because no one would dare attempt to attack his house and save the girl, whilst a village council called a *panchyad* of five elders, needless to say all men, met to decide if she should be killed. Such tribal customs are so fiercely protected by villagers that police are powerless to interfere or to try to bring revenge killers to trial. In one village just outside the city of Peshawar there was said to be a man who had chopped off his own nose because his daughter had shamed him. Substantial areas of Pakistan are more under the control of feudal local landlords, tribal or village chiefs and drug lords than that

of the police force. With sufficient money for bribes it is said that it is quite possible to get away with murder, despite the laws in force. Given this aspect of Pakistani society it is less than half the battle to change the country's discriminatory laws, for the changes would be more of a symbolic gesture, than an actual impact on many women's lives. Indeed the subordinate position of women is perhaps of secondary importance to the general deprivation and oppression suffered by both sexes at the bottom of the social scale. Human rights are so undervalued that women's rights are probably not as important an issue as it seems from the West.

One would have thought that a good way of changing attitudes as well as laws would be to have a woman in power in Pakistan. A woman head of state in Pakistan might be a huge victory over the right-wing religious leaders, who have denounced it as un-Islamic. Much of Benazir Bhutto's appeal derives more from her father's memory in the popular imagination than from her own charismatic leadership. True, she has reorganised the women's wing of the People's Party, but she has very rarely specifically raised women's issues in her public speeches, preferring to stick to safe, uncontroversial comments on general discrimination under Zia's martial law regime, which have more appeal to her voters. Benazir may initiate some changes in legislation, act as a token symbol and reverse some of the detrimental 'Islamisation' of President Zia's reign, but it is unlikely she could radically alter the position of women, even if she made it her first priority, which she has not. Most important is a greater awareness amongst women themselves of the need for equal rights. Despite the injustices, many women are totally unmotivated or concerned about the question of their rights. Some classes can enjoy much more freedom in Pakistan than one might suppose. Islamic laws do not prevent affairs, adultery and drinking actually happening amongst the urban upper classes, although these all carry much higher risks than in the West, and require circumspection. Some bored and wealthy women think feminism means extra-marital freedom, which gives feminism a bad name. Sexual equality is little valued as an idea even by women, still less by men. Until this attitude changes there is little hope the reality will change.

[Frances Harrison is at present studying at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London for an M.A. in South Asian politics and economics. Her grandfather was Pakistani and she visits the country frequently.]

POEM

STRANDMAN

vials of sand march
the tiled ledge of my kitchen
milestones from a roman road
bottled ancient monuments

under a handlens
what neat boulders
ant-lion entrapments
particulate avalanches

visitors sometimes mistake
for spices and peppercorns
this ordered columbarium
is it so absurd?

here mountains are milled
small as powdered cinnamon
granites divide
to mustard seed

but these quartzes
are not condiments
rather time-capsules
cinerary urns

ossuaries and aphrodisiacs
silent inturned arenas
shut away from the sea
remembrancers of seasons

on distant beaches
hour-glasses of immortality
and starve for the sun
for we who have lost

IVOR C. TREBY

CHINA'S PRAGMATIC MODERNISATION

by Gary E. Popp and Syed Tariq Anwar

IN China, 1987 began with campus and student demonstrations which were in favour of democracy and political reforms. These demonstrations later forced Hua Yaobang to resign from his post as Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP — 46 million members). This raised questions about political stability and China's long-term march toward an economic and pragmatic modernisation process. On the other hand, 1988 started with the outcomes of the 13th Party Congress (held in October, 1987), when China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping stepped down from the communist party's top leadership. Most of the old guards and fellow octogenarians followed. This time he was successful in planting his own men in top leadership positions, especially Zhao Ziyang as his future successor. Zhao Ziyang is regarded as the strongest exponent of economic reforms. Since 1982, Deng Xiaoping's reforms and the renewal process have been geared towards separating the party and the state. The 13th Party Congress also resulted in significant reshuffling in the party, which could be attributed to this separation of powers.

The new politburo was reduced from 20 to 17. With the inclusion of new young reformers, the average age of the new politburo dropped from 70 to 65. The party secretariat was reduced from 10 members to 4. For the time being, the 13th Party Congress seemed to be a major triumph for Deng Xiaoping. For Zhao Ziyang, it provided an opportunity to gain support of a broad cross-section of the party leadership who were looking for unity in the revival of the reform process. Deng Xiaoping has contrived to hand over power in a smooth fashion from the old leaders to a new generation of reformers. Both groups were embarrassed by the significant technological and economic progress of the neighbouring Four Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) in the Pacific Rim. All four countries are exporting high-tech goods and raising per-capita income and the standards of living and are far outpacing China. Among those who are no longer in the politburo were Li Xianian, 81, the President, and Peng Zhen, 85, Chairman of the National Peoples Congress. A great number who were in the politburo either stepped down or moved to the Central Advisory Commission (CAC). Overall, conservatives and reformers are determined to catch up in terms of socio-economic development. However, neither faction has been willing to compromise on ideology or leadership styles. According to reformists, significant overhaul in the social and economic life is a prerequisite for future modernisation.

In the past, the conservative camp strictly adhered to socialist ideology in the form of Maoist political economy, self reliance and minimum interaction with the outside world. According to some sinologists, stability of the party may severely disintegrate if this tussle between conservatives

and reformists continues. To further highlight this debate and the likely future of China, it is interesting to compare the ideological patterns of conservatives, reformists and the role of the Chinese bureaucracy and to consider the changes which will affect foreign investors and the Pacific Rim geopolitical balance.

The Conservative Chinese brought revolution and they have seen this revolutionary process from the Party's earliest days. They are the last of the '. . . long march generational' leaders. The conservatives' top priority is a strong emphasis on four cardinal principles to build socialism with Chinese characteristics — (1) the socialist road, (2) Communist party leadership, (3) Marxism, Leninism and Mao's thought, and (4) the People's Democratic Dictatorship.

According to conservatives, implementation of the four principles can only be achieved by Mao's strategy of direct confrontation[1]. The conservative nationalistic tendencies over 30 years have undergone a process of change. These have ranged from emotional, xenophobic, isolationist with ideological purities, to militant, rigid, and ultra expansionist[2]. In some areas of the present politics and economy, these conservatives have been a major obstacle to the reformer's plans. Anything which destabilises the status quo meets severe resistance from this highly conservative group. The reformist in today's China signifies professionalisation, organisational rationalisation, market reforms and some political liberalisation[3]. These



CHART 2: CHINA'S "BIG POWER STATUS" PRAGMATIC MODERNIZATION PLAN TOWARDS YEAR 2000



leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, ousted Hua Yaobang and Secretary-General Zha Ziyang believe in attaining greater economic and political efficiency through launching fundamental structural changes in the Chinese society. Since, 1983, the reformists' open door policies have been directed to attract foreign investments, imported technology and the introduction of some aspects of a free market system. Political reforms are intended gradually to introduce some Western-style democracy within the context of Chinese socialism. During the last five years, reformists had been injecting creative spirits of entrepreneurship in the Chinese society and this made the conservative leadership nervous. To raise motivation and productivity the worker's contributions will determine job security and promotions under the reforms. New labour laws give factory managers the right to increase productivity and to fire incompetent staff. This has also created dissatisfaction and insecurity among the 'Iron Rice Bowl' cadres.

International investors who deal with China's bureaucracies complain about red tape, bureaucratic hedging and inefficiencies. Since 1982, Deng and his associates have created some reforms in the bureaucracy. Attempts have also been made to turn these into 'efficient organisations' by delegating authority and responsibility. The approval of large projects and the overall political climate in China is still controlled by the top 25-35 leaders who come from the party politburo, Secretariat, Military

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Affairs Commission, and the Government State Council. In the top hierarchy, power is not institutionalised. Informal personal connections *(Guanxi)* are still prevalent. Like other world bureaucracies, the Chinese bureaucracy is also fragmented, segmented and stratified[4]. Within the CCP, most of the members at different ranks favour strong bureaucratic oligarchy, which sometimes encourages sabotage of governmental policies. The present reforms are reducing various ministries, commissions and agencies from the present 98 to 52 and placed them under the state council. Since 1985, the top leadership has been recruiting 1,000 potential candidates for future promotions at the central and provincial levels, 30,000 for different administrative jobs and 100,000 for various counties and small geographical areas. This step is gradually reducing the influence of gerontoratic leaders in many positions. At different ministry levels, the average age of Central Ministers and Vice Ministers has been reduced to around 55 from the mid 60s[5].

The CCP, acting like a census system, controls every nook of Chinese society. Reformists intend to give China what they call 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. Reformists are yielding a more stable governing structure and a younger leadership elite by gradually hiring and selecting professionals and technocrats over generalists. The present trend of the government is to fill jobs with qualified and competent individuals. It seems evident that within 5 to 10 years this induction will destabilise the inherited and acquired power base of conservatives and generational leaders.

In the future, opposition to reforms in China can come from several factions. First, older cadres with little industrial education and experience from rural areas could become an obstacle. Secondly, 'Cultural Revolution' college graduates, which constitute 21.4% of college graduates from the revolutionary days (1949), can pose a significant threat to Chinese leadership. Most of them are now in their fifties. Ten to fifteen per cent of this group are qualified in various fields. Twenty per cent are not well qualified. These cadres would not wish to see technocrats and professionals in good remunerative jobs. The third opposition block is the Red Army veterans who rose from factory party secretaries and old factory managers. These are from China's 3,000 state controlled enterprises. The present government's cultural reforms would replace 70% of these unqualified personnel. Finally, the bureaucracies of China could constitute the largest group likely to oppose the reforms due to their party affiliations and political activities.

One development which may assist Chinese leadership could come from the rise of a 'collective leadership' style. This would attempt to separate the party from the government. Its various forms are the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC) and the Central Committee (CC)[6]. It appears probable that within ten to fifteen years charismatic and gerontocratic leadership styles will gradually disappear from Chinese politics. The rise of leaders from the 4th echelon and such reforms that fix tenure, together with the

gradual retirement of elders, will contribute to the increasing influence of professionals and intellectuals by the year 2000. This argument is supported by the fact that by the year 1990 Chinese students will constitute the largest foreign student population in the United States. At present, there are 23,000 Chinese students in the United States and only 300-400 in the USSR[7]. This group will eventually become the 4th echelon in the CCP.

As far as the economy is concerned, successful reforms and development strategies can only be achievel by bringing about structural and radical changes in Chinese society. At present, a major priority of the Chinese government is to raise *per capita* income from the present $200 to $800 by the year 2000, and to $2000 by the year 2050. In order to maintain a high growth rate and modernisation, China will have to rely on foreign loans. It is estimated that by the end of 1986, China's foreign debt was $25-$27 billion[8]. At present, much of the money comes from the World Bank and the Japan Overseas Economic Co-operation fund, which provides about $2 billion annually[9]. Currently, China's debt service ratio is about 8-10%, which is considered pretty safe in the financial world. Western bankers are not worried about the future rise of Chinese debt because of the potential of the Chinese economy.

In the coming years, Sino-Soviet economic relations are bound to take new forms. It is expected that China will seek help from the Soviets in steel-making, hydropower equipment, power transmission, and generating techniques.[10] It is also anticipated that China will initiate the exporting of technocrats and skilled labour to Eastern bloc countries. East Germany has signed a 10-year contract with the Chinese government to use its labour by providing local currency. Chances of exporting manpower to Soviet Russia (especially the Siberian region) looks promising because of severe labour shortages.[11] There are no unemployment figures available in China, but it is estimated that millions are grossly under-employed.[12] The collectively owned rural industries and rural enterprises will also grow in the future. At present, these employ approximately 70 million people.

The concept of pragmatism in Chinese society has different connotations, where 'exceptional flexibility' is dominant and top priority is given to 'action'. Chinese society accept reforms and readjustments in a normal manner.[13] Within these circumstances, future leadership, especially from the 4th and 5th echelons, will make frequent reforms and adjustments to implement change. It is always difficult to predict accurately, but the present circumstances indicate that, after the decisions of the 13th Congress, reformers will subsequently be in charge of the political arena with collective leadership styles. It is almost certain that conservatives will resist some reforms, but their gradual implementation will assist the new leaders to consolidate power in 8 to 12 years. The recent changes at the 13th Congress have helped one generation to transfer power to another without political strife. Ideology will become less important and compromises more prevalent in the coming years between conservatives and

reformists. It is also visible that China is becoming more 'entrepreneurial' than ideological. The revolution of rising expectation will not appear overnight, but will take years of patience and hard work due mainly to the gigantic size of the country. For Chinese leadership, it will be their start of the 5th modernisation encompassing some limited 'democratic' freedoms with inclinations toward an open-door policy. For international investors, the dream of one billion consumers is likely to come true.

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The authors are grateful to Tamer Tamer Salameh for preparing Charts 1 and 2.

THE SHARING SOCIETY

by Mark Cook and Judith Piggott

PROFIT sharing and employee share ownership are nothing new. A share scheme existed in 1929; it was estimated that around a quarter of a million individuals could have participated. During the 1930s, however, there was a decline in the incidence of these schemes and with the exception of a few companies — ICI being a major one — profit sharing did not become important again until the late 1970s.

The movement towards a wider share owning public, 'popular capitalism', has been an important policy aim of the Thatcher government. The policies to widen share ownership can be categorised in three main areas — firstly, encouraging share options for both employee and management; secondly, promoting employee share ownership in the company in which they work; thirdly stimulating share ownership in firms in which individuals may have no direct/indirect relationship — mostly through privatisations and Personal Equity Plans. Whether such policies have widened or deepened the shareholding base both in the short term and the long term, and whether the impact of the Stock Exchange 'crash' has affected this distribution, are issues which need examining both from a wealth and from a general economic point of view.

The Treasury and Stock Exchange in the first two months of 1987 sponsored a survey of direct share ownership in the UK. This revealed a dramatic rise in the ownership of shares by the general public. In 1979 when the Conservative government came to power, only 7% of the population held shares (quoted and unquoted) directly; by the beginning of 1987 this had almost trebled to 19½% of the population or nearly 8½ million people. Such figures suggest that the government's share ownership schemes are working.

According to the government, they are reversing the decline in share ownership which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s — a situation which was the result of the bias against enterprise which pervaded UK culture at that time. A more 'concrete' explanation of this, however, can be found in the then unfavourable UK tax structure. Capital gains tax was payable on relatively small gains and investment income was subject to a surcharge, so penalising direct investment in the Stock Market. A 2% stamp duty and a system of minimum broking commissions operated by stockbrokers further discouraged the small investor and the low profitability of companies during the 1970s obviously meant company shares were not viewed as the most lucrative of investment.

Under Mrs. Thatcher's new 'enterprise culture', which demands the spread of property ownership via home and share ownership, such a situation could not be condoned. The low spread of shareholding was therefore attacked from various directions.

Firstly, the tax disincentive to small shareholding was greatly reduced. Stamp duty on share transactions was halved to 1% in the 1984 Budget.

At the same time, Investment Income surcharge, which had been at 15%, was abolished. Several Budgets have also reduced the burden of capital gains tax — increasing the threshold by six times so halving the number of people who otherwise would have paid this. It has also been fully indexed since 1972, so that gains through inflation are not taxed.

Apart from removing the actual 'barriers', the government has also instituted some positive steps to encourage the small investor into the Stock Market 'community' by its furtherance of employee share ownership schemes.

Encouragement to firms to introduce share ownership schemes can be traced back to the Labour government and the 1978 Finance Act. This allowed a company to keep in trust for each full time employee, shares worth not more than £1,250 or 10% of earnings (the ceiling being £5,000) per annum. Shares could not be touched in the first two years but if they were kept in trust for five years, no tax was payable by the employee when sold; if held for four years, tax was payable on 75% of the value; and if sold before the fourth year, full tax was payable.

The Conservative government has, however, greatly extended these provisions.

Under the 1980 Finance Act, for example, the value of shares which a company could allocate to each employee without tax was doubled, thus encouraging the growth of such schemes from 30 in 1979 to approximately 1,000 in 1988 and covering approximately one million employees. Within this Finance Act, the Save-As-You-Earn (SAYE) Option Scheme was also set up. All full time employees can take out an SAYE contract of between £10 to £100 per month if desired and the employer then must grant an option to the employee with total exercise price equal to total saved over the five years of the scheme (plus interest). If the current price at the exercise date is above the exercise price then the value of the option on that date is equal to the difference between the share price and the exercise price — the option holder then receives this difference. If the share price is less than the options price then the individual has the right not to purchase the share. All gains are then taxed as capital gains, not income, so giving a fiscal advantage to employees.

The 1984 Finance Act set up a further share option scheme — the Executive Share Option Scheme — aimed at key workers, in practice mainly top management. This type is more popular and at least 2,500 such schemes have been approved by the Inland Revenue.

Not surprisingly, far more of the 1984 schemes are in operation than the 1980 schemes and the Inland Revenue has estimated that about 1½ million employees have benefitted under approved employee share and share option schemes over the past nine years. If share options granted under approved schemes are accounted for, approximately 1¾ million employees (approximately 10% of the corporate sector employment) are estimated to have such shareholdings or unexercised share options.

Whether share options lead to a widening of the share base depends upon whether the option is taken up. Option schemes may, however,

prove to be more popular than the traditional profit based schemes since in the latter there is always the question as to whether profit figures can be manipulated.

Secondly the government has further attempted to widen the base through the Personal Equity Plan (PEP) Schemes. Under this scheme £2,400 per annum (changed to £3,000 under the 1988 Budget) can be set aside for the purchase of equity, and capital gains and dividends are not taxed provided they are left in the fund. Wealth can then be accumulated over a long period. The Scheme was introduced in January 1987 and during 1987 260,000 plans were taken out and £466 million invested. Approximately 40% of PEP holders hold no other shares and only a quarter hold shares in four or more companies outside the PEP, according a survey undertaken by the Inland Revenue. The survey only covered a very small number of PEP schemes which mean these figures are very questionable; however, they do seem to suggest this scheme is widening as well as, to some extent, deepening the direct shareholding in the UK.

From the above figures it can be seen that such schemes are obviously important factors in the UK but they can only really be accountable for preventing the decline in share ownership not its growth. The real factor which has led to the growth in public shareholdings has been the large-scale privatisation issues, a major feature of which have been special arrangements to encourage employees/small investor to buy shares.

Although other companies were privatised in the early 1980s it was perhaps the British Telecom share floatation in 1984 which saw the major move to attract the individual investor. The need to entice the small shareholder stemmed from the fact that the British Telecom floatation was the largest seen by the Stock Market and the small investor was needed to absorb this issue. Those investing in British Telecom (and there were over two million individuals at the time of the floatation) received a significant premium on their shares almost immediately as an added incentive, but perhaps their popularity owes much to the ethos of 'popular capitalism' and wider share ownership which pervaded society at the time.

Share ownership also increased with the TSB flotation in September 1986 and British Gas in November of the same year which attracted 3 million and 4½ million shareholders respectively. In the case of the TSB floatation 1.3 million of TSBs customers and employees bought into the newly privatised company. None was allocated more than 10,000 shares. In the case of BT, although some of the new shareholders sold their shares quickly, many still held them; for example, 2,051,373 individuals held shares at the time of the BT floatation and two years later on the 31st May 1986 there were still 1,566,790 individual shareholders; however with TSB over 1 million were calculated to have sold their shares shortly after purchasing them. Certainly the TSB floatation was an example of an attempt to promote wider share ownership, but at a cost — the estimated advertising and underwriting cost was £86 million. Lazard's suggest that the TSB could have been placed with institutional investors with a fifth of the cost.

The privatisation measures have also brought forth, however, another interesting feature — although more people own shares they tend to be only in a few companies and of a limited number. Dewe Rogerson undertook a survey in 1986 which showed of the shareholders sampled 59% held shares in only one company, 15% in two, 5% in three and only 18% in four or more companies — obviously an effect of the privatisation issues.

These figures have been supported by the latest survey sponsored by the Treasury and Stock Exchange in January/February 1988 — 56% of shareholders held shares in one company and only 17% in four or more companies. The narrowness of the portfolio is particularly seen for those individuals who send-off for their own applications for shares in newly privatised companies, whilst individuals who enter shareholding through a 'shareshop' are more likely to go on and buy shares in more than one company.

Such figures suggest that share ownership may have widened but it is spread very thinly. More people own shares but only in a very small number of companies, and the proportion of Stock Market shares held directly by individuals has not therefore changed significantly — in fact it continues to fall. The main reason for this falling proportion continues to be because the amount of shares owned by institutions has grown more rapidly than those of individual shareholders.

The share ownership base may be widening but there are distinct ownership differences in age and region. Both MORI and NOP reveal that London has the highest proportion of shareholders and those between the ages of 55 and 64 are more likely to be involved in this aspect of the 'enterprise culture'. Since the future will see a growing proportion of individuals in the 65-plus age group and, with evidence suggesting that quite a high proportion of the post-65 age group sell their shares, then we may see a decline in future share distribution.

But how has the 1987 October Stock Market Crash affected this picture? Obviously 'Black Monday' had a disastrous effect on the BP floatation of shares and the government thereby lost the chance of widening share ownership further. In fact, after the 'crash' the government did not appear to encourage small shareholders to invest in BP — a whole series of advertisements were cancelled immediately — perhaps they were trying to keep the public 'sweet' for future privatisations?

Most 'privatised' shares, however, survived the crash fairly well. All except Rolls-Royce still showed a profit after the crash compared to the issue price, so although people watched their shares fall in price they did not make an actual capital loss. Furthermore, research by Dewe Rogerson suggests that the small shareholder does not associate himself/herself with the City 'yuppies'/wealthy shareholders and they have no sympathy for them. Therefore as long as they do not lose too much themselves, the small shareholder does not mind the 'yuppies' suffering.

In fact the 'crash' appears to have had little effect on the small shareholders holding shares. The Stock Exchange and Treasury have sponsored

a further survey for 1988 which has shown shareholding (including quoted and unquoted shares) to have risen to 9 million or 20½% of the adult population — 13% hold privatised shares and other shares (including the British Airways, British Airports Authority, Rolls-Royce and British Petroleum privatisations last year) and 6% held only privatised shares. This feature was also confirmed by the NOPs Financial Research Survey which has a narrower definition of shareholding (mainly only quoted shares). A further sign that individual shareholders were not 'panicked' into selling shares, is in fact that there has been no noticeable decline in the number of individual shareholders in privatised companies last year and on average two thirds of the initial holders still retained their shares. A further decline in share values, however, may make shareholders examine why they are shareholders. Opinion polls suggest that many first-time buyers of shares thought that purchasing shares was a low or very low risk investment.

The actual holding of shares may not have been affected, but whether the public's 'thirst' for privatised shares has been affected remains to be seen. Obviously some people will still want to invest in these shares, but perhaps not as many. In fact, the government may find that instead of justifying share sales on the grounds of wider share ownership they have to stress the increased efficiency and competition these measures are intended to bring — something which, considering the recent reputation of British Telecom, will not be an easy task.

Furthermore future floatations could see a less wide share issue simply on the grounds of advertising and underwriting cost. This may be the case, particularly if institutions feel themselves to be snubbed by policies to discriminate towards wider share ownership.

What of the impact on the economy of wider share ownership? Do schemes which enable individuals to become shareholders in their company employment encourage them to raise their productivity? On an individual basis such an argument seems erroneous since individual productivity is unlikely to affect the firm's share price quotation. With regard to the group to which the individual belongs, however, there may be pressure from contemporaries to encourage individuals to 'pull their weight'. This pressure to work hard comes from fellow workers thereby reducing management interference.

Furthermore, share schemes may give companies an advantage in keeping good workers. The involvement in share schemes is, however, unlikely to wrest control of the firm from interested parties since individual share holdings are likely to stay small and are unlikely to mount up in the future given the number of times workers change jobs.

There may also be problems with the growth of the 'enterprise culture'. It has been suggested by Paul Grout that as individuals purchase shares through either privatisations or PEPs then this may simply reduce expenditure elsewhere as consumption expenditure is 'crowded out'. If the argument is taken further, the purchase of shares in privatised companies may also crowd out other private investment.

Some cynics would suggest that encouraging private share ownership particularly in newly privatised companies may lead to people voting Conservative rather than Labour, since there is the fear of renationalisation. If such an argument were correct, the impact of the share owning would be important in marginal constituencies. If it is true that almost 20% of the population owns shares then this can be translated into approximately 18,000 voters per constituency — a useful 'floating' vote in a marginal seat. Contrary to this is the view that new shareholders are more likely to be Tory voters anyway. Owning shares, especially through employee share ownership schemes, may also undermine union power.

In conclusion, therefore, most people's wealth traditionally has been concentrated upon two assets, housing and their own human capital. The fact that the share owning base has widened but not deepened is unlikely to alter this fact substantially. Furthermore, since over half of all shareholders hold shares in only one company, it seems unlikely that any of the programmes currently being undertaken by the government are likely to have a major short term impact on the economy. In fact, the danger now lies with people changing their views of the UK economy. Earlier privatisation programmes were undertaken during periods of falling inflation rates, relatively low interest rates and in a period of good expectations for the UK economy. Much of the scenario has changed and the Tories may find it difficult to widen the share ownership base with the privatisation of the electricity, water and steel industries; the sale of the water and electricity industries, at around £23 billion, may be undertaken in more than one tranche.

But perhaps the overriding factor about share ownership is that people have seen their shares fall and, coupled with the rise in the mortgage rate, this may discourage any speculative dabble in new share issues. So on the one hand we have seen a widening of the share base to become a more 'sharing society' but on the other the limited number of shares held by the 'new enterprise culture' indicates that general wealth holding is still as unequal as it was in the late 1970s and unlikely to change in the near future.

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REMBRANDT OR REMBRANDTESQUE?

by Muriel Julius

A significantly different exhibition called 'Art in the Making' opened recently at the National Gallery in London. Hidden away on a top floor of that vast enclave the members of their Scientific and Conservation Department — incidentally one of the most advanced in the world — toil away unsung. At last some of their secrets are here revealed. The painter under their minute investigation is Rembrandt. By means of x-rays, magnification and infra-red photographs his working procedures, the materials he used and the alterations in his thinking, are laid bare. Absolutely minute fragments of paint, the size of a pin point rather than a pinhead have been blown up in colour photographs that transform them into the richest of layered cakes, lasagne or hamburgers according to taste.

It is as close as one could come to observing at the artist's elbow but it is not exclusive. It is of as much interest and fascination to the general public as it must be to the professional artist.

One learns for example that he was more conventional in his methods and altogether more systematic than has generally been allowed. That he was economical — using red lead to eke out vermillion — and impulsive in his use of impasto.

The exhibition is built round the National Gallery's complete holding of nineteen Rembrandt paintings, supplemented by one early work from his Leiden period, lent from a private collection — the intriguing 'Judas and the Thirty Pieces of Silver'. Thus they range in period from 1629 to 1669, the year of his death. They are supplemented by drawings and etchings from the British Museum. With or without their dismembered techniques it makes for a wonderful exhibition.

Perhaps no painter in art history can bridge the gap between the eye and the mind more effectively than Rembrandt. His works provide a profound contemplation of the human condition by one of the subtlest yet most powerful artistic talents of all time.

It may come as a surprise to learn that this artistic talent has been the subject of scholarly suspicion for the past twenty years.

The Rembrandt Research Project, financed by the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research, is due to continue its investigations for a dozen years or more, and with it a drastic decline in the number of authentic Rembrandts is anticipated.

In 1913 Hotstede de Groot listed 988 paintings. In 1921 there were thought to be 711. In 1937 a catalogue raisonné gave the total as 630. This had declined to 562 in 1966 and further to 420 in 1968. By the time the Project is finished it seems that under 300 canvases will be recognised as by Rembrandt, while over 400 paintings will be declared merely 'Rembrandtesque'.

It is generally accepted that the 'Man with the Golden Helmet' in

Berlin is, if not a fake, a pseudo-Rembrandt. Argument over 'The Polish Rider' in the Frick Collection, New York continues. The National Gallery's 'A Man in a Room', once considered an excellent example of the artist's Leiden period is now designated 'Imitation of Rembrandt' and consigned to the basement. To my personal regret, for I used to gaze lovingly at the diagonally posed 'Old Man in an Armchair', the Gallery now catalogue this as by a Follower of Rembrandt along with the equally splendid 'A Seated Man'. My own suspicion falls on the 'St. Bartholomew' in the J. Paul Gettly Museum in Malibu. With his worried expression and knife in hand he does so extraordinarily look like a company director the day after the October Stock Market crash wondering if he should do away with himself.

As that perspicacious and outspoken art critic, Brian Sewell, has pointed out, three hundred paintings in a career spanning forty years works out at a mere seven or eight a year. This for an artist as famous and successful — and invariably desperately short of funds — seems absurd. The art historian Bode estimated that in the years 1632 to 1635 after the huge success in 1632 of the group painting 'The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp', now in the magnificently restored Mauritshuis at The Hague, Rembrandt in a deluge of commissions painted fifty portraits. He is reliably credited with having painted no fewer than sixty-three self portraits. The earliest, painted in 1628 when he was only twenty-two years old is in the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam: one of the last, with its invariable expression of anxious resignation was painted in 1669 when he was sixty-three. It is the ultimate painting (No. 20) in the exhibition at the National Gallery. Another self-portrait, of the same date but wearing different clothes and headgear is in the Mauritshuis, and yet another is in Kenwood. When one considers that the French artist, Auguste Renoir, admittedly fifteen years older than Rembrandt when he died, is reputed to have left several thousand paintings, it does seem extraordinary that so few are now attributed to Rembrandt. But while museum curators and private owners dread the attentions of the Research Project, no serious opposition to their stricture has so far been mounted.

Surely no one could doubt that Rembrandt painted the pregnant Saskia van Uylenburch in Arcadian costume, (No. 5). The rich cousin of his art dealer, Hendrick van Ulenburch, he married her in 1614. She is almost full-length looking very pregnant a year after their marriage, and not nearly so charming as his earlier portrait of her attired and beflowered as Flora, which is in the Hermitage, Leningrad.

In 1649, after Saskia's premature death, Hendrickje Stoffels, was taken into Rembrandt's household as a nurse for his only surviving child, a son, Titus. Eventually she became the artist's mistress and bore him a daughter. She remained with him until her death.

In his several portraits of her Rembrandt reveals their affectionate intimacy. Most charming is the portrait in the National Gallery of Scotland. She looks very young, and was in fact twenty years younger than the painter, and she is seen in her bed at the moment of awakening.

Two portraits in the National Gallery are thought to be of her because their informality of dress sets them apart from commissioned works. 'A Woman Bathing in a Stream', (No. 11), shows her standing up to her calves in water. Her white shift, held up to her hips, was painted at speed with wide strokes on loaded brushes. The excellent catalogue which accompanies this exhibition, in which techniques are minutely discussed, assures us that the painting of this shift is famous as an outstanding example of Rembrandt's virtuosity in handling paint. It 'appears deceptively simple: but the calculation of both tone and texture is both complex and exact'.

The second portrait of Hendrickje Stoffels, painted when she was in her early thirties, is equally informal. She is sitting leaning on the arm of a chair. Her left hand is tucked into the waist of her enveloping white fluffy wrap which opening to a deep décolleté reveals the edge of a cotton bodice and a two-strand gold necklace. She wears long earrings and her hair is held by a jewelled band. But the supreme beauty of this portrait lies in the calm sweetness of her expression, and the human quality that was this painter's supreme gift.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in his assured portrait of Jacob Trip. The Trip family was one of the richest in Holland. Their money came from the manufacture of armaments and they lived in considerable style in Dordrecht. Compared with portraits of the same sitter by Cuyp and Maes one sees in Rembrandt's work an understanding of character that is unsurpassed. I quote from Michael Kitson's 1978 (Phaidon) monograph on the artist.

> Rembrandt depicts the aged armaments manufacturer as a symbol of iron will-power. There is none in his oeuvre as gaunt as this formidable ancient figure who is both sinister and wise — a merchant patriarch. This is achieved in part by the low viewpoint and the imposing breadth of the lower part of the figure, by the massive cloak, the throne-like chair, and most subtly by the chiaroscuro.

Rembrandt himself did not disdain life's luxuries. With Saskia's dowry he purchased a fine house. One of his contemporary biographers, Filippo Baldinucci records that he went to public auctions 'and collected every kind of old and modern arms, halbards, daggers, sabres, knives and so on, and innumerable quantities of exquisite drawings, engravings and medals'.

The same writer also tells us:

> ...he worked so slowly and completed his things with a tardiness and toil never equalled by anybody. He could have painted a great quantity of portraits, owing to the great prestige gained by his colouring, but after it became known that whoever wanted to be portrayed had to sit for him for some two or three months, there were few who came forward.

In 1656 Rembrandt was declared bankrupt and his fine house and his collections, including 'all sorts of foreign curiosities' had to be sold. By then he knew that he must work at a faster rate. Peter and Linda Murray's *Dictionary of Art & Artists* (1972 edition) states that he left 300 etchings and 1,500 to 2,000 drawings. However, in the same edition they wrote 'His (Rembrandt's) portraits of the 1650's and 1660's include such masterpieces of psychological penetration painted to please himself as the 'Jewish Merchant' of c.1650 (the one now called 'A Seated Man'

(London, N.G.), the 'Old Jew in an Armchair' (1652, London, N.G.) — (the one now called 'Old Man in an Armchair').

A. Bredius in his *Rembrandt — The Complete Edition of the Paintings* (Phaidon, 1969) quotes no less a person than Kenneth Clark who in 1966 stressed the 'Venetian tradition echoed in this later picture'. But Bredius expresses his personal doubts about this attribution. However, he does not question the authenticity of 'The Polish Rider' and writes admiringly of Berlin's 'The Man in the Golden Helmet'. This appeared both as the coloured frontispiece and in black and white in Professor Tancred Borenius's large Phaidon *Rembrandt — Selected Paintings* published in 1944.

No doubt debate will rage among scholars until the end of time, but right or wrong these are all wonderful paintings.

I would like to mention *Picture This* a recent witty, factional novel by Joseph Heller who for three hundred and fifty pages explores the making, history and classical background of a single Rembrandt painting, 'Aristotle contemplating the bust of Homer' — at $2,300,000 a snip for the Metropolitan Museum in New York.

In a final statement Heller explodes the whole premise of the book and of attributions. He writes:—

> The Rembrandt painting of Aristotle contemplating the bust of Homer may not be by Rembrandt but by a pupil so divinely gifted in learning the lessons of his master that he was never able to accomplish anything more and whose name, as a consequence, has been lost in obscurity. The bust of Homer that Aristotle is shown contemplating is not of Homer. The man is not Aristotle.

The exhibition at the National Gallery, sponsored by Esso U.K. continues until late January, 1989.

The February number of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Reforming the United Nations* by Keith Suter, *UK Opposition to the EC Tobacco Tax* by Melanie Powell, *Countering Institutionalised Racism* by Harold J. Kearsley and *Ireland and the Spanish Armada* by J. J. N. McGurk. David Shipman's *International Film Festival* has been replaced in the January number by his *Cinema: A Quarterly Review.*

THE INFAMOUS CAPTAIN, WAS HE FALSTAFF?

by Brian Dawtrey

DURING the Armada celebrations this year, my mother mentioned to me that an ancestor of ours at that time was supposed to be Falstaff. 'As far as I can recall, his name was Captain Nicholas', she said. This was my cue to undertake some serious research.

A trip to Stratford-upon-Avon confirmed that William Shakespeare and Captain Nicholas Dawtrey frequented the inns of London and the Royal Court at the same time (1587-1600). Further work at the British Museum soon revealed his nature to be a pestilential but likeable, comic, corpulent Don Juan, perceived as a poor, literate gentleman, honest in all matters, except money! His petitions and reports to the Queen and government, reveal that he possessed an exceptionally egotistical nature. His rambling pen has fortunately left us with a clear impression of his character in numerous documents viz; Privy Council documents, Cottonian Manuscripts, and letters from him and about him at Hatfield House, Barbican House and the Bodleian Library.

He joined the army for survival and avoided exposure to danger, using his pen to greater effect than his sword. He wrote regularly to the heads of state, with frank criticism of Generals and the Viceroy of Ireland, under whom he was serving. Had he been as powerful as he aspired to be he almost certainly would have lost his head or been assassinated.

In 1584 Sir Henry Bagenal marshalled 1,000 English troops and Captain Nicholas to do battle at Red Bay (Ulster) with the Scottish leader Sorleboye, the romantic 'fair haired Charley' of Irish legend. There was a ferocious battle which the English lost with substantial casualties and 70 Englishmen killed. Bagenal's official report states inter alia '... the Seneschal (Captain Dawtrey was the Seneschal of Clandeboye) being in the rerewards at the first was shot through his thigh with an arrow, for whose recovery, *being very heavy and unwieldy,* I was fain to make long stay and hard shift to carry him away'.

That he should receive this much comment in an official report on a battle, emphasises the striking corpulence of the man.

In 1600 when Nicholas was sent back to Ireland, a letter from Sir Geoffrey Fenton states 'I fear his passage will be as slow into Ireland as himself is *unwieldy in body'.*

The Viceroy of Ireland was Sir John Perrott, and Nicholas constantly quarrelled bitterly with him, and even wrote that he was 'a worse enemy of England than any Irishman'. Nevertheless he managed to borrow £40 (about £5,000) from him, in return for his warrant. When Perrott presented the warrant at the Treasury for settlement, the auditors declared that they were 'tired of Dawtrey's warrants' and refused to honour it, instead debiting it to Perrott's own account. This caused a considerable stir in court, and Shakespeare wrote. 'One or two bonds of £40 apiece, Hal!'

In 1589, when the young Shakespeare is known to have had lodgings in

Southwark, and was 'playing' the court-yards, Captain Nicholas is recorded as being a temporary Inspector of Vittals for the Inns of London. At this time Captain Nicholas was an unattached soldier 'just returned from the wars', and full of colourful tales of battle, weaponry, military tactics; and his recent close association with the young King James VI of Scotland.

I gather that there has been much debate as to how Shakespeare acquired his detailed knowledge of weaponry and military strategy for his first two plays (1597/8), *Henry IV* parts 1 and 2. An early association with Captain Nicholas seems to be a very plausible explanation. Nicholas, in fact, wrote five Martial Discourses during his 11 years in idleness at Court.

At the termination of his service as Inspector of Vittals, his enjoyment of the inns continued unabated, as did his bills for accommodation for himself 'and his servant'. He rapidly became dependent upon borrowed money and well-to-do ladies, in order to avoid 'the degradation of work'. His ragamuffin servant received no wages and lived by whatever means he could, ('the scum of England' — Bardolph and Pistol).

I then sought to discover the means whereby this servant became a slave to Captain Nicholas, and the search took me again to *Henry IV,* part 2.

The records show that in 1585 Captain Nicholas was sent by the Viceroy of Ireland, Sir John Perrott, to Scotland to organise a spy ring against the Catholic Earl of Arran. Arran was the 'Gaddafi' of the Ulster rebels, but with only 40 miles of sea across which to ship his arms. There was also a very strong possibility that the Earl would 'nail' the Captain, which would have been a great relief to the Viceroy.

Nicholas found a corruptible Jesuit at an Arran seminary and recruited him as a spy. Apparently this spy was later indicted for spying for both sides. Nicholas managed to save the Jesuit from execution, and the Jesuit's subsequent indebtedness was paid for with a promise to become a loyal subject of the Queen, and a servant to Nicholas for life, with no wages! Thus Captain Nicholas acquired a subservient 'shadow'.... ('Yonder he comes, and that arrant malmsey-nose knave, Bardolph, with him'... *Henry IV).* [Malmsey — a sickly sweet wine].

Captain Nicholas spent one and a half years in and around the Scottish Court, attempting to wheedle his way into the confidence of the nineteen-year-old King James VI, whilst masquerading as the King's saviour from plotting Catholic Earls. Admittedly there is a record of a *plan* by the Earl of Arran to 'have Dawtrey murthered with pistols', but the Queen organised Arran's demise.

The Captain was anticipating James's ascension to the English throne. These seeds were fruitless. These recorded events are very like Falstaff's manipulation of Prince Hal (*Henry IV,* Part 1).

In 1587 he resigned his post in Ireland and returned to London without a pension. His father Anthony (a Gentleman Usher at court for 6d a day), and his uncle Thomas, were both courtiers. Nicholas had spent his childhood at court, and official documents refer to him as the 'Queen's ancient servitor', so that he must have been quite well known in court circles.

The Captain complained about his gout in letters from Ireland and

continued to do so in court petitions for a pension, where he 'spent nine years in court suits'.

Falstaff . . . . waiting in the court, I can tell you.

Prince Hal. For obtaining of suits? . . . . (*Henry IV*, Part 1).

Henry IV, Part 2, was first staged for Christmas 1598, carrying Falstaff's inconsequential soliloquy.

> . . . A pox of this gout! or, a gout of this pox! for the one or the other plays the rogue with my great toe. 'Tis no matter if I do halt; I have the wars for my colour, and my pension shall seem the more reasonable. A good wit will make use of anything. I will turn diseases to commodity. *(Scene 2, Act 1).*

He was finally granted a pension of 5/- per day at the age of 59. This was on the 20th of September, 1598. *The Merry Wives* . . . Act 2, Scene 2 pertains, Mistress Quickly (referring to the lovers of Mrs. Page) 'And yet there has been Earls, nay which is more, pensioners, but I warrant you all is one with her'.

This 'comic hero' of the court period, coincides with Shakespeare's association with the court, from which he, presumably, drew his material for *The Merry Wives of Windsor.*

In 1595 the Nine Years War broke out in Ireland. Nicholas had predicted this in his earlier reports to the government, and even named the ringleaders as Tyrone and Tyroconnel. Regrettably, no-one had acted upon his warnings.

As the crisis grew Captain Nicholas was posted back to Ireland again in April 1600 at the age of 61 years. In 1601 the Spanish again attempted to conquer England by landing in Ireland. The next report of Nicholas reads that he has (ironically) been killed in action.

The news that the court's Comic Hero had been killed in the Queen's service and at the age of 62 was a shock, and there was much remorse. Coincidentally, the *Merry Wives of Windsor* (Aldine version) shows that Ford's speech about Falstaff was changed after the death of Nicholas to be much more complimentary. The two versions read thus,

Aldine version:

> *Ford* . . . Now, Sir John, you are a gentleman of good discoursing, well beloved among ladies, a man of such parts as might win twenty such as she.

Revised version (1602):

> *Ford* . . . Now, Sir John, here is the heart of my purpose, you are a gentleman of excellent breeding, admirable discourse, great admittance, authentic on your place and person, generally allowed for your many warlike, courtlike and learned preparations.

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

AS I've noted in these columns before, Sidney Lumet does not regard himself as a 'film-maker', an auteur, but as a director who does the best possible job, on time and under budget if possible. He has also said that he selects the best scripts available to him at the time, and if it isn't quite as good as he would like he'll choose the project because of the people involved, because he'd like to work with them. And, he says, you only learn by working. Well. I thought his first film, *Twelve Angry Men,* pretty good, and in the thirty years since he has made such excellent films as *Long Day's Journey into Night, The Hill, Serpico, Dog Day Afternoon* and *Prince of the City.* His latest film, *Running on Empty,* has just opened in New York to rave reviews, but the one before that, *Power,* was execrated; it wasn't liked much better here. The Americans didn't like *Daniel* — the one about the Rosenbergs — so could it be that they don't like film-makers, sorry, directors, to have a conscience? I didn't think anyone thought Frank Capra old-fashioned anymore.

Power is named for that which politicians seek: at its centre is a manipulator, Pete St John (Richard Gere), who for huge sums of money guides the campaigns of men — or women — ambitious enough to want to be Governor, Senator or whatever. Seeing the film so soon after the Bush-Dukakis circus I found enormously rewarding — as, I think, would be a movie on how Saatchi and Saatchi sought to make Mrs Thatcher more appealing (Zounds!). *Power* is not the first American film by any means to suggest that those seeking high office are a cynical, corrupt bunch — one of the few nice guys suggests they screen Capra's *Mr Smith Goes to Washington* (instead of listening to his speech). Julie Christie plays Gere's ex-wife, a journalist who drops a good story because it will hurt friends, and Gene Hackman is his mentor, an old hand who will only work for people he respects: both, of course, are in contrast to Gere himself, and I suspect that some people disliked the film because he finds integrity towards the end. But Lumet's films in recent years have seldom presented easy options, and this one may be read so: Gere is so unprincipled as to suggest only a temporary conversation, and in any case it is motivated by spite — because one of his rivals has sneered at him and threatened his life. But in any case I think the piece as compulsive as all those behind-the-scenes stories — as written by David Himmelstein.

Good Morning, Vietnam is also, as you might suspect from its title, loaded with political allusions — and since it's set back then, during the War, it's only too easy to have the bad guys worshipping Vice-President Nixon and the good guys having only contempt for the creep. That does not suggest much effort on the part of Mitch Markowitz, who wrote the script, and indeed what plot there is is also fairly simplistic — nice to the natives, but finding a traitor or so amongst them because the Yanks have no right to be there in the first place. Otherwise the bad guys are limited

to two — a wimp (Bruno Kirby) and a redneck (J. T. Walsh) who want Mantovani back on the airwaves and not the rock music favoured by the new disc-jockey, played by Robin Williams. That is not all they dislike about him. To say his style is ebullient would be an understatement: it is way out, eccentric — and sometimes taken from Williams's own improvised act as a stand-up comic. The movie was designed to make him a star after half-a-dozen others in which he had failed to make much impression. He moves from one-liner to impersonation to speculation and reflection — not always wittily, but with charm and what is a considerable talent. A star? Case proven, as far as I'm concerned. Barry Levinson directed, more fastidiously and confidentially than when he last handled other people's material *(The Natural).*

I'm never sure whether today's young stars have enough individuality to last — and it may be that it's the lack of that quality which makes so few of them box-office attractions. It is often forgotten that many of the stars of Hollywood's golden age worked long and hard developing those qualities which made them special. I've seen Tom Hanks several times over the past few years, and only thought him a pleasant young man with a certain gift for comedy. With *Big* he really has come on, almost casting a spell: but he's not likely to find a role like this again — despite the fact that it's the third on this subject this season, the dilemma of a boy in a man's body. Josh made his wish, and it comes true: his mother chases him off as an intruder, but because his friend Billy is closer to fantasy he believes him.

It will take six weeks to reverse the formula and during that time Josh must earn a living. The only possible adult job for which he's suitable is a computer operator — fortunately with a toy manufacturer; and since it's clear that he has empathy with the little monsters for whom the company's products are intended he is soon promoted. Since he also falls in love, it's a question as to whether that and success in business will prevent him from returning to Billy, family and childhood. As directed by Penny Marshall and written by Gary Ross and Anne Spielberg, *Big* stops being inventive around the halfway mark, but it is always agreeable — and sometimes more, as when Hanks and his boss dance to 'Chopsticks' on a giant piano keyboard set in the floor of New York's most famous toyshop. In setting its sights on charm, this movie misses some jokes and problems of a sexual nature. For instance, Hanks is quite oblivious to the lady's first attempt at seduction but only too willing on the second — whereas I felt that a boy suddenly given a man's sexuality would not adjust so easily.

The two similar films I mentioned, *Vice Versa* and *Like Father Like Son,* were both flops. One might congratulate the public on its taste in making *Big* a success, but that same public has been flocking to *A Fish Called Wanda,* as unfunny a film as you'll find in a month of Sundays. This is another star vehicle, for John Cleese, who also produced and penned the screenplay, as well as writing the story with the veteran director Charles Crichton. Cleese plays a variation of Basil Fawlty, a

pompous, obtuse lawyer (but nice underneath), and I can see that Americans are amused by his line, 'Do you know what it means to be an Englishman?' but it's not supported by any evidence; and given the Anglo-American cast and what they're supposed to be doing he fails to make any comment on national characteristics. Even if this is a case of crooks falling out there is no conviction about this quartet getting together in the first place; the business of dumb criminals pulling off big jobs and then outwitting the police was done to death in some Peter Sellers comedies over two decades ago; and the cross and double cross here is so insistent, with plot lines dropped (why does Kevin Kline pretend to be gay for a while?), that the surprises simply aren't surprises. Given the thinness of the material it's to Kline's credit that he goes pleasingly over the top, but as with *Fawlty Towers* the best thing about it is the actress playing John Cleese's wife — there, Prunella Scales, here Maria Aitkin. But the role is small.

At the end Cleese and Jamie Lee Curtis leave for South America with the loot, and I longed a little for the days of censorship when crime didn't pay. The cinema, like the press, has always glamorised crime. It is a fact to be lived with, but I'm not sure whether films should be made about living criminals — as in the case of Buster Edwards, one of the great train robbers. 'What a cheek!' says Sheila Hancock admiringly in *Buster*, and a lot of people felt the same way about the robbery. Since I was emphatically not among them, I went to the movie in disagreeable frame of mind. As directed by David Green and written by Colin Shindler it tries to be objective — though it does omit mention of the train guard who was beaten up so viciously that he still suffers today. The first half of the film — the planning, the robbery itself and Buster's subsequent disappearance — is of little interest and less distinction, but matters brighten after Edwards (Phil Collins) and his wife June (Julie Walters) achieve their dream of living in luxury in Mexico. Perforce, their only friends are another of the robbers, Bruce (Larry Lamb) and his wife Franny. Shindler achieves a decent balance between the unhappiness and increasing desire for 'home' that is June's, and the ease and love of the high life, which is Bruce's: with Edwards caught between the two. The sequence in which he decides to return to prison rather than lose June permanently is unexpectedly touching, though I think the film's strength is in the way Collins and Lamb flesh out their cardboard roles.

Nothing similar occurs to revive *A Handful of Dust*, another Evelyn Waugh novel killed off by movie people — though the chief culprit is the director, Charles Sturridge, who handled *Brideshead Revisited* (or, rather, most of it) for television. He seems to think the earlier novel requires the same languid, visually beautiful approach, but of course the two are hardly alike. *Brideshead* was a tale of feeling, recollected in tranquillity, while *A Handful of Dust* was written in spite and bitterness after the break-up of his first marriage, and at a time when Waugh's satiric thrust was very strong indeed. The dialogue is often taken direct from the book, but it is spoken blandly by three miscast principals — James Wilby as the

inert, country-loving husband, Kristin Scott Thomas as the wife who from sheer wilfulness starts an affair with the unworthy John Beaver, played by Rupert Graves. These last two roles should have been played much closer to caricature — the wife, especially, in the way Joan Greenwood played in *Kind Hearts and Coronets,* managing to be at the same time a silly little ninny, completely selfish and utterly adorable and, above all, stylish. The book was witty, pointed and poignant; I left the cinema feeling, 'So what?'

Of course, there are no Joan Greenwoods about today, but Cary Elwes and Chris Sarandon bid fair in the Errol Flynn-Basil Rathbone stakes in *The Princess Bride,* as was intended. If Mr Elwes had had more experience he would have brought it off, and to spare. William Goldman wrote it from his own book, which was both a send-up and a celebration of the fairy stories/swashbucklers/fantasies of yore. I believe that Goldman conceived it originally as a film, but despite his prestige as a screenwriter *(All the President's Men,* etc) could find no film-maker interested. Rob Reiner directed for a minor company, and the budget restrictions are chiefly notable with the matte shots and locations, which badly match most of the time. We have also seen too many expensive fantasies these last few years, so that this one rather limps along in their wake. Also, Goldman's deadpan, deliberately cliched dialogue is not as amusing as he thinks it is. All the same I had a good time with this movie, which is liable to see long service as a Christmas attraction on television for kids. Robin Wright as the heroine has no more going for her than the lady in the not dissimilar *Krull* — but then, how lucky I was that my first story-book heroine was Olivia de Havilland!

Finally, I've just got around to seeing the first of Neil Simon's autobiographical trilogy, *Brighton Beach Memoirs.* Space, fortunately, doesn't permit me a dissertation on Simon's individual successes or otherwise, his fortunes with the critics or indeed with myself. Suffice to say that I've liked some of his work immoderately and others not at all, that all three plays were received rhapsodically by the New York critics, and that the National Theatre staged this one after West End managements considered it too risky. It follows the fortunes of one Brooklyn family over several days in 1937 — an accident at work for Dad (Bob Dishey), a successful audition for cousin Nora, a sacking for big brother Stanley (Brian Dillinger), a date for widowed Aunt Blanche (Judith Ivey), as seen through the eyes of young Jerome (Jonathan Silverman), who pesters his brother with questions about whacking off. That alone sets it apart from the sentimental Hollywood family films of forty years ago. I have thought Simon an artful observer on occasion, and it's nice to see him getting away from flip one-liners, but this seems to me to have only pretend-depth. 'He's trying to imitate Tchehov' said a friend of mine, 'but he doesn't understand Tchehov'. He didn't know that Simon had had a lifelong obsession with Tchehov and had in fact written a play about him (which was a quick failure on Broadway). It doesn't help that the film is directed flatly and theatrically, by Gene Saks.

CORRESPONDENCE

A DEFINITIVE PLAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Dear Madam,

You asked me to comment on recent events in Northern Ireland. The recent spate of terrorist crimes has forced political leaders to reconsider their policies for the Province. After what were seen to be crisis meetings at 10 Downing Street Mrs. Thatcher re-affirmed the Government's commitment to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. Tom King, the Secretary of State, promised anti-terrorist measures of a positive kind which have yet to emerge clearly. Neil Kinnock produced his party's new policy document, outlining a programme for 'United Ireland by Consent' which contained nothing fresh. The idea is in any case still-born; the objective being itself the ground for the Unionist majority's refusal to co-operate. Dr. Owen alone has proposed practical steps to improve border security.

The time is therefore ripe to think the unthinkable. A policy of total integration of the Province into the United Kingdom on the same terms as those which apply to Scotland and Wales should now be adopted. It has never been tried before, because the borders of the Province, when originally devised in 1921, embraced a large proportion of the population which actively desired to be within the new Irish state. Deference to the republican minority has caused the Province to be held constitutionally at arms-length from Great Britain ever since.

The border should be re-drawn, so far as possible to exclude those areas which do not want to be within the United Kingdom. They should be handed over to the Republic. People finding themselves on the 'wrong' side of the border from their point of view, including republicans in Belfast, should be given generous grants to re-settle in the country of their choice.

A drastic and expensive remedy, but far kinder and cheaper than the continuance of the present misery. Once the exercise is complete, all residents in the Province should be treated as British citizens entitled to the same rights and responsibilities as those living elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The national political parties should organise and sponsor candidates for election to the United Kingdom parliament. These people would be eligible when elected to be ministers including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his junior colleagues. A full system of local government, on the lines of that applicable in Scotland and Wales, should be instituted.

Meanwhile we have to deal with the terrorists. The adoption of the proposed policy would itself be a crowning blow to them. Our other policies should be directed towards the principle that the continuance of terrorist activity would result in the adoption step by step of measures designed to make the political objectives of the terrorists more and more difficult.

We should refrain from adopting policies of punishment which only

make terrorists more determined to spread support for their cause. Internment is one such policy which we should avoid. We should institute a new sentence of imprisonment for terrorist offences which will mean detention for the duration of the present emergency. Convicted terrorists should not be released until terrorism itself ends. The border should be closed except at official access points which would be strictly regulated. The Irish Republic should be invited to join a military surveillance team which would have jurisdiction on both sides of the border. Judges of the Irish High Court should be invited to sit as observers at High Court cases in Northern Ireland and vice versa. The discussion of common problems should be transferred to the Parliamentary arena, to a joint council of Parliamentarians drawn equally from the United Kingdom and the Republic, and away from the inter-governmental conference. The reporting of statements by and the case for the terrorists should continue to be unlawful. Parliamentary seats in the United Kingdom Parliament should be declared vacant if not taken up by the winning candidate within six months of the election. Everything possible should be done to make more difficult the political, as well as the military activity of the terrorists. It follows that the Sinn Fein should be banned, as well as any organisation which takes its place.

Only if the British Government shows itself really determined to defeat terrorism by the adoption of measures such as these, will the long-suffering people of Northern Ireland come to the peace and progress which they richly deserve.

House of Commons,
Westminster, London SW1.

Yours faithfully,
IVOR STANBROOK, MP.

STIGMA: THE USE OF THE WORD LIBERAL IN AMERICA'S PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

Dear Madam,

Following Professor Thomas' article (Vol. 253 No. 1474) may I take the opportunity of making the following points?

In the presidential race between Dukakis and Bush, the word Liberal has emerged as a term of stigmatic opprobrium hurled constantly at the Democratic contender by the Republican Vice-President. Dukakis, in turn, has disdained the Liberal label, running as a centrist technocratic problem-solver, who represents the forces of pragmatic change. Both Dukakis and Bush seem to race headlong for the centre of the political spectrum. In their managed posturing, both contenders have reduced the level of campaigning to mediocre poll-watching and the drive to stitch together centrist coalitions.

What, then, has happened to the once-respectable label of political Liberal in the national politics of the United States? What changed the traditions of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson into a kiss-of-death for national contenders? True, sometimes both candidates evoke

the memory of these Presidents; however, they do so through the haze of superficial nostalgia, rather than positive precedent. For both candidates, it is the drive to occupy the middle-ground which counts: while Dukakis believes that the Liberals will come running to aid the Centre, Bush seeks to parley the certain vote of the Conservatives into a coalition with moderate Centrists. Where, then, is the national voice for the Liberal tradition in the United States?

In a sense, the centrism of the American middle class, long the bastion of Liberalism, is a tribute to the past achievements of Liberal presidents. The middle class does not want to dismantle the gains of the welfare state; nor, on the other hand, do they want a broad extension of it for the troubled lower class. What the American middle class, at this juncture wants is a defence of its past gains, a bit of moderate tinkering with the social programs in its favour and, above all, security in its middle status. The superficial prosperity of the United States, even when coated by Reagan's financial and super-patriotic hokum, is what the centrist middle class wants defended.

At this juncture, it may well be asked: when were middle-class fears of national Liberals first awakened? Is the middle-class fear of Liberal spending a cover for organised selfishness? The answer to the second question is 'no', and that there are, unfortunately, historic roots to middle-class fears in America. These roots go back to Lyndon B. Johnson, and his decision to pursue a policy of guns-and-butter during the war in Vietnam. It was the unfortunate combination of Great-Society programmes, aimed largely at the ghetto poor and slovenly-administered, and the simultaneous expansion of the war in Vietnam which fuelled the inflationary spiral in the United States. Not only did the middle class suffer acutely from the inflationary spiral, but it was disillusioned by the setback in Vietnam. Furthermore, its fears of the ghetto poor were aroused by the tragic riots of the under-class in the down-trodden black inner-cities of America.

Although most Liberals will cling to Dukakis, even in what seems a fruitless course, the election of Bush may well lead to interesting results. For Bush may revive the old moderate tradition of Eisenhower Republicanism, thereby welding together a new Republican majority and solidifying their hold over the once-Liberal American middle class. In this case, American Liberals will be forced to reformulate their programme and ideology.

Professor of History,

New York Institute of Technology,
New York.

Your faithfully,
MARVIN GOLDWERT

Literary Supplement

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Small Circle of Beings. Damon Galgut. Constable. £9.95. *Coromandel.* Pat Barr. Hamish Hamilton. £11.95. *Thomas Hardy Collected Stories.* Introduced by Desmond Hawkins. £16.95. *Swann Song.* Elizabeth Russell Taylor. Hutchinson. £11.95. *The Beginning of Spring.* Penelope Fitzgerald. Collins. £10.95. *Nice Work.* David Lodge. Secker. £10.95.

Compton MacKenzie once said that if a writer was not published by the age of twenty-two he would achieve neither fame nor excellence. A harsh edict, certainly, yet there is truth in it. The sheer bubbling enthusiasm of the early twenties is seldom recaptured — to the chagrin of mature writers. Damon Galgut, a South African, is one of those rare writers who are young and successful. His first novel, *A Sinless Season,* written when he was seventeen years old and still at school, received unanimously enthusiastic reviews. Now, six years later, he has published *Small Circle of Beings,* and at once his astute observation and sense of character are apparent. The setting is an isolated farm in South Africa and it is interesting that the atmosphere of this arid, though strangely beautiful terrain is conveyed without the usual political overtones of any novel pertaining to the Republic. *Small Circle of Beings* is a purely personal story. Related by a wife and mother, it follows the progress of a small boy's illness, and the difficulty of persuading the local doctor to take the case seriously, to the devastating procedure of highly technical treatment. There can be few situations more poignant than the plight of a young child in hospital, and the mother's decision to leave home to be near her child in the city heralds the break-up of the marriage. What sympathy had existed between husband and wife is gradually eroded by the tragedy, and even when the boy returns home the rifts and tensions are not healed. Meanwhile, the presence of a crazed grandmother and peculiar, taciturn black servants do not advance the restoration of peace. Separation and re-marriage follow, for the father at any rate; the mother consoling herself with a singularly unsavoury live-in lover who repays hospitality by bullying the now adolescent boy — a diversion also indulged in by the mother as she faces her once dependent son's hostility. There are no happy endings in this bleak tale. A final glimpse of the hopelessness of human beings to control their fate shows mother and grandmother locked in each other's arms on a narrow, comfortless bed.

There have been so many accounts of life in India, whether when the continent had Dominion status or after Independence, that it might well seem that nothing remained to be said about the problems facing expatriots. However, Pat Barr, in her fourth novel, *Coromandel,* has succeeded in presenting a rather different view. It reveals the domestic scene of the modest, impecunious white residents, and the almost incredible courage of those men and women who sought to build their lives on alien foundations. The year is 1830 and Amelia has arrived during a heat-wave after many weeks' travel in a primitive boat. She has a young baby in her arms and how the pair of them survived the voyage must remain a mystery. But Amelia has no regrets, deeply in love

with her young husband, Theo Lang, already installed up-country in the dubious employment as librarian to a Raj holding court in a decaying 'palace', ill-equipped to sponsor and finance the extensive cataloguing and organising envisaged; and indeed, maintaining his small family is one of Theo's main problems, for the Raj proves reluctant to supply anything so practical as money or suitable living accommodation. The tumbledown bungalow offered as 'home' crawls with vermin and insects and only the most intrepid settlers could have made it habitable. Page by page the reader anticipates the early death of the baby, Rolly, but this does not happen and the Lang family gradually settle down with the small, disparate group who have elected to settle in the benighted area. Theo Lang is an outspoken critic of British policy and the East India Company in particular, and so is not always popular, particularly when he attempts to save a childhood friend from committing suttee.

But all such secondary considerations were set aside when news seeped through to the remote areas of an outbreak of the dreaded cholera. Victims were, as always, indiscriminately claimed by the disease and it was a bold narrative stroke to select Theo Lang for one of them, with some sixty pages of the novel yet to go. Surprisingly, Amelia decides to remain in India rather than return 'home' to circumstances which, as an impecunious widow, could prove even harsher than the still backward sub-continent. Details and insight into unfathomable mysteries make *Coromandel* a revelation of India's mystical past.

The debate continues on the respective merits of Thomas Hardy as poet and novelist, with different verdicts emerging, yet how often is Hardy as short story writer allowed to enter the controversy? To many people the short stories are very much a side issue, seldom studied alongside the fiction giants of *Jude, The Obscure* and *Tess of the D'Urbevilles,* or the most famous and often quoted of the poems. To the discerning, the contents of *Wessex Tales* and *Life's Little Ironies* offered interesting sidelights on minor characters and aspects of a slightly different view of Wessex in the early and mid-eighteen hundreds. It comes as a surprise to realise that a volume of nearly 1,000 pages could be compiled as a total collection of the short stories in which contents of *A Group of Noble Dames* is rightly included. With such a diverse collection spreading over many years from 1874 onwards — the last collection was *A Changed Man* published in 1913 — some carefully organised guidance is essential. This is provided by a brief biography, notes on sources of the stories, a map, a summary of the stories, and a glossary of dialect words. Equally valuable is a list identifying the place names which finally lays to rest the frustrating dilemma of attempting to pair the fictitious Wessex with the real places. Most important of all is the introduction by Desmond Hawkins, brief and cogent, as fine and inspired an example of scholarly prose as any to be found in Desmond Hawkins' many books on Hardy and Dorset.

Which of the many stories stand out above the rest?

Those two strange little tales, 'A Tradition of Eighteen Hundred and Four', the fictional account of the supposed reconnoitring for invasion by Napoleon Bonaparte, 'The Corsican Ogre' — a fantasy which was later mistaken for fact, and the grim little story about the two summarily executed German Hussars. But for many people the peak of Hardy's achievement as a short story writer is 'The Withered Arm', the grim record of witchcraft and superstition in the not often explored Wareham and East Stoke region, and 'An Imaginative Woman'.

Moving out of the darker, more primitive side of nineteenth century Dorset

to an equally murky scene surrounding the life and circumstances of Marcel Proust may prove a difficult transition. In *Swann Song*, Elizabeth Russell Taylor has chosen an unusual theme for her new novel. The action takes place in the year 1971, the anniversary of Proust's birth, and the starting point is with a young television reporter and documentary-maker, Auriol Anders, who is commissioned to prepare a feature to mark the event. Despite Proust's international fame and familiarity with the villages in which he lived, much remains obscure about the author of the monumental work, *A La Recherche du Temps Perdu*.

The theme does not get off to a dramatic start, with a correspondence between Auriol and her friend, 'Becca', reminiscing about their Oxford days, love affairs and ideas about life in general with names of famous people engagingly popping in and out. Next, we have 'Olga' — Olga Saul. She is the Curator of the Proust museum, about to retire, and through her thoughts and memories much valuable factual material is stored. A Russian by origin, she has much in her experience to equip her for this rather unusual post, not least of which was her special understanding and knowledge of Proust's 'liberal' message. Yet there was much more to uncover: homosexual relationships, Sabatianism, and private family orientation. Olga, a tied up middle-aged spinster, to use her own description of herself, is nonetheless a person of immense dedication; but it is the third section that Elizabeth Russell Taylor displays her full powers of narrative and characterisation. Here we have Miss Gluckstein, Senior Welfare Officer for the Jewish Council of Refugees. She knows the whereabouts in Wales of an elderly Polish Jew, Bar-Lev, who holds the key to much of the required information, vital to the proposed TV documentary. The description of this self-absorbed, unsavoury individual in his uncomfortable cottage is masterly in its evocation of sight and sound. Elizabeth Russell Taylor possesses extensive knowledge of Proust's writings and his background, so that *Swann Song* will be valued not only as an absorbing short novel but also for the new insights it provides.

The Beginning of Spring by Penelope Fitzgerald, short-listed for the Booker Prize, is also concentrated on a relatively unexplored background. This is Russia in the year 1913. It is in no way political, but deals with the domestic life of an English family, Frank and Nellie Reid and their three children, in a modest 'provincial' way of life in a city, ill-supplied with electricity or the telephone. Frank Reid runs a small printing business, inherited from his father, and the placid daily routine is disturbed only by a most dramatic and unexpected occurrence. Without prior warning Nellie leaves home with the children, giving no explanation and Frank, dazed with shock, is left to carry himself through the rest of the day. Later it is found that Nellie has abandoned the children on a remote railway station. Once reinstalled at their home, friends and an uncle from London set about repairing the damage. Of the three it is the girl, Dolly, whose character shines out in the drab scene — a lively, outspoken child, capable of running the household if need be. Well-meaning advisers suggest that a housekeeper should be engaged. The choice falls on a young Russian girl, Lisa Ivanova. Half-child, half-woman, she rarely speaks, gives little of herself away. It is one of the strengths of the novel that the relationship between Frank and Lisa is never fully clarified. It does not finally develop into anything tangible. After suffering a deep emotional shock, Nellie returns just as the long winter gradually gives way to Spring and the children return from their first visit to the *dacha*. The overall impression is of a curiously static world, light years away from any impression we might have of Moscow today,

revealed with an impressive clarity and charm.

And, finally, another novel shortlisted for the Booker Prize, *Nice Work*. David Lodge is a supremely accomplished writer, with a meticulous eye for detail and the ability to communicate it with considerable humour. The description of the slow awakening of the Wilcox family — wife and three children — after the breadwinner, Vic, sets off for a demanding day's work is worthy of the highest traditions of comedy. The scene is a fictional town called 'Rummidge', blackest of the industrial Midlands, and those who earn their money there do so in the most depressing conditions. Running alongside these uninspiring happenings is a second narrative thread — Robyn Penrose, the brash young lecturer, given to uttering long quotations, product of a more permissive university era. Robyn's path crosses Vic's fortuitously and their lives merge though in a manner not to be described as catalystic. But when, after various complications, Robyn inherits money and the liaison ends, Vic is left to deal as best he may with his clinging, flaccid wife, and self-centred off-spring. Robyn's unexpected inheritance could have brought the novel down to the level of banality, but it does not do so. The lasting impression, overriding the sly digs at a shamelessly synthetic society, is one of sadness for the predicament of wage slaves such as Vic, frustrated by the mundane round and an ungrateful family.

Also Received

A Twist in the Tale. Jeffrey Archer. Hodder & Stoughton. £9.95.

Jeffrey Archer's talent for building up suspense really requires the space of a full length novel. *A Twist in the Tale* is a collection of twelve new and unpublished stories. Each of the twelve is different, each ends with a surprising 'twist' (not always credible) but intriguing nonetheless. Readers who await Jeffrey Archer's next novel may console themselves meanwhile with a visit to the Queen's Theatre in London to see his skilful, long-running play, *Beyond Reasonable Doubt.*

Books of Bale. John Arden. Methuen. £12.95.

John Arden has chosen an unusual theme for his second novel, *Books of Bale* — the 16th century Bishop of Ossory in Ireland. Undaunted by the sparse factual records about the Bishop he has presented a commendably lucid picture of life and times shrouded in the mists of antiquity. Described as a 'Fiction of history', the novel sustains interest and novelty throughout its 500 pages.

The Lost Father. Marina Warner. Chatto & Windus. £11.95.

Shortlisted for the Booker Prize, *The Lost Father* by Marina Warner will please and satisfy many readers who prefer a novel to be long, leisurely and to present a wide variety of characters and events. Set in the South of Italy, *The Lost Father* takes as its starting point the mysterious death of Davide Pittagora; but it is his descendant, Anna, through her researches into the story of the Pittagoras which is unfolded, who provides the basis for a rich and absorbing tapestry.

The Booker Prize for Fiction over two decades, has commanded the services of many distinguished judges and awarded the generous and prestigious prize to many important novelists. In 1988 the six shortlisted novels offered a wide variety and all were rewarding in their different ways. The winner was *Oscar and Lucinda* by Peter Carey (Faber, £10.95).

NON FICTION REVIEWS

BENAZIR BHUTTO

Daughter of the East. Benazir Bhutto. Hamish Hamilton.

Surely there has never been such a story of grandeur, misery, and grandeur again, at least at the time of writing (December 4th, 1988). Benazir Bhutto came of a grand feudal family. She was at the side of her father when he became President of Pakistan and in his company met not a few world leaders. She was educated at Harvard and Oxford, where she became President of the Union. I spoke with her there and at Cambridge, admiring even then her exceptional charm and skilfulness. Returning to Pakistan in 1977 she found her father soon being arrested and later hanged. She was herself imprisoned in painful and humiliating circumstances, only liberated to go abroad in 1983 on medical grounds. In 1986 she returned to seek the democratic overthrow of President Zia, her father's murderer. She has, at the end of 1988, just been confirmed as Prime Minister, beautiful as always, full of confidence it seems, with her father's portrait on the wall behind her. She describes all these events with a fascinating power of recall.

Her arranged marriage is explained with candid dignity. She informs us that she is still in principle opposed to arranged marriages, but leaves us with a conviction that this one will succeed. Shortly before the election she gave birth to a child after a difficult pregnancy. She is still only 35!

She adheres loyally to the Muslim faith but combines it with a passionate belief in democracy. Writing in August of this year, before President Zia was killed in an air crash, she expressed an unalterable confidence in the ultimate triumph of freedom. 'Just as a flower cannot bloom in the desert, so political parties cannot flourish in dictatorship. That the political parties have managed to survive and flourish despite the draconian measures taken against them is a tribute to those who gave their lives for democracy and to the people of Pakistan who realise that their rights can be restored and protected only if they band together in a national party. We are the conscience of the country, the future and the hope. Our day, I know, will come'.

And come it has. We must hope that it has come to stay. She does not attempt to deal with the various criticism that has been levelled at her father's regime. He comes out here as a man, not only of love, but of wisdom. He committed, it was to prove a fatal error when he appointed a Chief of Staff, General Zia, who was to displace and murder him. His daughter gives an unforgettable picture of her meeting with him the day before his execution. '"Goodbye, Papa", I call to my father as Mummy reaches through the bars to touch him. We both move down the dirty courtyard. I want to look back, but I can't. I know I can't control myself'. 'Until we meet again', I hear him call. No father was ever so fully vindicated by his daughter.

FRANK LONGFORD

A NEW VIEW ON EDMUND BURKE

Edmund Burke. Stanley Ayling. John Murray. £17.95.

Edmund Burke's reputation has had a strange fate in the twentieth century. Throughout the Victorian period, almost all statesmen revered the speeches and writings of this eighteenth century politician and orator as a fount of both wisdom and beauty. In this century Sir Lewis Namier and some of his disciples have reduced Burke's standing amongst many historians. At the same time, Burke has had an increasing influence on the revival of Conservative thought first in America and latterly, though to a lesser extent, in England.

There has long been a need for a good basic account of Burke's life to show how he rose from relative obscurity in his native Ireland to exercise an important role in British politics. He also became an important figure in the London literary world as one of the key members of Dr Johnson's Club. He did this by a combination of superb talents and some luck. As secretary to the Marquis of Rockingham, Burke became the leading thinker and speaker of those Whigs who attacked King George III's policies particularly regarding the American colonies. Burke's views on the need for party government played an essential role in the development of modern politics. For many generations schoolboys read and memorised passages of Burke's great speeches on America. Schoolboys, of course no longer memorise let alone read masterpieces and the world has been a poorer place. Burke had a marvellous ability to use the English language, so much so that both Cardinal Newman and Matthew Arnold believed he was supreme amongst the writers of prose.

Burke had however other causes that occupied more of his time. Although he spent most of his political career in opposition and never attained Cabinet rank, he exercised a powerful force upon his age. Mr Ayling's book is particularly useful for having a lucid account of the tangled web of Indian politics. For many years Burke devoted himself to prosecuting, many said persecuting, Warren Hastings, the Governor General of India. This subject, quite understandably, does not have the appeal it once had to readers of Burke.

Perhaps Burke's most important and controversial role was in his opposition to the French Revolution. His vision of what that event would lead to proved almost entirely correct. As his former friend Fox said Burke was right but he was too right too soon. Burke saw the potential for disruption, mob rule, and eventual military dictatorship almost from the beginning. His book, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* marked a turning point in European intellectual history when it was published in 1790. Because of his one man war against the Revolution, many Whigs joined in a coalition with Pitt's government and from that dates the true beginning of the modern Conservative Party. In all the media bilge that the bi-centenary of the French Revolution is likely to generate in 1989, there is much to be said for retreating to a quiet corner and re-reading Edmund Burke.

The publishers claim that this is the first biography of Burke for fifty years. This is untrue: Carl Cone produced an excellent two volume work about 25 years ago. Burke scholarship has been much advanced since the publication of a superb edition of ten volumes of his correspondence. American scholars such as Carl Cone, Thomas Copeland, and Ross Hoffman have played the crucial role in re-assessing Burke in the light of new facts and documents. It is unfortunate that Mr Ayling has ignored the many valuable articles in the American journal, *Studies in Burke and his Times*, this is a good basic biography for

anyone to read about Burke's life though still the best way to understand Edmund Burke is to read some of his own prose, which to use the title of one of his early works in both 'sublime and beautiful'.

RICHARD MULLEN

THE TUDOR PERIOD

The Tudor Age. Jasper Ridley. Constable. £25.00.

The first thing to be said about this book is that it is extremely attractive. There are some sixty-four colour plates as well as numerous period wood-cuts which help readers to understand the Tudor period. The book's approach is to avoid chronology and to see the period 1485 to 1603 in its varied aspects. We have therefore, no chapters on Henry VII or Mary I but on the family, London, social classes, dress, furniture, education, exploration, beggars, sports, the law and, of course, that most divisive of topics of the period, religion. There is, however, a useful four page chronology at the beginning of the book.

The author is well grounded in the period. Of his ten other books five have been on the same period and these include biographies of Thomas Cranmer, John Knox, Henry VIII, Elizabeth I and Bishop Nicholas Ridley, an ancestor of Mr. Ridley if this reviewer is not mistaken. One of the points worth remembering is that what we call an 'age' in history is something of our own invention. History is like a stream which flows on, ever changing and yet ever drawing on the same original source, in history's case, man's nature, geography and previous events. When in 1485 yet another claimant to the English throne defeated his enemy and established himself as King few would have thought that a new era had been entered, that the feuding had ended or that a settled royal family, however dubious its claim to the throne, would reign securely. In the event it did not: rebellion was frequently round the corner throughout the period and spasmodically erupted. The Tudor dynasty was also short-lived: by the time this king's grand-daughter, Elizabeth I, died in 1603, the 'Tudor Age' was over.

Yet in that period fundamental changes occurred in English life, changes which have shaped history ever since. The English Church's tragic break with the centre of the Christian world, the 'reformation' which followed, the defeat of Europe's greatest power, Spain, the explorations, the vast building programmes of the new classes which surrounded the new dynasty, the literary and, most enduring of all, the theatrical out-pourings: all these were parts of the Tudor Age if not products of the Tudor dynasty. The religious settlement was not as secure as some thought. The puritan movement survived Elizabeth I and the religious dictatorship she had inherited from her father, England's Idi Amin. This movement almost destroyed the English Church after the murder of Charles I, the man who paid the price for the Tudors' religious policy.

This is a well written book which general readers will enjoy and from which they will benefit. The writer knows his period well and writes well although it is amusing to see how the canons of 'new speak' must be obeyed: we can no longer talk of Englishmen but of 'Englishmen and women'. It is, admittedly, difficult in a post-Christian society such as ours to explain sixteenth century religious arguments. To explain why ignorant artisans would die for the

doctrine of Transubstantiation Mr. Ridley comes up with a most unusual 'secular argument': these artisans were part of a generation war with their more conservative adults in the shape of old and learned divines! Thus readers who can believe nothing can understand why people in the past, less intelligent, learned and sophisticated than then, could act so oddly. Alas, religious motivation is far more complicated than this and martyrdoms cannot so easily be 'understood'.

It may well be true that many artisans can be assumed not to have understood the subtle arguements about Transubstantiation, arguments which after 450 years the churches are only now resolving. Having said this, must one patronise individual acts of bravery and obedience to conscience by invoking specious theories? It is also, of course, very difficult in a general book like this to avoid generalisations but it is surely something of a gamble to say, as on page 114, that in 1558 'the majority of the English people were Catholics'.

JAMES MUNSON

T. S. ELIOT IN HIS LETTERS

The Letters of T. S. Eliot. Volume 1. 1898-1922. Edited by Valerie Eliot. Faber and Faber. £25.00.

Valerie Eliot has assembled an enormous amount of material, both personal and professional, for the first volume of her husband's letters. She possesses three great advantage for the undertaking: T. S. Eliot agreed with her, before his death, that they should be published; her editorial expertise is second to none in general so that this particular labour is a crowning work for her; and as a long-serving member of the house of Faber she has at her fingertips a knowledge of their dealings with her husband's work, especially as she was his devoted and meticulous secretary long before becoming his wife.

For students of literature who cannot easily study Eliot's letters in one of the transatlantic treasure-houses which have acquired his letters over the years, this and its projected successive five or so volumes will prove invaluable. Eliot always remained in close touch with his family in St. Louis, Missouri, and particularly with his mother, herself no mean poet. These missives show how staunch was her maternal support, how comprehending of her son's need to stay in London in close contact with writers of the old, European world whilst at the same time she suffered the greatest misgivings about his sudden and disastrous union with Vivien Haigh-Wood whose history of nervous illness could only hinder her son's career.

More information than the personal sentiments expressed by Eliot and Charlotte, his mother, is revealed in this section of the correspondence. His roots in his native land went deep and were broadly spread. The reader is disposed to wonder, perhaps for the first time, by what powerful compulsion the poet was minded to make his permanent home here. Certainly his regimen in the early years was one of unremitting toil, especially after his difficult decision to abandon philosophy and stick to poetry and criticism. This resolve almost exactly coincided with his arrival at Merton College, Oxford, as a Sheldon Fellow, to continue his doctoral thesis on the Idealist philosopher, F. H. Bradley. He, the resident alien and struggling poet, threw out both Hegelian

idealism and the 'flaccid culture of England to which the Idealists seemed to have contributed. *The Waste Land* is proof enough that his powers of something like prophecy were at work thus early in his life in England.

It is, however, no coincidence that his first meeting with Ezra Pound occurred soon after his arrival in 1914. Pound was to become his guru in the London literary world of Bloomsbury, of Virginia Woolf, Lytton Strachey, Wyndham Lewis and James Joyce, as well as the compatriot of both Eliot and Pound, Conrad Aiken. In the first epistolary volume we read Eliot's letters to his mentor whereas before only Pound's side of the discussion has been published. And Mrs. Eliot's own admirable edition of *The Waste Land* manuscript in full shows the extent to which its first versions were pruned by Pound of petulant antipathies and personal spite. Eliot learned to 'transmute his personal and private agonies into something . . . universal and impersonal'. It is not perhaps entirely out of the question that some strong element of hero-worship existed in Eliot's nature alongside his inherited puritanical habit of mind: the stern critic governs most, but not all, his writing. Emotion can break through.

BETTY ABEL

THE COMPLETE VICTORIAN MAN OF LETTERS

J. B. Priestley. Vincent Brome. Hamish Hamilton. £16.95.

John Boynton Priestley, a notably gruff, disgruntled, perpetually grumbling Yorkshireman, was, on that account, ironically nicknamed 'Jolly Jack'. Vincent Brome's comprehensive and detailed biography — the first to appear since Priestley's death in 1984 and published with the approval and co-operation of his widow — lays bare the ground for Jolly Jack's persistent asperity. Written in a light and easy style of market-place prose which its subject would have thoroughly commended, it essays a candour of portraiture, peccadillos and all, and, as might be expected from the author of biographical studies of Freud, Arthur Jones and Havelock Ellis, quite a ladling of psychoanalytical speculation. Priestley was unquestionably a very considerable craftsman — poet, novelist, essayist, playwright and critic — but, equally certainly, he belonged (and nothing shaming about that) to the middle passage of literature. He sailed with such fellow-voyagers as Wells, Walpole and Bennett on picaresque cruises in the renovated tall ships of the eighteenth and nineteenth century novelists, Fielding and Smollet, Balzac and Dickens — Dickens in particular. Indeed, his publishers, not very sagaciously one might think, actually labelled him the 'Gas-fire Dickens'.

Mr. Brome very properly points out that *The Good Companions* both made and unmade him. Its enormous success transformed him overnight into a rich man and a 'popular' novelist. It also totally blotted out the higher critical esteem evoked by earlier and more academic studies of *The English Comic Characters, George Meredith,* and *Thomas Love Peacock.* It was one of life's dangerous corners. Thereafter, he could do no critical right. Literary Bloomsbury's attitude was embodied in Virginia Woolf's sneer at Bennett and Priestley as 'the tradesmen of letters'. It was not so much what Dr. Leavis said about him as the fact that, in a lecture on 'Literature in My Time', he had, in the Great Tradition, said *nothing* about him, that penetrated the carapace. All of

his long life — ninety years — Priestley was inspired to eloquent vituperation on the theme of 'the split sensibility between academic novels suitable for analysis by their own critical theory and the broad Dickens tradition of straightforward narrative'. He was to suffer, too, from that critical perversity which modern critical theory has named the intentional fallacy.

Although the earlier part of the book exhibits what appears to be a heavy reliance upon Priestley's own version of affairs in his autobiographical *Margin Released*, Mr. Brome, who has been permitted free access to family papers — including the revelatory love-letters which Priestley addressed to his third wife — provides the first complete account of the triumphs and tragedies which marked the extraordinary life of one who was perhaps the last of his breed — the complete Victorian Man of Letters.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

DR GARETH BENNETT

To the Church of England: Gareth Bennett. Churchman Publishing Ltd. £5.95.

This book is a tribute to Dr. Gareth Bennett, the distinguished Church historian and lately Fellow of New College, Oxford. It has been edited with an introductory Memoir by a friend, Dr. Geoffrey Rowell, Fellow and Chaplain of Keble College, Oxford. Dr. Bennett was a traditionalist disturbed by the increasingly liberal complexion of the Anglican Church. 'It is perhaps a product of our history that we tend to minimise our doctrinal requirements and allow a considerable latitude in interpreting what is required'. To him the Anglican Church had developed into a loose association of independent national churches with no effective central authority and as a result its witness was blurred. He was particularly concerned about the Episcopal Church in America and thought that Lambeth Conferences did not face the big issues. In England the General Synod was not a sufficient safeguard to tradition and he said that the real power was in the hands of Bishops and their inner diocesan staffs.

He died tragically in December 1987. He had written a Preface to Crockford's Clerical Directory which criticised the present state of Anglicanism in the ways mentioned in my first paragraph and attacked the Archbishop of Canterbury. He had some kindly things to say about Dr. Runcie but there was also this comment, 'His clear preference is for men of liberal disposition with a moderately Catholic style which is not taken to the point of having firm principles'. By tradition the Preface is anonymous but on this occasion newspaper interest in the Established Church had been aroused by controversies about homosexuality and the ordination of women. Reporters tried to discover the identity of the auhor. Dr. Bennett was under pressure and it seems that he took his own life. Sharpish things had been said in previous Prefaces but criticism had not been made of the practice. False impressions became current by selected quoted sentences. It is lamentable that there should have been such a witch hunt. It was overlooked that during it the author was not so much concealing himself as protecting a principle. The Preface was the opinion of a shrewd and scholarly mind, and if the facts or emphasis were wrong they should have been countered.

The book is well planned and always stimulating. After the Memoir which is a cursus vitae rather than an appraisal, there follows a selection of Dr. Bennett's historical work including the effect on religious thought of some great figures of the past, a splendid essay on the Englishman's view of the clergy, and some studies of Church Mission and Unity. The latter were written for particular occasions, and commissions and working parties, and are not always easy reading. The Crockford Preface then appears in full. This is then followed by three of Dr. Bennett's sermons and a final memorial address.

It is not possible to read the book without being moved, partly by thought of the tragedy, partly by the insight, humanity and spirituality revealed, and partly by reflection on the Church as an institution. One is prompted to wonder where is the dividing line between developing tradition, of which Dr. Bennett would have approved, and the liberal attitudes criticised. Perhaps the Archbishop of York's new book *Confessions of a Conservative Liberal* will help. *To The Church of England* can be recommended to the general reader and should be required reading in Theological Colleges of whatever churchmanship. The problems encountered are found in Churches other than the Anglican.

LAURENCE TANNER

THE LONG BIOGRAPHY OF BERNARD SHAW

Bernard Shaw. Volume 1. The Search for Love. Michael Holroyd. Chatto and Windus. £16.00.

The biography of Bernard Shaw is an enormous undertaking in the sense that not only did he live a long and full life but also that his written output was prodigious. Around his plays, arguably his most important works, are woven political diatribes of the most seemingly rational import, full length speeches (1,000 of them), and 90,000 words of music criticism. Of his characters on the stage Max Beerbohm perhaps rightly said, 'The men are all disputative machines, ingeniously constructed'. Possibly Shaw himself was a disputative machine but whether he was also a great writer of plays is a perennial question amongst critics of the literature of the late nineties and the early twentieth century.

Michael Holroyd has no doubt that Shaw almost single-handedly dispelled the glooms and shadows of Victorianism, that he rejuvenated the theatre and raised the level of criticism in the press. In this first volume of the biography the author concentrates on Shaw's many loves. His amours, other than his love for Ellen Terry, are of little interest in themselves but a pattern may be traced of advance and retreat, of constantly being the third party in a triangular romance. Holroyd attributes this preferred state, until his marriage at 42 in 1898, to a confused childhood in which his parents had imported into their household some strange characters whose status in the menage was ambiguous. These colourful friends included George Vandeleur Lee, the original Svengali, and Malachi Kilgarriff, Mrs. Shaw's lover. Some slight crisis of identity was inevitable and it caused Bernard when quite young to drop his first name, George, out of a possibly unworthy suspicion about his origins. Even Shaw's own marriage was hedged about by contractual obligations and little romance. Many loves do not indicate a loving nature. Shaw's childhood in Dublin is described with sympathy and understanding. It provides also a picture of the

times amongst impoverished Anglo-Irish gentry and reveals how far Shaw had to travel psychologically to translate himself into London literary life in the late nineties. Once there, his goal was recognition and he began by electing himself a leading member of the Fabian Society, collaborating with Sidney and Beatrice Webb, playing flirtatious duets with Annie Besant, cultivating debates with Eleanor Marx and contributing to Frank Harris's newspapers. His socialism belied the distinctly rackety social life he was leading, being of the repressive, 'People must have what is good for them' ideology.

Volume 1 takes us from birth to marriage and there are two volumes to come. Michael Holroyd is to be admired for making out of copious contradictions so readable a chain of circumstance. There were many Shaws and the biographer cannot help to some extent choosing between them. Holroyd has shown scrupulous impartiality whilst never denying inconsistencies and bringing out most enjoyably the essential humour of his subject.

BETTY ABEL

SHORTER REVIEWS

Munich, the Eleventh Hour (Hamilton. £14.95.) This is a valuable study by Robert Kee on the events leading to the now notorious Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, which Neville Chamberlain pronounced as 'peace with honour'. There was an infinite sense of relief throughout the nation after the threat of war following the Godesberg Memorandum which accepted war by Germany against Czechoslovakia, theoretically for the Sudeten territories, but in fact for the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Mr Kee starts his study with the rise of Hitler who became nationally popular in seeking the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed he retained popular support until his evil anti-Jewish policy took effect. Neville Chamberlain was taken in and believed in his personal integrity far too long. Mr Kee sums up his assessment of Chamberlain: 'The worst that can be said about him, judging him by his own lights, is that he was too ready to suppose that Hitler would act within his own (Chamberlain's) conventions when he so much wanted him to do so'. He had opposition to his policy in the Cabinet, but succeeded in having his own way, with the resultant disaster-out consequences. Mr Kee has used only published sources. These fortunately include the 'monumental series of Documents on British and German Foreign Policy published by H.M. Stationery Office'.

C. S. Lewis: A Biography. Roger Lancelyn Green and Walter Hooper (Souvenir Press. Hardback. £12.95.) This year, the twenty-fifth anniversary of C. S. Lewis's death, has seen a crop of new biographies about the Oxford don whose books made him a world figure. This is an undated reprint of a biography published about ten years after his death. Lewis has become one of the most influential writers of this century from his Christian apologetics and his children's books. The fact that Roger Green was a pupil of Lewis at Oxford as well as a close friend and that Walter Hooper was his secretary and literary executor gives this book an authority and a personal touch that none of the other works have. Whatever other books are published, this will always remain the essential biography: one to begin with and to return to with pleasure. (R.M.)

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REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS

by Keith D. Suter

REFORMING the United Nations is now an item on the international political agenda. The UN has certainly made great progress but there is still much to be done. Various ideas are circulating for reforming the UN. By contrast, there are few proposals for its total abolition — even its critics prefer to improve rather than abolish it.

The immediate need for reform has been forced upon the UN through its current financial crisis — largely, but not solely, initiated by the United States. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, has for the first time since 1945 made proposals for enhancing the UN's effectiveness. The main consistent source of proposals has come from non-governmental organisations (NGOS) and private individuals. Ironically, it is among this sector (rather than the governmental one) that there is most interest in abolishing the UN since the proposals range from those of strengthening the UN until it becomes a world government, holding a world constitutional convention, within or without the UN; and starting a 'world government', as has been done by the World Constitution and Parliament Association, with a view to gaining the support of individuals, groups and countries until it is ratified as the world government.

Before looking at some of the proposals, it is worth recalling that the UN has some considerable achievements to its credit. Brian (now Sir

We regret very much that Rosalind Wade, OBE, has been obliged to resign the editorship of the *Contemporary Review* on the grounds of ill health, with effect from February 1989. Betty Abel has succeeded her as Editor. Rosalind Wade was appointed Editor in 1970 and she took up the post at a difficult time. We wish her well in retirement.

During the past eighteen years she has maintained the reputation of the *Review* for articles of academic quality and relevant to the issues of the day, both at home and overseas. Apart from our established readership in America, the Commonwealth and Europe, as well as of course at home, the *Review* is now widely read in Third World Countries. These include recent additions in, for example, Korea and Ethiopia.

For all this we owe Rosalind Wade deep gratitude for her endeavours. Public recognition of her work has been made in the award of the OBE.

Brian) Urquhart in 1985 (while still UN Under-Secretary-General) set out some of those achievements: for the first time in history there exists a virtually universal world organisation; through the process of decolonisation the world now is basically composed of independent sovereign states; the world has escaped a third global war and it has learned some new techniques for avoiding world war in the future; extraordinary economic and social progress has been achieved; the world has begun to learn that there are problems which even the most powerful countries cannot solve alone and which can only be dealt with on a global basis. There is much more international responsiveness to the great humanitarian tragedies and disasters that from time to time strike parts of the world. Through the work of the UN the issue of human rights has become a real preoccupation of all peoples and all governments and the body of international law has tremendously expanded.

An alternative way of assessing the UN is by comparing it with its predecessor, the League of Nations. The League expired in a world war at the age of 20, and the United Nations is still going strong at 44 with no world war in sight. The League had an extremely limited membership, not including the United States or in its later days either the Soviet Union or Germany. The United Nations contains virtually every sovereign state, all 159 of them, including the greatest powers, all of whom have stayed in and have no intention of leaving. It is also a very different world. In one way it is promising and in another sense it is far more dangerous, due to technological and other developments. It is a world that is infinitely more closely knit than the one before World War II. Virtually everyone in some way is dependent on someone else, and so there are unprecedented problems in creating mechanisms to cope with global interdependence among nations which still pretend they alone are guardians of their individual national destinies.

The most immediate interest in reform has arisen from the need to cope with a reduced budget. The UN obtains its funds by assessing each member-nation for a certain percentage of the total budget figure decided by the General Assembly. These assessed contributions are payable at the start of the calendar year (which is also the UN's financial year). Differences between the budgetary cycles of some member nations and the UN necessitated the creation of a reserve fund to give the UN sufficient operating capital to continue operations while awaiting payment of these contributions. The United States, which is the major contributor, does not pay its bill until the last quarter of the year. Despite numerous efforts since the mid-1960s to remedy the situation late payment of assessed contributions has become an increasing problem for the UN. The problem has been exacerbated in the last decade by the downturn in the international economy.

Parallel to the problem of late payments there has been increasing non-payment of assessed contributions and more recently deliberate withholding of assessed contributions by member-nations which objected to particular UN programmes. Neither of these actions could be anticipated

in drawing up UN budgets and so progressively the UN was forced to draw more and more on its reserve funds to finance the programmes authorised by the UN budget. Unlike late payments, however, non-payments and withholdings represented permanent withdrawals from the reserve fund.

Some 75 per cent of regular budget expenditure goes on staff costs. Conditions of service for UN civil servants have improved to the point where they exceed those offered by member governments. Of concern to the United States is the use of the Secretariat (and the Soviet mission to the UN) as bases for espionage and intelligence gathering. Reform on personnel issues has been difficult because countries seek to protect the remuneration and positions of their Secretariat members.

The UN Secretariat is the object of criticism because it is increasingly engaged in unproductive preparation of documents and reports sought by the General Assembly and other bodies (an estimated billion pages per year) which are in turn largely ignored. The agendas of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the other organs have become laden with marginal issues, East/West wrangling and North/South sniping. There are too many meetings at which not enough is done (about 10,000 meetings at New York and Geneva alone each year). Member-nations must bear much of the responsibility for the difficulties confronting the organisation. They have avoided hard decisions for too long.

The largest single debtor is now the United States. Since 1985 the US has failed to pay US$467 million to the UN's regular administrative budget — two-thirds of all outstanding dues. Initially the money was held back until Washington could be satisfied the UN was committed to streamlining its operations. The introduction of widespread budgetary and staffing reforms in the UN since 1986, however, failed to satisfy the US. The need to reduce an alarming budget deficit closer to home has inclined Congress to take a dim view of US financial obligations. A preference for unilateral action in pursuit of US foreign interests inclined the Administration to avoid pressing the issue with Congress.

Such withholdings are seen as violations of treaty obligations arising from the UN Charter. It is interesting to note that the US itself argued strongly in the early 1960s that withholding by the Soviet Union and other countries of funds for peace-keeping activities were violations of the Charter. Adding to these difficulties is the fall in the value of the US dollar, which is expected to add to UN expenses this year, basically by raising costs of servicing UN installations in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and elsewhere.

However, it seems that the US is now willing to pay some of its back debts. The USSR, under its new leadership, has paid its back debts, thereby making the US more vulnerable to criticism for its own withholding of payments. Also, there is a feeling that this policy has become counterproductive. The UN is now introducing administrative reforms and so the US could hardly continue to meet its obligations when the UN was being co-operative: a bankrupt (and defunct) UN would be impossible

to reform.

In March 1989 the US President is obliged to create a US Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the UN. This project was the result of lobbying by American non-governmental organisations which wanted to use the US's debts issue as a vehicle for something more than laying off UN staff and reducing the number of UN meetings. Senator Pell, Chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, changed the operative date of the Resolution to March 1989 to avoid any Reagan appointments to the Commission. The Bill (of December 1987) was then attached to the State Department Appropriation Bill which evaded a presidential veto. The Commission is to examine the UN system as a whole and evaluate its strengths and weaknesses, and it is to make recommendations to the President and Congress on ways of improving the effectiveness of the UN. It is to conclude its work by late 1990.

The Soviet Union's attitude to the UN has undergone a dramatic change. Its usual role was to seize the moral high ground via speeches but not to follow through with actual involvement in UN affairs. Indeed the USSR often sought to limit the UN's actions, such as the international protection of human rights. In recent years this approach has given way to a more co-operative one. It seems to be, at long last, bringing its actions into line with its rhetoric.

Following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the USSR decided to co-operate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency on both investigating the tragedy and proposing new arrangements to give early notification in the event of a nuclear accident. The UN mediation on Afghanistan, conducted by UN Under-Secretary-General Diego Cordovez, enabled the USSR to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan from a war it was not winning and which was souring its relations with Moslem Third World nations. Additionally, *perestroika* at home requires a withdrawal from the costly involvement in some Third World affairs, such as underwriting communist economic planning failures in Cuba and Vietnam.

In October 1987, the USSR announced that it would pay its back debts to the UN — in hard currency. The New York Soviet Mission to the UN is suspiciously large (275 persons) — especially for a nation which had little detailed involvement in UN affairs. Some of the staff were spies, who used New York as their diplomatic cover. In accordance with US demands, the Mission has been reduced to 170 persons. Soviet citizens on the UN staff often acted as Soviet civil servants rather than international civil servants. The USSR now permits its UN civil servants to apply for long-term contracts to encourage loyalty to the UN.

In September 1987 the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, set out in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* a new approach to the UN. The UN should be the basis of a 'comprehensive system of international peace and security', involving social, economic and ecological co-operation among all nations. The USSR is also looking to a redirection and expansion of the UN's political and peacekeeping work.

Evidently the USSR recognises that regional conflicts tend to involve

the interests of the superpowers and therefore to invite competitive intervention on their part. The obvious solution is the use of UN machinery to fill the political or military vacuum and thus make superpower intervention unnecessary. In other words, each superpower should be assured that restraint on its part will not open the door to unimpeded intervention by the other. This is, of course, the view of the UN held by Dag Hammerskjold — which was so criticised at the time by the USSR. The USSR now believes that it cannot just abandon expensive clients like Cuba and Vietnam and expose them to US influence. Consequently it looks to a revitalised UN to prevent one superpower filling the vacuum created by the exit of the other superpower.

The new Soviet approach requires two developments. First, the US will have to accept the USSR's perception of the UN's role. It is too soon to assess the attitude of the new Administration on this matter. Second, the USSR has yet to set out the specifics of how the UN is to be revitalised. My experience of Soviet delegations at recent UN meetings is that *perestroika* has created bedlam in foreign policy-making and that the diplomats are not clear just what policies they ought to be proposing.

It is precisely because there is now, in effect, an ideas vacuum that non-governmental organisations and private individuals can play a useful role in generating new ideas. After all, the League and UN were both designed partly in this way.

Proposals for reforming the UN vary considerably in their ambition and chances of an early implementation. Some would like to see changes in practice (as distinct from changes to the UN Charter), while others want amendments to the UN Charter, while others would prefer a fresh attempt outside the UN. At this stage of the debate over UN reform, it is perhaps best (as Mao Tse Tung said in another context) to 'let a thousand flowers bloom'.

One document which has attracted particular interest is by Maurice Bertrand, 'Some Reflections on the Reform of the United Nations'. A senior inspector for the UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) for several years, his report stresses that, thus far, changes to the UN have been managerial in nature. It states the need for structural reform. The most acceptable structural reforms are rationalisation and integration of the UN Economic and Social Council and specialised agencies, in the direction of an 'economic United Nations'. The Bertrand Report is not intended to be a full report on UN Charter reform. This first instalment, made up of Bertrand's personal observations, calls for sweeping internal changes, as well as structural changes. The major problem identified by the report is the way in which the UN attempts to affect world affairs through management. Of four traditional UN functions (humanitarian relief, peace and security, forum for discussions and development), there is very little consensus on what course to follow. Under the present system, every time a situation arises, a strategy for negotiations must be worked out. Meanwhile, the problem might well be escalating. Under a restructured UN, these strategies could be outlined in advance to eliminate the time-consuming

task of negotiating for negotiations. Bertrand sees the need for new negotiating bodies. In the field of development a 'total reconversion' should take place. Regional development agencies of enterprises, with an integrated approach to co-operation, should be established. A new 'Economic Council' with 23 or 37 members should replace the Economic and Social Council. The specialised agencies would not be abolished, but their staffs and programmes would be integrated into the regional development agencies; only standard setting would remain to the old agencies. Decision making, in an organ where not all nations would be represented and where the realities of wealth and power were recognised, would have to be done by some kind of weighted voting system.

The UN Charter begins with a ringing statement about 'we the peoples . . .' but then references to the 'people' disappear in favour of the UN being an association of nations (and governments). Ironically, many governments get along better with other governments, even when they are disputing with each other, than they get along with their own people. As a whole, the UN touches elites, but rarely the majority of any population. It is governments and specialists which make use of the Specialised Agencies, and there is no feedback to the agencies.

There is a point of view that the UN was flawed from the outset. It was given responsibility without any real authority while at the same time the superpowers have authority through power but no overall responsibility.

Designing 'world governments' is a great deal easier than gaining public acceptance for them. The 1940s were a propitious time to establish the UN, coinciding with the expansion of governmental power to create the welfare state, reduce unemployment and regulate economic, social and environmental activities.

The 1980s, by contrast, have been years of disillusionment with big bureaucracies, the deregulation of business activities and the popularity of satirical programmes like the BBC's *Yes Minister*. National governments have given government itself a bad name. If Whitehall is bad, then a world government would be even worse! But this disillusionment could be wrongly based. Economic problems such as inflation and the debt crisis surge across national boundaries and are at the margin of governments' ability to control. Ideas for reforming the UN or even replacing it are important. There is a crisis in the global organisation of human affairs which is gradually being recognised by governments, non-governmental organisations and private individuals. The ideas may seem in 1989 to be impractical or unrealistic, but given the speed of change in international affairs, what is today's idealism may be tomorrow's conventional wisdom.

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NO PROSPECT FOR REFORM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

by Gordon Wightman

THE resignation on 10 October of the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, Lubomír Strougal, was widely interpreted in Britain as a major setback for reform in that country. Strougal, the Prime Minister since 1970, was seen as the main proponent in Czechoslovakia of Gorbachev-style reforms and his departure was taken to indicate victory for opponents of change within the Communist Party leadership.

Yet, while it is true that Strougal has in recent years been the most unequivocal advocate within the Czechoslovak leadership of economic, and indeed, if more equivocally, of political reforms, his resignation from the Government, and more importantly from the party Presidium, should not be taken too readily to mean that all prospects for change in Czechoslovakia have disappeared for the foreseeable future.

As far as economic reform is concerned, the objective arguments remain as forceful now as they were before the October Central Committee meeting at which Strougal's resignation was announced. During a visit to Prague and Bratislava in late September[1] I was told repeatedly that there was simply no alternative to a radical restructuring of the economy. On the one hand, academics I spoke to argued, it is the only way to ensure improved economic performance — that factories produce goods that people want to buy and avoid the perennial problem of having to stockpile consumer goods that are unsellable (such as the continued overproduction of black-and-white television sets no one wants while the demand for colour sets is unmet). On the other hand, and perhaps more critically, reform is seen as the only means to resolve the more serious underlying problems of the economy: the need to develop modern industries particularly in the high-tech area, to ensure more efficient use of raw materials, energy and labour, and to improve and increase the provision of services.

To judge from the policy documents that have emerged from the party Central Committee, as well as the legislation that has been prepared by the Government in the past two years, the case for an economic reform has already been accepted by the leadership. The clearest indication that a Czechoslovak *perestroika* was under way came as long ago as January 1987, when a lengthy document was published, entitled 'Principles governing the restructuring of the planned management of the economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic'. It set out a programme very similar indeed to Gorbachev's proposals for the Soviet Union, including the introduction of market mechanisms, a devolution of power from the central ministries to factory managers and the requirement that factories move towards a self-financing regime in which profitability would be a key goal in their operations.[2]

Those ideas were, somewhat belatedly it is true, given the party Central Committee's seal of approval in December 1987. At the same time, the

Central Committee set out a programme for the restructuring of the economy involving a gradual transfer to the new rules by 1991 — a longish time perspective but not necessarily one that reflects opposition to reform as distinct from caution in the light of the practical difficulties such a radical change is likely to face.

That same Central Committee session witnessed the replacement of Gustáv Husák as party General Secretary by Milos Jakes, a man rightly remembered as a fierce opponent of the Prague Spring (he oversaw the purge of reformists from the party membership in 1970). Whatever his record, however, Jakes' election as party leader seems to have given an impetus to economic reform that was lacking under his predecessor, and created some scope for consideration of changes in the political sphere.

One example of the more committed approach to economic reform following his election as party leader was the decision to implement the Law on the State Enterprise — a key piece of legislation which not only incorporated the proposals for greater managerial power and self-financing by enterprises but also added provisions for the election by the workforce of factory managers and 'workers' councils'— six months earlier than originally planned, in July 1988 rather than January 1989.

Although question-marks remain about the capacity and the will of the leadership to realise the programme that has been set out in the last two years, their commitment to the idea of economic restructuring remains unchanged following the October Central Committee meeting and it is in the political arena that the most controversial issues are to be found. Insofar as Strougal's resignation was prompted by disagreements within the leadership over the course of reform, it seems likely that at issue was the question of democratisation, and how far Czechoslovakia should emulate the Soviet Union in devolving power to the people, separating party from state, and encouraging a more pluralistic political system. So far, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in Czechoslovakia commitment to that second major policy plank in Gorbachev's programme is at best only half-hearted.

The arrests and detention of dissidents shortly before the celebrations of the seventieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia, on 28 October, and the harsh police action against the unofficial demonstration that took place in Prague that day illustrate the continuing intolerance of expressions of opinion and activities that have not been sanctioned by the party leadership. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude from those actions that no political reform whatsoever is being undertaken in Czechoslovakia, however circumscribed that reform might be.

Although it is difficult to regard what has been done so far as other than cosmetic, it should be noted that Jakes has already made some changes in the political sphere. Two months before the Soviet Communist Party conference in June endorsed Gorbachev's proposals for a limit on the tenure of key posts within party and state, for example, the Czechoslovak party Central Committee had taken identical steps, restricting tenure of executive posts such as that of the General Secretary to two

electoral terms. It is a provision that poses no threat to a party leader who has just taken office and who, at 66, must see another eight or nine years at the top as the most he can hope for.

Jakes has spoken out firmly, too, in favour of another reform introduced under Gorbachev in the Soviet Union — secret ballots for elections within the Communist Party. The response in Czechoslovakia so far, however, has been disappointing despite the General Secretary's advocacy of that procedure. As few as 4.8 per cent of the party's primary organisations elected their officials by that method at their general meetings in the first months of 1988 and only 47 of the 127 District conferences of the party, held last April, used it to choose new District Committees. Even fewer of those new District Committees — 29 — then opted to elect their Presidia by secret ballot. Jakes' message, however, seemed to have got across by the time that the conferences at the Regional level were held in May, for only one of the eleven failed to vote in secret for its Regional Committee.

Much clearly should not be expected from such limited changes. No attempt appears to have been made to nominate more than one candidate for each place in those party elections and for the most part the exercise has remained as ratificatory as voting by acclamation. Only in a very few cases, at the level of the primary organisation, were the results other than expected. As Jakes told the Central Committee meeting in April, 138 nominees were rejected by the membership (out of several hundred thousand) including sixty people who had been picked out as potential chairmen of their organisations.

In many of the elections of new factory managers which have been held since the Law on the State Enterprise came into force in July, democratisation has not gone far and only one candidate has been put forward, often the incumbent manager. In these cases, the response of the workforce has not always been acquiescent. The Prague party chief, for instance, has reported that attempts to foist a new manager on the workforce have been resisted in a number of workplaces in the capital, and in the Lubenec state farm, in the Louny district — to cite a case that was reported in great detail in the party daily, *Rudé právo,* on 18 August — the sole candidate in the election, a man who had been its director for seventeen years, was rejected when only 29 of the 158 delegates' of the workforce voted for him.

Despite these moves to emulate changing political practice in the Soviet Union, even limited democratisation is a controversial area for the leadership and a great deal of uncertainty remains about how far to go down that path. There appears to have been strong resistance, at least before Jakes' accession as party leader, to electing factory managers and to the creation of workers' councils. Both have been given the go-ahead, but it is doubtful if either change will have all that much impact. Selection of the candidates who will stand for election as factory manager remains in the hands of the party and the 'owners' of the factory, i.e. a local government committee or a government ministry. The precise nature of workers

councils' powers and even the frequency of their meetings remain unclear, for the time being at least.

It seems likely that the leadership will also sanction the introduction of multicandidate elections for local councils and even the national and federal parliaments but that the procedure will remain tightly controlled from above insofar as it will be operationalised through the National Front, the Communist-Party dominated umbrella organisation embracing the other, non-communist political parties and mass organisations such as the trades unions.

This attempt to balance economic reform with only minimal political change creates its own problems. Intrinsic to the success of economic reform is commitment by the people, especially workers, to its implementation. Yet it is doubtful that that commitment will be forthcoming as long as a leadership remains in charge which has primarily been identified with opposition to reform.

In that respect, the changes which have been made in the composition of the party Presidium since Jakes became General Secretary may be of some significance. Until last April all but two of its twelve full members were men who had been there since at least 1971, and who had been brought in in the period after the 1968 Soviet invasion with the task of dismantling the reforms introduced during the Prague Spring. Nevertheless, despite their long period in power, the Czechoslovak Presidium was far from the gerontocracy that the Brezhnev leadership of the Soviet Union had become a decade ago, but with two members in their seventies and the remainder well into their sixties, it was, to say the least, a body that appeared to be in need of some rejuvenation.

Paradoxically, it is rumoured to have been the advocacy of just such a rejuvenation by the Prague party boss, Antonín Kapek, that led to his enforced retirement from the Presidium in April at the age of sixty-six, a move that was accompanied by the promotion to full membership of two candidate-members: Jan Fojtík, a Secretary of the Central Committee, then just turned sixty, and the then fifty-seven year old, Ignác Janák, who was to be appointed First Secretary in Slovakia a week later.

The changes in October were much more radical than that, however, for the departure from the Presidium of Strougal and the Slovak Prime Minister, Peter Colotka, was accompanied by the elevation to full membership of five people, two of them new to the top level of the party and all of them men in their forties and fifties.

Both newcomers, Karel Urbánek and Ivan Knotek, have risen rapidly through the party hierarchy. The former has moved in the space of a year from the post of party boss in Brno to that of Head of the Politico-organisational Department of the Central Committee and, in October, was appointed Chairman of a new committee set up to oversee party organisations in the Czech Lands. Ivan Knotek, at fifty-two, five years older than Urbánek, has held three different posts in less than two years. Appointed party chief in West Slovakia as recently as 1987, he was moved the following year to full membership of the Slovak party Presidium,

which he combined with responsibility for agriculture as a Secretary of that party's Central Committee. Following his election to the central party leadership in October, he took over Colotka's post as Slovak Prime Minister.

It was the promotion of Miroslav Stepán that was perhaps the most striking change. Appointed the party chief in Prague and a member of the Central Committee Secretariat as recently as last April, he is, at forty-three, the youngest member of the Presidium. Elevated with him to full membership of the Presidium in Prague were two candidate-members: Frantisek Pitra, the fifty-two year old Central Committee Secretary for agriculture since 1981, now Prime Minister in the Czech Lands; and Miroslav Zavadil, the fifty-six year old Chairman of the Trades Unions since March 1987 (he was previously ambassador in Moscow).

The overall effect of the changes since December 1987 was an increase in the number of full members within the Presidium from the more usual eleven to fifteen and a marked reduction in their average age, from sixty-six at the time of Husák's resignation to just over sixty in October. There is however little reason to expect a marked shift in attitudes within the leadership. These most recent recruits may not be so clearly identified with the antireformist policies of the 1970s as the surviving members of the Presidium, or for that matter Fojtík, but they are nevertheless all people whose careers advanced significantly in that decade. Though perhaps less clearly identified in the public mind as opponents of reform than their colleagues, they are unlikely to be much more favourably predisposed towards any change in the political sphere which might encourage expectations of a rehabilitation of the Prague Spring or of radical political reform.

Jakes himself has already described this enlarged Presidium as a temporary measure. Further departures from its ranks may therefore be expected in the not too distant future — in time perhaps for the next party congress, which it has already been announced will be held a year early, in the first half of 1990. In those circumstances, Husák, seventy-five last January, and Vasil Bilak, the Secretary responsible for international relations, who was seventy-one in August, look the most obvious candidates for retirement.

The changes within the Presidium were not the only ones at the top of the Czechoslovak political system approved at the October Central Committee meeting. If anything, the government 'reshuffle', of which details were given on 12 October, was more sweeping. In all, ten of the twenty members of the Federal Government lost their posts, and another four changed ministerial responsibility (two of the ten who lost their posts, however, were moved to other positions in the party-government hierarchy and a third became chairman of the Czechoslovak State Bank).

The casualty rate among members of the Federal Government is even more striking when one observes that only eight members remain from the Government which was formed immediately after the last national elections in June 1986 and which had already been subjected to a major

reshuffle as recently as last April. Where the two senior members, Strougal and Colotka, appear to have been the victims of policy disagreements within the party leadership, most of the other changes look like an attempt to give a boost to economic performance by weeding out those who have proved wanting and bringing in fresh blood. There is certainly no reason to suppose that Ladislav Adamec, Strougal's erstwhile Deputy and now his successor as Federal Prime Minister, will be less committed to economic reform.

The revival of reformism in Czechoslovakia was always likely to be a difficult process after the experiences of the Prague Spring. There is no reason to suppose that the party leadership after the recent changes will be more favourably disposed towards radical political reforms than before October and there is little evidence that Moscow is any keener on a political liberalisation in Czechoslovakia than the domestic leadership. Rather the reverse, given the endorsement of the Czechoslovak leaders' hostile assessment of 1968 by some of their Soviet counterparts, notably Vadim Medvedev[3] who, until his promotion to the CPSU's ideology portfolio at the end of September, was the CPSU Central Committee Secretary responsible for relations with ruling communist parties, and thus the authoritative voice on these matters.

Nevertheless, economic necessity and a desire to stay in line with the broad thrust of policy in the Soviet Union have combined to place economic reform back on the agenda in Prague. It remains to be seen what the longer-term consequences in the political sphere of the economic changes will be, or whether the minimal modifications that have been made to political practice will lead to deeper changes, but in the meantime it would be a mistake to oversimplify the case and regard Czechoslovakia in 1989 as a bastion of unswerving opposition to *perestroika* in any shape or form. At least in the economy that is not the case.

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1. The visit was arranged under the exchange programme between the UK and Czechoslovakia administered by the British Council.
2. For a brief review of developments in Czechoslovakia in the last three years see Gordon Wightman, 'Czechoslovakia: The Seventeenth Party Congress', in *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1986), pp.304-308 and 'Gorbachev, Czechoslovakia and Reform', *ibid*, vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1987), pp.313-317.
3. On Medvedev's views, see my 'Gorbachev, Czechoslovakia and Reform', p.316.

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KANAKS, CALDOCHES AND METIS, PART 2: NEW CALEDONIA AND THE 1988 FRENCH ELECTIONS

by Adrian Smith

NEW Caledonia's history since 1853 has been one of sustained resistance to French rule by an indigenous but shrinking Melanesian community — the Kanaks. Over the past 30 years, and particularly during the nickel boom of the late 1960s, successive French governments have encouraged large scale immigration into the territory, intentionally swamping the local Melanesians by sheer weight of numbers. *Pieds noirs,* thrown out of Algeria in 1962, joined other recent arrivals — *les métros* — in exploiting the western half of the main island, La Grande Terre. The Europeans, or *caldoches* now make up around 40 per cent of New Caledonia's 146,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of them still concentrated on the western coastal strip, and in the capital of Nouméa. A further 20 per cent of the population comprises imported labour and refugees from south-east Asia, notably Indonesia and South Vietnam, or from France's other Pacific territories. Fearful that independence could bring expulsion or second-class citizenship, the Asians, and ironically, the Polynesians, vote solidly with the *caldoches* in favour of remaining French. Reduced to a minority in their own country the Kanaks have little chance of controlling the territorial assembly, of securing representation in the National Assembly, and, most crucially, of winning any referendum on self-determination.

Melanesians first rebelled against their French rulers as long ago as 1878, and again in 1917. Tribal and communal demands for an independent 'Kanaky' were first established between the wars, but only over the past twenty years have they become moulded into a potent political and paramilitary force. Since September 1984 six separatist parties, each with its own tribal and territorial allegiances, have coalesced into today's FLNKS (Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front).

The FLNKS leader, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, is a *métis* or 'mixed blood'. Most *métis* are fiercely opposed to independence, including those tried in October 1987 for the murders of 10 FLNKS members three years before. Their acquittal seriously threatened Tjibaou's hold over his coalition's more militant elements. For over two years his strategy of non-violent protest had ensured the enthusiastic support of all South Pacific Forum (SPF) members, including New Zealand and Australia. The 1986 Summit of Non-Aligned Countries and, most especially, the United Nations General Assembly, recognised New Caledonia as a colonial issue of global concern. Yet even Tjibaou interpreted last October's not guilty verdicts as final proof that, whatever the international benefits, pursuing independence within the law was getting nowhere. In November 1987 he and his deputy, Yeiwene Yeiwene, called for 'a Kanak people's resistance against the occupying forces'. Both men were subsequently charged with inciting murder and violence. The French crackdown was seen as conclusive

evidence that non-violence — always a tactic, never a principle — was politically bankrupt.

The Kanaks argue that, with the present electoral system and ethnic mix, any independence referendum will always be a foregone conclusion. On this assumption is based the FLNKS's policy of having 'actively boycotted' all elections bar one over the past four years. It was the very first boycott, of the November 1984 territorial elections, which led to that winter's violence. In 1985 the then Socialist government finally secured a ceasefire by promising regional power, and an early vote on President Mitterand's compromise proposal of 'independence-with-association'. That September, the FLNKS secured majorities in three out of the four new Regional Councils. Defeat in the densely-populated, and therefore predominantly non-Kanak, southern region was judged an acceptable price for abandoning the boycott. Today, the FLNKS insists that any decision on self-determination should be restricted to Kanaks and residents with parents born in the territory. Back in 1985, however, Tjibaou anticipated the Socialists retaining power in Paris. Government pressure might persuade just enough Europeans, however reluctantly, to vote for a qualified break with metropolitan France. Full independence could follow in the course of time.

In March 1986 the new conservative coalition soon clashed with Mitterand over New Caledonia. The credibility of moderates like Tjibaou was first undermined when Jacques Chirac insisted that any form of autonomy was out of the question. A referendum would still be held, but solely for the purpose of inflicting a crushing defeat upon opponents of the status quo. Throughout 1987 the FLNKS, buoyed by international support, maintained its fragile policy of peaceful protest. As requested by their leaders, almost all Melanesians boycotted that autumn's referendum. Not that surprisingly, 98 per cent of those who did vote expressed a desire to remain French; a result interpreted by Chirac as a great personal triumph.

Throughout the previous 18 months the islands' territorial government, controlled by the Gaullist RPCR (Rally for New Caledonia in the Republic), had persistently withheld vital financial aid from the Regional Councils in the east and on the outlying Loyalty Islands. Following the 1987 referendum, Paris set about denying the FLNKS any future opportunity to consolidate its regional power-bases. Chirac's Minister for Overseas Territories, Bernard Pons, sanctioned new regional divisions in advance of the 1988 elections. The FLNKS denounced such action as unashamed gerrymandering, intended to deny it continued control of the three Regional Councils. Henceforth, the Kanak boycott would also embrace regional and presidential elections, both of which were planned to coincide. Full of high expectations, many Kanaks had voted for Mitterand in 1981. Seven years later, most were disillusioned by his reluctance to insist in public on Chirac maintaining a dialogue with the FLNKS, and also by his uncompromising position over French nuclear testing on Moruroa.

The FLNKS leaders had to balance the propaganda value of sustained confrontation against the danger of alienating sensitive SPF governments. Tjibaou acknowledged the very real danger of sacrificing public opinion in France itself. Polls have consistently shown the French to be equally divided over the independence issue. Violence finally erupted last February, when 150 Kanaks, some later arrested, briefly seized ten gendarmes protecting a hospital construction site. In normal circumstances increased medical provision would have been welcomed with open arms. However, this hospital's symbolic importance lay in its location — Poindimié, a remote north-eastern village of the Tiati tribe.

After the 1878 rebellion, the authorities set up tribal reservations. Ironically, today's 'capitalisme populaire' dictates that these focuses of Kanak nationalism be broken up for private development. Intent on extending white influence throughout La Grande Terre, the territorial government want to expand Poindimié into the *caldoches'* second largest town. FLNKS opposition to any erosion of the Melanesian heartland was seen by the politbureau as further legitimising its disruption of the forthcoming elections. Preparing for a showdown, Pons' response was to fly in more gendarmes, bringing the combined strength of the security forces up to an astonishing 8,500 men.

'Cohabitation' had highlighted a surprising degree of bipartisan agreement over many external issues. New Caledonia was a notable exception. Early in last spring's campaign Mitterand slyly suggested that, prior to Chirac's premiership, both right and left were agreed on the territory's future. Thus, between 1981 and 1986 the Socialists had in fact adhered to policy guidelines previously established by Raymond Barre, the centre right's 1988 presidential candidate. The incumbent in effect embarrassed one rival, while accusing the other of sacrificing national interest for personal and party gain.

Any propaganda value in Mitterand's claim that Chirac was solely interested in pleasing his *caldoches* supporters depended upon the FLNKS impressing French voters with the dignity of their non-violent protest. The Poindimié incident was followed by two months of relative calm. The President's luck ran out in the final week of the campaign, when Kanak threats became reality. On 22 April, only two days before the first ballot, the FLNKS firebombed property in Nouméa. Roadblocks prevented rural polling stations opening. Most serious of all, masked men attacked a security post at Fayaoue, on the tiny east coast island of Ouvea. Three gendarmes were hacked to death, and another died later. The 27 survivors were held hostage in a maze of caves hidden by dense underbush on the northern tip of the coral atoll. (Tjibaou later expressed his personal regret over the deaths; they had to be seen in the 'historical context' of the independence struggle. The gendarmes had imprisoned male members of Ouvea's Gossanah tribe, and evacuated the women and children.)

The president could do little other than appeal for calm, and adamantly refuse to issue blanket condemnations. The prime minister, by contrast, exploited the crisis with relish. An emergency cabinet meeting despatched

Bernard Pons and the prestigious GIGN *(Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale)* anti-terrorist unit to the South Pacific. Chirac briefed the press on alleged Libyan involvement, at the same time also appearing to accuse Mitterand of fuelling Kanak extremism. His candidate obliged to maintain a dignified silence, Lionel Jospin, the Socialists' secretary-general, insisted that violence in New Caledonia was the responsibility of the present government. Its continued refusal to compromise had ultimately undermined the authority of moderate FLNKS leaders such as Tjibaou.

Thirty-one of the territory's 139 polling stations remained shut the following Sunday, 24 April. On the Loyalty Islands eleven of the hostages were released, but two more police stations were besieged. Paramilitary reinforcements flew in with orders to return fire. At least 11 Melanesians were wounded in gun battles, and a teenage girl died in crossfire. The tactic of mass boycott, if not of armed insurrection, did no doubt undermine the legitimacy of the elections; but the FLNKS's failure to disrupt voting in and around Nouméa is shown in the relatively high overall turnout of 56.37 per cent. The Europeans voted overwhelmingly for Chirac; the RPCR gained 35 of the 48 contested seats, sharing control of the four new Regional Councils with smaller Francophone parties such as the FN (National Front).

As the situation deteriorated in the aftermath of the elections, fighting between insurgents and loyalist vigilantes centred upon the besieged town of St. Louis, only 10 miles from Nouméa. In the capital itself, where Kanaks now began appearing in court charged with armed rebellion, kidnapping and murder, Pons talked of outlawing the FLNKS. Force was now the only feasible course of action on Ouvea, an assumption backed up by the decision to fly in 250 marines. A further 300 troops were already on Ouvea. Acutely aware of FN complaints about the government's 'kid-glove' approach to problems in the South Pacific, Chirac needed Jean-Marie Le Pen's 4.3 million first-round voters if he was to have any chance of overhauling Mitterand on the second ballot. Cruelly for him, crisis management turned abruptly into farce.

On Ouvea, the GIGN commander, Captain Philippe Legorjus, along with a magistrate and four members of his unit, literally walked into a trap. Legorjus was later released, but only on condition that he act as a hostage negotiator. His capture, along with reports of persistent fighting in the besieged east coast towns of Canala and Pouebo, fuelled a growing impression that the government had lost control of the situation. With only a week to the final ballot, Mitterand seized the initiative with a strong personal appeal, for understanding on behalf of the French people, and for compassion on the part of the FLNKS.

In Nouméa, the RPCR organised a successful one-day strike; the FN urged loyalists to take up arms; and the French High Commission imposed a news blackout. Scorning local dignatories, Kanak leaders demanded a real intermediary to initiate a ceasefire, an exchange of 'prisoners-of-war', and a UN inquiry into the conduct of the French security forces. Bereft

of hard facts, French observers speculated on the hostages' freedom following Mitterand's imminent victory. None anticipated the dramatic events of the campaign's final 72 hours.

With defeat almost a foregone conclusion, Chirac needed to avoid a landslide if he intended leading his own party, let alone a united conservative alliance, into opposition. Denied Le Pen's endorsement, he set out to massage the national ego and impress floating right-wing voters. On 5 May Chirac personally welcomed home the last three French hostages in Beirut. With the arrival a day later of Dominique Prieur, both the agents convicted of sinking the Greenpeace flagship, *Rainbow Warrior* were now at liberty. TV viewers were duly treated to a furious David Lange on their screens. The New Zealand protests extended to Chirac's third coup — also in the South Pacific. The 23 hostages on Ouvea escaped unhurt after an eight-hour gun battle, at the cost of two paratroopers and 19 separatists. (Astonishingly, just a week later the 29 Kanaks taken prisoner would be in Paris, awaiting trial for murder and armed rebellion.) Bernard Pons hailed the operation as a triumph for his forces in the field (particularly as it was the hapless Legorjus who had smuggled two pistols into the cave). At home on the final day of campaigning, Chirac's team gave the gendarmes' release maximum publicity. A defiant FLNKS communique condemned the operation as a costly electoral stunt.

Given that on the first ballot the right's total vote was 50.8 per cent, and that in the run-off its candidate secured only 45.98 per cent, Chirac's spectacular eve-of-poll attempts to sway opinion must be judged a failure. His aggressive tactics not only left FN supporters unimpressed, but drove thousands of centre-right voters into either abstaining or swinging left. In Nouméa, the Europeans' overwhelming support for Chirac left them predicting chaos if a new government 'condemned us because we want to remain French'. A jubilant Tjibaou nevertheless only gave Mitterand two days to form a new government, withdraw troops, and despatch an independent mediator.

Chirac's Socialist successor as prime minister, Michel Rocard, responded by sending two leading churchmen and a prominent freemason to reestablish dialogue between Kanaks and *caldoches*. The team's key member, to whom Rocard looked for concrete proposals, was a government specialist on South Pacific affairs, Christian Blanc. Blanc's 'mission of conciliation' took on an added dimension when a radically new version of the hostages' release began to emerge. Witnesses claimed that at least three FLNKS prisoners had been summarily shot — an allegation at first strenuously denied by Legorjus and Pons. (Wencelas Lavelloi, who continued resisting, was shot in the head by his captors. A 'teabearer', Waina Amossa, earlier died in crossfire. Those responsible for their deaths have yet to be established. However, one gendarme did admit to investigators that in panic he wounded the kidnappers' leader, Alphonse Dianou. The FLNKS insist Dianou died as a result of ill-treatment en route to a field hospital. Like every other aspect of the operation, confusion still surrounds precisely what did happen to him.)

With parliament dissolved, the party in office again chose to exploit New Caledonia for campaign purposes. This time however, it was the Socialists enjoying privileged access to the media, and at issue were newspaper reports of a virtual breakdown in civil-military relations prior to the rescue attempt. President Mitterand had supposedly vetoed plans to bomb and napalm the caves holding the gendarmes; orders drafted by the Minister for Overseas Territories and his army commander, General Jacques Vidal. Vidal insisted that, despite Pons' evidence to the contrary, he had always preferred Legorjus' plan for a limited night time operation. Meanwhile, other senior staff speculated on whether agents of the security services could risk attending any public inquiry. Should Pons have sanctioned the deployment of *paras* from the DGSE's 11th Shock Regiment, the very same unit responsible for sinking the *Rainbow Warrior?*

Libération revealed that prolonged preparations for a dawn raid had forewarned the kidnappers. Lightly-armed Kanaks were thus able to repel an initial assault by France's crack anti-terrorist squad. The GIGN's contingency planning was then swiftly subsumed by the indiscriminate fire power of marines and paratroopers attacking with flame throwers and heavy machine guns.

Throughout the election campaign there was never any clear idea of exactly what had occurred on Ouvea. The scandal fuelled inter-service rivalry, threatening to undermine the image of efficiency and self-discipline so carefully cultivated by France's armed forces since 1962. The killing of an unarmed Melanesian by a paratrooper had too many echoes of Algeria, and the army was ordered to withdraw from all policing operations. The Socialists' electoral prospects received a further boost when *Le Monde* charged by Bernard Pons with selective quoting, published the now Commandant Legorjus' complete account of the raid. His report, deeply critical of the army, repeated the claim that negotiations had ceased because the Minister felt Chirac's flagging campaign needed a show of force. Such an allegation was bound to undermine the Gaullists' parliamentary campaign: Pons was looking to succeed the demoralised Chirac as leader of the RPR (Rally for the Republic) in the next National Assembly. Whether out of bravado or self-sacrifice, it was not long before Chirac declared that he alone was responsible for events on Ouvea.

The new Defence Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, routinely deplored the leaking of classified documents. At the same time, he unashamedly promoted the suggestion that Pons had over-ruled anti-terrorist specialists in favour of unnecessary force. With one field commander already suspended, and Vidal protesting his innocence, the Defence Ministry's own investigation concluded that 'acts contrary to military honour had been committed'. On cue, Rocard reiterated ministerial responsibility for these abuses. The same day, Mitterand ordered the Justice Ministry's inquiry to uncover 'all the truth'.

With the gendarmerie ordered to keep a low profile, and Christian Blanc busy promoting compromise, an uneasy peace prevailed between the two rounds of elections. On 12 June the Socialists won 276 seats. Even

without a working majority, they were again predominant in French politics. Rocard formed his second cabinet. On 15 June, having accepted Blanc's proposals for a swift interim solution, he met Tjibaou. This was a clear signal to the RPCR's leader, Jacques Lafleur. No doubt recalling the Algerian experience, he now chose to sacrifice his hardliners and do a deal with Rocard. Needing centrist support in the National Assembly, the new administration used the peace moves to cultivate the *Barristes*. As the UDF (Union of French Democracy) began to break up, Raymond Barre discreetly assisted Rocard in bringing Lafleur and Tjibaou together, for a marathon negotiating session at Matignon on 26 June.

The agreement finally hammered out presupposes both sides laying down their arms and accepting direct rule from Paris for 12 months. For 10 years a High Commissioner (and his Melanesian deputy) will work with a new federal system of three regional administrations: their elected executives will together make up a territorial congress. Blanc's system of checks and balances is underpinned by provision for major investment throughout the islands, but with strict controls on further immigration. In 1998 a referendum on self-determination will exclude all arrivals over the previous decade.

The whole package was to be ratified by a national referendum in November 1988. Mitterand is the master of his old enemy's constitutional creation. Like de Gaulle, he and Rocard wish to avoid prolonged parliamentary debate; also, moderates on both sides are seen to need a plebiscitary 'guarantee' with which to reassure their less compromising comrades. An enthusiastic Tjibaou returned home to convince his own supporters, and the FLNKS's more militant factions, that Rocard offered the only alternative to further bloodshed. The prospects for long term peace did not look good; every sign suggested that the Kanaks' common front faced imminent collapse. Yet, astonishingly, by the end of August Tjibaou had persuaded all elements within the FLNKS to accept that Rocard's plan was the most they could achieve. At the same time, Lafleur convinced the RPCR that compromise was not the same as betrayal. By the end of August both men had signed the new accord, enabling Rocard to make a brief but triumphant visit to Nouméa; his prestige, and personal standing in the polls, had never been higher. Few now anticipated his early departure from office, nor, thankfully, yet more bloodshed in the Pacific.

Generally speaking, French voters were concerned with how their leaders handled the crisis, as opposed to the crisis itself. Even on the right, the fate of the *caldoches* scarcely raised the same passions as that of the *pied noirs* 30 years ago. In which case, why is New Caledonia so important to France? Certainly, it boasts an unusually rich variety of key mineral resources, and the same would appear true of its 200-mile maritime exclusion zone. More significant perhaps is the territory's strategic importance for the West. Its location astride two of the Pacific's key sea lanes helps explain American reluctance to criticise France's handling of the crisis. The US Navy relied heavily upon New Caledonia between 1942 and 1945. Today, Washington and Paris enjoy reciprocal basing arrange-

ments across a huge theatre of operations. Furthermore, US Pacific Command's contingency plans rely heavily on Nouméa in the event of explusion from the Philippines. Its airport now has extensive military as well as civil support facilities. The naval base is currently being upgraded to harbour France's *force de frappe* and hunter-killer submarines.

However, the clearest explanation of why the Kanaks must remain French citizens for at least another decade is given in Jane Dibblin's moving study of Pacific nuclear testing, *Day of Two Suns.* Three years ago, veteran Gaullist Jacques Chaban-Delmas warned an RPCR rally that:

> If France were to vanish from New Caledonia it... would be followed by Polynesia — and France disappears. Your children would be poor little children because, if France ceases to be a nuclear power, she ceases to be a power altogether.

Geographically, Nouméa and Moruroa are thousands of miles apart: geopolitically, they are inseparable.

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UK OPPOSITION TO EC TOBACCO TAX

by Melanie Powell

THE UK Government has taken a firm stand against European Community (EC) Proposals to harmonise VAT and excise duties. Despite making an initial commitment on signing the Single European Act (1986), the Government now cites the need for national taxed-based health policy as a major reason for opposing the harmonisation of alcohol and tobacco duties. However, evidence from past budgets indicates that the UK Government is reluctant to adopt this type of health policy. Government reliance on indirect (expenditure) tax revenue and flexible, low cost revenue adjusters suggests that the UK health argument in opposition to harmonisation is a smokescreen, behind which the Government hopes to retrieve fiscal sovereignty.

Several issues arise from the apparent conflict between EC trade policy and UK health policy. It can be argued that the term conflict is inapplicable because harmonisation is not essential for the creation of a Single European Market, and that national tax policies are inappropriate public health measures in relation to smoking. In addition, the UK Government is unlikely to use tax policy as a health instrument with or without the constraint of harmonisation. Neither the UK nor the EC has developed co-ordinated tobacco control policies which take account of revenue requirements, trade pressures and the expansion of competitive international markets. It is argued that the current conflict arises from political strategic bargaining between national and supranational governments, but that future conflict will occur because an effective UK tobacco health policy cannot operate in isolation from EC trade policy.

Recent estimates place the number of premature deaths resulting from tobacco use in Britain at 100,000 per annum (Royal College of Physicians 1983). Between 15 and 20 per cent of all British deaths are associated with tobacco use. The annual cost to the National Health Service is thought to be in the region of £155 million. Evidence continues to mount on the impact of smoking, on the increased incidence of cancers, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, coronary and arterial heart disease, ulcers and damage to unborn children. The health implications of environmental tobacco smoke or 'passive smoking' are also under consideration, (Froggatt 1988). As a result, the use of tax increases as part of anti-smoking policy has been strongly recommended by health agencies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO 1982) and the Royal College of Physicians (1977, 1983). A tax increase can be passed on to the consumer through a rise in price, which will tend to reduce consumption overall.

Tax policies have also been promoted in two European preventive health policy agreements. In 1984, EC Member States agreed individually to aim to reduce tobacco consumption in the European region by 25 per cent as part of the WHO programme, Health for All in the Year 2000, (WHO 1984). In 1987, the European Commission launched the Europe

Against Cancer compaign in which it was argued that total tax revenue in all Member States should be approximated upward towards the Danish rates (EC 1986). The highest rates of tobacco tax in Europe are levied in Denmark, where the excise duty is earmarked for health service funding. Although the EC tax harmonisation proposals have partially accommodated the campaign objectives with regard to health policy, the aim of harmonisation is to break down barriers to trade in all goods through the creation of the Single European Market.

Member States are already forced to levy duties on cigarettes using a combination of specific (unit) taxes and ad valorem (percentage of final price) taxes choosing a ratio of specific to total tax between 5 and 55 per cent of final price. Ten of the 12 Member States levy a total tax rate on cigarettes of between 67 and 75 per cent of final price. The UK, Denmark and Ireland levy the maximum specific component, whereas France, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy levy the lowest specific rate allowed. Specific duties on cigarettes range from 0.6 ecu's per 1,000 in Greece to 77.5 ecus per 1,000 in Denmark, and ad valorem rates vary from 4 per cent in Spain to 41 per cent in Belgium (Powell 1988). A high ad valorem rate favours producers of low cost cigarettes produced from Community grown tobaccos.

The EC tax harmonisation proposals were published in 1987 and introduce two bands for VAT as well as specific rates for excise duties, (EC 1987). Standard rate VAT is to be charged between 4 and 20 per cent, with a reduced rate band for special goods. The impact of VAT approximation on tobacco tax will depend upon the level of ad valorem tax adopted. Specific cigarette tax has been set at the unique rate of 19.5 ecus per 1,000 derived from the arithmetic average of existing rates. The ad valorem rate on cigarettes, when combined with VAT, must lie between 52 and 54 per cent. All other tobaccos are to carry only ad valorem tax with lower rate bands for cigars and cigarillos. Overall, the shift to ad valorem tax will raise total revenue from tobacco in line with the Commission's health policy, and reduce the ability of countries like the UK to protect high cost domestically produced cigarettes. Tax rates and prices will rise in most countries except Denmark and possibly the UK and Ireland.

The Commission argues that different structures and rates of indirect tax between countries will result in a distortion of trade and a continuation of frontier controls when the barriers to trade are due to be removed in 1992. Rate harmonisation is required to ensure fiscal neutrality and to remove the distinction between suppliers, so that imports are not taxable transactions. When the barriers are removed, producers may attempt to pay tax in low rate countries if excise differentials exceed transport costs. In addition, cross border shopping may force some countries to reduce tax rates, driving down the rates in countries with adjacent borders.

Part of the UK argument against tax harmonisation is that tax rates should be market driven and that the proposals are not necessary to

achieve an internal market. VAT, for example, is levied on output on the destination principle, being paid where the goods are sold rather than produced. Differential rates cannot distort trade by affecting production decisions. When border controls are lifted, the proposed VAT clearing house system will replace the current system of zero rating at the border and ensure that net receipts balance for every Member State. Continued differentials may however exacerbate fraud, particularly in cigarettes which carry an ad valorem component which encourages retailers to charge a higher price, and increase the degree of cross border shopping. However, these costs should either be borne by countries charging higher rates, or could be mitigated by agreements between countries on the Benelux agreement principle (Boss and Nelson 1988).

Arguments in support of excise harmonisation have a stronger basis. Excise duties are levied at the point of purchase and differentials are magnified because ad valorem taxes are raised on the final price including excise. Small differentials can lead to large variations in cost structures and prices. It is only possible to maintain excise differentials without border controls if a method can be devised to prevent duty paid tobaccos in low tax countries being shipped and sold in higher rate countries. Physical stamps, banderoles and the use of bonded warehouses may be one method, (Lee *et al* 1988). Even so, personal importation may still lead to some distortion of trade.

Many of the economic arguments in favour of tax harmonisation of tobacco duties can be countered by resorting to alternative schemes. However, the Commission stands to gain major political, technical and psychological benefits from the enforcement of harmonisation. The proposals are seen as the flagship of the single market, establishing the need for a supranational government. Within the Commission's policy agenda is a new emphasis on a social Europe which will require the subordination of national prerogatives in fiscal policy. Even if the UK were successfully to challenge the current proposals, some degree of harmonisation, and loss of national sovereignty, appears to be inevitable.

There was little opposition to the progress of the single market policy before 1987 when the tax proposals were tabled. The full implications for government revenue and fiscal sovereignty had not been publicly expressed. However, Margaret Thatcher was outspoken in her opposition at Bruges by August 1988, and Nigel Lawson only subsequently raised the issue of health policy as a major reason for opposition. UK Customs and Excise estimates suggest that the proposals could lead to a 10 per cent reduction in tax on cigarettes leading to a price reduction of 12p on 1987 levels; tax on pipe tobacco could decrease by 17 per cent leading to a price reduction of up to 80p per 25 grams. The combined impact on tobacco taxation could reduce revenue by £530 million (EC 1987b), and will preclude the use of tax hikes or tax increases above the rate of inflation as a health policy to reduce consumption.

Proponents of a public health policy to reduce consumption of tobacco products in the UK have pressed for three main types of government

policy; tax increases, greater expenditure on health education and stricter controls on advertising by producers. The methods of control and justification for intervention differ between each policy type, but the goals are common; to reduce the level of per capita consumption based on the assumption that lower levels of consumption are associated with lower incidence of smoking related disease and improved population health. There can be little doubt that smoking is harmful to the smoker, but the measurement of risk and the attribution of mortality to smoking is fraught with methodological and epidemiological difficulties. It might be argued that if smokers are aware of the health risks, they have a right to choose ill health and that the costs to the National Health Service of smoking are outweighed by the savings made in the long run because people die prematurely, avoiding health costs at a later date, (Atkinson and Meade 1974). However, controls over tobacco use may also be justified on the basis of harm involuntarily imposed on third parties through passive smoking and smoking induced fires, on the basis of poor information and the addictive nature of tobacco products, and when society demands the achievement of a level of health status irrespective of individual choice. Given the connection between consumption and health, Government should adopt the most efficient method of reducing consumption for a given level of policy cost.

One argument in favour of tax policy is that price is more than 70% tax and demand for tobacco falls less than proportionately as price increases. This inelasticity of demand implies that revenue will continue to rise despite an increase in tax and prices. Although the impact on consumption is relatively small, the revenue needs of government are maintained. Estimates of price elasticity derived from empirical studies suggest that a 10 per cent increase in the price of cigarettes would lead to a fall in consumption of between 3 and 10 per cent, (Godfrey and Maynard 1988). However, any tax policy might be counteracted by the influence of rising incomes. Estimates show that a 10 per cent increase in income could lead to an increase in tobacco consumption of between 1 and 3 per cent (Godfrey and Maynard 1988). Similarly, a 10 per cent increase in advertising expenditure might have no impact on consumption or result in a 1 per cent increase. The impact of health education is difficult to measure, depending on whether empirical models assume that the effect on consumption is temporary or permanent. Work by Godfrey (1989) found that the first Royal College of Physicians Report in 1962 resulted in a continuous decline in demand for tobacco equivalent to 3 per cent per annum. As a result of all these factors, a 10 per cent increase in the inflation adjusted price at 1986 was estimated to result in a 6 per cent reduction in consumption per annum over a four year period.

Increasing the real price or maintaining the real price of tobacco products through tax policy could lead to reductions in consumption as a health policy. The effectiveness of tax policy must be balanced against the cost of increasing regressivity because the lowest earning groups spend a larger proportion of their income on tobacco and therefore pay rela-

tively more tax against income. But recent estimates of price elasticity between socio-economic classes indicated a higher elasticity response in the lower class groups. (Townsend 1987). An increase in tax and price might therefore result in greater reductions in consumption in lower class groups and less regressivity.

Since the 1960s, health interest groups have consistently argued for increased tobacco tax rates at the annual budget alongside the tobacco industry lobby for lower rates. The industry can cite a 24 per cent reduction in per capita consumption in the UK since the peak level of 1979 and have argued that high tax rates lead to lower profitability and employment losses. Influence is limited on both sides but appears to favour industrial interests. Health policy has only been referred to as a supporting reason for raising tobacco tax in the 1976, 1984 and 1986 budgets.

An examination of past budget policy shows that tax increases are determined in an ad hoc fashion depending on the balance of revenue, trade and political objectives rather than health policy (Godfrey and Powell 1987). For example, in 1976, the Chancellor used the regulator clause to raise tax tobacco tax by 10 per cent subsequent to an International Monetary Fund restriction on domestic credit expansion. In 1981, tobacco tax was raised to generate extra revenue when the new derv duty was opposed. Pre-election years have been characteristically free of increases. Although Chancellors have identified the need to raise tax in line with inflation to maintain revenue, this policy has not been followed with regularity. Tobacco tax is an important, flexible, low cost budget adjustment instrument and past evidence gives no indication that any Chancellor would forego these benefits in order to follow a strict pattern of adjustment for health goals. Indeed, the central point of the Government's argument against harmonisation is this very inflexibility.

The UK Government has opposed the EC proposals on the grounds that tax harmonisation is not a requirement for the creation of a single market and that harmonisation restricts the pursuit of health policy. A tax policy, however, requires adherence to consistent rules which the UK Government is unlikely to adopt. The health policy arument is the method by which the Government hopes to retain fiscal sovereignty given a revenue system which requires flexibility. The EC goals of a single market are nevertheless directed towards expanding trade and supporting Community agricultural production of tobacco (Powell 1988). These policies will tend to increase trade in tobacco within the Community and to external countries. Agreements on public health policy in the EC and on an international scale cannot succeed unless the impact of trade policy on tobacco and the implications for consumption and health policy are recognised and co-ordinated.

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The March number of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Challenges to NATO* by Manfred Hamm, *Malaysia's National Agricultural Policy* by Raymond J. G. Wells, *The Muddled Mind of Mr. Hurd* by John Elsom and *The EEC and Mrs. Thatcher* by Gordon Tether.

POEMS

THE PICKERING

(The DHSS at Bridlington called on a vicar to exorcise a ghost from a fishing trawler after the men reported difficulties with a poltergeist. Report in *The Guardian*, 1988.)

The ship turned in circles again today,
as if we were sailing a boating pool. The bay
came thrice to starboard.

The fish spurned us — mackerel, cod —
and the radar failed. Skip said, God
knew what ailed us.

We turned away from other men's eyes.
Each of us had our own mysteries,
heart and head,

in secret maelstrom, but what wasn't said
was how the ocean buoyed up its dead
resentful spirits.

All that vast, that deep, rustling its
planetary skin, and a seaman whose wits
are weeping

clings to our helpless planks, and we lapping
our barren trawl, nervously wrapping
ourselves in wool.

For we cannot get warm and comfortable,
and the upper bunk creaks with the full
weight of flesh

that isn't there. And the lights flash
on and off, and we haul in non-existent fish.
So we drift

dry-foot in harbour, and get short shrift
from the DHSS, till the spirit's left
the ship, till God

who knows is asked for water to spread,
consoling the piteous dead
from port to starboard.

We'll sail straight with the catch doubled,
but whether our dreams will still be troubled
I couldn't say.

JOAN DOWNAR

A PARTICULAR MANTLE

Slip past Avebury, towards Salisbury,
and the coat is on. A tweed of water,
chalk and sand, buttoned with stones,
a white horse for a badge;

the rough pile of Savernake, bracken red,
beech green; the nap of thistled
water-meadows; Silbury's deep pocket
with its dormant love-grove seeds.

Sweat seeps like Avon and Kennet, that sly
female river. The long barrows
pucker the sleeve, bristle and subside
at your progress; they would cover

every curve of your flesh. Under
the woven crust the fluid muscles
stretch, contract. Such comfortable wearing,
such celebration of becoming.

JOAN DOWNAR

[Joan Downar's poems have appeared in *Encounter, New Statesman, Poetry Review* and other journals. Her first collection, *The Empire of Light,* is the fiftieth volume in the Peterloo Poets series published by Harry Chambers.]

THE OBLIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

by Mark Gibney

WITH the spectacular growth of television news coverage, viewing the misery of other people in the world has become almost a nightly event. Perhaps because of telecommunications changes, the compelling question of whether individual citizens in rich, developed nations have any duties or responsibilities to those suffering in other parts of the world takes on more relevant meaning. In the United States, and no doubt in other parts of the developed world as well, the message several months ago was that 'we are the world', although few espousing this position — through song, tee-shirt, poster, or otherwise — seemed aware of the implications of this pronouncement. In terms of Ethiopian starvation at least, the outpouring of aid by private individuals has indeed been impressive.

In fact, the much larger sums collected by the Live-Aid concert than by the Farm-Aid[1] concert might mean a host of things, including the rather novel idea that duties to individuals in other countries might be considered to be as strong as duties to compatriots. Perhaps they might even be stronger, depending upon the circumstances.[2]

This article will not attempt to address the question to whom duties lie, as much as it will look at the question who possesses that duty. That is, assuming that there is some duty to aid individuals who are suffering in other lands, who has this duty? The thrust of this article will be to argue that individuals will have moral responsibilities that transcend national borders. This is not to suggest that policymakers in developed nations will not have the kinds of moral obligations under discussion here. In fact, given their unique position, it might well be argued that there is an even greater responsibility for policymakers to act.[3] However, the more unsettled proposition is that individual citizens have duties to aid others.

It should be noted that the idea that individual citizens have moral responsibilities beyond national borders is a minority position. James Fishkin defends the majority view:

> It is characteristically liberal assumptions that require us, too easily, as individuals to assume the full burdens of large-scale, public problems — those that might be better left to collectives, nation-states, and other large institutions.[4]

There are several things to note about Fishkin's arguments. To begin with, it is by no means apparent that liberal political philosophers have in fact espoused the position that individuals should be responsible for 'large-scale, public problems'. A related point is that the tenets of liberal theory often point in the opposite direction to where Fishkin says they point, namely, the idea that apart from a special relationship, individuals should be free to pursue their own version of the good unfettered by the duty to care for others. Even if one assumed that Fishkin is correct in the sense that liberal assumptions point in the direction of assuming massive burdens, individual citizens in rich, developed countries do not seem to have assumed such duties. This is also to say that Live-Aid can

be seen as the exception rather than a recognition by private citizens in rich nations that they have a moral obligation, generally, to aid those suffering in other lands. Even Live-Aid itself does not jibe with Fishkin's notion of individuals assuming anywhere near a 'full burden'. Many citizens have contributed to famine relief, and many have given quite generously. Few, however, have assumed a 'full burden' if that is taken to mean that one gives as much as one can.

Stanley Hoffman[5] has recently looked at the role of morality in international relations and I think his *realpolitik* conception of the issue shows why it is so difficult to promote moral concerns in this area generally, particularly the notion of citizens having moral obligations. Hoffman divides moral obligations into three separate categories: (i) the moral obligations of policymakers; (ii) the moral obligations of those who have to carry out the directives of policymakers; and (iii) the moral obligations of what he terms 'the rest of us'.

Although Hoffman purports to talk about the moral duties of all three groups, essentially he ignores the moral obligations of the second category, and he offers a very limited view of the moral responsibilities of 'the rest of us'. Added to this, Hoffman accepts the notion that nations pay a severe price for acting morally in the international realm to begin with.

> What are the consequences of these limits of moral choice? The most evident could be called the moral inferiority of international politics. This is a domain in which, more than in domestic politics, one pays a penalty for behaving decently.[6]

What this ignores, of course, is that acting morally will often entail some cost. Simply stated, these costs make moral actions more difficult, but not any less compelling.

The portion of Hoffman's argument that I want to focus on is his depiction of the role to be played by citizens in a Western democracy. Citizens, he argues, are to throw the rascals out of office through the power of the franchise. In addition, Hoffman believes that citizens can lobby their elected representatives. Although Hoffman gives an accurate depiction of the democratic process (actually the ideal), it is noteworthy that he gives little substance to his discussion of individual moral objectives. In other words, Hoffman asserts that 'the rest of us' will have moral obligations as citizens, yet it is never clear what those obligations would entail beyond voting rascals out of office. It is never even clear what makes a politician a rascal. Because Hoffman promotes the idea that national leaders are to act as 'trustees' for that society, one can only presume that a rascal is one who does not promote the best interest of the members of that society. In sum, Hoffman purports to speak about the obligations of citizens but he offers a very limited vision. The moral obligations of citizens are either no different from those of policymakers, or else they are subsumed by the interests of policymakers.

One explanation for this limited view of citizen responsibility is that Hoffman's views are based on an 'ought implies can' premise, and he sees citizens as being able to accomplish very little: 'How much can citizens actually accomplish? At a minimum they can vote . . . they can, by their

pressures on the representatives or by their own efforts, affect at least some things'.[7] Again, Hoffman is not clear what it is that citizens should hope to accomplish.

This notion that there is very little that individuals themselves can do is commonly accepted, and it seems to be the most prevalent argument against individual responsibility in the international realm. Susan James argues that not only is there little that indivduals can do to relieve harm, but individuals themselves are not in a position to cause much harm either:

> A concern with the responsibilities of groups might be regarded as a merit, rather than as a defect, of an argument which aims to reveal the extent of our obligations to relieve or prevent harm, for much of the harm which afflicts people is both caused by groups and of a kind which can most readily be relieved by them. Single individuals often cannot do a great deal to prevent famine and disease, and they are relatively powerless to wreak these ills on others. But governments, hospitals, and corporations can obviously make great changes in the world.[8]

Because of its theoretical importance, this capacity argument needs close examination. The first response to its position is the most obvious: individuals do make a difference. Again, I point to the outpourings of aid for Ethiopian and Armenian relief from private citizens. Related to this, there is no reason why individuals have to accomplish a great deal. Fishkin's earlier comment about assuming the 'full burdens of large-scale, public problems', and James's statement that individuals 'cannot do a great deal' are based on a faulty premise. Moral obligations should not be based on the amount that individuals can accomplish. To employ a variant of Singer's example,[9] if there are fifteen children drowning, but a passer-by has only the energy to save one, this fact should not remove the obligation to save this one child. What is more accurate is that we should not inform the exhausted lifesaver: you had a moral obligation to save all fifteen children. Fishkin and James might possibly be speaking of a moral overload problem, but their limitations on moral obligations seem to be based on the idea that because individuals could not accomplish a whole lot they therefore should not have any moral obligations for large-scale, public problems.

Another response to the dominant position is that even if individuals themselves do not have the ability to make a difference, they can quite easily join some interest group which can make a difference. There will be free rider problems, but the free rider problem should not imply 'can't', nor should such problems imply that moral obligations do not exist. Instead, the free rider problems arise out of self-interested behaviour which cannot be equated with moral behaviour. The issue is whether the principle that 'ought implies can' should limit the moral obligations that individual citizens have in the international arena. Finally, even if we assume that individuals (or groups) can accomplish very little, there is no reason why a government should be precluded from carrying out the moral obligations of its citizens.

The prevalent view sees governments acting in the purported best interests of society. This is the trustee argument alluded to earlier. Brian

Barry[10] argues that this position has often been used to ignore moral concerns, the view apparently being that the best interests of a society do not necessarily include a moral interest. My point is that nations can act as trustees. However, there is no logical reason why the moral component should be removed when a nation acts as a trustee for its citizens.

Thus far I have concentrated on the rationales often given for removing moral responsibility from individual citizens in the international realm. On closer examination these are not compelling arguments. However, providing a positive response to the question of why individuals have moral responsibilities in the international realm is more difficult. The best answer seems to be that individuals should act morally because in doing so they exercise their own autonomy, and at the same time they respect the autonomy of other individuals. Acting morally does not entail doing that which is politically expedient, or avoiding what is inconvenient or difficult. It is only when individuals recognise and go beyond their immediate self-interest that they act as autonomous beings; only in doing so can other individuals be treated as autonomous beings as well.

The final issue that needs to be addressed is the practical policy implications of the position taken here. For one thing, given the existence of some individual moral obligations in the international realm, citizens should generally be free to pursue what they consider to be their own moral obligations to those beyond national borders. The problem that will arise is when the government as trustee takes a different position from that of some individuals in a particular society on the question of whether a moral obligation exists or not. In the United States at the present time such an example now exists in the government prosecution of leaders of the Sanctuary movement for Salvadorans.[11] Under the position suggested here, citizens should generally be free to pursue their moral obligations to others, even when such actions would conflict with the view of moral obligations held by the trustee. The only limitation on this should be when the pursuit of these obligations interferes with duties to other members of that particular society.[12]

The second point relates to the first. Although a government can act as trustee for its citizens, this should not mean that individual citizens can ignore the existence of such duties, even if these duties will in fact be met by the trustee. Although telecommunications have in fact brought many more world events to living rooms, it is not so apparent that there has been a corresponding revolution in terms of political knowledge or moral reasoning. Behavioural studies have shown that citizens in the United States have an appalling lack of knowledge of foreign affairs.[13] Political scientists have quantified this, but few have made any normative judgements from it. The inattention to this matter might be explained by the dominance of the view that citizens of rich countries do not have individual moral obligations in the international realm. What must be hoped for is the general recognition of the moral obligations of individual citizens, which will, at the same time, serve as a proper grounding for the moral obligations of policymakers as well.

NOTES

1. It is estimated that the Live-Aid concert collected $70 million and the Farm-Aid concert collected $10 million.
2. For a good review of this debate see Richard Dagger, 'Rights, Boundaries, and the Bounds of Community: A Qualified Defense of Moral Parochialism', *American Political Science Review*, 79: 436-447 (June 1985).
3. See, Thomas Nagel, 'Ruthlessness in Public Life', in Stuart Hampshire (ed.) *Public and Private Morality*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
4. James Fishkin, *The Limits of Obligation*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), at 9.
5. Stanley Hoffman, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981).
6. *Ibid.*, p.23.
7. *Ibid.*, p.229.
8. Susan James, 'The Duty to Relieve Suffering', *Ethics*, 3: 4-21 (1982), at 19.
9. The example referred to is the situation where a young child is drowning in a nearby shallow pond. See, Peter Singer, 'Famine, Affluence and Morality', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1:229-243 (1972), at 235.
10. Brian Barry, *Rich Countries and Poor Countries*, (New York: Cambridge University Press).
11. See, Mark Gibney, 'Seeking Sanctuary: A Special Duty for the US?', *Commonweal*, (May 1985).
12. Two examples might help to clarify this point. In one instance a government is seeking to prevent donations of private aid by its citizens to individuals in another country who are in serious need. Perhaps the government's rationale is that the country where the private aid would be going is an enemy, or else that no serious need exists. The second example involves citizens of a country admitting aliens to that country for similar reasons, again going against a particular government policy. My argument is that some actions of private citizens will have a more serious effect on others in that same community than other actions will. To use these two examples, the admission of aliens will work as much more of a disruptive force to the communal process than simply providing aid to individuals outside the nation's borders. As a result, there is a stronger presumption in favour of following the government's policy in the alien admission situation than there would be in the other situation.
13. Barry Hughes asks: 'Is it possible to talk about public opinion when 30 per cent of the US population seems completely to lack foreign policy knowledge on which to base opinions?' in *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy*, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1978), at 23.

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BANKING IN LUXEMBOURG

by B. Narpati

LUXEMBOURG represents the greatest banking concentration in the European Community. The personalised service offered by Luxembourg banks is finding increasing acceptance among private customers, medium-sized companies and institutional investors.

The banking and financial sector is itself undergoing a major transformation. Private banking and investment management are slowly replacing traditional wholesale lending as the main areas of future growth. At present, banking accounts for about 20 per cent of government revenue.

The banking sector has become one of the largest economic activities in the Grand Duchy. It accounts for more than half of total corporate income tax revenues, employing about 6 per cent of the working population.

Apart from its commercial banking operations, Luxembourg is the home of the credit and investment department of the European Economic Communities, the European Investment Bank, and of Cedel, the computerised bond and precious metal clearing service.

The Luxembourg commercial banks offer a range of banking services, including current and savings account, safekeeping and execution of money transfers. They buy and sell securities on the stock exchange for customers as well as for their own account. They act as underwriters for government and public issues.

In addition to normal commercial banking services, Luxembourg banks generate a significant part of their income from transactions and advisory services. Luxembourg banks are the depositories for securities (Eurobonds) and for the securities' holdings of Luxembourg registered mutual funds and investment trusts.

Luxembourg banks are increasingly involved in investment portfolio management and consultancy.

Three Luxembourg banks with the largest branch network and diversity of services are: *Banque Générale du Luxembourg, Banque International à Luxembourg* and *Kredietbank S.A. Luxembourgeoise.* They are affiliated to the three major Belgian financial groups and operate with a considerable degree of independence in their business.

The membership of the Securities Clearing House Cedel increased by 176 to 1,764 at the end of 1986. The volume of transactions rose from US$762.2 to 1,207.4 billion, an increase of 58 per cent during the year.

Initiatives by the government in developing the financial market and the increasing importance of new lines of business make Luxembourg an attractive centre for banks wanting to expand their international representation.

According to M. Pierre Werner, debtors from Western Europe absorb over 70 per cent of all credits given by Luxembourg banks, but only about

50 per cent of the loans granted by all international banks in Europe. The balance of payments difficulties of a number of developing countries are therefore of a lesser concern for Luxembourg than for other countries. (M. Pierre Werner served as Prime Minister of Luxembourg from 1979 to 1984).

According to Mr. Werner, gross profits of banks in Luxembourg increased in 1981 by 67%, and in 1982 by 56% on a local currency basis. About 64% of the gross profits of these two years have been used to create specific and general provisions for potential losses. He would not therefore describe the present situation as a global banking crisis. Nor would he be particularly concerned about the near future, given the cautious attitude of Luxembourg bankers.

Due to its undeniable merits in the re-cycling process after the first oil price hike, the usefulness of eurobanking is clearly recognised. For the current difficulties one has to blame a too heavy country exposure in the wholesale credit market and the subsequent difficulties of a number of sovereign borrowers.

The national authorities of the industrial countries are aware of the fact that the banking community suffers from its past readiness to take a major share in the recycling and readjustment process necessary to avoid a collapse of the world trade.

The involvement of major Central banks, of the IMF, and the Bank for International Settlements in the recent rescheduling procedures gives a new standing to the Euromarkets. The increased awareness of the existing risks will nevertheless lead to a more comprehensive statistical information on the markets and stricter legal requirements on published consolidated figures in the individual banking institutions. It is a development that can only be welcomed as M. Werner has recently stated.

In order to diversify the Luxembourg financial market, the Government intends to encourage insurance and reinsurance companies to develop their activities in the Grand Duchy. The latest development is the Law of 24 February 1984. It incorporates substantial changes to previous legislation covering insurance and reinsurance undertakings. It will give an impetus to development of the insurance sector.

Apart from the three major Luxembourg commercial banks, and a few smaller Luxembourg entities, other commercial banking operations are carried out by subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks.

The *Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat* is a state-owned savings bank and was created by Law in 1856. Its savings deposits are fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the State. It provides clearing functions in the absence of a central bank. Its interest rate is set in agreement with the government and has a leading role in the Luxembourg market.

The Luxembourg monetary system is characterised by the absence of a central bank and functions within a monetary association with Belgium.

The *Banque Nationale de Belgique* (Central Bank of Belgium) maintains a branch in Luxembourg. It performs limited central bank functions. The supply of fiduciary money is regulated by the Banque Nationale de

Belgique for the monetary association of Belgium-Luxembourg as a whole.

The Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois (IML) was established in June 1983. The IML performs many of the functions of a central bank. The legislation establishing the IML transferred the exercise of all supervisory and regulatory powers of the previous Banking Control Commission to that institution.

The *Société Nationale de Crédit et d'Investissement* (SNCI) is an autonomous public institution created in 1977. Its operations are aimed at stimulating the Luxembourg economy. The SNCI also manages funds received from EEC grants. The *Institut Belgo-Luxembourgeois du Change* (IBLC) is legally charged with the responsibility of controlling exchange transactions within the monetary association comprising Belgium and Luxembourg.

According to M. Pierre Jaans, director-general of the Luxembourg Monetary Institute, it is impossible to give a concise answer to possible destabilizing effects stemming from off-balance-sheet business given the great and growing variety of commitments and claims recorded below the line. Rapid financial innovation in today's banking has a strong impact on off-balance-sheet business and requires major analysis and monitoring on the part of supervisory authorities.

The question of the effectiveness of recommendations versus regulations is partly a matter of semantics, partly a matter of the legal background against which a recommendation has to be viewed. The supervisory authorities in Luxembourg have discretionary powers to use a number of measures of coercion. These range from formal injunctions to forbidding categories of business which the authorities can use about the soundness of a banks business. Under these circumstances, recommendations are a very flexible and effective tool.

M. Jacques Santer, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who also holds the Finance portfolio, said in a recent interview that the broad-ranging innovations, deregulations and structural changes presently under way in the international financial system hold out the promise of improved efficiency of that system. They nevertheless constitute a formidable challenge for supervisory authorities.

Measures to be taken should tend to ensure that the new types of activities and the entities conducting them are subject to the same supervision and offer the same level of protection to investors and depositors as the traditional financial services. Supervisors should not react restrictively to new forms of business, but adapt and extend their surveillance accordingly.

The Government is actively encouraging the diversification of the Luxembourg financial services industry. The share of traditional wholesale eurocurrency business in Luxembourg is decreasing in favour of so-called private banking. The growth in banks' fee income and the impressive number of investment funds recently established in Luxembourg illustrates this trend.

The Luxembourg Government has already put through wide-ranging reforms of laws regulating the financial centre. It is committed to further moves in this direction so as to ease the handling of private customers' financial needs. The Government has also taken several steps to help this development through removing fiscal impediments. It has recently announced further measures in this respect for 1987.

M. Santer observed that salary levels in Luxembourg are not so much in the limelight as in the City of London. Nevertheless, the development of private banking is labour-intensive and calls for skilled specialists, who often have to be recruited abroad and paid at internationally accepted levels. The Government is looking into possibilities to help banks fiscally with the added financial outlay this situation entails. The Luxembourg Monetary Institute (IML) exercises monetary competence for Luxembourg proper. Within the framework of the monetary association linking Belgium and Luxembourg, some functions of a central bank (eg. interventions on foreign exchange markets) are exercised for the account of both member States by the National Bank of Belgium. There is thus no overlap between the functions actually exercised by the IML and those taken care of by the BNB. A branch of the BNB, in Luxembourg, is mainly concerned with managing the circulation of notes and coins between Belgium and Luxembourg. It ensures the excellent working relationship between the monetary institutions of both partner countries.

FOOTNOTE:

The Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois (IML) was established in June 1983. The IML performs many of the functions of a central bank, including issuing coins and notes, holding and management of official reserves, regulation of domestic credit, serving as a depository for governments' funds, and supervising financial institutions. The legislation establishing the IML transferred the exercise of all supervisory and regulatory powers of the previous Banking Control Commission to that institution. (Source: Attachment II — Statement by Paul A. Volcker before the Committee on Government Operations, United States House of Representatives. 27 March, 1985.)

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COUNTERING INSTITUTIONALISED RACISM

by Harold J. Kearsley

WITHIN the United Kingdom there are many individuals, some of whom are in exceedingly influential and prestigious positions, who would have us believe racism within their country is a myth.[1] Racism, according to some, is nothing more than a concept invented to cover the natural human tendency of tribalisation or, to put it in more modern terms, the need for people to belong to groups. This natural tendency for people to form groups is founded on the assumption that the underlying human characteristic is one of being unfriendly and distrustful of their fellow human beings, if they are not protected by this grouping concept. The result is 'groupism' which if the gloss is stripped off results in just another '... ism' and sounds suspiciously like 'racism'.

It is, perhaps, an optimistic belief that the foundational assumptions of humanity are not as indicated above, but are more positive and that people are naturally friendly and not inherently suspicious of their fellow humans; but there does exist what some would call 'racism', or others of a more gentle disposition might call 'groupism', throughtout our world. Britain is no wonderland and is therefore not exempt.

If we keep the UK as an example for the moment (Britain however, is by no means unique), racism here takes many forms, some of which are more obvious than others. The most overt form is that of the individual racist act, when a black man is seeking employment and is told that there are no jobs, while a white man, who applies immediately after the black man, will be given the job. Or, as was the case in a recently broadcast and much acclaimed British TV programme, where a black journalist (dressed as a local workman) hunting for a flat in a large British city was repeatedly told that the flats were already rented (or otherwise not available) while a white journalist, whose inquiry followed that of the black man, would be offered one of the supposedly already rented flats. As Martin Luther King indicated, this sort of racism is the easy type to deal with. Britain has laws to stop this kind of discrimination. It is concrete, overt and recognisable, and thus a victim has the opportunity to deal with it face to face.

A further point to emphasise is that this form of face to face racism is not part of human nature. It is not part of the foundational make-up of people to hate others for the quantity of pigmentation in their skin or, for that matter, the colour of their eyes. Neither is it natural to hate someone for the choice of building in which they choose to worship. These concepts are learned. And these learned concepts can be constantly reinforced by society. This reinforcement can be either overt and formalised, as that which exists in South Africa, or of a less obvious kind.

The society within which one lives is an entirely different 'being' to that of the individual person. What happens when the 'system' or the 'structure' is racist? How does a black man or an asian for that matter, deal with such an inanimate object as a racist, faceless bureaucracy?

The concept which defines the structure of a society as discriminating is termed 'Institutionalised Racism'; but one might legitimately ask how can an inanimate object be racist? The answer is best explained with a few examples backed up by factual data.

For a society to be suffering from Institutionalised Racism, it must be provable that certain racial elements of that society are systematically not receiving equal opportunities in comparison to the remainder of that society. If we remain with Britain as our example, the fact is that within the UK more non-whites live in 'inner cities' (that is the portion of the city which might be considered poor or a 'slum', i.e. east and south London) than the average national proportion would dictate. If non-whites make up only eight percent of the population nationally, but make up 25 percent of an inner city population, then there is clearly an uneven distribution. The fact is that schools functioning within the inner-cities are of a lower standard in terms of education than those operating outside these areas. One has only to refer to the recent headline news in the UK concerning the refusal of white parents to send their children to a school of 'mixed colour', located by the above definition in an inner city, despite it being the school of their district. Their rationale was that the 'mixed colour' school's education level was substandard and they have since sent their children to an all white school.

Students who attend these inner city schools will very likely receive a less than competitive education, no matter what colour their skin may be; and if the proportion of those students is unnaturally high in a racial category, such as black or south asian, then it can be said that the 'system' has discriminated against these children. A higher proportion of non-white students (higher than the national norm would dictate) are receiving a less competitive education. This is discrimination, but not by any individual. It is discrimination perpetrated by the nameless structure of the society.

Statistically, if one looks at the race of the people in Britain and then compares it to what kind of jobs they have, the evidence supports the concept of Institutionalised Racism. In overwhelming numbers, out of all proportion to the percentage of individuals that are white, the better paying, more prestigious work goes to the white section of the British population.

Another example is the fact that the infant mortality rate is higher than the national average in those British hospitals which are located in or deal mainly with people living in inner cities. This means that mothers from the inner cities stand a higher chance of losing their unborn child than those from other regions. As with education, if these mothers are largely non-white, due to the unequal population distribution as discussed above, then the 'system' is discriminating against a non-white child before it is even born!

How can this faceless inequality be negated? What can individual non-whites do when confronted by such adverse odds? When looking at their chances of 'success' within their society when the system is unintention-

ally but definitely against them even prior to their birth? The answer lies in the fact that the controlling majority (the white population) have to: (i) realise, as well as believe, that the system is unjust and, (ii) take positive action to correct that injustice.

The concept is not new and has been given various names, 'reverse discrimination' by those who are not in favour of it and 'affirmative action' by those who are. This philosophy is designed to counter actively the inequalities that are a product of history and its resultant institutions. The goal of affirmative action would be to promote non-white individuals in an organisation, or to give entrance to non-whites into an institution on a quota basis that is more in line with a country's population structure. If a company has, for example, 100 executive positions in its structure, then it should actively seek to fill 10 of those positions with non-white members of the community, if the non-white portion of the population is around 10 per cent.

There are prominent white individuals who have labelled this concept as 'absurd'. The United States Supreme Court, however, does not consider it in that light. In a recent decision, that august body upheld the quota policy of allowing non-white Americans better access to the higher paying and more rewarding jobs. Quotas are now actively enforced in the US to ensure that organisations with such diverse structure as that of a police force, a university staff as well as a city fire brigade have an ethnic make-up which at least attempts to equate with that of the community of which it is a part.

Of course, this policy has to be run with intelligence and forethought. Safety, morale as well as efficiency do have their parts to play in any organisation. None of these can be compromised to such an extent as to precipitate the death of that organisation. If this happens then all white and non-white alike will lose.

The plight of the United States Navy is a classic example of how an organisation was able to deal with the concept of affirmative action. In the 1960's it was a subject of much controversy that the Navy's officer corps was almost exclusively white. This was grossly out of line with the fact that almost 20 per cent of the American population is non-white. As a result, the Navy was experiencing a tremendous degree of friction, with a corresponding loss of efficiency and morale. Something had to be done. But the admirals realised that you cannot just take a black seaman off the 'lower deck', put gold on his sleeve, call him 'Sir' and expect things to be all right. If this kind of instant solution were attempted then you would not only set up that individual to lose, for indeed his or her prospects of failure in the job would be very high, but you also set up the race or creed that he or she represents. People against this concept just love to say: 'I told you so! Non-whites are just not capable of doing the job'. To be an effective naval officer takes years of training. The solution that the US Navy took was both intelligent and far sighted.

The first step was to ensure that all people associated with the organisation knew that the leadership was aware of the problem. A massive

campaign of awareness directed at all levels of the organisation was initiated. This campaign is still continuing over twenty years later. The next step was to open the Navy's educational facilities, ranging from the Naval Academy through the universities with which it has training units, down to the fleet training commands, to non-white candidates in unprecedented numbers: numbers that were even in excess of those that would be dictated by strict observation of the percentage figures for the non-white portion of the population. An aggressive recruiting campaign was initiated in non-white areas of the country to fill these newly created vacancies.

Although the progress was slow, often painful and mistakes were made, the result is that today the United States Navy's leadership is much more in line with the overall national racial distribution. The effectiveness of that leadership has in no way been impaired. On the contrary, it can be said to have been strengthened due to the infusion of new blood, along with renewed confidence of the ordinary sailors in their officers. As of yet there are only a few non-white admirals, but this too, in time, will change.

There is some truth in the old adage, 'one must fight fire with fire'. Countering the evils of racism might require a society to 'reverse' itself for a time. It is not enough for people in a country to say: 'OK, racism is bad, let's wipe the slate, start a clean record, there will be no more discrimination from now on'. For even if that were possible, the structure that we live under is itself practising a racist policy, silently, but with an iron determination. The average non-whites in many white dominated countries have their chances of being equal to their white counterparts slowly but consistently eroded. This erosion begins before they are born. The lack of equal treatment by the structure must be actively countered through affirmative action. It is up to those who have enjoyed the fruits of that system for so long to ensure that now, at last, the fruits will be equally distributed, irrespective of the colour of one's skin. Martin Luther King said 'I have a dream'. Surely now is the time to change that statement to 'We have a dream', with the hope that one day it can be said 'We have a reality'.

NOTES

1. Professor K. Minogue, 'This Talk of Racism Is Nonsense', *Sunday Telegraph*, 24 April, 1988.

[Harold J. Kearsley has served for over eight years as a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. He has also held the post of Assistant Dean and Lecturer at a private European university. He is at present reading for a PhD at Aberdeen University.]

IRELAND AND THE SPANISH ARMADA (September-October 1588)

by J. J. N. McGurk

IN the fourth centenary year of the defeat of the Spanish Armada it is perhaps salutary to remember, not so much the victory over Philip II's Spain — for that cannot ever be forgotten — but some of the mythology that gathered around the story in the re-telling over these four centuries, and to give some emphasis to the aftermath of the defeat in the Channel; the wrecking of the remnant of the great fleet off the coasts of Ireland in September and October 1588.

From an early date it became customary to write and speak of the defeat of the 'Invincible Armada' but neither King Philip of Spain, Portugal, the Two Sicilies and Lord of the Indies, to give him some of his titles, nor his captains ever gave the fleet such a name. In Spanish official documentation it is spoken of as the 'Gran Armada', that is to say the great armed force embarked for service on the seas and, as an eventual landing army, to invade and occupy England. Even more enduring is the legend struck on the Armada victory medals, *Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt,* that the defeat of the Spaniards was due to a Heaven sent storm and, by further implication, that the English nation was especially dear to the Almighty since He showed his favour by raising a storm to crush the Spanish enemy. Providence may well work in other ways in the affairs of State, but, as is now well recognised by specialist historians of the event, and at the time by the Spanish commanders themselves, they were well beaten by superior strategy, tactics and the decisive orders of more prudent commanders.

The war too has been interpreted as a religious conflict in the sense of a crusade aided and abetted by the Pope to bring heretical England back to the unity of Christendom; religious bitterness certainly added spice to the war between England and Spain but was not its cause. Hawkins's and Drake's armed sorties on the Spanish trade of the West Indies in piratical raids ending in the looting of Spanish trading posts, as much as the aid given by Queen Elizabeth I to King Philip's rebellious subjects in the Netherlands, were more cogent reasons for Philip's retaliation, and the execution of Maire Queen of Scots may well have hastened his preparations for the Enterprise of England.

After the debacle for the Spaniards in the various Channel engagements, the remnant of the fleet set its course home to round the coasts of Scotland and Ireland, its captains anticipated the normal navigational difficulties of autumn gales, damaged ships and, from their point of view, hardly charted seas. What they did not expect was the severity and persistence of the gales and the frequent and disastrous errors of their pilots on the north and west coasts of Ireland where their ships were trapped in cliff-lined bays or struck reefs and were driven ashore to become wrecks littering the Atlantic coast of Ireland. Hence it was on

these coasts in the first three weeks of September 1588 that the most tragic disasters of the Spanish Armada took place.

Hugh hulks were sighted all along the western coast from Donegal to Kerry. As soon as they had turned Scotland and headed for Spain in a curve far out to the west of Ireland they battled against headwinds from the west and south west, the worst direction for a fleet with square rigged sails. In a gale the only thing to do was to furl sail and let the ships drift. Purser Coco Calderon wrote that they were driven inland by 'leagues of stormy seas' and he lamented the constant storms, fogs and squalls in which he said 'we were always working to windward, breaking our tackle and taking a great deal of water . . . the coast is rough, the seas heavy and the winds are strong from the seaward (westward)'. Many of the ships were already battered and leaking, their crews sick and starving from lack of food and above all of fresh water.

Contemporary reports in the State papers leave no doubt that the Spaniards sailing in the Armada were generally ignorant of the coast of Ireland. Survivors' depositions display an ignorance of their whereabouts when their ships foundered; indeed, there were instances where the north coast was mistaken for the south west, a hundred miles in error save in those cases where they had Irish pilots on board. Many were hurled on to the coast without charts or pilots and often without anchors as so many of the latter were abandoned in the Channel whilst they retreated from Drake's fireships.

On September 10th an extreme south westerly of hurricane force blew in a heavy storm which lasted from two o'clock in the afternoon until ten o'clock the next morning, wreaking havoc among the Spanish ships on the uncharted rocks and jutting promontories off Mayo and Clare. That storm and a similar one on the 20th cost the lives of almost 3,000 Spaniards. Every squadron of the Armada lost at least one ship off Ireland while the losses of smaller vessels is well nigh inestimable. The Levant Squadron, for example, of ten ships lost eight were between the North Sea and the coast of Kerry. The two remaining were strong enough to follow Duke Medina Sidonia far off Ireland into the Atlantic whence they reached Lisbon. The wrecks round Scotland and Ireland account for all the fighting ships lost except those to enemy action in the Channel. As many as sixty may have been driven onto the Irish coasts; twenty-six named and accounted for were wrecked between Donegal and Kerry.

Place names of wrecks on the west coast were traditionally handed down by word of mouth which naval historians, deep sea divers and archaeologists have found invaluable in that this oral tradition has proved to be uncannily accurate in pin-pointing the sites of wrecks. Unfortunately the native Gaelic Irish kept no written records of the names of ships or their commanders except along the north-west shores where facts were given written record. Identification for the many generations of historians has been made the more difficult in that the State Paper reports, many of them by Sir Geoffrey Fenton, then secretary to Sir Richard Bingham, military governor of Connaught, and later secretary to the Lord Deputy

Sir William FitzWilliam, not a single ship wrecked was named. Fenton wrote of seventeen ships wrecked, of men killed and drowned but of no named ship. 'There were', he wrote in one report, 'wrecked on Clare Island, one ship, 300 men; in Fynglasse (Modern Toorglass) O'Malleys countrie, one shipp, 200 men.' Only in rare isolated instances in the numerous other reports are ships correctly named: the number is small compared to the total. There is, however, a solid core of evidence on Irish Armada wrecks where identification of names is irrefutable: these include the *Girona, Valencera, San Juan of Castille, La Rata Encoronada, El Gran Grin,* and the *Santa Maria de la Rosa.*

Suspicions of Spanish intentions soon gave rise to real fears and fear turned to panic as reports began to speak not of wrecked ships but of actual landings by the Spanish in Ireland; of armed men off five ships on the Mayo coast, four off Sligo, two off Galway, three in Clare and seven in Donegal. In Dublin Sir William FitzWilliam received the reports and he began to speak of an 'invasion fleet' in his letters to the Privy Council. In Ireland he had less than 2,000 badly trained, armed and fed troops. He wrote to the Queen in haste for more men, money and munitions to meet the expected emergency for, as he said, 'we look rather to be over-run by the Spaniard than otherwise'. But England stood in no danger from these landings in Ireland, the Spaniards came in from their wrecks in search of food and water, not to do battle. The reinforcements from England were not needed. Sir Richard Bingham, military governor of Connaught and known as the flail of Connaught, fearing the Irish would befriend the Spaniards, put out the direct and simple order to kill them as soon as they were discovered. The people of the western ports, who had long traded with Spain, paid little heed to the tales bruited abroad that the swarthy foreigners would massacre the old and carry off the young into slavery. Bingham's orders from FitzWilliam were brutally unequivocal:

> 'to take all hulks of ships, treasures etc. into your own hands and to apprehend and execute all Spaniards of what quality sc ever... torture may be used in prosecuting this inquiry...'

Wherever shipwrecked crews set foot in Galway or Mayo they were captured by Bingham's men or else handed over by the native Irish under threat of execution for harbouring, having first dispoiled them of arms, and even clothes. At one time three hundred Spaniards were taken to St. Augustine's monastery at Fort Hall outside Galway City and there executed. Bingham is said to have ridden from Athlone to supervise the executions carried out by his troops. He reported to the Lord Deputy FitzWilliam:—

> 'having made a clean despatch of them both without the town and in the country abroad I rested all day Sunday giving praise and thanks to God for Her Majesty's most happy success in that action and our deliverance from such dangerous enemies...'

It is said that two survivors of the massacre were hidden in the town and later smuggled to safety by an escape route to the Continent from the Aran Islands at the mouth of Galway Bay. Spanish fishermen still come to Fort Hill cemetery to pray at the mass grave of Armada victims.

Further and reliable reports came in that the *Sancta Maria Rata Encoranada,* later identified and commonly called the *Rata* of 820 tons, 35 guns and 400 men with Don Alonzo de Leiva in command, and heir-apparent to the fleet command under the Duke of Medina Sidonia, had cast up at Ballycroy and that the men had fortified themselves in Fahy Castle (Doona) on the shores of Blacksod Bay. Another report put the number at 600 and that they were transferring to Torane (Tiraun) where they were to join up with 800 more from another great ship lying in Elly Cove, the safest anchorage in Blacksod Bay, then known as Pollilly, 'poll' being the Irish for 'hole', a deep hole with ample water at low tide even for a large ship. Bingham requested reinforcements, in vain as it happened, to assault Tiraun claiming that there were 1,500 Spaniards armed to the teeth on his territory, and that should the Burkes, O'Malleys and O'Flaherties join them the province of Connaught was utterly lost to the crown. Bingham's panic proved groundless when a messenger came to him with the news that the great ship at Pollilly by Tiraun had sailed south-west for Spain. As for the *Rata,* de Levia and his company took everything easily transportable from the ship, poured tar and pitch on the hulk to set it alight for it was too badly damaged to see them back to Spain. Their hopes of getting home lay through Scotland where it was known that King James VI, neutral in the war between England and Spain, harboured shipwrecked Spaniards from Scotland and Ireland and had helped their colleagues to return to Spain.

By the end of September 1588 Sir Richard Bingham was able to assure Lord Deputy FitzWilliam that the invasion threat was over. From Shrule Castle in Co. Mayo he wrote that in his own knowledge 'there hath perished at least 6,000 or 7,000 men, of which there hath been put to the sword first and last by my brother George and, in Mayo, Thomond, (Clare) and Galway and executed one way and another about seven or eight hundred or upwards'. Modern historical researchers have refined Bingham's figures. For instance, Niall Fallon has shown that from the wrecks in Sligo Bay a total of 1,252 men, in Galway Bay from two ships 328 men, from the Donegal wrecks 1,413 and from three wrecks on the Clare coast 948 men. From five identified wrecks on the Mayo coast, there were 1,411 men and from four ships off the coast of Kerry 908 men. Therefore the total of men lost to Spain on the western seaboard of Ireland alone was 5,250, of whom about 1,500 had been executed, 3,750 drowned while 750 survived.

Sir Richard Bingham who had fought as a soldier of fortune with the Spaniard abroad seemed to revel in their extermination in Ireland in 1588. His name became a by-word for cruelty in the west and even among the hardened English campaigners in Ireland, and yet on one occasion he showed some mercy to some survivors wrecked off Clifden from the *Falco Blanco* but only perhaps because the noblemen among them would fetch a fine ransom. FitzWilliam commanded him to execute them but Bingham wrote directly to the queen from Athlone requesting that he over-ride his superior's orders in the matter. The issue was but one of the many

quarrels that arose between the Governor of Connaught and the Lord Deputy. It was, however, a unique occasion for Fitzwilliam to have to order Bingham to execute Spaniards for his tendencies that way had to be curbed rather than encouraged. In the end only two of his prisoners, Don Luis de Cordoba and his nephew Gonzalo, were ransomed for an unknown exchange and returned to Spain.

No one now who writes on the Armada in Ireland can ignore the work and writing of Robert Sténuit, the Belgian diver and marine archaeologist who discovered the wreck of the *Girona* in 1967 in thirty feet of water at a little cove near the Giant's Causeway and still called Port na Spaniagh near Dunluce Castle, Co. Antrim, nearly four centuries after its sinkng. During the following two summers Sténuit and his team of divers, after some six thousand hours of underwater archaeology, retrieved 12,000 items from the *Girona's* treasure including 450 gold coins, 756 of silver, 115 of copper, all of sixty different Mexico and Peru. And among the ordnance recovered were two bronze cannon, stone cannon balls, lead bullets and ingots used in the making of ammunition. Among the navigatonal instruments salvaged there was an astrolabe, and of items of table silverware there were thirty silver candlesticks. Then, as now, Spanish men wore much personal jewellery and from the sea bed gold rings, chains, medallions, crosses and crucifixes, including the gold cross of a Knight of Santiago belonging to Alonzo de Leiva, were found. They are today in the *Girona* rooms of the Ulster Museum in Belfast, the official resting place of these reminders of the *Annus Mirabilis* 1588 from the Invincible Armada of the English history textbooks.

Nearly thirty years ago Garret Mattingley, in his classic account of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, exposed two myths which strangely live on in the folk memory because they live on in our classrooms. One was the story put abroad by the victorious English, almost from the date of the event, that the Spanish who put ashore on the northern and western coasts of Ireland were gratuitously slaughtered by the native Irish for their clothes, jewellery and arms. Many unfortunate Spaniards were indeed robbed, and now and then a throat was cut, but there is only one recorded occasion of the killing of Spanish castaways by Irish not in the pay of the English garrison, and that aroused general reprobation. There are many more instances in which the Irish sheltered, supplied and helped the wrecked Spaniards to escape, mainly through Donegal to Scotland, the McSorley, O'Donnell and McSweeney families being notable in this respect. Some remained in Ireland but only a few. The Spanish state papers make clear that some survivors from the wreck of the *Juliana,* for example, stayed on in Donegal as well as some from the *Lavia* in O'Donnell's castle in Donegal where they apparently helped in the training of soldiers with Hugh O'Neill and Hugh O'Donnell in their nine year conflict with the forces of the English crown, throughout the 1590s.

Then there is the legend still current in the west of Ireland and elsewhere that black eyes, black hair, swarthy complexions and the aquiline features of many Connaught people betrays the blood of the Spaniards

wrecked off their coasts in the September and October storms of 1588. Perhaps the odd stray Spaniard who evaded English detection found a roof and a wife in a friendly and remote townland but clearly they did not survive or remain in sufficient numbers to affect the physiogonomy of an entire people. The similarities in physical types in Galacia and Connaught must be from some other cause.

The imponderable pipe dreams and 'ifs' of history may well exercise the imagination but are unprofitable for the historian. And yet, *what if* Ireland had fallen to the Spaniard during the Armada period? What if King Philip II had grasped the actual state of the poor English defences of Ireland then? What if de Leiva's forces, a total of 1,500 men had joined up with those of O'Donnell and O'Neill outnumbering the English forces in Ireland by three to one. Would Queen Elizabeth's control of Ireland have ended in 1588? The facts of history remain; while the danger to England from a Spanish occupation of Ireland largely escaped King Philip, it did not escape Elizabeth and her commanders in Ireland. And, as for the northern Irish leaders, they were too much taken up in local internecine struggles, lacking the confederacy they would later adopt but too late to stem the Elizabethan conquest of their country. The next and last time Spanish troops would set foot in Ireland to aid the Irish in their struggle was at Kinsale in the winter of 1601 where they were defeated both in seige and battle by the English forces of Lord Mountjoy, who confidently boasted before his victory that he had no doubt but that he would beat both Spain Dons and Irish 'macs and 'oes from the field.

CORRESPONDENCE

A DUBIOUS REPUTATION

Dear Madam,

The article 'Is There Life After NATO?' (Vol. 253, No. 1475) prompts me to make a few more observations about Canada. Over the years, Canadians have gained a dubious reputation for being 'bland'. Not so long ago a British magazine described us as 'bland Americans'. That was reported here as an item of news on our national radio network and the announcer could not keep from his voice a sort of weary, 'here we go again' tone. To any number of Canadians, being labelled 'American' comes as a deep insult; we believe ourselves to be a distinctly separate society, with entirely different values. To be considered 'bland', many would say, is hardly less insulting. Yet in a world seething with militancy, avarice, political unrest, blatant corruption, deception and intrigue, what is wrong with being, in dictionary terms, 'gentle or suave in manner; mild; not irritating...'?

It may be blandness, or a similar quality, that enables Canadians to be respected peace-keepers around the world. To keep the peace in global hot spots requires a firm understanding of the art of compromise; there is no place in the process for self-interest or national pride.

It's possibly a form of blandness that has been attracting increasing numbers of refugees to Canada, their perception being that Canadians are fundamentally just, with no axe to grind. Canada has, in fact, become a mosaic of minorities.

If blandness is not being demonstrative, self-congratulatory, reckless or confrontational, then Canadians *are* bland, and we shouldn't resent it or feel moved to apologise for it. Nevertheless, Canadians bristle when the word 'bland' is applied to them.

In western society we have been led to believe that there can be no progress in any area without aggression. Employers persist in advertising for 'aggressive' employees.

It can be argued that, in society as we know it, aggressive conduct has made possible industrial and technological growth and development and the accompanying prosperity. On the other side of the coin, however, it has brought us to a tortured, possibly dying global environment, an awesome potential for nuclear and chemical mass annihilation, and to ever-rising levels of crime, terrorism, molestation, drug abuse, disease, homelessness and poverty.

If ever there was a time to renounce aggressive behaviour and offensive characteristics, to temper human endeavour and aspiration with gentleness and mildness of manner, then surely this must be the time. Blandness — of which Canadians stand accused — glimmers as a saving grace.

Yours faithfully,

Ontario, Canada. IAN TROWELL

(I. D. Trowell is a journalist, poet and essayist residing in Canada.)

Literary Supplement

THE SECOND CHAMBER

A History of the House of Lords. Lord Longford, with an Introduction by Elizabeth Longford. Collins. £15.00.

Lord Longford has been a member of the House of Lords since 1945 when he was created Lord Pakenham in the English peerage. He is, of course, a member of the Labour Party and a former Cabinet Minister in Harold Wilson's Government. He is clearly devoted to the Chamber, with all its blemishes. He writes in a style at once popular and scholarly in a volume which should be widely read and enjoyed. In many instances he relies upon quotations from experts in a particular historical period.

Lord Longford has the greatest admiration for the House of Lords with its continuous history going back at least to the thirteenth century. He discusses briefly main features in its development and constitutional authority. After the Act of Settlement it became clearly subordinate to the Commons whilst retaining its theoretical and often its actual influence on events until it was shorn of the ultimate legal power of veto by the Parliament Act of 1911. The author discusses the latter in some detail.

Perhaps the most valuable part of the book is his account of the working of the Lords based upon his own experience there since 1945. In the last resort the Conservatives in Government or party in opposition can prevail in a Lord's decision. Nonetheless, Tories in the House retain a large measure of independence and are quite prepared to vote their own way when they consider the national interest is involved in any particular issue.

Lord Longford would like to see the elective element introduced into the appointment of peers to the House but he sees no chance of this reform without a large Labour majority in the government of the day. As it is, 'the House of Lords today provides the widest selection of views and expert knowledge that can be found in legislatures I am aware of'. He concludes that the House 'is an active and greatly respected Second Chamber'.

Elizabeth has written a delightful Introduction in which she describes vividly the introduction of a new peer to the House against the background of the ancient ritual, still followed. The volume is very well illustrated.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

THE TRAGIC LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTE

Charlotte Bronte. Rebecca Fraser. Methuen. £14.95.

Charlotte Brontë's life is in itself a good subject for a long, eventful, sad Victorian novel. In the beautifully reconstructed scenes on the bleak Yorkshire moors, Rebecca Fraser portrays, without distorting or exaggerating the facts of the life played out in the grim Haworth parsonage, a family totally at the mercy of a deeply religious father who permanently grieved for his lost wife and the gaiety of former times. The third-born of the six children who survived their

mother, Charlotte herself lived only to the age of thirty-nine: and yet the impact of her novels on the literary output of the nineteenth century was so enormous.

Mrs. Gaskell, Charlotte's contemporary, former biographer and devoted friend, wrote a biography of the novelist in which she intended to let the public 'see Charlotte as she really is'. Rebecca Fraser has succeeded supremely well in letting us see even more than Mrs. Gaskell did how remarkable was the literary achievement of one who had the cards stacked against her in both her private life and in the hostility of the reading public when she wrote *Jane Eyre*. Successful as her novel was, it breached many of the prejudices about women's freedom that the church and society held in the 1850s. For that matter, men's freedom too was circumscribed for the hapless Mr. Rochester could not, under the social and religious rules of the day, break out of the confinement imposed by having in his care a hopelessly insane and violent wife.

None of the implications of these situations should, by rights, have been exposed in fiction or in fact by any writer: and yet, this young, perceptive woman, possessing none of the social advantages which might have cushioned the endeavours of one more protected by the social mores of the time, dared to dramatise such a story. Even under cover of an ambiguous pseudonym (for Currer Bell was not obviously male) it was a daring thing to do. Inevitably, therefore, public curiosity at all levels was aroused by speculation about the identity of the novelist, whether man or woman, clergyman or lay writer.

Rebecca Fraser's most important research has been done in the area of Charlotte's childhood. The total destruction of her siblings by the dreaded disease of tuberculosis caused her long-lasting anguish; and the author of the biography shows up vividly the effect that constant bereavement had on the sensitive girl. Another of the hitherto unrevealed aspects of her life which here is fully described is her marriage and the robust and stable nature of her husband: how great a support he was to one who above all needed stability is made very clear. Rebecca Fraser manages to intersperse biographical facts with her own extremely sound critical views of the novels in a way that makes the book a pleasure to read as well as a welcome addition to the scholarship of the Brontë canon.

BETTY ABEL

THINKING ABOUT AMERICA IN THE NEXT DECADE

Thinking About America: the United States in the 1990s. Edited by Annelise Anderson and Dennis L. Bark. (Hoover Institution, Stanford University.) Paperback, the Adamantine Press, London. £10.50. *1999, Victory Without War.* Richard Nixon. Sidgwick & Jackson. £14.95.

Policy studies have become fashionable on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, according to Glenn Campbell of the Hoover Institution, who put together the collection of essays in the first of these two books, a twin to it was done 10 years ago and it proved to be an excellent prognosis of the stormy decade we have just come through. There are forty-seven essays here, on every aspect of American domestic and foreign policy; and in the section entitled 'Philosophic Perspectives: Peace Prosperity Liberty' his contributors range from the right-wing economists Milton Friedman, Thomas Sowell and F. A. Hayek to political leaders not usually labelled philosophers: George Shultz, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. To reinforce the message, he begins the volume

with an article from Richard Nixon.

For a vade-mecum through the problems ahead, President Bush could hardly ask for a more compendious single-volume guide than this. He ought to read it, if only because General Secretary Gorbachev has called the Hoover Institution 'a sort of intellectual Politburo for the administration'. Moreover, he can read it, or have it read for him; George Bush does not have access to the information assembled by Gregor Arbatov or his Institute for US Studies in Moscow. One great advantage enjoyed by the USSR is that it has access to all American books, journals and libraries, and many of its computer systems, and ensures that no item of American unclassified information (and, one suspects, much that is classified) fails to reach it. This intelligence-seeking does not work in reverse, since in so many areas even under Gorbachev the USSR is still a closed society. So, in reading a blueprint the President will be aware that his adversary (if the word is permitted) is reading it too, or probably ahead of him.

The first of these two books is not designed for quick reading, or even to acquire a global view. It is best seen as a collection of situation reports on a host of problems any one of which, or probably too many of which, will face the Man in the White House: from disarmament, including S.D.I. (by Edward Teller and William R. Van Cleave) and the Middle East (by Philip Habib) through a host of international and domestic economic issues to the problems of cities, immigration, education, poverty and many more. Perhaps the President will in fact look first at Aaron Wildavsky's essay: 'If you can't budget, how can you govern?' or Charles McLure's 'Tax Policy for the 1990s'. The former gives a lucid analysis of the failure of the last decade to find a consensus, admits what no single commentator on the '88 election campaign ever said — 'the president's budget when it gets to Congress is "dead on arrival" '—and confesses at the end that 'my crystal ball clouds over'. Like almost all these contributors, he wants a smaller government; like them all, he says nothing on the one group in the US who do merit government assistance, the American farmers; and, like his colleagues, he can breathe more easily since Mr. Dukakis was defeated. Mr. McLure is specific and challenging: he identifies the responsibility of Congress, seeks curbs on 'the pet projects of politicians and their influential supporters' (Hear! Hear!) and makes a compelling case for a consumption-based direct tax. Has Mr. Lawson time, now, to read this and to act on it this year?

For practical wisdom, I would award two alphas to this collection. One is to George Shultz for what is a general treatment, but full of shrewdness and insight. He stresses the impact of continuous invention, the immense dynamism and creative energy of free peoples, and the immensely involved character, not only of decision-making in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East... but the complexity of manufacturing itself.

> I recently saw a snapshot of a shipping label for some integrated circuits produced by an American firm. It said, 'Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of origin is unknown'.

That label says a lot about where current trends are taking us. Mr. Shultz has no illusions: 'The Soviet Union will remain our central security concern for the foreseeable future'. He is not the only contributor to hold this view.

My second alpha is to Annelise Anderson for her study of immigration policy, and for her introductory overview. Se culls the text to draw her own conclusions, and they are often worrying confirmation of the lessons of the recent past: that much of the Third World is part of 'the extended empire' of the Soviet Union, with Nicaragua as a stockpiler of weapons for a 'protracted

struggle in Central America and the Caribbean' (Richard Staar's view); that the economic constitution is in disarray, with no limits on absolute levels of taxation and spending, and that only a constitutional amendment can act as a curb on government (including Congressional) extravagance, and balance the budget; or that, because of its emphasis on a balanced government, Americans need, tomorrow as in the past, to take the Constitution as their blueprint as well as their guarantee of freedom. This volume as a whole is a remarkable illustration of the academic merits of the Hoover Institution, and the range of its expertise.

Richard Nixon's volume is its own situation-report on the world scene, and for him too the Soviet Union is central to all the analyses: his chapters cover 'How to Deter Moscow', 'How to Compete with Moscow', 'How to Negotiate with Moscow'. He recalls his own experiences, and from them concludes, among other things, that Europe is a 'fragmented giant'. He is frank in saying that while at the time he supported President Eisenhower in his criticism of Britain and France in their Suez expedition in 1956, in retrospect he regards American opposition to Britain's and France's efforts to defend their interests in Suez as 'the greatest foreign-policy blunder the US has made since the end of World War II'. He claims that, in retrospect, Ike agreed with this view. He does not say, as he might, that the real damage was done when Sir Anthony Eden agreed two years before to Nasser's demands to replace British troops by civilian engineers.

This is a valuable book and not only for its revelations of the past. As he did when he was President, Mr. Nixon goes to the nub of each issue. He sees the poverty and disease of the Third World as the breeding grounds of turmoil. 'Over forty wars rage in the Third World today. Most have nothing to do with the Soviet Union, but they have everything to do with US-Soviet rivalry.' 'Our century is,' he says, 'one of war and wonder': 120 million people have been killed in this century's wars — more than all those killed in war before 1900. But in the same century more material and technological progress has been made than ever before. He gives us a readable and shrewd comment on a century that has been 'the bloodiest and the best'.

ESMOND WRIGHT

CHURCH AND THE STATE

Confessions of a Conservative Liberal. John Habgood. SPCK. £6.95.

The author, John Habgood, is the Archbishop of York. At Cambridge he read Natural Sciences and was awarded a First in both parts of the Tripos. Later after periods as Vice Principal of Westcott House and as a parish priest, he became Principal of Queen's College, Birmingham and then Bishop of Durham. The 'Confessions' of the title are certainly not revelations in the popular sense. They form a statement of what he believes. The book is a selection of sermons, lectures and articles which have been written in the last five years since he became Archbishop. The themes are varied. Readily one becomes immersed in the arguments, generally agreeing, sometimes questioning and always challenged.

The Archbishop begins by defining the terms of the title. By liberalism he means openness in the search for truth and by conservatism he means to treasure what is given by tradition. His attitude is a conflation of the two. In his Enthronement statement he said — 'it is only by alternating between belief

and doubt that we come to know anything at all'. The book has five parts. The first defines the public part played by religion in a society of different creeds and races. The second concerns controversies about belief. In this section is a consideration of Dr. Gareth Bennett's Cockford Preface. Parts three and four are concerned with ethical theory and moral issues, and the way in which Christian judgement can be valid outside Christian Churches. The final section deals with Church matters, for example baptism, ministry, ecumenism.

In recent years the sermon has declined as a feature in Church services and fringe people who come casually to Church may hear little to their benefit. In this book we are given a collection of elegant sermons. It is true that the Archbishop was preaching to congregations often collected for special purposes but he has demonstrated by example how sermons should be constructed with care, with the determination to say something and without losing the common touch. We are given no narrow view of Christianity. He makes the point that some people find spiritual reality in the sacraments, some in a personal relationship with our Lord while for others the emphasis is mainly ethical. The process is represented as a search. Over the centuries men have looked for infallible Church, infallible Bible or infallible conscience. The facts are not so straightforward. He speaks of the over simplification of scriptural fundamentalism for which he uses the unfamiliar word, biblicism. Believers are to be considered as explorers not recipients.

In politics he puts his finger on the dilemma of modern Conservatism which he considers to be a divided philosophy. He sees a conflict between a philosophy which roots freedom in competitiveness and a philosophy which wishes to sustain traditional values. Such a cool appraisal is healthy and timely.

The approach is rather different with the comments on the Crockford Preface. Whereas elsewhere themes are dealt with in a detached manner, in this account there is more feeling, and though it ends on an ironic note, there is reproduced a press statement using the words 'sourness and vindictiveness' to describe the Preface. One has to say that to a number of people the Preface does not read like a bitter attack.

This is a valuable book which once started is difficult to put down. It reflects the present day problems of Church and State and those which are permanent to mankind. Anglicanism should be grateful for such a statement which is both intellectual and hopeful.

LAURENCE TANNER

RESURRECTIONISM AND THE ANATOMY ACT

Bodysnatchers: A History of the Resurrectionists. Martin Fido. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £10.95.

Social resistance to the mutilation of human corpses — other, that is, than as art and part of martial souvenirs! — is as deep-grained as the Pagan and Judaeo-Christian tradition which, insisting upon reverent interment with religious rites, paid no respect to the medical apophthegm, *Mortui vivos docent.* So it was that, as medical men grew dissatisfied with sole reliance upon the anatomical observations of Galen, based anyway upon the dissection only of animals, and Vesalius had recourse to gibbet-theft for the prosecution of practical studies, the foundations of the profitable trade or avocation were firmly laid down — or should it, perhaps, be raised up! But it was, as Mr. Fido's scholarly history of the premature resurrectionists clearly demonstrates,

the ninety years between 1742 and 1832 which saw the real rise, full flowering and withering away of the graveyard craft.

The popular notion of the infamous firm of Messrs. Burke and Hare, of Edinburgh, as bodysnatchers is, of course, incorrect. They were not snatchers, mere pillagers of burial-grounds, but manufacturers of their stock-in-trade; and it was, indeed, the discovery of their murderous method of 'burking' that put an end to the business, with the passing of the Anatomy Act — *Anno Secundo et Tertio Gulielmi IV Regis, Cap. LXXV*. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fido reveals, Burke and Hare are not truly entitled to the discredit of being pioneers. Their inventiveness was anticipated seventy-seven years before by two Edinburgh women, Helen Torrence and Jean Waldie, who, having agreed to sell to a surgeon's appentice the body of a child so severely ill that it was expected to die within hours, finding themselves balked by the child's survival, killed another, and sold it for less than five shillings.

Meanwhile, between 1800 and 1828, resurrectionism in London was steadily growing to boom proportions. The Sassenachian supplier in chief at this period was one Ben Crouch, the son of a Guy's Hospital carpenter. He headed the most powerful gang of bodysnatchers ever known, and from 1809 to 1813 enjoyed a virtual monopoly in London.

Mr. Fido's excellent book abounds in strange characters, savage beyond belief, grotesques who seem to have stepped straight out of the frame of a Hogarth print. Fearful caricatures, such as the terrible trio of cadaver purveyors, Bishop, May and Williams — the Bethnal Green Gang — whose cruel murder of a boy — whether the Lincolnshire cow-boy or the 'little Savoyard', Carlo Ferrair, the small Italian street boy, with the revolving squirrel-cage of white mice hung about his neck, so beautifully described by Sacheverell Sitwell in his *Journey to the Ends of Time* — for the sake of the blood money realizable on his pathetic little corpse appals one. And the dreadful Eliza Ross, the tall, raw-boned Irishwoman, the last person to be executed for burking in January 1832, capable of revenging herself upon the landlady of the Sampson and Lion public-house by seizing the pub cat, breaking its neck and skinning it on the spot with her bare hands. A horribly absorbing book . . . but one of immense interest to doctors, lawyers and a wide spectrum of social historians.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

FLAWS IN OUR LAWS

Miscarriages of Justice. Bob Woffinden. Hodder & Stoughton. Hardback £14.95.

Mr. Woffinden's thesis, soon and plainly stated, is that dispensed justice, like all human institutions, is far from perfect. This contention, by no means unique, he supports with a series of reasonably familiar examples of alleged, and, in some instances arguable, miscarriages — such 'classics' as the case of Walter Rowland (1946), Timothy Evans (1950), James Hanratty (1962), Stafford-Luvaglio (1967), the Luton Post Office Murder (1970), and the Carl Bridgewater affair (1979). Several of these will be remembered because of the passionate — and effective — arguments of such 'lay counsel' as Ludovic Kennedy and Paul Foot. Mr. Woffinden confines himself to selected verdicts in dispute from the period 1946-86. He has nothing of significance to add to his accounts of these already well publicised cases of alleged juridical error. The Beck (1904) and Slater (1909) cases are, of course, outside the parameters of

his elected period, but one would have thought the Patrick Meehan case (1969) worth a mention. In the second part of the book there is a very full treatment of what are comprehensively described as 'The Irish Cases', that is, the Guildford, Woolwich, and Birmingham pub-bombs, the trial of the Balcombe Street four, and the trial of the Maguire family. An additional new chapter in the paperback version (published by Coronet) focuses closely on the Home Secretary's referral of the Birmingham pub-bombing case back to appeal on January 20th, 1987, as an example of the total inadequacy of the appeal system.

There are those who believe that it is not the occurrence of the inevitable occasional juridical error that need nag at the public conscience, but that what really matters is the procedure for discovery, admission and correction of that error. And it is precisely here that Mr. Woffinden's social anxiety is acutely aroused. He quotes Cyril Connolly. 'The test of a country's justice is not the blunders which are sometimes made but the zeal with which they are put right'. That zeal he finds wanting. He harbours more than a suspicion that the judges have in too many instances abdicated their responsibilities. He describes with disturbing clarity the ongoing failure of the British legal system to adjust the balance when patently wrong criminal convictions have thrown justice out of true. Juries are, in fact, right surprisingly often, but it would be crass to deny that mistakes can, and do, happen, acquitting the guilty as well as convicting the innocent. It is not so much the prejudice of a judge (as in the Edith Thompson case, 1922), an unfortunate summing-up (as in the Florence Maybrick case, 1889), or the combined unfairness of both judge and prosecutor (as in the Oscar Slater case, 1909), for these wrongs are, or should be, redressable, as the failure of the redressing mechanism that gives serious cause for disquietude. Mr. Woffinden's careful analysis of the factors contributing to this inadequacy is of much more interest than his criticisms of specific cases. He dismisses the value of appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal, because 'appeal court judges have ducked the responsibilities which Parliament prescribed for them'. He deplores the sparing use made by the Home Secretary of his power to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal. He is guilty, perhaps, of some over-simplification — but what he writes is certainly well worth consideration, and this book is without question one which should be read and well marked by judges, practising lawyers, police, politicians and independent, socially concerned members of the public who have an innocent, fundamental faith in the rule of law.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Napoleon and Hitler: A Comparative Biography (Desmond Seward. Harrap. £14.95.) The point of this book is to compare the careers of two dictators who rose from obscurity to dominate the Europe of their time. It is not without interest for those seeking a quick retelling of the basic biographical facts. The problem is that Napoleon has to be re-fashioned to draw parallels with Hitler; thus Waterloo is given scant attention because Hitler had no return from exile. As if it were not difficult enough to compare two figures, the author drags in another by making a great deal of the German military theorist Clausewitz. Desmond Seward attributes

much to the fact that Hitler read Clausewitz's account of Napoleon's strategy. The physical production of the book is quite appalling with some pages having a margin and others bereft of one. (R.M.)

Jack the Ripper: The Uncensored Facts (Robson Books, £12.95) provides a long-needed setting of the record straight. The correction of misinterpretations, the cross-checking of sources, the plain and simple putting right of perpetually repeated errors, that is what Paul Begg has undertaken and most handsomely achieved in a work which will henceforth prove absolutely indispensable to anyone who proposes to give any serious attention to the — albeit in this centenary year somewhat over-exposed — perennially fascinating series of murders perpetrated in Whitechapel in 1888. Mr. Begg dispels the legends and encrustations which have accumulated to distort and disfigure the true lineaments of a classic case. Not only does he go right back to examine the original documentation, but he also supplies soundly-based analyses of the conclusions that may — and may not — be fairly drawn regarding the three major nominees identified in the persuasive Macnaghten Papers.

(R.W-E.)

Human Rights (Routledge. £5 paperback original). The fortieth anniversary on December 10, 1988, of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the occasion for the publication of this series of articles, under the editorship of Peter Davies. He is, inter alia, Chairman of the United Nations Association's (UK) Human Rights Sub-Committee. The volume includes articles on an historical perspective, Human Rights by David Weissbrodt, Women's Rights by Marianne Haslegrave, 'the Magna Carta of humankind' by John F. Humphrey who sets The Universal Declaration as the world equivalent. Leah Levin discusses the rights of the child, Ben Whitaker writes on 'the ultimate crime of genocide', 'Protecting the mentally ill' is the subject of Erica-Irene A. Daes' article, and Donna DEL Caudio has edited a contribution on the fight against apartheid. There are a number of other articles, including, John Burger's on indigenous peoples and Martin Engals on the rights of minorities, R. G. Ramcharan discusses the legal implementation of the Covenant. This is at present unrealistic. Julia Hausermann understands the conflict between rights and reality. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan appreciates that the articles in the Declaration remain largely unfulfilled. This is a useful volume by experts in their particular fields but depressing.

The Bedside Book of Murder (David and Charles. £12.95). The well known criminologists, Richard and Molly Whittington-Egan have produced a fascinating and somewhat morbid volume which tells in dramatic detail the horrifying facts of murder cases going back into the last century, as well as more recently. Of these, they make 'four sanguineious pilgrimages to America and one each to Australia and New Zealand'. A good example of the evil people narrated in this gruesome volume is 'Irish Kate, hatchet-faced cook-general' in whose copper 'simmered prime cuts of her lately butchered late mistress'. They discuss at some length the ways of the 'great poisoners' and include brief accounts of many. However it appears that poison is now out of fashion. The volume is superbly produced with masses of illustrations and photographs. For those who are serious students of criminology this book provides a great deal of material usefully put together. For other readers who enjoy the detective story, this volume should provide no terror at night.

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THE US BUDGET DEFICIT AND THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

by Nigel M. Healey

THE 1988 US presidential campaign, widely acknowledged to have been the most acrimonious of recent years, was also remarkable for the candidates' reluctance to address the fundamental issues, not least the budget deficit which voters consistently rated as more worrying than inflation, national security, taxes, drugs, crime and AIDS in pre-election opinion surveys. These two lamentable hallmarks of the 1988 campaign were not unrelated. As Thomas noted in his excellent preview of the election, 'in a campaign . . . where ideological attacks are shunned, the emphasis tends to be on *ad hominem* attacks'[1].

The reason for the reluctance of Messrs Bush and Dukakis to join in ideological combat over the deficit issue was that, by accident rather than design, the two political parties found their traditional roles in what would otherwise have been a set-piece skirmish disconcertingly reversed. The Republicans, historically wedded to the ideals of 'sound money' and balanced budgets, have presided over the largest budget deficits in American history during Mr Reagan's eight years in the White House. Conversely, the Democratic Party, which pioneered deficit financing during the Kennedy-Johnson era, has been a long-standing advocate of budget deficits to counter unemployment. Both parties thus lacked the ideological baggage and the political commitment to switch sides effectively in the pre-election budget debate.

Indeed, in the event Mr Bush chose to almost completely ignore the budget issue, in an attempt to discourage media speculation about the likelihood of electorally unpopular tax hikes. Mr Dukakis also skirted around the fringes, all too aware that a successful attack on President Reagan's deficit record might backfire by undermining his own call for increased spending on social programmes. Having been boxed into an uncomfortable truce on the main ideological front, the two candidates resorted to slinging mud at each other instead.

For this, history will not easily forgive them. Long after the furore about negative campaigning has been forgotten, the 1988 presidential campaign will be remembered as a missed opportunity to seriously address the deficit issue. Sobering realities which should have been faced and hard decisions which should have been taken were driven off the

agenda by a flurry of insults and innuendos. President Bush obtained no mandate for tax increases and made national defence a central plank of his campaign; the Democrats retained control of both chambers of Congress on a pledge to fight cuts in social welfare programmes. This article examines the background to the present budgetary crisis, assessing the prospects for the US economy in the light of continued governmental inertia and arguing that the American people have been misled into unwittingly voting for a very high-risk 'solution'.

The United States began the 1980s with a rapid slide into its deepest recession since the interwar years. Social security outlays were boosted by payments to the growing numbers of unemployed and tax revenues were depressed by dwindling economic activity. A gap between federal spending and taxes began to appear, but since recovery was expected to throw the system into reverse in due course, the burgeoning deficit was widely regarded as a temporary and unavoidable by-product of recession. As the downturn gathered momentum in 1981, however, President Reagan introduced a radical 'Economic Recovery Tax Act'. This phased in major tax reductions in the belief that the incentive effects of lower tax rates would stimulate work effort and investment and so propel the economy back to prosperity. The effects of these tax cuts and the rapid growth of military spending which followed meant that while the economy did indeed recover strongly after 1982, the underlying balance of taxes and spending had been so fundamentally altered that economic growth alone could no longer push the two back into line (see Table 1 below).

The emergence of a large budget deficit which persisted in the face of a vigorous upturn in the economy was unprecedented in peacetime and has had far-reaching effects on the economy. Financing eight years of deficits by the sale of US Treasury bonds has hugely increased the outstanding national debt (see Table 2 below); in less than a decade, America has accumulated more public debt than during the two centuries following the Declaration of Independence. Selling such vast quantities of securities on Wall Street during the 1980s has meant the Treasury competing with corporate borrowers for funds. In the process, US interest rates have been bid up and foreign capital has flooded in to take advantage of the resultant, internationally-attractive rates of return. The consequence has been the 'selling of America', as Japanese and European investors have snapped up high-yielding US assets; both the proportion of the national debt owned by foreigners and the number of once American companies now run by foreigners who have acquired a controlling interest have risen dramatically. From being the world's largest net creditor in 1980, the USA has become the world's largest net debtor, with net overseas liabilities which now dwarf the external debt of the Third World.

Another unwanted by-product of these capital inflows was, until 1985 at least, a sharp rise in the value of the dollar which priced American exporters out of overseas markets and sparked an influx of artificially cheap imports into the expanding US market. By 1983, the current

account had moved into a deficit which quickly grew to rival that of the budget (See Table 1 below). Following the so-called 'Plaza Accord' in 1985, the Federal Reserve Bank collaborated with other central banks around the world to try and reduce the value of the dollar by pumping dollars into the foreign exchange markets. Although this strategy was successful in bringing the dollar back down, the US trade balance is responding to treatment only very sluggishly, fuelling pressure from the hardest-hit industrial sectors (notably, automobiles and steel) for import controls.

As the adverse effects of the ongoing deficits became increasingly apparent, Congress came under public pressure to check President Reagan's budgetary excesses. The outcome of its protracted and stormy deliberations was the 1985 'Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act', popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman Act, which was passed in the face of open hostility from the White House. The Act established deficit targets for each fiscal year, which progressively declined until 1991 when the target was for a balanced budget. The logic was that should Congress and the President fail to agree a budget with a forecast deficit equal to or less than the Gramm-Rudman target, compensatory cuts across all discretionary spending programmes were to be automatically triggered.

Predictably, President Reagan refused to entertain the possibility of reversing his 1981 tax cuts or curbing the military build-up, both of which were electorally popular and had played a major part in his 1984 re-election; the Democrats in Congress blocked cuts in social programmes; and the automatic mechanisms by which spending cuts to achieve the Gramm-Rudman target were to have been achieved were challenged in the Supreme Court and declared unconstitutional. In 1987, the Act was amended in an attempt to resuscitate it. With automatic spending cuts administered by the executive ruled out by the Supreme Court, a complex set of rules by which Gramm-Rudman cuts would be 'automatically' voted through was agreed, again with initial opposition from the White House. The pill was sweetened for the President, however, by pushing the balanced budget target back to 1993 and revising upwards all the interim deficit targets (see Table 3 below). The 'automatic' cuts, moreover, are now only triggered if the forecast deficit exceeds its Gramm-Rudman targets by more than $10bn.

Much has been made of the loopholes which remain in the revised Act, notably the fact that the forecast overshoot which sets the alarm bells ringing is based on the projected deficit figure supplied by the White House. Economic forecasts are notoriously susceptible to manipulation and by making sufficiently optimistic forecasts about the effect of economic growth on tax revenues, for example, the Bush administration should be able to avoid the embarrassment of admitting to a projected overshoot. Yet the truth is that Gramm-Rudman was, and still is, an essentially cosmetic exercise, designed to present the illusion that the American system of 'checks and balances' is still alive and well in

budgetary affairs. So long as the Democrats in Congress oppose cuts in social programmes and the Bush administration maintains its commitment to the military and its hostility to tax hikes, Gramm-Rudman targets will be achieved only by accident or by creative accounting. In the absence of a genuine political will to reduce the deficit, self-imposed budget ceilings are no more binding or credible than the New Year's Eve resolution of an addicted smoker to give up cigarettes.

If the federal government machine is unable, or unwilling, to grasp the nettle of spending cuts or tax hikes, should America resign itself to another eight years of deficits and debt? President Bush argues that there is another way, namely that, provided spending can be held constant, economic growth will gradually increase tax revenues and close the gap between the two. This is the logic of the new administration's 'flexible freeze', the freeze being 'flexible' in the sense that while total spending is to be frozen, some programmes may be cut and others expanded to reflect changing political priorities. The 1990 Budget which the President presented to Congress on 9 February, for example, proposes cuts in farm supports, but increases in spending on the homeless and education.

There is, sadly, a major flaw in the apparently attractive proposition that the deficit will melt away in the heat of economic recovery, so averting the showdown between the Congress and the White House that neither wants. It is that many expenditure items simply cannot be frozen by Presidential edict. America is an ageing nation and the Medicare and pensions bills will continue to grow with the numbers of elderly. Some existing social problems, namely drug-related crime, AIDS and homelessness, are not static, but are intensifying rapidly and will not be solved without increased resources. And there are new calls on the public purse looming, not least of which is the worsening crisis in America's equivalent of the building society industry. Of the country's 3,300 federally insured 'savings and loans institutions', some 900 are insolvent and a medium term rescue operation may cost the federal government up to $100bn over the next five years.

But potentially the biggest, uncontrollable drain on the federal budget would arise in the event of a downturn in the economy. President Bush cannot command continued economic growth any more than he can order the elderly to stop ageing or the criminal to obey the law. Another recession would shatter President Bush's flexible freeze, inflating unemployment-related outlays over which the executive can exercise no control. After taking into account the impact on tax revenues as well, the Congressional Budget Office estimates (on 1988 figures) that for every 1% increase in unemployment, the budget deficit would increase by $42bn. Even the most modest of downturns could therefore easily push the deficit back up to $200bn heights. Significantly, America's recovery since 1982 already constitutes one of the longest periods of unbroken economic expansion in recent times and most commentators expect the economy to run out of steam within the next eighteen months. As a solution to the deficit problem, the non-confrontational, 'economic

growth will pull us through' approach of the Bush administration is thus barely plausible and must be seen as a very high-risk option.

To conclude, it is evident that there is no genuine political will to drive the budget deficit away and no compelling reason to believe that it will automatically wither and die of its own accord. Continuing deficits will add further to the national debt and turn the United States into an ever-larger international debtor, implying that future generations of Americans will be obliged to pay higher taxes and export more of their output abroad simply to service the debts which funded this generation's tax cuts and military build-up. The stark fact, moreover, is that in marked contrast to Messrs Bush and Dukakis, the American electorate regards the prospect of continuing deficits and escalating debt with considerable alarm. This concern is registered consistently in public opinion surveys and underscored by the intense interest of the popular media in every aspect of the deficit debate. Yet by some bizarre twist of fate, both political parties find themselves facing a problem with which neither has the ideological tools nor the political courage to deal. The real tragedy of the 1988 presidential campaign was not the bitter tone of the contests, which was simply a distasteful substitute for the intellectual exchange which should have taken place, but rather the failure of the world's largest democracy to produce candidates who could offer the electorate what it so plainly demanded.

NOTES

1. Thomas, D. (1988), 'Background to the Presidential Campaign 1988', *Contemporary Review*, 253, 1474, 225-231.

Table 1 — US Budget and Trade Deficits 1980-88 ($bns)

		1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Budget	Deficit	−59	−58	−110	−196	−175	−209	−221	−150	−157
Current	Account	+57	+49	+26	−20	−84	−118	−141	−154	−137

Source: Congressional Budget Office, US Bureau of Commerce

Table 2 — US National Debt 1800-1990 ($bns)

1800	1850	1900	1920	1945	1960	1970	1980	1985	1990[1]
0.08	0.06	1.3	24	258	286	371	914	1828	3163

Source: Office of Management and Budget [1]estimated

Table 3 — Gramm-Rudman Budget Deficit Targets 1988-1993 ($bns)

		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Original	Target	108	72	36	0	—	—
Revised	Target	144	136	100	64	28	0
(Upper	Limit)	(154)	(146)	(110)	(74)	(38)	(0)

Source: Congressional Budget Office

[Nigel M. Healey is a lecturer in the Department of Economics, University of Leicester and Visiting Professor of Economics, California State University, Hayward, USA.]

A TIME OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Terence Davidson

THE outlook for peace in the Middle East will be more favourable over the next twelve months than it has ever been since the Second World War. Three sets of circumstances are converging to permit a glimpse of hope in what has been a scene of unrelenting tragedy for most of our lifetimes.

The first of these favourable developments is the arrival in the White House of George Bush, who will exercise more professional leadership than we have seen from Washington for a long time. Equally important is the fact that at this stage in the US electoral cycle, the Administration can look forward to several months of relative freedom from the political pressures it will face in the long run up to the mid-term elections in 1990. It will thus have some latitude for action in the United States' longer term interests, which include peace in the Middle East.

The second new factor is the ending of the Gulf War in which for eight years Iraq pitted its technical superiority against the vast human resources of Iran. This admittedly fragile ceasefire is a much-needed triumph for the United Nations and its Secretary-General, Javier Peres de Cuellar. If the ceasefire continues to hold, it will open the way to tremendous business opportunities in the region and at the same time remove a huge distraction from the fundamental problem of Palestine.

Thirdly, and this is the most dramatic development of all, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) has at last acknowledged the existence of Israel. Public opinion there seems to be ready to reciprocate in some measure, although the Israeli Government is far from sharing that view.

These developments have combined to produce a state of affairs in which the Palestine question can never be the same again, no matter what extreme positions are taken in pre-settlement manoeuvring.

The Holy Land has been the centre of controversy at least since the time of Abraham (or Ibrahim, according to one's point of view). But the problem as we know it emerged with brutal suddenness in 1948, when Arab armies tried and failed to prevent the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.

Strengthened by waves of European and Oriental immigrants after Britain's Balfour Declaration of 1917, which favoured the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, Jewish forces in Palestine were able to hold their own and on 14 May 1948 their leaders proclaimed the creation of the State of Israel. About a third of the Palestinian population was Jewish at this time.

Some three-quarters of a million Palestinian Arabs were displaced by the fighting. Most of them had fled with only such possessions as they could carry; and when the ceasefire was agreed, they were huddled in destitute, near-starving groups in neighbouring Arab territories, largely in the areas of Amman, Gaza, Beirut and Damascus. Britain had tried in

vain to maintain order in Palestine after being given a League of Nations mandate over the territory in 1922, and at last in desperation it handed the problem to the United Nations.

Palestine was the first great international crisis to face the fledgling world body, and it took its responsibility seriously. It sent out a special committee, which recommended the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews, and on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly approved this proposed solution. After this failed to halt the fighting, the General Assembly sent a truce commission to help bring about a ceasefire. It then sent a mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross. Count Bernadotte recommended that the Palestine refugees should either be repatriated or compensated for the loss of their property. He was promptly murdered by Jewish extremists in Jerusalem.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted Count Bernadotte's proposal and its Resolution 194(III) of 11 December 1948 has remained part of UN policy ever since. In one key passage it resolves that 'refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible'.

With no sign of any progress in this direction, and with famine and disease threatening the homeless hordes of Palestinians, the General Assembly decided on 9 December 1949 to set up a United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In the absence of a settlement, UNRWA has become the largest non-governmental employer in the Middle East with its 17,000 employees running 600 schools, 100 clinics and welfare services for a registered refugee population that has grown to more than two million people. So much has UNRWA become a part of the Middle East scene, with its ubiquitous white cars and blue trucks, that it has sometimes been accused of perpetuating the Palestine problem single-handed, as a self-serving bureaucracy. This charge is however belied by one fact: the United States, its largest contributor and its sternest critic, renews its support for the agency's work at every year's General Assembly session. Western backers know that without UNRWA's education and health programmes the Middle East would be even more dangerous to world peace than it is today.

The long deadlock between an American Government that would not talk to the PLO, and a PLO in which extremists set the pace, was broken on 14 December 1988 when the PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, recognised Israel's right to existence. The US Government established contact with the PLO forthwith, and the transformation breathed new life into European Community efforts to promote dialogue.

Hopes for peace were balanced on a razor's edge now because so many vested interests might be expected to sabotage anything that might really

lead to peace. Tragedy did strike, in the form of the PanAm jumbo jet that crashed on Lockerbie some days later with the loss of 270 lives. And partisans on both sides of the Palestine conflict did indeed accuse each other of complicity. That was predictable. What was surprising — and heartening — is the fact that the disaster, whatever its cause, did not deflect the West from its search for continued progress toward a settlement.

It is important that Israel should acknowledge the PLO's recognition. Otherwise it will repeat the mistake it made when it accepted peace from President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and gave him little in return apart from his own Sinai Peninsula. Sadat's reward was to be murdered by compatriots who clearly believed that he had bartered away recognition of Israel for no good purpose. In Sadat, Israel and the West lost a powerful ally.

It would not be in Israel's interest to allow a similar fate to befall moderate leaders of the Palestinian Arabs, if only because it would guarantee the indefinite continuance of serious unrest in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel occupied these territories in its 1967 campaign, and the increasingly drastic measures it has adopted to control the turmoil there since December 1987 have alienated some of its own troops.

With 54 per cent of the Israeli public favouring direct talks with the PLO, according to a recent poll, the Government of Israel appears to be contemplating some form of elections in the occupied territories. As the peace process gets under way the Arabs may well take as their starting point the declaration of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held under United Nations auspices in Geneva in 1983. This text, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in the same year, calls among other things for the creation of an 'independent Palestinian State in Palestine'. The General Assembly called again for an international conference, including the PLO, last December.

The gap between the two positions is as wide as it could be. But the prospect of bringing them closer together looks more promising now than it has been in living memory.

[Terence Davidson, a former Reuter's correspondent in the Middle East, has recently retired as UNRWA's Information Director.]

THE 'VISION' COLLIDES WITH THE 'GRAND DESIGN'

by C. Gordon Tether

THE British political situation has recently taken an extremely curious turn. The Thatcher regime, renowned for the single-minded way in which it pursues its objectives and for crushing all opposition it may encounter in steam-roller like fashion, has been suddenly overtaken — or so, at first sight, it would seem — by an acute attack of schizophrenia. Since it concerns an aspect of the nation's life of the greatest importance — nothing less than the future of its involvement in European unification — it is a development of immense significance for everyone.

The phenomenon began to take shape in 1987. It was then that Britain and the other members of the European Community agreed that the time was ripe for putting into a higher gear the drive for greater togetherness set in motion by the signing of the Treaty of Rome in the mid-1950s. This was not, as it happens, the first major attempt to speed up the unification process. A highly ambitious plan, designed to bring about complete economic and monetary union between the member states within ten years, was actually put on the table at the time of Britain's accession to the EEC in 1973. But that had had to be shelved when the subsequent oil prices explosion triggered off a global economic crisis a year or two later.

Now, however, the more dedicated of the pro-Market protagonists had managed to convince member governments that there was everything to be said for getting the European 'Vision' back on course again. It was agreed that the process would start with the completion by 1992 of the work of creating a single market for the Community's economic activity by removing all remaining barriers to trade and financial traffic, including capital transfers. And none of the members, it seemed at the time, was more enthusiastic about the idea than the United Kingdom.

Certainly, the Thatcher Government lost no time in pressurising Parliament to pass the Single European Act — the legislation needed to give it authority to arrange for British participation in the Single Market plan. Moreover, as soon as that had been done, Whitehall launched a massive publicity campaign aimed at persuading the British public in general, and the business community in particular, that considerable benefits would accrue to the country provided all appropriate measures to meet 'the challenge' were put in hand in good time.

All, it seemed, was sweetness and light. And so it remained until Downing Street began to realise that the governments of many other Community countries, including some of the largest, had ideas about what the new advance in European togetherness was to mean that were radically different from its own. This sombre truth emerged from intergovernmental discussions on the practical steps required to bring about the new move forward organised by the EEC Commission, the Community's top executive body.

Mrs Thatcher was not, to use Queen Victoria's famous phrase, amused.

In due course, she gave full vent to her feelings in a lengthy address to a high-powered audience at Bruges in the very heartland of the European Community. She did so in terms to which even the most diehard of British anti-Marketeers would have found it difficult to take exception. Going along with the Single Market proposition was, she said, something that she was happy about. This was because she wanted to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of purpose and that was an acceptable way of working towards that goal. What she was totally opposed to was European unification that 'failed to recognise that different traditions, parliamentary powers and national pride had to be preserved'.

She made it clear, moreover, that her decision to strike such a disharmonious note was not to be seen as a rhetorical exercise aimed only at improving her image at home. The British Government, she insisted, was totally opposed to handing over greater control of Britain's affairs to a bureaucracy in Brussels or getting caught up in exercises like economic and monetary union that achieved the same result indirectly.

Subsequently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Nigel Lawson, endorsed the Prime Minister's stand in a series of pronouncements. He even went onto the offensive, not stopping short of accusing proponents of economic monetary union of being out to sabotage the Single Market project itself. 'It is difficult to escape the conclusion', he said, 'that this divisive and intensely difficult new issue has been propelled into the forefront of the European debate at this time, either out of culpable carelessness or as a smokescreen to obscure a lack of sufficient progress towards the Single Market — or, worse still, as a means of running away from the challenge of freedom.'

Since it has always been widely assumed that the whole purpose of the European Community 'Vision' was to achieve a stage-by-stage advance to togetherness that would ultimately culminate in full political union, the British decision to sound an antagonistic note so strident that it came near to denouncing that idea was a bombshell. It began to look as though the 'Iron Lady' had experienced a conversion to anti-Marketism in respect of the sovereignty issue that was just as dramatic in its way as that which overtook St. Paul on the road to Damascus. And this is, indeed, the way in which much of the British Press interpreted the Bruges peroration.

Things are not, however, always what they seem. And when the record of the Thatcher regime in relation to the sovereignty issue is studied in conjunction with the reasons the Prime Minister adduced for not being prepared to go along with Continental ideas about the form the projected new advance in Euro-togetherness should take, a somewhat different picture begins to emerge. The story it tells is that there is little or no justification for the theory that a belated resurgence of the Falklands spirit is responsible for the Government's decision to make no further sacrifice of Britain's sovereignty on the altar of the European unification dream.

What we perceive instead is that at the heart of the sudden up-welling of concern in Downing Street about the Single Market project is the

realisation that deeper involvement in European unification could get seriously in the way of the continued implementation of Thatcherism's 'Grand Design' for the British economy. Which takes its cue — as we are being constantly reminded — from an ideology based, first and foremost, on the proposition that the best economic policy for any nation is one that makes 'market forces' its king.

To put it in another way, the European 'Vision' has collided with Thatcherism's 'Grand Design', thereby creating a crisis that can only be resolved, as the 'Iron Lady' sees it, by calling a complete halt to British participation in European integration before it goes any further.

What, after all, has been happening to the sovereignty of the British people since the Thatcher regime insisted on making domination by 'market forces' the keynote of the country's economic policy a decade ago? To give effect to a more or less absolutist dedication to this — the greatest of all modern Capitalism's deities — it has carried out a complete dismantling of tariff and other trade barriers, along with the abolition of exchange controls and restrictions on the movement of capital into and out of the country.

One result of these measures and other steps to internationalise the economy to make it more 'market forces' oriented has been to leave the way clear for transnational capitalism to acquire ownership and control of large sections of British industry and commerce — inevitably at the cost of whittling down the power of the home side to protect its well-being. Another has been to deprive the Government itself of the economic levers needed to ensure that the shaping of the country's economic life can take full account of the interests of its own citizens. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has himself confessed that the only instrument now left to him for performing this function is the manipulation of interest rates — an instrument so blunt that it takes years to achieve its objectives and only then at the cost of inflicting serious damage through mortgage rates hikes and otherwise, on the well-being of a sizeable part of the population.

The sombre truth, then, is that there is very little sovereignty left to the British people in the all-important economic field. And what makes that the more deplorable is that sacrificing so much of it has not brought them to the promised land of 'market forces' economics. On the contrary, at the end of Thatcherism's first decade, unemployment in Britain is running far beyond normal levels, industrial activity has barely recovered to the levels of the mid-1970s, the country has a balance of payments deficit far greater than ever experienced in the past and inflation is again rearing its head in disconcerting fashion.

If, to sum up, we are to judge by deeds rather than words, it is clear that it cannot be because of a determination to preserve British sovereignty that the British Government is setting its face so wholeheartedly against deeper involvement in European unification. If there are any remaining doubts on this score, they should be disposed of by an examination of Mrs Thatcher's thinking on the sovereignty aspects of the

Single Market exercise itself. For throughout she has been at pains to stress that she is altogether in favour of committing Britain to participate in that project to the extent that — though only to the extent that — it will give a further boost to the processes that have been steadily eroding the nation's sovereignty during the past ten years. It was, indeed, because it was at first thought in London that all that was involved was a further liberalisation of 'market forces' — notably in respect of financial services and capital movements — that Mrs Thatcher was initially manifesting so much enthusiasm for the Single Market idea.

It is plain, therefore, that for the real explanation of the British Government's sudden display of distaste for the idea of proceeding further down the European togetherness road we have to look beyond the sovereignty issue. And there is, as it happens, no difficulty in discerning the real objections, since Mrs Thatcher spelled them out in no uncertain manner in the speech she gave at Bruges. They can be said to fall, broadly speaking, under two headings.

The first concerns what can be most appropriately described as the bureaucracy aspect. 'We have not,' said Mrs Thatcher in her Bruges address, 'rolled back the frontiers of the State in Britain only to see them reimposed at European level with a European super-state exercising a dominance from Brussels.'

It cannot, of course, be denied that Thatcherism has seen the dismantling of State regulation of economic activity as an essential part of its drive to establish the supremacy of rule by market forces. But it is also clear that it has displayed no enthusiasm for standing in the way of increased official interference in other directions. Certainly, it has presided over the processes that have been bringing an ever-increasing share of Britain's economic, financial, legal and even political life under the control of the EEC bureaucracy in Brussels. There is no need to look any further than to what has been happening in the European court at Strasbourg to see that. Similarly, at home the treatment meted out to local authorities demonstrates all too clearly that the keynote of the Government's approach has not been decentralisation but the exact opposite. Where was the belief Mrs Thatcher expressed at Brussels that 'success depends on the dispersion of power from the centre', hiding away when that policy was being evolved?

What really worries Mrs Thatcher about the role that 'bureaucratic dominance from Brussels' could come to play in a post-1992 setting if Continental ideas set the stage was spotlighted by the 'Iron Lady' herself when she defended her Bruges peroration at the Tory Party's annual conference a few weeks later. At Bruges, it was the rolling back of the 'frontiers of State' that she did not want to see reversed. When she spoke to the party conference, it was the rolling back of the 'frontiers of socialism' that would not be tolerated.

The Governments of the other EEC countries are, of course, far from being unequivocally socialist in tone. Some of them have a distinctly right-wing flavour and others take pride in occupying the middle political ground. But what is true is that almost all of them accept — as

Thatcherism does not — that there must be firmly established limits to the extent that the 'market forces' ideology is allowed to shape the economic lives of their peoples. Accordingly, as many of them see it, the next stage of unification must have a 'social dimension' built into it — a system of checks and balances aimed, among other things, at ensuring adequate protection for those who, through no fault of their own, find themselves materially disadvantaged by unification.

This is clearly what M. Delors, the President of the EEC Commission, had in mind when he said that there would have to be 'a frank elucidation of economic policy matters' before the Single Market plan to remove exchange controls and capital traffic barriers was put into effect. It is this insistence that Euro-integration must be given a human face that Thatcherism sees as posing a serious threat to the 'Grand Design'.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer provided a vivid illustration of this when he made it clear that the British Government did not have much sympathy with one of the things that supporters of the 'social dimension' approach to economic management consider to be an essential ingredient of such a policy — the provision of subsidies for disadvantaged regions. 'Grandiose attempts to reduce regional disparities by ever-greater resource transfers were to be deplored,' he declared, because 'subsidising industries and subsidising regions destroys their will to compete and thus their ability to compete'.

The same kind of thinking can be discerned behind the British Government's reaction to Continental ideas about how the Single Market operation should be handled under the second heading — that concerned with participation in economic and monetary union. Integration of this kind obviously calls for a much more advanced form of togetherness than that involved in the creation of the Single Market. It must ultimately entail the centralisation of the member countries' economic and financial policies — even the emergence of a common currency. So it is eventually going to call for the surrender of pretty well all the meaningful sovereignty of the participating countries to a super-state organisation.

That said, however, it has to be recognised that there are strong arguments of a purely technical nature for seeing a movement towards economic and monetary union as a necessary concomitant of the establishment of the Single Market the EEC is now contemplating. A report by the Common Market Commission hinted strongly at this when it asserted that: 'As a simple matter of feasibility, Europe cannot have at the same time stable exchange rates, integrated capital markets and independent monetary policies.' It was with the same idea in mind that the Commission announced, shortly after embracing the Single Market plan, that it was launching a year-long study aimed at proposing concrete stages towards economic and monetary union.

There is also the point that distinguished central bankers have been insisting that, in the absence of some form of centralised control of the monetary situation, the full liberalisation of capital movements within the Community could have disastrous consequences — not least a destabilisation of the economies of the more exposed member states —

that would torpedo the entire Single Market programme in the process.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's answer to this is that all that is really needed is 'some form of agreement on how we can work together in a market-related way once exchange controls and restrictions on capital transfers have been eliminated in the Common Market area'. What he probably has in mind is British accession to the European Monetary System, which is essentially a mechanism for exchange market collaboration that has been operated successfully by most of the other EEC members during the 1980s and which stops short of major interference in their domestic economic policies.

What the Continental opposition to the British theme is saying, however, is that Mr Lawson is being dangerously simplistic in claiming that complete freedom from exchange controls and restrictions on capital flows can be accommodated without doing more than, for example, giving the EMS a bigger role. And there is no difficulty in seeing why this is another consequence of the greatest importance of the collision between the European 'Vision' and Mrs Thatcher's 'Grand Design'. The point is that the other EEC countries may well be right in insisting that the Single Market operation cannot be safely launched on the simplistic basis favoured by the British. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer may also well be right when he claims, as he did earlier this year, that participating in economic and monetary union arrangements is 'incompatible with independent sovereign states retaining control over their fiscal and monetary policies and that setting up a new European central bank or a new European institution to determine Community fiscal policies goes to the very heart of nationhood.' In short, it is something that could be counted upon to derail Thatcherism's 'Grand Design' for Britain's economic future just as surely as dominance by a super-state bureaucracy in Brussels.

It may be that the differences of opinion between British and other members of the Community on what the implementation of the Single Market should mean will be resolved in a manner that Mrs Thatcher considers acceptable — one, that is, that will not require British involvement in the Brussels bureaucracy or in EEC economic and monetary togetherness on a scale calculated to compromise the progress of the 'Grand Design' at home. We shall be in a better position to determine the answer to that question when the argument between the two factions is joined at the next EEC Summit Conference in June.

However, it is already apparent that there is little or no chance of the 'Iron Lady' altering her stance in significant degree. From which it follows that there will either have to be a major climb-down on the other side of the Channel or the 1992 exercise will bring about a parting of the ways. In the latter event, we shall see the emergence of a two-tier Community, with some of the other members, including some major ones, committing themselves to press on with the more advanced forms of unification while Britain and other like-minded members effectively suspend their participation in the European 'Vision' at the point it has now reached.

What will that mean for the British people? They will be spared the further loss of their sovereignty that deeper involvement in the European unification process of the order entailed by participation in economic and monetary union would inevitably bring. On the other hand, they will remain more exposed to the rigours of Thatcherism's 'market forces' philosophy than they would be if, having been brought more within the rule of Brussels, they were afforded the relief provided by its concern for the 'social dimension'.

What it boils down to is that, as things stand, the British people are, so far as the future of their sovereignty is concerned, between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Whether they have to submit to further integration with the other EEC countries or remain under the sovereignty exercised over them by Mrs Thatcher, their independence — their ability to retain control over their own affairs — will be further eroded. All that can be said is that, whereas Thatcherism's reign may not last for ever, deeper involvement in European unification could well be irreversible.

What can be taken for granted is that they are hardly likely to be consulted on the vital question of what course they would like their nation to take. And that is a great pity.

The highly optimistic projections that are being made about the benefits that will flow from involvement in the European Single Market are likely to prove as illusory as those put forward at the time of Britain's accession to the Community in the 1970s. But it has to be remembered that, for this country, the further liberalisation now envisaged amounts to little more than a dotting of the i's and crossing of the t's.

It also has to be recognised that the movement towards a single market in Europe is just one aspect of a global internationalisation process that Big Business has been master-minding for some two decades. It has now reached such an advanced stage that it is hard to see how it could be put in reverse or, indeed, how individual countries could contract out of it even if they wanted to.

But a matter to which we ought to be giving a lot more thought is how far it makes sense to get caught up in unification processes that are calculated, later if not sooner, to generate the kind of tensions and frictions that are now finding expression in internal dissension — sometimes amounting to civil war — in countries all over the world, not excluding Europe. The tide, as Russia's experience shows, is now running strongly against centralisation of all kinds. We will disregard this at our peril.

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CHALLENGES TO NATO AFTER THE INF TREATY

by Manfred R. Hamm

WESTERN publics and governments are exuberant about the conclusion of the INF treaty. It was signed by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at their December 1987 Washington summit. NATO leaders are proud to point out that it was their political resolve in facing down the Soviet Union as well as internal political challenges by the anti-nuclear movement in many Western European countries, that ultimately persuaded Moscow to settle for less than total euro-strategic nuclear dominance. In that respect, they are right to contend that their 'deploy-and-negotiate' approach was instrumental in bringing about the complete elimination of intermediate and long range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. The current debate on how to safeguard the continued viability of NATO's flexible response strategy and how to proceed in the field of arms control demonstrates, however, that the much acclaimed 'double-zero' agreement may be a far more mixed blessing for NATO than the near universal approbation it has received from almost all political quarters, leads one to believe.

By contrast, NATO's military leaders are far less sanguine about the treaty's contribution to European security. They worry not only about its negative impact on NATO's strategy of flexible response by eliminating the two most capable weapon systems that could be used in its support, they are also weary that the public expectations and arms control momentum generated by the INF treaty might prevent the Alliance from carrying out its nuclear modernisation programme pursuant to the 1983 Montebello decision. Moreover, they fear the arms control euphoria might erode political support for improving NATO's conventional defences that are widely regarded as inadequate to counter Soviet aggression. Since enhancing conventional defences is even more urgent today than it was prior to the INF treaty, its military strategic impact could be exacerbated by the failure to bolster NATO's conventional strength. Obviously, these fears are not completely unjustified: growing financial and manpower constraints in most NATO countries militate against the expansion of the existing force structure and impose serious limitations on fielding advanced weapon systems to improve the combat capability of current forces. Instead, most NATO governments and, by necessity, the military leadership, look toward arms control negotiations to help solve their conventional predicament. They seem buoyed by recent signs of Soviet willingness to entertain the asymmetrical forces reductions that would be necessary to achieve a balance of conventional forces in Europe.

NATO is in an unenviable position, chasing a dual dilemma. First, as a result of the INF treaty, its nuclear strategy may become unhinged and governments are hesitant to lend their political support to a comprehensive overhaul of its remaining nuclear capability, while compensating for some of the lost INF potential. Second, urgent conventional force improvement measures are being postponed for political, financial and

personal reasons. Despite the apparent lack of negotiating leverage vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, there is a clear propensity to prefer negotiated arms control solutions to unilateral NATO force improvement programmes that are indispensable to enhance their chances of success in the first place. Thus NATO governments appear to repudiate the very approach they credit with the success of the INF negotiations.

At the heart of the different assessments of the INF treaty and its impact on NATO nuclear strategy are profoundly differing interpretations of NATO's 1979 INF deployment rationale. It should be recalled that NATO governments (with Great Britain and the Federal Republic in the forefront) demanded in the late 1970s the deployment of US ground based intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe to strengthen extended deterrence, ensure a tight coupling to US central strategic systems, increase the flexibility of NATO nuclear options in the theatre, and prevent Soviet territory from becoming a sanctuary in a European conflict. At the time, European governments considered then existing NATO nuclear systems inadequate to meet the requirements of flexible response, while demanding political reassurance from the United States through the deployment of nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet Union from European soil. Hence, the 1979 deployment decision was based on distinct military operational requirements to maintain flexible response as well as on the political desire to win reassurance of the US nuclear commitment to the defence of Western Europe at a time when the future of extended deterrence was called into question by emerging strategic nuclear parity between both superpowers. These European demands for intermediate range nuclear weapon deployments in Europe met with luke-warm support if not outright resistance from the United States, for it was at odds with the American desire to acquire greater flexibility of nuclear employment options by diminishing the near-automaticity of escalation to central strategic nuclear war in the event of an armed conflict in Europe. The Carter administration embraced the same position that had prompted President Kennedy to withdraw the Jupiter and Thor medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe in 1963. Consequently, the Carter White House dismissed European concerns of maintaining the broad range of nuclear options in Europe, pointing out the growing flexibility and selectivity in nuclear targeting with central strategic nuclear forces that rendered dedicated euro-strategic systems superfluous. The US contended further that American forward-based-systems (FBS) deployed in Europe provided a sufficiently broad spectrum of flexible nuclear options against Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In order to attenuate European concerns about the US political commitment to the nuclear defence of Western Europe, the Carter administration finally pointed to the deployment of some 320,000 US troops and their dependants in Western Europe as tangible evidence of American resolve to stand by Europe in case of a military emergency. It was only in the aftermath of the neutron bomb fiasco caused by President Carter's fumbling that he decided, under pressure to demons-

trate competence and decisiveness in alliance nuclear policy making, to accede finally to European demands.

This brief review shows that European pressure for US intermediate range force deployments in Europe preceded and were independent from the fielding of the SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union. Consequently, the second element of the 1979 decision, the intention to negotiate with the Soviet Union on INF weapons in Europe, was consonant with NATO's strategic deployment rationale only insofar as common upper ceilings for these weapon systems would be established through bilateral negotiations. The complex military reasoning underlying the deployment decision was, however, hardly suited to legitimate missile deployment among the Western public. Thus for reasons of political convenience and because NATO's negotiating approach aimed primarily at limiting Soviet SS-20 missiles, it was only too tempting for NATO leaders to justify their own deployment decision in terms of the Soviet SS-20 and to link the scope of NATO deployment to Soviet willingness to curtail these systems. This departure from NATO's original deployment rationale gave Moscow the opportunity to interfere with its implimentation and laid the intellectual foundation for the 'zero-option' which became NATO's own negotiating position in November 1981. This was bound to happen as domestic political pressures against NATO INF deployment kept mounting.

Arms control negotiations were given priority over deployment; and non-deployment by NATO became considered as the preferred outcome of these negotiations. In a sense then, the European political climate essentially forced the repudiation of the military strategic deployment rationale in favour of a political approach that would dispense with the need to station these new forces in Europe. This shifted decisively the carefully constructed balance of the 1979 double-track decision of deploying while negotiating a common level of forces in favour of arms control as a viable substitute for NATO deployment. The so-called 'zero-option' was attractive politically because it showed support for proceeding with the double track process. That offered some military benefits by reducing the nuclear threat to Western Europe and had some obvious advantages in terms of verification. In many respects, however, the NATO interim proposal of 1983, according to which each side would have retained 100 INF systems, or the 'walk-in-the-woods' formula, initiated by Paul Nitze and Yuri Kvitsinsky in the summer of '83, would have much better reconciled the military deployment rationale and the politically motivated desire to negotiate with the Soviet Union a common upper ceiling for these systems.

The 'zero-option' and, even more so, the 'double-zero' agreement as signed, are inconsistent with the military strategic rationale of the 1979 decision. Consequently, supporters of this rationale (admittedly, they are confined to a narrow circle of military and civilian strategists) are examining ways to compensate for the 'lost' INF capabilities and press for the full implementation of the 1983 Montebello decision together with its subsequent re-affirmations. Some of those who had not been all too

committed to INF deployment, nevertheless viewed as desirable a de-emphasis on battlefield nuclear weapons in favour of long range systems capable of inflicting nuclear damage on a territory of the Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, they now support extended range nuclear capabilities to fill, at least in part, the gap caused by the elimination of ground-based INF systems, if NATO resolves to thin-out US battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. Supporters of this position are to be found mostly in the Federal Republic which has legitimate anxieties about the widescale deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons on its soil.

By contrast, former critics of NATO INF deployment deny categorically that extended deterrence has been weakened and, consequently, reject any modernisation of remaining nuclear capabilities or the acquisition of new capabilities with a range of up to 500 kilometers permitted under the INF treaty. Most of them also support a concept of nuclear-free-zones, while some of them at least concede the desirability of maintaining a residual nuclear deterrent in Europe in the form of over-the-horizon sea-launched-cruise missiles (SLCMs). Given the widespread support enjoyed by proponents of this latter view, it is questionable whether NATO can muster the political resolve to reconfigure its nuclear potential and make up for some of its 'lost' capabilities.

It is hard to believe Moscow would willingly renounce such opportunities. Indeed, there is very considerable evidence that it is deliberately acquiring compensatory capabilities before even the first of its SS-20 missiles has been eliminated. At the April 1988 nuclear planning group (NPG) meeting, American intelligence experts briefed NATO defence ministers on a broad array of Soviet measures to maintain a diverse, redundant, and highly flexible eurostrategic nuclear capability. The director of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that the number of dual capable aircraft deployed in the European theatre had increased to 4,000 planes, of which roughly 1,000 are on nuclear withhold. Further, in an unprecedented move, Soviet medium range bombers, comparable to the US F-111s stationed in the UK, had temporarily been deployed to Poland and East Germany, probably to practise the logistics and, hence, speed up their forward deployment in a future crisis. He pointed out that Warsaw Pact air defences in the GDR and Hungary had also been bolstered in recent months by the arrival of Soviet-made SA-10 and SA-11 missiles. In view of NATO's growing dependence on the penetration capabilities of its nuclear-capable aircraft, these and expected future improvements of Warsaw Pact air defences should not be taken lightly.

Moscow is also working assiduously to regain ballistic nuclear missile options against Western Europe. It has tested its new mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs at a range between 2,000 and 3,000 kilometres which allows these missiles to perform the missions formerly covered by the SS-20s. Furthermore, there are increasing uncertainties as to the actual range of the Scud-Bs whose official range is given by Moscow as less than 500 kilometres. Yet Iraq has used conventionally armed missiles against

Iranian cities at ranges well above 500 kilometres. Furthermore, older Yankee class submarines that used to patrol off US shores have been redeployed to waters closer to NATO Europe. These older subs are being fitted with SLCMs capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe. Finally the Soviet Union seems to have accelerated the deployment of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), mainly the new AS-15s, abroad the Backfire bomber as well as older Blinder and Bizon bombers in its inventory. While NATO is deeply divided about what to do to maintain the viability of its nuclear deterrent in the wake of the INF treaty, the Soviet Union is thus already systematically exploiting all available opportunities to fill the gap caused by the elimination of its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-12s missiles, in obvious contrast to its nuclear arms control rhetoric. At the same time, however, it is decrying NATO's still inchoate nuclear force modernisation plans as violations of the INF agreement.

There is thus hardly any evidence that Moscow has renounced its claim to eurostrategic nuclear preponderance by signing the INF-treaty. As to conventional forces, Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev announced before the UN, last December, the unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces by 500,000 troops, including associated weaponry. Similar, though smaller reductions will be made by other Warsaw Pact countries. While these steps should be welcomed, even the Warsaw Pact's own comparison of military forces shows that an asymmetry will persist in critical weapon systems even after these substantial reductions are implemented. Moreover, the January 1989 Warsaw Pact data achieve a 'rough balance' only by including naval and sea-based US airforces, not subject at the Vienna Conference on conventional arms control, due to start in March 1989. Hence, there is no reason for NATO leaders to accede to Soviet demands at this time. While opinion in the West is divided as to the magnitude of the force disparity in favour of the Warsaw Pact, there is little disagreement that the Warsaw Pact maintains substantial superiority in virtually all types of weapon systems. A recent RAND study concluded that achieving a conventional force balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO would require force reductions of 4:1 by the Warsaw Pact. Others have contended that, in view of these stark asymmetries, no reductions may be preferable to some reductions that would cut into NATO's minimal operational requirements without substantially reducing the attack potential of the Warsaw Pact. In the light of these serious conventional force imbalances and NATO's own reluctance to make major improvements in its conventional forces, NATO has obviously exceedingly little negotiating leverage in any future conventional arms talks.

Some strategists. mainly from outside the military establishments, have advanced proposals to restructure radically the conventional forces of both alliances. These 'alternative strategies' seek to eliminate the offensive components of the existing force structure (primarily heavy tanks, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, and offensive aircraft) and to restructure the remaining forces in such a way as to ensure the

dominance of the defending forces. Through this approach, they hope to sidestep not only the problem that a rough balance of conventional forces in their present configuration cannot be equated with conventional stability and, in fact, might be even less stable than the present imbalance. They also believe that a comprehensive restructuring of forces might increase NATO's negotiating leverage relative to the Warsaw Pact by allowing the Alliance to trade off its technological superiority in advanced munitions and delivery vehicles and advanced aircraft for Soviet reductions of traditional armoured forces. By being able to exploit its superior technology to build a highly capable defence structure built around light advanced weaponry it would presumably gain a relative advantage over the Warsaw Pact. Although these various approaches to a 'defensive defence' have serious weaknesses and suffer from a credibility gap owing in part to the anti-defence pursuasion of most of their authors, at least conceptually they might provide a useful point of departure for NATO in devising a comprehensive security policy that balances military strategic requirements with the political imperative of pursuing arms control. Restoring this balance — as spelled out in the Harmel Report — will be essential if NATO is to preserve its politico-military strategy to maintaining security and to keep the gap between the requirements of its flexible response doctrine and available capabilities from widening.

Insofar as the INF-treaty can be assessed today, its military benefits to NATO appear questionable, while its concrete drawbacks are readily apparent. This point was repeatedly made by witnesses in the ratification hearings of the US Senate just released in print. Nevertheless, virtually all of them called for the ratification of the treaty for political reasons. Neither NATO's political nor military leaders ever really scrutinized the ramifications of the 'zero-option' before or after it was proposed by the Alliance in November of 1981. Admittedly some had second thoughts in the interim, but rejecting the zero-solution would have called into question NATO's commitment to arms control, jeopardized public support for the Alliance, and risked the potential political gains that might be achieved in the treaty's aftermath. Doing so, however, requires strong leadership that charts the future course of NATO's political and military policies based on an objective assessment of military requirements derived from NATO's doctrine of flexible response and the need to exploit the political manoeuvring room created by the INF-treaty. If, however, considerations of political opportunity costs could once again prevail over sound strategic reasoning, as was the case with the zero- and double-zero option, then NATO military strategy will invariably become a victim of a misguided arms control policy without any longer being able to limit, at least in part, the damage to the common security. If NATO heeds this lesson at the upcoming Spring ministerial meeting, it may indeed be able to live with the consequences of its past failures.

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EDUCATION REFORM

by Bruce Pattison

ABOUT every forty years Parliament goes into labour and produces a major Education Act. It happened in 1870, in 1902, in 1918, 1944 and again in 1988. The latest one was hotly contested. It occupied more Parliamentary time than any other Act since 1945. Some 5,000 amendments to it were proposed, and 88 clauses were added to it during its passage through Parliament. Its sponsors called it the Education Reform Act. It was intended to be revolutionary.

Its opponents accused it of transferring control of education from local authorities to central government. It certainly asserts the Secretary of State for Education and Science's supremacy over the whole national system from nursery schools to universities. But he had that already; the Act merely confirmed the existing situation. Finance for education has always been directed by the central government. It has always used local agents to meet the needs of particular areas. The 1870 Act set up elected school boards to supplement the primary education initiated by voluntary organisations. When local government had been systematised throughout the country the functions of the school boards were transferred to all-purpose local authorities, which were permitted to provide secondary as well as primary education. The 1944 Act confirmed their role as agents of central government. It approved the appointment of a Minister 'whose duty shall be to promote the education of the people of England and Wales . . . and to secure effective execution by local authorities, under his control and direction, of the national policy'. Local authorities had to submit plans to him and to secure his approval for all major projects.

Their strategic functions will be unaffected by the Act. They will still have to plan the provision for their areas; their advisers and inspectors will continue to monitor the implementation of the plans, and they will still provide social services — transport, school meals, etc. Polytechnics and colleges mainly concerned with higher education will pass from them and become independent, but some 400 colleges of further education and all maintained and aided schools will still be their responsibility. However, they will have to delegate to these institutions the detailed carrying out of their plans. Their governors will be more independent. Not more than 20% of a college governing body may be local authority representatives. Similarly local authority representatives will be in a minority on school governing bodies. Each college or school will have to be allocated a budget which it can spend as it pleases, the allocation being according to a formula approved by the Secretary of State. Schools will be run like small businesses competing with each other. Each will be able to admit as many pupils as its facilities allow. School governors, with the support of parents, will be able to opt out of local authority control altogether and be funded directly by central government. New city technology colleges may be established with endowments from

industry and commerce but will be maintained by direct government funding.

Schools will welcome freedom to settle their own priorities. But voluntary governors meeting at intervals can only generally determine policy. Schools will need stronger administrative staffs. The local authority bureaucracies cannot be expected to contract, and the Department of Education and Science will need additional manpower to deal with the direct communication with institutions it is proposing to initiate. It has promised extra funds for the changes it is making, but these are likely to be eaten up by higher administrative costs. Resources for schools are inadequate now, and there is little prospect that they will be increased. Governors will find little room for manoeuvre: beggars cannot be choosers.

The number of schools applying to opt out of local authority control is likely to be small. Whitehall has no great reputation for either speed or generosity in responding to requests that would cost money. Those that have indicated an intention to apply so far seem to be mainly either schools threatened with closure or grammar schools an authority wishes to become comprehensive. Both categories will pose problems for the Secretary of State. Nor are there likely to be many city technology colleges. Industry and commerce have shown little enthusiasm for them. They are said to be ready to admit pupils of all abilities and will select pupils 'who make a commitment to their school education and who will take advantage of a curriculum emphasising technology and science' but will follow the substance of the national curriculum. They will probably attract articulate parents who cannot afford private schools but cannot bear to send their children to ordinary comprehensive schools. The government will make sure they are well resourced, but their chief importance will be their effect on the planning of a few local authorities.

The administrative changes are hardly revolutionary. They will add to administrative costs without making much difference to teaching and learning. What directly affects these, and is an innovation, is the prescription of a national curriculum for all compulsory education.

The much vaunted freedom of British schools to determine their own curriculum has in practice always been heavily limited by external pressures. The nineteenth century grammar school curriculum was influenced by the London Matriculation Examination, and School Certificates modelled on it continued to influence the secondary schools which developed after the 1902 Act. They encouraged a broad curriculum by requiring passes in a spread of disciplines. The General Certificate of Education examinations introduced during the 1950s, however, were in separate subjects, and when comprehensive schools became general they tried to cater for diverse abilities by allowing pupils to concentrate on subjects in which they had most chance of success. The resulting deficiencies in general education of many school leavers has been widely criticised. A broad curriculum have now been imposed rather than arrived at by consensus and is not entirely consistent with recommendations of Her Majesty's Inspectorate during recent years. It is in terms of

traditional subjects and has an air of hazy nostalgia for the grammar school of fifty years ago. It may inhibit interesting cross-discipline experiments. Nevertheless, despite reservations about its origin and formulation, its insistence on a broad education for everybody is to be welcomed.

The effectiveness of the prescription can only be conjectured. People do not always learn what they are supposed to learn. Many schools will have difficulty in providing some parts of the curriculum. There is a shortage of qualified teachers of mathematics, the sciences and modern languages, and applications for professional training are falling. Teachers' morale is low. Their salaries were imposed on them and not negotiated with them. They have hardly been consulted about the national curriculum. There has been talk of recruiting people with experience in other occupations without requiring them first to undergo the usual professional training. Unlike other learned professions, teachers have little influence on entry to their profession, training for it and maintenance of professional standards. The profession is held in little esteem and will not attract graduates who can get other and more respected or remunerative employment.

The Government's chief recipe for raising standards of achievement is formal testing at fixed intervals. Pupils will be graded at the ages of 7, 11 and 14, and then at 16 there is the General Certificate of Secondary Education. The final examination is an improvement on the examination it replaced, not least in taking into account work done during the preceding year. There is much to be said for setting objectives at various periods during the school course: the final examination is too remote to be an incentive at earlier stages. But the specification of ages at which tests are to be administered ignores differences in individual rates of development. A graded set of examinations, each grade being entered for when a student is ready for it, would be preferable. Fitting assessment to students' progress would be more likely to be generally encouraging. It would also give a clearer indication of students' abilities. It would mean classes would have to be formed separately for each subject and would contain students of different ages. Teachers have got used to mixed ability groups and could adapt to mixed age groups.

The Act deals with compulsory education up to the age of 16 and with higher education. Government policy on the gap between the two, and indeed for further and continuing education, has not been fully disclosed. A-levels, the qualification for entry to higher education, have been discussed for some time, but so far no consensus about possible changes has emerged. They concern only a minority. The number getting any sort of education after 16 is smaller in the United Kingdom than in other western countries. No doubt the government will extend training opportunities. A National Council for Vocational Qualifications has been set up. It is satisfactory that it is reported to be discussing the relationship of vocational qualifications with more education-based ones, but the government's approach to most problems causes some apprehen-

sion that a good deal of training will be too narrowly vocational and that the more broadly educational courses will be inadequately supported.

Higher education has until now retained a certain independence. But for more than half a century it has depended on government finance. A University Grants Committee was set up in 1919 to submit estimates to the Treasury and to distribute to universities funds allocated to them collectively. But for a quarter of a century it has had to deal not directly with the Treasury but with the Department of Education and Science. Nominally it has only distributed Treasury grants and advised universities on their administration of them, but its guidance has become increasingly precise and extensive. Its replacement by a new Universities Funding Council merely gives statutory recognition to the present situation. The new body is very like the old. The chairman of the UGC becomes chief executive of the UFC; seven of its 15 members are university teachers, one the Director of a polytechnic, and two others were members of the UGC. Despite the continuity it is likely that the deployment of grants will be even more closely supervised.

Open government direction would probably be preferable to the rather secretive diplomacy by which government control is exercised. In most European countries universities are state institutions. Their staffs are civil servants and their programmes and student numbers laid down by state legislatures. Their academic standards and the freedom of their teachers to teach and carry on research as they think best are as secure as those in this country. But their communities have perhaps a greater respect for learning than has the United Kingdom, and their governments are more accountable to public opinion because of their constitutions and electoral systems.

The binary division of higher education continues. Polytechnics and colleges of higher education are freed from local authority control but are to be financed by a Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council. They are not to become universities; nor have they clear prospects of emancipation from the tutelage of the Council for National Academic Awards, though their qualifications are being increasingly recognised by universities: the University of London and the CNAA signed an agreement on credit transfer in March 1988. Nevertheless they have attained the operational independence enjoyed by universities.

Such independence as remains is allowed partly because it throws on them some responsibility to finance themselves. In a speech at Lancaster the Secretary of State expressed a preference for American rather than European practice. One characteristic of American universities he particularly approved was the contribution of private funding to their budgets. But to other observers of the American scene private funding does not seem as important as Mr Baker supposes. It is true that there are private universities, some of them well endowed, but a main part of their income is from fees, which are higher than those in the public sector. However, 80% of full-time students and most part-time students and those who work their way through college are in universities and

colleges maintained by the separate states. There is an American university tradition of service to the local community, and a considerable part of their income is earned by involvement in local projects and making facilities available to them. British universities could probably do this to a greater extent than in the past, but they are following the American lead. This is the only significant addition to the income American universities receive from public authorities and fees. Private sources make only a small and diminishing contribution to American higher education as a whole, and most of it goes to specific projects, as it does in the United Kingdom: the names of many colleges, libraries and laboratories show that benefactions of this kind have always been important, but they have little direct effect on most of what the teaching institutions offer. Appeals to alumni of prestigious institutions are successful, but the less esteemed ones can hope for little from similar exercises. Oxford may raise the £2,000,000 it is asking for at present; the new universities and polytechnics cannot expect a comparable response. Mr Baker's American dream bears little resemblance to the reality that American higher education is financed mainly by federal, state and local authorities.

The financial straits of universities are too pressing to allow time for getting out with begging bowls. Several of them face huge deficits, and their staffs are threatening to boycott examinations if they do not get rises in salary.

The situation of the University of London is particularly interesting. Not only does it have about a fifth of all UK university students but it has an exceptional variety of ways of qualifying for a degree. In recent years it has been concentrated into fewer Schools, but some of the largest of them are finding it difficult to balance their accounts. As always when rations run short, doubts grow about the fairness of the distribution and as to whether the distributors are not themselves an unnecessary liability. The largest Schools are as big and comprehensive as most complete universities. From some of them are coming murmurs that they would do better if they dealt directly with the UFC and the central University machinery did not eat up some of the UFC's allocations. They could certainly manage quite well on their own. What is doubtful is the effect a break-up of the Federation would have on the smaller institutions and on activities of the University as a whole, some of which could point the way to future developments in higher education.

The oldest and most distinctive feature of the University is the external degree system. From 1836 until the 1960s, when the CNAA and the Open University were established, the external system offered the only opportunity in the UK of gaining a degree without attending a university. It had examination centres all over the world. Preparing students for its examinations set standards for several institutions which have now become universities. Its influence reached far beyond this country. Between 1947 and 1971 eight colleges in the Commonwealth had special relations with London before becoming independent universities.

The advent of the Open University to provide for individual students and the CNAA to validate courses in polytechnics and colleges was thought to make the London external redundant for first degrees, though higher degrees should still be obtainable through it, so that London graduates could add to their qualifications anywhere at any time. Institutions are no longer able to enter students, but individual students still register; there is still a demand for London degrees as well as for those of the Open University. At present there are about 24,000 external students, half of them in this country and the majority undergraduates.

Another institution peculiar to London is at Birkbeck College, which teaches in the evening students in employment during the day. The College now incorporates the Department of Extra-Mural Studies, which arranges adult education classes throughout the south-east. The Centre for Continuing Education in the College is trying to bring together all the University's provision for mature students and for education in mid-career. A good deal of continuing education is already going on in the Schools, especially courses for various professions, and it is hoped to involve the Schools and Institutes in plans to offer a wide range of opportunities for study for those who cannot follow normal university programmes. Great possibilities for the future could open out. Higher education could be brought to many who cannot be catered for by traditional arrangements. To realise the possibilities modular courses and transferable credits would have to become normal, so that qualifications could be gained by a variety of methods — private study, full and part-time study, correspondence, distance teaching, vacation courses, etc. — to suit a student's circumstances at any part of his career. That kind of flexibility is the useful lesson to be learned from American experience. They try to make higher education as widely available as possible. Like most Europeans, they believe a community benefits from higher education. Our government regards it as a privilege which surely increases an individual's earning power: hence the persistent pre-occupation with student loans. Nevertheless it is to be hoped it can be induced to give some encouragement to the opening out of opportunities in the ways referred to above, not only directly but also by helping institutions carrying on more traditional types of teaching and research to have a little extra capacity for assisting new methods of reaching out to a wider public.

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FAMINE IN AFRICA: A CHALLENGE TO THE WEST

by Cosmo Russell

THERE is famine in Asia and Latin America, usually man made. Africa, however, provides the classic case of famine in the last part of the twentieth century, containing features of alarming continuity and by no means all of them the consequence of human conflict. The scare of 1985 produced Band Aid, the compassionate response of Bob Geldorf and his young associates. It was moving, even magnificent in its generosity. Yet in spite of temporary relief, famine in Africa did not go away and is still present. Clearly this presents a challenge to the West with its substantial food surplus, as permanent a feature of contemporary economy as famine in Africa.

War, a factor of human relations, cannot it seems be prevented by human action. Famine, a further indication of man's brutality to man, can or should be overcome by wise handling. So its initial causes need study. First is the factor of rising population. Despite adverse pressure due to famine it cannot be prevented. Secondly, almost as important, is the expanding desert. This is partly due to unwise husbandry but is fostered further by climate and recurring drought, worse in some years than others. When bad drought occurs it is extremely serious. It is ancient in origin as many will recall from the Book of Genesis when Joseph in Egypt stored grain for five years and was able to feed the hungry in the next year when food was needed badly. This old story merits recall in our time. Thirdly, African States, the succession to Empire of France, Britain, Belgium, Portugal, are not only poor but heavily in debt. Pressure therefore exists to grow 'cash crops' — coffee and cocoa in particular for sale to the developed world and thereby to earn necessary foreign exchange. Basic food cultivation suffers therefore and is insufficient for the basic needs of the majority of African peoples in those areas most affected.

Fourthly is the factor of civil war in countries where famine is most apparent — more especially Ethiopia and the Sudan. This is the last straw to drive whole villages to leave their homes to escape war and to go in search of food and to gather in primitive camps leading to insanitary conditions, disease and very high infant mortality. Food promised does not always arrive and the people are deprived of the means to grow food which even in modest quantities they had a better chance of doing in their own villages. An example was shown in a recent television programme on the civil war now in its sixth year in the Sudan. People from the Southern Sudan driven north to the outskirts of Khartoum were deprived of their cattle, a main source of the rural economy, and have been subject to all the aspects of famine above mentioned. The immediate reaction of the multiple relief organisations present in the Sudan has been to seek to deal with this crisis by way of food aid brought in mainly from the West. Food aid gives rise to two

further problems — transport and storage. Currently there is not only famine at Khartoum but also at Juba in the South. This principle centre was deprived of food for five months since both air and road transport were prevented by guerilla action.

There has equally been civil war and famine in Ethiopia and Somalia giving rise to mass migration of population. The Ethiopian Government has sought to correct the situation with an attempt to create larger villages for greater protection and more easy feeding. However, war conditions have been particularly acute in the Tigre and Eritrean districts and food convoys, where they can, have had to reach those areas from the Sudan where famine is also prevalent. In both countries mass migration has led to constant further problems. In 1985 a remarkable air lift took food to Ethiopia mainly by the RAF since road transport was prevented both by lack of lorries and by weather conditions. In 1988, despite the civil war and the problems of mass migration, observers noted that while famine persisted more food was being distributed.

Under present circumstances it is impossible to avoid massive food aid from the West distributed both by way of the United States and the European Community and by non-governmental organisations — Save the Children, Red Cross, *Médecins sans frontières,* War on Want and many others. Governments contribute in addition to sending aid through the EEC. Admittedly one school of thought maintains that the only sound way of dealing with the constant crisis, and it can only be described in those terms, is to assist African villagers to grow the food they need themselves. One may answer that this involves the conditions in which this is feasible. In famine struck countries it is clearly impossible until peace returns. Here quite apart from the factor of civil war, there are two further comments. First is the question of debt. Recently steps have been taken to cancel a large proportion since it was realised that any financial aid to African countries was only enabling them to pay the interest on loans. The second factor would be for the West to take a hard look at its demand for cash crops and to assess what reductions could be made to enable Africans to grow cereals and other forms of basic food. Here one should note the special relationship of the Community with Africa through the Lomé Conventions. In 1985 the United Kingdom Branch of the International Association of former EC officials and pensioners produced a Report, 'Famine in Africa — the Challenge and implications for the EEC'. The Working Group consisted of a number of Branch members assisted by specialists from Save the Children Fund, the United Nations Disaster Relief Fund, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Disaster and Settlement Unit of the Oxford Polytechnic and the Relief and Development Institute. The Report was debated in London under the chairmanship of Sir Anthony Kershaw, then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Commons and discussion was opened by the Right Honourable Timothy Raison, MP, then Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Members of the Houses of Lords and Commons were present.

The Report was then circulated to the Council, the Parliament and the Commission of the European Communities. The Report's conclusions, based on first hand experience in the field, have not been overtaken by time.

By way of the Lomé Conventions the EEC is a partner of its African Associates in the search for food security. The first of the General Recommendations of the Report was therefore that 'the EEC, making use of its position as a partner in the Lomé Conventions and as the leading donor of development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa (55% of development aid to the 8 most seriously affected States, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad) should continue to press the governments of these countries to evolve policies and strategies of food security and agricultural and rural development so that EEC aid may be concentrated on the support of such policies. Furthermore particular importance should be attached to the building up of Regional Buffer Stocks and developing policies to restructure internal markets through stabilising domestic market prices for essential foodstuffs'.

Obviously, little here has happened in countries affected by civil war, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Chad with the worst conditions still found in Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique. The Report goes on with Restoration and Revitalising Plans: The EEC should take a hard look at cash cropping for export which occurs in some African countries to the detriment of food security. 'This calls for more positive land use planning, bearing in mind that the so called cash crop for export need not decline in export value nor indeed in viable quantities if properly planned.'

It should be noted that this point was taken up by the Nigerian delegate to the 1988 World Food Conference. It was suggested that tariffs imposed by OECD countries on tropical products should be further drastically reduced or abolished. The same applies to value added taxes imposed, for example on coffee or tea to raise government revenue in certain OECD countries. 'The amounts collected total many billions of dollars and if saved could well be used for agricultural development in the Third World.'

This could tie up with the third Recommendation of the 1985 Report on Agricultural Research. 'The EEC and its member countries should continue and further promote research on the type of seed and grain which could be raised in Community countries for onward despatch and use in African agriculture. Equally they should consider positively the encouragement of food crops suitable for Africans by Community farmers for storage and use as aid when emergencies arise.'

It is fair to state that this proposal has hardly been considered at all. Yet at a time when Lord Plumb, President of the European Parliament and of the World Food Conference, can speak of the 'appalling spectacle' of the contrast between 'the surpluses of industrialised countries and the deprivation and malnutrition of millions in the Third World,' it is surprising that the Community cannot link the two contrasts in a positive

manner. First, farmers in the West and the Community in particular produce substantial food surplus and are continually seeking the means to reduce it. Secondly, this is almost criminal by comparison with famine elsewhere. Third, farmers could if encouraged divert output from stock surplus crops to seed, grain and crops destined for Africa. The output would be destined for famine affected regions and paid for in the first instance under crisis conditions by the European Community and passed in the form of food aid to countries in need.

The 1985 Report stressed the need for the EEC to co-operate with international and non-governmental organisations both for immediate relief measures and for the longer term build up of countries afflicted by famine and of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. For example the EEC should:

> — emphasize the importance of achieving far higher standards in the management of emergency relief operations for large scale droughts and provide more direct support to international organisations and non-governmental organisations who are responsible for implementation — emphasize the need for more consideration to be given to social cost benefit analysis of the various types of aid given and the benefits e.g. cereals, skimmed milk, casein replacing butter — take steps to encourage and promote the need for improved in-Service training at all levels, including local African help and requiring the preparation of specialised training manuals, data bases, information and support systems for pooling information and know how so that this can be made more readily available to all concerned in the Relief and Development fields.

On transport and distribution, the report indicated that 'since the EEC is not equipped to be a relief agency it should seek to strengthen the role of other agencies who are so equipped. The EEC should consider turning over its food shipments to the World Food Programme and the inland transport of food either to WFP or to an appropriate voluntary agency. The EEC should provide adequate funding for the task also to ensure that cash is available for transport from the port to point of distribution'. That this is at times desperately important was emphasized by the Princess Royal visiting the Sudan as President of the Save the Children Fund. Princess Anne referred to a case where food was available but no money available for transport.

The Report was emphatic in urging the need for a proper Early Warning System and for the EEC to allocate funds for analysis as follows:

> *Starting Needs*:Database; early warning; contingency plans; trained response teams; emergency response support equipment.
> EEC ACTION I
> *In-Country Response Needs*:
> Official co-operation; overcoming formalities; easing resource availability; designating working links; supply entry points; ports and airports; lines of communication; upgrading; emergency priority use; storage; transport (repair facilities, fuel supply).
> EEC ACTION II
> *Overseas Back Up*:
> Funding; supplies; personnel, back up equipment; information to field; information to international community.
> EEC ACTION III

There is a concluding phase summarised by the Report as follows:

> Europe and Africa are neighbours. The way in which the latter will develop must profoundly affect the way of life of the former and therefore the lives of children on both sides. The importance of proper emergency and contingency planning is therefore vital. It must also shape European public opinion to keep the longer term future of both continents in mind. All this involves an immed-

iate response to Early Warning. Prediction is usually right. But food aid response takes time. At the start of the eighties the average time calculated from request to port was 175 days. In 1985 the EEC calculation was 40 days from crisis order to port delivery bearing in mind that the port is only the first stage. Inland transport follows and as shown may break down or take a long time before it reaches the hungry.

With the above in mind the Report makes practical proposals for a Food Security System. Recollect that Lomé III Convention imposes an obligation for this on both the Community and its African associates. This requires consideration and the Report was as follows:

1. When Food Aid is given it should be a component of integrated rural development schemes and consistent with national planning.
2. While it would be difficult to devise a different plan to meet each separate national or regional need with food security proving a variable occurrence in very different circumstances, the Report suggested a 'Food Security System applicable to any developing country'.
3. This would be based upon a National Food Reserve co-ordinating a varying number of Food Reserve Zones and linked both with the National Food Reserves of other developing countries and with the EEC through the European Development Fund. A Food Reserve Zone (FRZ) would be the effective focal point of food production, storage, intake, despatch and information for a suitable graphical area. A FRZ would comprise a sufficient area of land made available by the State, corporate bodies such as Churches or private landowners.
4. The land ceded for a FRZ could be held on lease or contract and farmed co-operatively or under some other method of management with specified EEC or government counterpart support.
5. The land should be reclaimed by irrigation, conservation, fertility improvement, drainage, flood control, fish ponding, tsetse clearance.
6. Each FRZ would be managed to provide a livelihood for participant farmers as well as to supply specified foodstuffs against any foreseeable contingency. It would build up buffer stocks to see the whole region through shortage due to failure of any kind.
7. The FRZ would deal with three possible scenarios; balance of supply and demand; surplus for sale locally or for transfer to an adjoining FRZ or to national stocks; shortage supplied initially from its own buffer stocks or from another FRZ or from national reserves.
8. The National Food Reserve would act at a higher level on balance; surplus for transfer to the NFR of another developing country; shortage to be replenished from FRZs internally or from another NFR or from EEC food reserves. The NFR would, in addition to storage movements, quality control and financial management, control and correlate information at all levels, including early warning systems and take a leading part in public education for food security.
9. The system of NFRs and FRZs should be interlocking throughout African countries affected or likely to be affected by famine. It should be financed primarily by a percentage levy (to be called Famine Factor) upon annual surpluses of food accumulated by EEC Members as a result of CAP subsidies. This would be a visible recognition of the link in human terms between huge surpluses in Europe and elsewhere in the West and death by Famine in African countries. To this end the FSR would assist NGOs and the training of local African staff. The role of Western Youth volunteers could be especially interesting.

Parliamentary Association meetings could be valuable in establishing co-operation in the mutual interest of Africa and Europe and the removal of famine according to the Lomé III Convention. For its part, the EEC should respond to areas in need in terms of port facilities, communications, transport and distribution for emergency and long term needs.

Such is the pattern for African and Western, notably Community, co-operation to defeat famine in Africa from now to the twenty-first century. The 1988 World Food Conference reaffirmed the need. Herewith the System to achieve success. It is a priority task for the Western world.

LEONARDO: THE ONCE AND FUTURE MAN

by Muriel Julius

LEONARDO da Vinci may rightly be called a Prince among the giants of Renaissance Italy. Even today, when Man has touched the moon, the fecundity of his mind remains unequalled. An illuminating overview of his work impeccably displayed can be seen at the Hayward Gallery on the South Bank until April 16th.

Most people know Leonardo as the painter of the world's best known works of art, The Last Supper fresco, crumbling in Milan, and the dull, discoloured Florentine matron with goitre, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre. No paintings are included here; instead we see Leonardo as scientist, inventor, anatomist, mathematician, civil and military engineer, stage designer, writer, sculptor and prodigious draughtsman. In the exemplary catalogue, Sir Ernst Gombrich writes: 'There appeared to be no field of knowledge to which he had not made a contribution.'

In Leonardo we meet a phenomenon seldom, if ever duplicated — an inventive mind of superlative penetration and depth of comprehension. About the man we know few personal details. He was born in 1452, the illegitimate son of Ser Piero d'Antonio, a notary, and a peasant girl in the small hill town of Vinci near Florence. He had no formal education, was ignorant of Latin or Greek, but became in his own words 'a disciple of experience'. In 1469 he entered the workshop of Andrea Verrocchio in Florence. It says something of this teacher that among his other apprentices were Domenico Ghirlandaio, Pietro Perugino and Sandro Botticelli. Leonardo it seems was handsome and charming. According to Vasari he combined exquisite sensory sensitivity with great physical strength and dexterity. Possibly due to some accident Leonardo wrote with his left hand from right to left, so that his writing can only be read with the aid of a mirror. By the age of twenty Leonardo was being given independent painting commissions, by twenty-five he was already famous.

From about 1482 Leonardo spent seventeen years at the Court of Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan; from there he went to Rome and finally to France where he died in 1519, aged sixty-seven, in a chateau given to him by King Louis XII who, according to Benvenuto Cellini, 'did not believe that a man had been born who knew as much as Leonardo, not only in the spheres of painting, sculpture and architecture, but also that he was a very great philosopher.'

The one hundred and nineteen drawings in the exhibition cover almost every facet of Leonardo's preoccupations. Eighty-eight are from the Royal Library at Windsor. One of the greatest glories of the Royal Collections are the six hundred Leonardo drawings, purchased by the great connoisseur, friend and adviser to Charles I, Thomas Howard, 3rd Earl of Arundel, which came into the Royal Collections during the reign of either Charles I or Charles II.

In 1972 drawings by Michelangelo, Raphael and Leonardo were

exhibited in the Queen's Gallery at Buckingham Palace. In the catalogue of that exhibition Anthony Blunt, then Surveyor of the Collections wrote:— 'The personality of the artist — that is the core of the question. There can have been few opportunities for studying the personality of an artist through his drawings comparable with the Leonardo exhibition in this gallery. Every aspect of his art could be seen and felt, except his monumental paintings, and even they could be glimpsed through the studies for them; but for the rest they were all there, displayed to the full: his interest in the external appearance of things and even more in their inner structure, but at the same time his power of creating ideals of physical beauty; his study of the movements of the human body, partly for their own sake but more particularly for their expressive power, as in his studies of the Madonna and Child; his interest in perspective, but only as a means of creating new spatial inventions; his studies of rock formations and his analyses of how water flows, out of which he created his great visions of cataclysmic storms and eruptions; and, of course, his studies of anatomy, which were not only scientifically epoch-making, but exquisitely sensitive as drawings. All this and much more.'

Among the earliest drawings (c.1472) is one of a single stem of Madonna lily where the grace of line and delicate light and shade show the influence of Verrocchio. Of the same period a beautiful study of linen drapery on a kneeling figure (No. 3) contrasts with that of the rippling drapery on a sleeve made of the finest gauze (No. 56).

Leonardo's incredibly precise anatomical drawings occupied him for over thirty years. Many will remember their first showing at the Royal Academy in 1977. We see the amazing sheet with the foetal baby with its incorrectly long umbilicus, cradled like a seed inside a bifurcated pod; the legs of a man are stripped to bones and compared with the legs of a horse (No. 15); the human skull, bisected and sectioned into cavities (No. 9), is drawn with exquisite delicacy; even the drawings of lungs and abdominal organs (No. 54) are as beautiful as rare plants.

Somewhat unexpected in one whose sexual preference lay elsewhere, Leonardo's women are creatures of tenderness and grace. The study for the head of St. Anne (No. 17) has a serene freshness that quite eludes the St. Anne who appears in the large Cartoon in the National Gallery, London, or in the painting in the Louvre. For the head of Leda, destined for a painting now lost, he devised several complicated wigs: 'this kind', he noted, 'can be taken off and put on again without damaging it.' With their narrow plaited braids that curve across the crown and around the ears, one wonders did he invent today's fashionable Rastafarian hair style? By contrast the portraits of men are often grotesque and cruel. (No. 90).

Leonardo's topographical skill is seen in his maps of rivers and of the town of Imola (No. 98) near Rome which he made for Cesare Borgia. In his animal drawings of horses, bears, lions and cats and especially in three studies of the paws of a wolf (No. 39) we see his minute attention to surface texture. Unexpectedly Leonardo invented several varieties of

dragon.

From about 1513 Leonardo became fascinated by the effects created by tempestuous waters, and the ten drawings in the Windsor Library known as the 'Deluge Drawings' endow nature with sublime majesty. Two drawings (Nos. 22 and 63) of extraordinary power and menace were triggered possibly by a natural disaster that occurred during his time in Rome in the Alps near Bellinzona when a major landslip led to the destruction of a whole village under the impact of falling rocks and water. In a famous description of a deluge Leonardo wrote: 'Let the pent-up water go coursing round the vast lake that encloses it with eddying whirlpools which strike against various objects and rebound into the air as muddied foam, which, as it falls, splashes the water that it strikes back into the air. The waves that in concentric circles flee the point of impact are carried by their impetus across the path of the other circular waves moving out of step with them, and after the instant of percussion leap up into the air without breaking formation.' Only Turner, with paintings like 'Hannibal Crossing the Alps' (1812) comes near to Leonardo's depiction of atmospheric drama.

As architect Leonardo was nothing if not grandiose. From the Louvre comes a drawing (No. 117) of about 1507 for a monumental Mausoleum in the Antique Manner. It was to be a conical mountain, no less in height than a real one, capped by a circular temple with a peri-style and stepped dome. At two thirds of its height a terrace gives access to six galleries leading to a series of burial chambers containing five hundred funerary urns. His designs for churches are hardly less elaborate. The plan for a Temple (No. 118) has a central dome and eight secondary domes above eight radiating chapels; the exterior, a series of alternating apses and niches containing gigantic statues, is equally dramatic.

Nothing seems to have daunted Leonardo. During 1487-90 he drew the plans for a town. It proposed a double system of high level and low level roadways, the upper 'exclusively for gentlemen' and the lower for vehicles. In his exquisitely neat notes he stipulated the arrangement of housing, public facilities, food deliveries and rubbish collection, including the instruction that all exterior staircases must be spiral because the corners of square ones are always fouled. Oh, Leonardo! London needs you now.

Most astonishing of all are Leonardo's inventions. His intense curiosity led him to speculate on man's ability to emulate the flight of birds. The upper floor of this exhibition is dominated by a thirty-six foot model of Leonardo's man-powered flying machine. None of his grand projects was to work: the technology was not there. Other models are of his hoists, cranes, guns and his armoured car.

In his letter seeking employment with Ludovico Sforza, Leonardo set down a long list of his military inventions. Drawings exist of his bridges capable of rapid erection prefiguring the Bailey. There are models of a gun with ten splayed, horizontal barrels, and a more substantial cannon of thirty-three barrels arranged in three ranks of eleven which permitted

the loading of one volley down the muzzles while another was being discharged. Although the idea of an armoured assault car had already been thought of by Valtureo and Guido da Vigevano, Leonardo's was a more mobile variation: they were all four hundred years ahead of Churchill's World War I military tank. On the same sheet (No. 68) Leonardo has drawn a terrifying scythed chariot, with wickedly curved knives projecting front, back and from the wheels — maybe the origin, of James Bond's lethal Aston Martin.

Leonardo's aeronautical interests led him to design a parachute made of linen, also a helical-screw helicopter, surely the first in history. In his 1978 monograph, *The Inventions of Leonardo da Vinci*, Charles Gibbs-Smith, Professor of Aerospace History at the fascinating National Air & Space Museum in Washington, D.C., speculates that Leonardo was indirectly responsible for the development of the modern helicopter. Apparently Leonardo's drawing was shown to Igor Sikorsky by his mother, and this inspired him later to develop his helicopter.

What adds to the excitement of Leonardo is the fact that new drawings are still being discovered. Less than fifteen years ago three groups came to light — the Codice Atlantico now in the Ambrosiana Library in Milan, and the Madrid Codice I and II in the Madrid National Library. Some were concerned with Leonardo's ideas for machines for weaving, spinning, cord making and braid making among other techniques. They appear in Kenneth G. Ponting's book *Leonardo's Drawings of Textile Machines.*

Most appropriately science adds a further dimension to this exhibition. It has been supplied by its sponsors, I.B.M. (U.K.) Ltd. Screens of computer graphics that surely Leonardo would have loved, demonstrate the use of perspective in his Last Supper, and enlarge on his geometric experiments and architectural designs.

In tackling the greatest mysteries of nature, Leonardo glorified the pursuit of human enquiry. The Hayward Gallery exhibition provides an opportunity to glimpse a mind unique in history.

The May number of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The Role of the EEC in Relation to Africa* by Michael Frendo, MP Malta and MEP, *Step Forward Mr. Manley* by Ian Christopher. *The Senegambian Conference* by Tale Omole has been held over from April.

A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

by Michael L. Nash

FOR Britain, constitutional monarchy began on Ash Wednesday, February 13, 1689. It was on this day that the assembled Lords and Commons presented the Bill of Rights to William and Mary, and as soon as their signatures were affixed to the Bill, they were proclaimed king and queen of England, France and Ireland.

Significantly, a contemporary witness describes this as the occasion when 'the lords and commons had agreed upon what power to take away from the king'. Britain had become a limited monarchy accountable to Parliament. The main limitations to the royal prerogative are to be found in the Bill of Rights, one of the most important documents of that legal curiosity, the British constitution. The principle implicit in the Bill is the supremacy of Parliament. Yet many questions then remained in the early stages. A large section of Tories (by no means the same party as the one which bears that name now!) asserted that Parliament could not lawfully change the succession, and so they remained either open or closet Jacobites, supporters of the 'King over the Water'. For in offering the crown jointly to William and Mary, Parliament had proclaimed that James II had legally abdicated through his flight from the country, and that his baby son and heir, Prince James, the Prince of Wales, was also unacceptable to the nation. Mary was James's elder daughter. She was a Protestant, and married to her cousin William, the ruler of the Netherlands, and also a Protestant. In proclaiming them joint rulers, Parliament had, temporarily at least, to pass over the claim which came between them, that of Mary's sister, Anne; but that seemed a small price to pay, a small interference in the succession, in the interests of political stability. The principle of hereditary succession remained at the heart of what many thought about monarchy, even William of Orange, the child of Republican Holland.

For some time there had been in Britain some concern over the succession. The queen of Charles II had been childless, and already by 1680 the succession had begun to present some bizarre possibilities, which discomfited many in Britain and the Netherlands. The heir was the king's brother, the Catholic Duke of York, followed by his two (Protestant) daughters, and then his nephew William of Orange, who was also his son-in-law. Fifth in succession was none other than the Queen of Spain. Marie Louise, the daughter of Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, sister of Charles II and James Duke of York. After her came her sister, soon to be the Duchess of Savoy.

That the Queen of Spain should become Queen of England was a possibility at which even the most loyal monarchist boggled. Thus in July 1683 it had been a great relief when the Princess Anne had married Prince George of Denmark, a satisfactory Protestant match. Unfortunately, by the time of the 'Glorious Revolution' in 1688, this marriage had not lived up to the promise it had held out, for Anne, by this time, had

had three daughters, all of whom had died, and a miscarriage.

William and Mary also had been disappointed in children. Mary had had a serious miscarriage and a phantom pregnancy, very much in the pattern of her luckless predecessor and namesake Mary Tudor. So, all in all, it was very much an all too human factor which pressured Parliament to change the succession so dramatically a second time in 1701. What is usually forgotten about the events of 1688-89 is that the main participants, much more conscious than we usually are of their own mortality, had already begun to think in advance, to make plans and take out options on the uncertain future of the British monarchy and the disturbing infant mortality of the Stuarts.

Already in 1689 William III had told his cousin, the Electress Sophia of Hanover, that she or her son might one day succeed to the throne. William had nominated her and her issue (as the nearest Protestant heirs) for the succession — a suggestion which Parliament had not then adopted. By one of those curious coincidences of history, the day before the Bill of Rights was signed and the reign of William and Mary began, February 12, 1689, the Queen of Spain died. Thus 'death had eliminated the bogey of the Queen of Spain', a tragic lady whose fate was to be one of loneliness and sterility although she had been described as 'the most beautiful and ill-fated princess of the House of Bourbon'. Those who married Stuarts, it must be admitted, often ran out of luck.

But she had a sister, who since 1684 had been the wife of Victor Amadeus II, the Duke of Savoy, a rising figure on the European scene, and one who would not let her rights lie fallow. The birth of a living son, William Duke of Gloucester, to Princess Anne in July 1689 seemed for a time to shelve the issue, but his delicate life was all that stood between the Duchess of Savoy and the English crown. As has been pointed out, she might be a foreigner, but was not Dutch William also a foreigner, and were not the Electress Sophia and her son equally foreigners? The point was that she was a Catholic, and the English were becoming paranoid about Catholic rulers after the experience of James II.

The inescapable fact was, however, that Sophia was 43rd in succession to the throne, the previous 42 all being Catholics! To exclude 42 people on the sole ground of their religion appeared impossible to believers in hereditary monarchy; and that is why, even before the little Duke of Gloucester sadly died in 1700, all kinds of possibilities were explored to prevent this happening.

William twice considered another marriage after the death of Queen Mary in 1694, although he had no taste for it; and during the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 he considered the possibility of adopting the exiled Prince of Wales, if he would turn Protestant. The answer his father gave for him is very significant. Should the prince become king in his (James's) lifetime, he declared, he would be a usurper, and the British monarchy would become elective and not hereditary. This was exactly, of course, what had already happened with William III himself. He had been elected, or chosen.

This was a profound comment and not without significance in contemporary Europe, for Poland had become an elective monarchy in 1573, and so had just completed the first century of what was to turn out to be an unhappy, divisive and unenviable experience. This was not, surely, what Britain wanted. When the little Duke of Gloucester died, on 29 July 1700, there was a dynastic problem of the first magnitude. William was aware of the same problem in Spain, and that war would probably break out when the last Spanish Hapsburg died, which he did in November 1700. William was right, and that war, between three claimants, was to last thirteen years. It must be avoided if at all possible in Britain. It is in many ways the noblest legacy of William III to British constitutional monarchy that he strove to prevent a similar war of the English succession.

If the Prince of Wales (who is known to history as the Old Pretender) was excluded from the succession as a changeling, the birth of his sister, Princess Louisa Maria Stuart, born in 1692, was unchallengeable, and after her came the Duchess of Savoy and her children.

For a while William thought of marriage again, but nothing came of it and he then thought again of the solution of the Electress Sophia of Hanover, a wise and cosmopolitan dowager, twenty years his senior, and invited her to meet him in the Netherlands to talk things over. Sophia was philosophical. She must have thought back to 1689, when Gloucester had been born with such high hopes, and she wondered whether the new baby 'would follow the other six, who all inherited the Kingdom of Heaven in order to bring me nearer to the crown, or whether it was put into the world to inherit England.' Now Gloucester had inherited the Kingdom of Heaven. Yet still she hesitated. She persuaded William to make a second offer of adoption (of the Prince of Wales) but again his parents refused. Sophia now knew she could count on her official nomination to the English succession.

In February 1701 therefore, when Parliament reconvened, they began to discuss the proposed Act of Settlement, which eventually passed into law in June, and which settled the Crown on the Electress Sophia, and her descendants, 'being Protestants', the Parliamentary title to the Crown which still subsists today. Parliament moreover took this most important constitutional opportunity to strengthen the fabric of the State. Judges were to have life tenure and could not be removed without an address by both Houses of Parliament. The 'Revolution' was being further accomplished.

Of course this did not pass without a protest from the next lineal heir, the Duchess of Savoy. This was read in the House of Lords in April 1701, as the contemporary Guillaume de Lamberty relates, fascinated as he was by the fortunes of the royal house. It should also be remembered that this Act was passed by the English (but not the Scottish) Parliament and the Crown was settled upon the Electress Sophia if William and Anne should die childless. The options were still being left open. The Act of Settlement only passed Parliament narrowly. It is said it was carried by one vote only in Committee in the House of Commons. It is certain

that the Act itself passed in the House of Commons 'nemine contradicente' on May 14, 1701, but the Bill was but languidly supported. Many of the members, never more than 50 or 60, (out of a full House of 513) appear to have felt that the calling of a stranger to the throne was detestable, but the lesser of evils. So the Bill was passed by 10% of the members. The passing of the Act is surrounded by myth and records were then imperfectly kept, but Sir John Bowles, who introduced the Bill was described as a 'member of very little weight and authority', who was even then thought to be disordered in his mind and who eventually died mad. Perhaps Parliament was looking for a scapegoat.

Whatever the truth of the matter, many Englishmen (and Scots) remained very unhappy with the arrangement, not least Queen Anne herself, who succeeded to the throne in 1702. She wished to make up not only for her apostasy to her father, James II, but to atone to her half-brother and sister, James and Louisa Stuart, and even to her Savoyard cousins, who had also, along with forty others, been cheated of the succession by the Act of Settlement. She was greatly upset by the death of her sister, Louisa, in 1712, at the age of twenty. She had hoped it might prove possible to bring the two sides together by marrying her to one of the Hanoverian cousins, in the event of her brother's death, and allowing her to keep her personal religion, as Stuart queens consort had done before on three occasions. Now that could not be, but she determined to make it up to her Savoyard cousins. Thus, at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, (the treaty which ended that other vexed succession question, the Spanish succession) she demanded that Victor Amadeus be given the kingdom of Sicily, and so he would become a king, and his wife, the heiress Anne Marie, a queen, even though not of Great Britain. Victor Amadeus later exchanged Sicily for Sardinia, which was to remain in the House of Savoy until it became the Royal House of Italy in 1861.

Thus Queen Anne assuaged her guilt for their exclusion from the English succession. The Duke, the 'Duchess Royal' and the Sovereign Princes (of Savoy) were after all, 'her nearest relatives', and she felt the legal injustice keenly. The Duke was even willing to have his son brought up an Anglican if he could succeed, but by then it was too late.

For the Electress Sophia, Anne had no time at all. Although she was naturalized in 1705, Anne refused to have any of the family in England and her final letter to the Electress in 1714 hastened her death. It was, however, Sophia's son who succeeded Anne just six weeks later, and whose dynasty still reigns (with one or two hiccups!) today. That proved to be one of the happy chances of history after all.

The hidden agenda, the sub-text of 1689 and 1701, was a deeply human one, whose shock waves reverberated for many decades. The leap from 1689 to 1701 was brought about by a simple human factor: a lack of suitable heirs in the eyes of the Parliament of the day. Yet the political fruit of the time was a successful constitution and an enduring monarchy.

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CINEMA: A QUARTERLY SURVEY

by David Shipman

REGULAR readers of this column will know that it is at this time of the year that I inveigh against the foolishness of the London Film Festival. Its organisers claim that it presents the best of the year's movies, but it was feast or famine as far as I was concerned. I chose the latter. Only two films struck me as worth going out of my way to see, a low proportion you have to admit out of over 175. To make matters worse new entries were being added daily, so that it was necessary to shuffle through a sheath of papers to find out what was where. Over a dozen venues were being used, and if you could remember which had been changed, and the new dates, you — if you were entitled to a press-ticket, that is — were required to know which of a score of different ways of applying was applicable. The press office, always courteous and helpful, has given new meaning to these words since Susan Santini arrived: but, frankly, too much was required for too little.

Ermanno Olmi's *The Legend of the Holy Drinker* was one of the titles rescheduled, which may be the reason why the theatre was much less full than for his *Long Live the Lady* last year: or it may be that that scared off some admirers and brought no new ones. I was less than enthusiastic myself, but at least it was better than *Cammina Cammina.* Most people know Olmi for *The Tree of Wooden Clogs* but even better in my view were some earlier films — *Il Posto* (his first), *Durante l'Estate, Un Certo Giorno, I recuperanti.* I wouldn't hesitate to call them masterpieces. Against all the odds *The Legend of the Holy Drinker* is of their order. It is the first time he has worked on material not by himself — a novella by Joseph Roth, *Die Legende des heiligen Trinkers;* it was filmed off his own turf, in Paris, in a mixture of French and English, with a Dutch actor in the lead. That way direness usually lies. The greatest of Olmi's predecessors, de Sica, went to Paris to make a film in English with Shirley MacLaine, *Woman Times Seven.* It was not only totally unworthy of the man who made *Bicycle Thieves* and *Umberto D,* but ghastly by any standards. Almost all 'international' films are, but the difference this time lies in Olmi's approach. He said that when he read the book Roth disappeared and only the poetry remained; that in shooting he made his own film, but one born in the heart of another: and that as each scene finished he thought he was giving something back to Roth.

I can only say that if that is the case he might try Roth's collected works. I lost my heart earlier last year to *Babette's Feast* and did not expect so soon to see a film as beautiful, as touching, as bewitching, as wholly original. It has heart and sinew *and* magic, qualities which have not been simultaneously present in his work since *Durante l'Estate,* which was also allegorical. That said, I will offer only a whisper of the plot, which begins with a down-and-out (Rutger Hauer) being offered 200 francs by a gentleman (Anthony Quayle) in a Homberg. Other means

follow and two women, one new and one from the past, for romping around in bourgeois hotel rooms — that being something, says Olmi, that comes with a certain affluence and quite obligatory before we shuffle off the mortal coil.

The other Festival film I managed to see was *Betrayed,* directed by another of the world's finest film-makers, Costa-Gavras, but it does not belong with his best work. That (let's just say *Z, Etat de Siège, Missing*) grows from an indictment of the faceless lackeys of governments and totalitarian regimes. A group of nigger-baiting, Jew-hating rednecks prone to Ku Klax Clan activities and patronised by an obviously crooked politician isn't the same thing at all, and I was constantly surprised to find that the F.B.I. let one of its finest, dear little Debra Winger, risk life and limb by flopping into bed with Mr. Nasty himself, played by Tom Berenger. When I was young, undercover agents used to be men, but this increasingly dopey effort moves in the direction of *Vertigo,* in which another innocent — also a cop — is both sexually attracted to and repelled by the probably lethal person being pursued. *Vertigo* is a silly thing, but it is much admired in France, where Costa-Gavras usually works. At least *Betrayed* doesn't betray him, for the first half-hour confirms his almost unrivalled ability to create tension. I enjoyed it without being incapacitated by respect.

There's another film around of the level of the Olmi and *Babette's Feast* and again it's unusual fare. The nearest I know to *Pathfinder* is *Seven Samurai,* which I — stuck for affinities — once likened to the European epics of the Dark Ages. This is *echt,* based on the Lapp legend, 'The Pathfinder and the Torch'. It is set a long, long time ago, among primitive people living close to the Arctic Circle: their enemies are named the Tchudes, but why they come and why they kill on sight is withheld from us. They massacre the family of Aigin, who becomes the chief protagonist, aiming to make a lonely stand against the barbarians while those who shelter him flee to the coast. The director, Nils Gaup, has had only experience of filming for children's television (in his native Norway), but in his grasp of narrative and tension he is already a master; it seems incredible that a novice should insert a touch of mysticism with such confidence, but then he uses his optical effects, the snowy landscapes and Dolby Stereo to shattering effect. I don't know whether you can speak of magic when the basic material is of blood and violence, but I was enthralled by it. Like the early epic films of Victor Sjöström it will be awing audiences sixty years from now.

There has been a good film from Hollywood, too: *Midnight Run,* which confirms the directorial ability of Martin Brest, who made *Beverly Hills Cop.* Both films are thrillers with the essential ingredient for that genre — they leave the spectator helpless in the matter of what may happen next; and yet both start with a premise which is not in itself extraordinary. In this case a bounty hunter for a bail bond firm is sent to bring in the absconding 'Duke' Mardukas, who embezzled $15 million from a Mafia mobster, most of which he gave to charity. Said gangster plans instant

death for him, not only for revenge: so that even when he's encased in jail he will be in danger — because he knows too much about him. 'Duke' turns out to be a mild enough man and our tough, foul-talking bounty hunter turns out to have something in common with him — and I won't give that away. By the half-way line we're rooting for them either singly or as a team, as they make their way in stages cross-country, followed and pursued by gangsters, another bounty-hunter and the Feds. The twists in George Gallo's brilliant original screenplay are as well-worked-out as they are satisfying; and a dry note of humour leavens the tension. As the bounty hunter Robert DeNiro uses no undue histrionics as he confirms his position as America's leading actor; and as his unwilling accompanist Charles Grodin is equally resourceful in under-using his talents — for what sort of man is this who would take on the mob and yet make only tentative attempts to get away from a small time ex-cop? As I write, this year's Oscar nominations have just been announced, and neither of these performances is among them. I am astonished.

I have seen few of the films in the Oscar stakes, for few of them have been shown here. These days Hollywood sends us mindless comedies and thrillers for eleven months, saving its prestige productions till December and their annual prize-giving. What I have seen on your behalf are four films which made it into the top box-office ten, and Why? you may well ask. Since those who flock to the box-offices of America are mainly adolescents they may have little in common with the readers of this paper: but, hang it, I am interested. It cost them $45 million to make *Who Framed Roger Rabbit?* and I can think of many another big bucks movie which dropped out of sight after a week or so. This one has been hugely popular, thus justifying the decision of the Disney Organisation to cooperate with producer Steven Spielberg (in Walt's time to see Daffy and Donald Duck together, Mickey Mouse alongside rival Bugs Bunny would have been unthinkable). As everyone probably knows by now, Roger Rabbit is a star of animated cartoons who enlists the help of a private eye (Bob Hoskins) in solving a murder mystery for which the evil District Attorney (Christopher Lloyd) wants him to take the rap. The actual animation is superb, and those responsible are to be congratulated (which they have already done to themselves) for putting Richard Williams in charge instead of one of those who likes his cartoon characters 'cute'. There is a harshness here and the duel-to-the-death at the climax is pretty scarey; on the other hand, the reasons behind the plotting, that run-down 1940s Hollywood should become a jumble of freeways and supermarkets, is tired — and it's juvenile to get laughs by ridiculing such schemes as being in the realms of fantasy. More seriously, the director Robert Zemeckis bungles what he did so well in *Back to the Future* — the period detail. In trying for the *noir* atmosphere of the films of the late 40s he gives us sleaze, with characters more likely to be found on skid row than in a low dive. Bob Hoskins is totally miscast as the private eye though I mind his charmlessness less than his scruffiness: the

point about the Marlowes and Spades is that though they had seen better days their threadbare pants were neatly creased and their scuffed shirts freshly laundered; and as his girl, Joanna Cassidy completely lacks the sleek, sexy appeal of Lauren Bacall, probably the best of the *noir* heroines.

The popularity of *Roger Rabbit* doesn't surprise me, but I'm surprised that *Beetlejuice* should have climbed out of the cult status it should have merited. In an era when anything goes at the box-office both try for certain originality: and so Oscar Wilde's *The Canterville Ghost* has been raided — for a grotesque ghost comedy which is about one-hundredth as funny as *Blithe Spirit*. A nice young couple is killed, but return to their homes as spirits, to find it sold to a ghastly couple refitting it with just about every pretension known to interior design: when they can't frighten them out themselves they employ Beetlejuice (Michael Keaton), a mad-as-a-hatter ghost claiming to be a bio-exorcist. He is also a lecher, but beyond his wild humour is given no character at all; the couple has none, and after a promising start the awful family is no longer awful (the daughter turns out to be whimsical). Because, you see, the director Tim Burton is one of those who believes that Special Effects take precedence over anything else. The piece is prodigal with these, and when they're not tired they're not for the squeamish. Still, it has a certain raw energy and one amusing scene, when the dinner guests are so possessed as to go into the bumps and grinds to Harry Belafonte's *Banana Boat Song*.

Die Hard looks back to the one-of-a-kind *Towering Inferno* and the best-of-its-kind *Dog Day Afternoon*, as a gang of crooks takes over an entire skyscraper and holds one partying office to a multi-million ransom. Unbeknownst to them (at first) is an intruder, Our Hero, requiring the power of Superman to defeat them as led by Alan Rickman. This actor came to my attention when he played the villain for the BBC in *Barchester Towers*, claiming (if I recall rightly) to have taken for the role two parts each of Tebbit, Parkinson and Brittan with a dash of Margaret Thatcher. He was horribly dislikeable, just what the big screen needed to make audiences hiss. He has little to work with here, but could still be the best heavy since Basil Rathbone. As his reckless resourceful opponent, Bruce Willis brings a perkiness that he hasn't shown on television's *Moonlighting*. *Die Hard* is directed by John McTiernan with more regard to technology than character, but I must have cared about these more than I thought: for as they swung out on ledges miles up in the air or walked barefoot on broken glass my eyes were firmly closed.

As to what *Cocktail* actually is, I'm at a loss. A 15-year-old of my acquaintance told me that I wouldn't enjoy it unless I liked watching Tom Cruise 'doing his thing' — which she and apparently millions of others do. Roger Donaldson directed, and although the result is pleasant, his earlier work showed that he should be working on something more substantial.

Literary Supplement

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Betty Abel

Any Old Iron. Anthony Burgess. Hutchinson. £12.95. *The Open Door.* Alan Sillitoe. Grafton Books. £11.95. *Have the Men Had Enough?* Margaret Foster. Chatto & Windus. £12.95. *The Sugar Mother.* Elizabeth Jolley. Viking. £11.95. *Dalva.* Jim Harrison. Jonathan Cape. £12.95. *The Risk Pool.* Richard Russo. Chatto & Windus. £12.95. *A Lesser Dependency.* Peter Benson. MacMillan. £11.95.

The Any Old Iron of Anthony Burgess's title is Excalibur, the magical, all conquering sword of King Arthur. The novel is centrally concerned with answering the question, 'What could Excalibur achieve, if found in a state of preservation, to spirit away the dire evils of the twentieth century?' There could be no more sternly metaphysical question than that and few with a more serious purpose. And yet the novel is brilliantly comic, many of the jokes are verbal Celtic jokes (the chief characters being a family of Welshmen and one Russian woman, the wife of David Jones, father of Reginald, Dan and Beatrix). The latter three, whilst living through some of the major calamities of the twentieth century, set out in the medieval manner to find the answer and to locate the sword which, in their own time alone, had a world wide significance if a curiously trivial one, having reputedly been stolen by the Nazis from Monte Cassino, from East Germany by the Russians and finally from the Ermitage in Leningrad by a Russian-Welshman. The Welsh family's relations and friends, Jews from Manchester, are the recorders of these startling events and the explainers, when possible, of remote historical Middle Eastern connections binding the quest of religious sects other than Christian ones.

The author obtrudes his own views at not infrequent intervals throughout the novel: this he is certainly entitled to do, as the *fons et origo* of all the proceedings. As we should expect, he exhibits considerable erudition. The flattening out of the unwary reader is, however, skilfully avoided by the pace of the tale and the humorous drawing of characters, as well as by the brief but beautifully written description of people and places. In the hurly-burly of New York in 1914, with its cosmopolitan citizenry, and the turmoil of pre-revolutionary Moscow in early 1917, there are thumb-nail sketches of the daily stress in the midst of comedy that ordinary people constantly have to endure. No-one is better than Anthony Burgess at such delineation. The story line is so strong that his incursions into world history and its religious wars, alongside twentieth century wars in the name of justice and humanity, are not distracting but in some inexplicable way relaxing. It is hard to find a better read than this novel.

Equally remarkable, though for different reasons, is Alan Sillitoe's new novel, *The Open Door.* It is the third and final volume of the Seaton trilogy, the other two being *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning* and *Key to the Door.* The scene is Nottingham, to which Brian Seaton returns after what should have been his demobilisation from Malaya in 1949: but the late discovery by army doctors that he has tuberculosis dashes his hopes of finding a new, exciting career in civilian life, based on all he has seen and learned in the exotic East. The magic of Sillitoe's prose never fails to bring to life the family scenes amongst black marketeers in a country still, unbelievably, rationed for basic food. Brian's

disappointments and uncertainties include doubts about the fidelity of his uncommunicative wife.

The core of the novel is, however, his resigned acceptance of life in a military hospital battling against the scourge of the times, the tubercle bacillus that has returned him to the untender clutches of the army. His wife, in her fear and incomprehension, goes predictably to another lover, leaving him more doubtful than ever that any part of his former life at home made sense. Gradually, leaving the military scene for a civilian sanatorium, he falls in love with Nora, a nurse, and with her he betrays Lilian, an old friend from the past who also is tubercular and subsequently kills herself, causing further doubts in Brian's mind. Finally he realises that he is either chasing ghosts or his destiny is to live a wandering life, using new experiences to stimulate the gift for writing, newly discovered but centrally important to him. There is, in the destiny of all the vicissitudes suffered by Sillitoe's characters, endless humour and boundless tenderness. Alan Sillitoe has a sure gift for revealing the inwardness and essential worth of a character, against all outward inconsistencies of behaviour.

Margaret Forster's new novel *Have the Men Had Enough?* is a moving story of female courage in the face of impossible odds in the domestic situation of three generations. An essentially modern dilemma is that of caring for at home or sending away a formerly loving and beloved matriarchal figure whom no-one can bear to see in her new state of disastrous senility. One daughter refuses to give up the unequal struggle until, inevitably, the mother's death supervenes. But Margaret Forster's sensitive handling of day-to-day emotional demands brings home the fact that no other life-threatening situations are quite like this one.

Mrs. McKay, the witty, obstinate but brave grandmother, has always put her menfolk first. The title, *Have the Men had Enough?* can at first sight mean just this. It soon becomes clear, however, through the clear gaze of Hannah, the compassionate grand-daughter, that 'the men' have very soon 'had enough' in a different way: they've had enough of doing their stint of caring, staying in with and mopping up after the old lady who nurtured them. The womenfolk have quickly grasped what is going to be necessary, the men have taken a great deal longer to assess the situation and to see its implications for their comfort in the home. It is Mrs. McKay's daughter, the intrepid Bridget, her grand-daughter, Hannah, and her daughter-in-law, Jenny, who come up to scratch. Hannah's ruthless teenage vision pierces all the family pretences and Jenny's mature compassion makes her a 'perfect' daughter-in-law, whilst until the inevitable end no-one is quite sure why Bridget is continually behaving as if her mother will return to her from the rest home as though from a normal spell in hospital for a curable complaint. This strange behaviour turns out to have been the only way in which Bridget can deal with her own violent feelings at all but it does not affect her subsequent rationality when the old lady dies.

Gloomy and even grim though the subject matter of the novel really is, Margaret Forster's gifts as a storyteller include bringing a great deal of quiet humour to bear on difficult family scenes and these are at once moving and compelling. Generations and the sexes clash in this fine novel. It is a wonderful portrait of an indomitable grandmother whose most telling act is that she bursts into free verse when wishing obliquely to recall to her family some significant memory or inescapable fact. Hence, her refrain about the men works on several levels.

In her new novel, *The Sugar Mother*, Elizabeth Jolley examines the mysteries of family life and the strange ties that bind lovers and kinsmen. Now for the

first time published in England, the novel is already thought of in Australia and the USA as possibly Elizabeth Jolley's finest work so far. The central character, neither hero nor anti-hero but rather a victim of circumstances, is a middle-aged and hitherto unadventurous professor of English literature with a wife who is a highly successful obstetrician: but the couple are childless and no longer care to mention it. The scene is set, therefore, for some kind of emotional trauma when the wife, Cecilia, accepts a year's fellowship abroad. The husband, Edwin Page, is the charge of Cecilia's friends in her absence for he is known to be fairly helpless in mundane domestic matters. But he has an adventure which nobody could have foreseen, one whose consequences determine the course of the rest of both their lives.

One night, soon after his wife's departure, Edwin is disturbed by a rapping at the window and finds that his new neighbours, a mother and her twenty-year old daughter, have locked themselves out of their house. He offers them a night's shelter but it soon thereafter becomes clear that their intention is gradually and in a slightly sinister fashion to encroach on his privacy. Something goes wrong in their house every time they return to it. Worse still, Edwin becomes obsessed by the slow, fat daughter whose very passivity provides a strong contrast to his absent wife's forceful vigour and positive bossiness. Leila's mother, a slatternly housewife but a determined planner of her daughter's future, begins a strange campaign of complicity with Edwin and suggests that his wife could condone the conception by Leila of a child for Edwin and Cecilia, Leila becoming the 'sugar mother', her illiterate misrepresentation of the word 'surrogate'.

The ensuing tale of deceptions and passions is extremely well told and the sense of foreboding is strongly conveyed as Edwin tries to come to terms with the simple comfort he finds in Leila whilst still regarding Cecilia, whom he loves, with the old admiration and pride. A devoted friend, Daphne, watches helplessly and disbelievingly as the dreadful events unfold. There is even mention of a considerable fee for Leila's willing services: Edwin is caught in a trap between his own obsession and his knowledge of the mother's sheer greed which is clearly going to be impossible to explain or extricate himself from. The full implications of the whole episode and the truth about Leila's immediate pregnancy are finally clarified in a way that emphasises the brilliance of the author's gradual development of the plot. Every detail of it has all along been carefully controlled, every effect on the reader's emotions cleverly planned.

Jim Harrison, an American novelist and a farmer from Michigan, has created in *Dalva* that most difficult of documents, an imaginary set of diaries spanning several generations of a Wyoming family. The story of Dalva who uncovers them, seen through her eyes, is basically that of a tough, hard-drinking girl whose love affair with a half Sioux Indian has resulted in the birth of a son whom she gave for adoption. Later, her dearest wish is to find her child. Her own western family has more Indian blood than it cares to remember. With the help of a Stanford professor who needs to publish a book for his academic survival she opens the family closets. The shifts in time and style, especially in the opening pages, are cleverly managed and are totally convincing. The story of Dalva's family is a strange and tempestuous one. The naturalist and explorer who is her ancestor keeps the diaries in which he vividly re-creates the traumas which the Indians suffered on the invasion of their territory by the white man. In the progress of the lives of this pioneering family there are many skeletons in the cupboard. Apart from a number of fairly unsavoury drug-and-sex passages and episodes, the novel is an old-fashioned, romantic American epic.

Richard Russo's novel *The Risk Pool,* is another American work that has crossed the Atlantic with every chance of success. Russo achieved fame first

with his book entitled *Mohawk,* a moving love story set in an imaginary New York town. In *The Risk Pool* Richard Russo returns to Mohawk to unfold the further tale of thirty years in the hell-raising life of Sam Hall. Hall returns from World War II, only to abandon his wife Jenny and their baby Ned. Several years later, he returns in search of his son, thus causing Ned to spend the next twenty years shuttling both physically and emotionally between his estranged parents, trying hard to gain acceptance from his father as earnestly as the father is trying to win the respect and affection of the son he left too early for reconciliation to be achieved without a bitter struggle.

The style is witty, easy and nostalgic in tone so that the characters in the story are real and recognisable. Small-town America is depicted vividly and precisely. The eternal loser, Sam Hall, is an unsuccessful gambler, a heavy drinker and a disastrous driver. Nevertheless, he is inexplicably some sort of local hero and although he is laid off work every winter when he spends his time in bars, telling everyone that but for the winters he would be Governor, they respect his ready generosity and inability to bear a grudge. The whole novel seems to consist of the trials of failed fathers and unappreciative sons. But Sam Hall finds it especially hard to justify to his son that his disregard for all tenets of safety, decency and even common sense have landed him at the bottom of the auto-insurance risk pool. The author brings humour and pathos out of this sad tale.

Peter Benson's *A Lesser Dependency,* a slight but bitter fictionalised account of the real destruction of an island community, provides an object lesson in the wanton elimination of a small sea-girt dependency by great nations. Based on documentation, it makes a powerful protest. A small family from the Ilois people, fishermen for generations in the Indian Ocean, left Diego Garcia on a night in September, 1971, accompanied by their neighbours. Maude's husband had already disappeared without trace on what was supposed to have been a simple expedition to collect supplies from nearby Mauritius. Leonard and Odette, their son and daughter, were wrested away from their simple lives hitherto spent in rural cultivation round their island home.

American construction teams had suddenly arrived, the jungle was burnt and when the boat came to carry them off they watched strange, glowing lights on their disappearing islands. They were landed in Mauritius, surrounded by unfamiliar sights and sounds, — buses, bicycles and advertising posters they did not understand. They were hungry, work was hard to find and no provision had been made for the unfortunate victims of a hand-over to the Americans of a once British dependency, for ends shrouded in mystery but said by rumour-mongers to be for reasons of security. The widowed Maude dies of despair, Odette sells herself to drunken sailors for a few rupees, Leonard goes mad and is drowned in a fit of dazed incomprehension. These loyal Commonwealth citizens, dragged from their homes by a deceitful British Government for the sake of a few Polaris parts, and to make room for a large US nuclear base, received no consideration or sign of common humanity from anyone, American or British, Peter Benson is rightly asking all of us not to forget or deny what has been so dreadfully done in our name. He writes beautifully, with compassion and tenderness, of their ordeal.

ALSO RECEIVED

Out on the Marsh. David Updike. Constable. £10.95.

David Updike's short stories have appeared in *The New Yorker* and in *Twenty Under Thirty.* In the volume published here, there are tales of human kindness and affection in which the author shows a sensitive understanding of the heart. David Updike is a talented writer.

NON FICTION REVIEWS

NATIONALISED UNIVERSITIES

Nationalised Universities: paradox of the privatisation age, Deepak Lal. Policy Study No. 103. Centre for Policy Studies, 8 Wilford St., London SW1E 6PL. £4.95.

Professor Lal is not amused by the paradox that a government which is transferring most public services to private enterprise is tightening the state's grip on universities. His proposed way to get rid of the paradox can be anticipated from the source of the pamphlet. But the case for freeing universities is well argued, and the pamphlet deserves careful consideration by anybody interested in higher education.

Even those who do not agree with Professor Lal's conclusions will concur with his criticisms of the present arrangements. The attempt to plan higher education to take account of the country's economic requirements is based on unproven assumptions about the direct link between economic success and education and misplaced confidence in ability to forecast manpower needs. The planners' other activities are even more dubious. They not only decide what disciplines should be encouraged for economic reasons; they also believe they can raise standards by favouring what they call centres of excellence. Professor Lal rightly ridicules their methods of grading departments — assessment of teaching by classes of degrees related to entry qualifications and of research by the number of citations of published material. 'The belief in the efficacy of *dirigiste* monitoring of the "quality" of higher education is built on sand.' (p.12).

Professor Lal's alternative recipe for raising standards is, as might be expected from an advocate of free markets, competition for students and any other support that can be obtained. This could be brought about simply by subsidising students instead of universities. Grants to universities would be replaced by a government undertaking to pay the fees of all students who at present have their fees paid by statutory authorities. Universities would then charge fees which would cover the full cost of courses, as they do now to overseas students. The government would still have some control, at least at first, because each university has a quota of students allocated by subject. If quotas were not imposed, other controls could continue. Public auditors have access to university accounts and could ensure that income was responsibly spent, and it would be quite legitimate to specify that fees would be paid only for students with certain entry qualifications and who pursue their courses satisfactorily. Professor Lal sees this switch of subsidising as a preliminary to complete independence, but those who do not share his aversion to government responsibility for higher education may still think this a better way of financing it. It would remove the premium on accepting overseas rather than home students and allow a university to deploy its resources as thought best and to respond to student demand. It would also make redundant the statistical exercises and diplomatic manoeuvring involved in determining grants, and for that reason it is unlikely to be adopted.

The switch just described is to a condition regarded by Professor Lal as transitional: eventually students would in principle be responsible for their own fees. But he considers that 60% of the cost could reasonably be borne by public funds. For the remaining 40% he proposes government guaranteed loans repaid over 20 to 25 years through a NIC surcharge. But he admits that people from low income families might be put off by the very thought of a loan and

advocates scholarships for them. This would raise all the problems of means testing. He also suggests the government might pay back the loans of students who go into professions the government particularly want to recruit — e.g. medicine, teaching, engineering. The slight advantage of marking up a loan which is actually cancelled is that it encourages people to go into the professions they are trained for: at present many who train as teachers never get into the classroom. A considerable proportion of graduates go into public services of one sort or another, and with all the special subsidies suggested it is doubtful whether a loan scheme for tuition fees is worth setting up. Maintenance during a period of full-time study when a student cannot earn enough to subsist, is another matter. This Professor Lal does not deal with and, it is probably as well to consider the two separately. What he does deal with he discusses lucidly, and persuasively. His pamphlet is a useful contribution to the debate on higher education.

BRUCE PATTISON

DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN GERMANY

Democracy in Western Germany: parties and politics in the Federal Republic. Gordon Smith. Gower Publications. £21 hardback, £6.95 paperback.

That this is the third edition of a book first published in 1979 is an indication not only of the changing character of West German politics but of the quality of Gordon Smith's analysis. Its first two chapters, a historical survey, and an examination of the Basic Law of 1949, remain classic brief descriptions: first, of the uniqueness of the German experience in the nineteenth century; and secondly, the merits of its post — World War II constitution, itself now 40 years old, and already much longer-lasting than the regimes of Weimar or of the Third Reich.

But this edition is more stimulating than the usual text-book surveys of 'government and politics'. Three points made are striking, and presented vividly. The rise of the Greens is due not only to 'the environment versus the economy', to a mistrust of parliamentary and party elites, and to a generation gap. It betrays also the enduring influence of German Romanticism, 'nostalgia which looks to the intimacy of a new-style *Gemeinschaft* instead of the faceless *Gesellschaft* of industrial society'. Issues like the siting of nuclear power stations or the threat of acid-rain pollution to German forestland can thus tap chords in all sections of German society.

Again, Gordon Smith reminds us that the German SPD is traditionally a male party, and has rested firmly, almost exclusively, on a trade union base. By the 1970s sex differences in party support had almost disappeared; but the SPD's former strength with young voters is now being threatened by the feminist vote as well as by the greens. As single-issue parties emerge, coalition-built parties would seem to have a less certain future.

And, not least, the Basic Law provides West Germany with a constitution that, like that of the US, poses the problems of judicial review. A legal training in the Universities is now an important avenue for entry into German political life. And this too has echoes of the German past and is reinforced by it: for the nearest equivalent to an Establishment in Germany was the *Juristenmonopol*. The future of West Germany looks likely to be in the grip of party politicians, which is presumably a good thing, and is manifestly — in economic, social and moral terms — a vast improvement on Weimar and on the Third Reich. In

West Germany however as in the US (and to a lesser degree even in Scotland and to a still lesser degree in England), careers in politics seem likely to be restricted to the graduates of the best law schools.

This is an authoritative, meaty and stimulating book.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE MEANING OF GORBACHEV

The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A historical interpretation. Moshe Lewin. Radius. Century Hutchinson, London. £12.95.

This book will greatly help to interpret and assess the spectacular results of the March elections in the Soviet Union. This because the author does not deal with Gorbachev as a person but with the social forces that produced him. The radical changes in Soviet society in the last 30 years are closely looked at with no fewer than 110 sources, most of them Russian, referred to. This gives the book an exceptional authority. Where the author fails rather is to take account of the reawakened nationalism in the non-Russian republics and the inevitable response of the Great Russians, the core of the Soviet Union.

The author shows that Gorbachev, a member of the newly educated generation of peasant origin, came to the fore when the efforts of Khruschev 35 years ago to restore the Communist Party and those of Premier Kosygin to make the economy work better had failed under Breshnev. The actual 'triad' of state bureaucracy-economic administration and Party officialdom as well as the other 'triad', that of party power — Communist ideology — and cultural efforts and relations, were working less and less effectively. The Party had been sucked into the administration of the state and so had been the economy of the country. There was, and still is, what the author sums up as vertical departmentalism. Everything has to be referred to the top; and sideways contacts and consultations between departments are rare even where enterprises related to each other in the normal production process are located in the same city.

Gorbachev has been challenging that Three Tier System in order to revive the Communist Party by persuading the educated classes in the Triad, technicians, scientists, skilled workers to join the Party or for members to become active in it. Gorbachev's task was to save the Party by making changes in the Triad system that affect the actual living standard of the people who have accepted that they can mostly expect 'empty talk' from officials.

The author tries to show, successfully, that the Command Economy that caused the drift to cities and towns since the death of Stalin is not coping effectively. There are 18½ million now who receive some type of higher education and among them 1½ million scientists, researchers and engineers. But there are not enough middle ranking technicians and assistants to work with them. At the same time the earlier generation of peasant immigrants to the cities still adds up to between 33% and 65% of plant managers and chief engineers. The new teams are therefore 'straight jacketed' into a production system of an earlier technical age because many poorly trained individuals hold high class technical jobs appointed by the Party secretary, always attached to an enterprise. There is therefore widespread job dissatisfaction, the feeling of a wasted generation among the massive new professional class that has emerged and Gorbachev has been trying to recruit them as party activists.

Gorbachev's task, the author reluctantly admits, is so formidable that it is just short of the impossible because he responded to the new realities. Gorba-

chev has criticised the Party itself. But some fear that the Party will disintegrate and there are many, too many perhaps, who feel that Russia must remain an authoritarian state, and that it is of secondary importance whether it is Slav nationalist or Stalinist. It is significant, and the author neglects this, that the new class of scientists and technicians proved its ability only where the institutions they worked in were practically independent of the state triad compared with other sectors, namely the Armed Forces and the related Space industry.

Gorbachev has to change the Party and the state bureaucracy by endeavouring to spread the decision making and engage the middle ranking new classes. But he cannot risk being seen to weaken the Party and this meant that he cannot deprive the top ranks of the present self-appointed oligarchy, of which he is one, of its control. For a sure way for him to fail is if it should begin to look like him weakening the Party. This because the Party is, for the time being, the only institution that can preside over the refurbishing of the whole backward system without endangering Soviet society itself.

The author concludes that there is a major group outside the Party and the bureaucracy that might be ready to join the Party to try and carry out the reforms that Gorbachev and his supporters believe are needed. That would amount to a 'democratization' of the Party and Gorbachev has been trying to make the 'Soviet', the local Councils, into real decision taking bodies. But he accepted the complex allotment of seats in the new 2,250 member 'Assembly' voted on in March which ensured that there is a safe majority of Party appointees.

The author says that a political will is necessary to carry out the comprehensive reform programme that is needed. He ends by saying that he believes that will is there and that 'one of the most remarkable stories of our time' has now unfolded. One cannot help feeling that he may be too optimistic. But the book paints in sometimes fascinating details a true picture.

LEO MURAY

ESSAYS ON CONSERVATISM

Conservative Thinkers. Essays from *The Salisbury Review.* Ed. Roger Scruton.
Conservative Thoughts. Essays from *The Salisbury Review.* Ed. Roger Scruton. (The Claridge Press 1988. £14.95 in each case).

The editor of *The Salisbury Review,* Professor Roger Scruton, is to be congratulated on the publication in more permanent form of some of the essays that have appeared in his quarterly since its foundation in 1982. They are valuable individually, but even more in collected form, since they are highly intelligent analyses and summaries of conservative themes, and of commentaries (for the most part) by conservative writers. They are, however, much more than this. When from other quarters on the Right (notably the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute) the emphasis in their publications is overwhelmingly on the paramountcy of market forces in decision-making, and when, in public debate, dialecticians fall back on laissez-faire, the picture here is much more varied, and much more political than economic. The editor, in his introduction to *Conservative Thinkers,* bravely tries to elicit the leading traits of conservatism: duty, obedience, tradition, law and order and social peace . . . but ends by describing it 'as a desire to record and respect the human condition'. And the originality of the volumes, helped by the brevity of each essay, lies in the summaries of the author's views which, taken together, give a vivid, wide-ranging and cohesive presentation of a number of important themes.

It is encouraging that there are so many vigorous proponents of conservative values on whom the editor can draw. Some of them are university teachers, and that when the atmosphere in common-rooms is not, and for long has not been, well-disposed to anyone who is not, militantly or otherwise, of the Left. As Professor Scruton does (and Professor Vincent of Bristol could) testify, an avowed conservative cannot assume an easy hearing in his own classroom: and ostracism inside the academic community is a familiar experience. But there are contributors in these two books who teach at a number of British Universities (Glasgow, Liverpool, London, Oxford, Cambridge and Bradford) and at two polytechnics (Middlesex and North London) that at least augur a more favourable climate. (What is missing in the UK, unlike the US, are those genuinely liberal-arts colleges some of whose economics and politics departments have been notable academic pace-makers of the Right, like Rockford College, Illinois, Hillsdale College, Michigan, or George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia).

Not the least of the merits of these two books is the re-discovery of those whose names are rarely mentioned in a conservative setting: Shakespeare, Jane Austen, Ruskin and Voegelin, to name only four. R.A.D. Grant's essay on the first of these is a brilliant summary of a longer work on which he is engaged; but the same contributor's studies of Burke, Jane Austen and Michael Oakeshott are of matching quality, and in the latter case not devoid of criticism.

For this reviewer there are two other conclusions. The contributors and subjects assembled here (and at least one more volume is promised) are drawn from Britain (correction: England and Scotland, but not Wales, unless Mr. Enoch Powell is seen as 'distantly' Welsh?) and from Germany and Central Europe. Do they share genuinely common assumptions about the political, economic and social order, or are the features that are common only abstractions? Where are those 'givens' that used to hold that the continent was so divided on church *versus* state (inside political parties and Trade Unions as in society) that there was no common language to be shared, say, by Western Germany and Britain? (And incidentally has there been, in now-near-twenty years of 'membership' of Europe, any real marriages of minds across the national divides?)

Secondly, while in these pages European names are, happily, frequent, one notes that of those who took refuge in 1939 or before in the US, few seem to have stayed there permanenetly.

Was this distaste for American materialism? Or did they find America's own conservatism totally uncongenial?

ESMOND WRIGHT

A PATHETIC EXIT

The Shah's Last Ride. William Shawcross. Chatto & Windus. £15.95.

This is the story of the end of the Shah's rule in Iran, of his wanderings in exile, of the rebuffs he suffered from the leaders of the West, his terrible cancer and his death. It is all done in detail based on exemplary research and interviews with those involved down to reports of conversations. This book was written long before the Rushdie affair erupted but it rather helps to understand it. Two quotations will show this. The Chief of the Revolutionary Court, Khalkhali, explained months after the Shah's flight, 10 years ago of course, that a reward of 70,000 dollars was available for the Shah's murder and he added: 'If Farah (the Shah's wife) killed the Shah she would not get the money

but a pardon as well and she could return to Iran'.

And again, the author explains that three reasons were given by the British Foreign Office for not granting asylum to the Shah, namely security arrangements that would have to be made, the damage that might be done to trade and the risk of British personnel in Tehran being seized. A senior retired F.O. man was sent to the Shah under a false name to explain this to him personally. The only leader who really wanted him was President Sadat of Egypt who took him twice and paid with his life for it. The Shah's exile wanderings started in Egypt and ended there after a cancer operation having passed, as an embarrassing guest, through Morocco, the Bahamas, the USA, Mexico and Panama. He would have liked to go to France, England, Switzerland or Austria, countries that had benefited from trade with oil rich Iran. But he was not wanted.

The Shah emerges as an insecure, confused and ambitious leader who imagined that he could turn Iran into a major modern power. He spent millions in 1971 to celebrate 2500 years of the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great, at the ancient ruins of Persepolis. Prince Philip and Princess Anne were there. But it was all organised by super-caterers from Paris mixed with an Opera type show of soldiers dressed up like ancient warriors.

The Shah started the 'White Revolution' to modernise Iran and gave land to the peasants. But this was bungled and thousands moved to shanty towns and provided the support for the Ayatollah. At the same time corruption spread starting with the Shah's own family and it became known that some of his relations had put away 2400 million dollars. There was plenty of oil money around. A spectacular sex life also became known with employees of 'Madam Claude' of Paris being flown in.

To keep control the Shah set up a vicious Secret Police, SAVAK. It became a feature of his public image. As the anti-Shah movement grew Generals went on their knees, literally, asking him to do something, use force to control the country. But he had pathetic illusions of his popularity and refused. The British and Americans rocked from anxiety to illusion. Only the French were certain and gave asylum to the Ayatollah.

The account of his exile reads like a Dallas or Dynasty series. Everyone wants to get something out of the Shah. As his illness gets worse he gets more and more depressed and abandoned. His last but one stay, with Torrijos, the dictator of Panama, is the most fascinating. The Ayatollah regime is trying to get him extradited. Its agents, French, are most active. At the same time his illness, cancer of the spleen, is getting worse. The author gives an absorbing account of the infighting between three teams of doctors, American, Panamanian and French. The Americans who sent him to Panama want him to be operated on at the US military hospital at their base there. The Panamanians, as hosts want it to be at their hospital. The French who were the first to treat him are somewhere in the middle. There is a superb account of what such an operation is about. In the end, because of fear of extradition, the Shah is flown back to Egypt. He is operated on by a mixed American-French team and soon dies. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger wanted the Shah to remain in the US, as an honoured ally and exile. But Carter was always thinking of the hostages at his Embassy in Tehran, to be released only after Reagan won. Nixon attended the funeral.

After reading this book one cannot help feeling that the Ayatollahs are likely to have similar illusions. The Shah spent billions on his army. He wanted Iran, really non-Arab Persia, to be the biggest power in the Middle East. The Ayatollahs want to be the leading power in Islam. All to be paid for with the oil revenues.

LEO MURAY

SHORTER REVIEWS

Bonn and Moscow: A Partnership in Progress? (Alliance Publishers Ltd., for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies). In his Occasional Paper 38, Robbin Laird shows the effects of the 'new look' Soviet policy towards Western Europe and its repercussions, especially on systems of defence. His conviction is that reconciliation between Russia and the West is now on the cards, largely because of three main factors. He pinpoints these as a recognition by Russia of a number of Western institutions, hitherto reviled in the Eastern Bloc, chiefly NATO and the EEC; the changing nature of Soviet society, especially since the publication in 1987 of Gorbachov's book, *Perestroika;* and the incompatibility between economic integration in Europe, now inevitable, and the continued separation of defence systems. There seems, he thinks, to be a new seriousness in Soviet initiatives towards nuclear disarmament and East-West cooperation in trade. The author states his case succinctly and gives ample documentary references.

The Case for Regional Security: Avoiding Conflict in the 1990s. (The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies: Conflict Studies 217. £5.50) Real peace and stability in an increasingly interdependent world, says Professor William Gutteridge, requires the precondition that 'the West, in particular, needs to develop a systematic and consistent strategy for fostering and supporting regional initiatives'. There is, according to him and to many other authorities, a growing recognition in the world of strict limits to the usefulness of military power. The superpower concept has for too long overshadowed the special importance of regional crises. He quotes three main examples of potentially dangerous power vacuums: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will not leave the region in peace, Pol Pot may seek to regain control in Kampuchea and the Angolan settlement cannot be safe in the absence of agreements with neighbours. In a wide-ranging analysis, the author defines the fallacies that have accompanied prevalent notions about world communism and shows the dangers of abandoning the Third World to a violent fate, inevitable unless they are substantially helped to become stable through the recognition of common ground beneath evident differences. The study is a challenging document.

British Welfare Policy: Workhouse to Workforce (Faber Paperback. £4.95.) Anne Digby, a social historian, discusses social policy today in the light of the history of the working population of Britain, both before and since the introduction of the Welfare State. In this example of the Faber series of Historical Handbooks, social policy is traced back as far as the 1830s. The author describes the emergence of such systems as benefits through means testing, eligibility for 'relief' and 'workforce' (benefits only in return for work). She shows the ways in which the many forms of private and public assistance plans have, perversely, fostered and sustained social inequality rather than relieved it. There are useful comparisons with the systems of other welfare states; and the notes to each chapter contain valuable bibliographical references. The volume is especially useful as a reminder that short term solutions to long term issues can only exacerbate already desperate dilemmas. It challenges parochial thinking and shows that our welfare concerns can be grasped only in the light of wider international developments.

Bloomsbury Good Reading Guide. (Bloomsbury Publishing Limited. Paperback. £4.99.) This unique reading guide compiled by Kenneth McLeish has several valuable aspects, not the least of which is that it does not consist of value judgements or recommendations in ranking order. It deals solely in 'map references' to the world of prose fiction. No critical works are included but factual recommendations for courses of reading are contained in marginal references to further works by the same and other germaine writers of novels. The author's stated intention is to answer two questions: 'Where shall I start?' and 'Where shall I go next?'. Adimittedly these queries are frequently made but seldom answered to the inquirer's satisfaction. The answers provided here might well be subject to the writer's preferences in the same way as any other reading guide: but it is a welcome attempt to introduce readers to original books rather than to books about books, thus avoiding a situation in which a man may complain that he had spent so much time reading books about Hamlet that he had never managed to read *Hamlet*. The three sections of the volume are entitled 'Author Entries', 'Including Special Reading Skeins' and 'And Menus of Suggested Reading': there is a clear Introduction and an excellent Index. Of course, making lists of any kind involves choices and choosing between alternatives itself involves a rudimentary value judgement; but, taking that inescapable fact into account, the book must be accounted a useful guide to (mainly) modern fiction, although it ranges eclectically from Laurence Sterne through Jane Austen, Dickens and Thackeray to the Booker prize-winning novels of today. The intention is to extend the range when appropriate with further volumes.

The Last Hero (Heinemann. Peter Forbath. £12.95.) This is a novel of distinction in at least two ways: it contains original research of remarkable exactitude on the route taken by Henry Stanley in his African expedition to rescue the Emir Pasha in 1846, two years after the seige of Khartoum which caused the death of General Gordon, and also it is written in a style of unusual vigour. News brought to London that one province, although beleaguered by the Mahdi, still holds out causes an expedition to be mounted to reach the shores of Lake Albert in the Sudan. The trek leads Stanley and his men into hair-raising adventures, through territory where no white man has ever been before and their near-destruction in the jungle and the risks they run through the activities of white traders are spellbinding in their impact.

Prisons and Punishments of London (Harrap. £14.95.) It was during the years that Richard Byrne worked as a member of the probation team in Wandsworth Prison that he became aware of, and fascinated by, the curious continuity of time that exists behind the encapsulating stone walls that *do* a prison make. Here, unaltered, physically and atmospherically, were the hundreds of cells in which each day since before the Crimean War prisoners had been entomed. It was as if Time itself had become a captive. It brought a new contingency of the historic past to the historic present, and Mr. Byrne found that, by a study of London's prisons itself. It was an odd, out-of-time feeling while doing research on the Marshalsea for this book to sit in the Local Studies section of the library in Borough High Street, reading about the prison which had covered that very spot. This excitement, together with scores of little known and highly interesting lights and sidelights on the more tortuous and remote penological byways into which he time-trespasses, Mr. Byrne nicely communicates in this, apparently the first full and very worthwhile survey of London behind bars.

R.W-E.

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Michael Frendo, M.P. Malta

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TAKING NOTICE OF SPAIN

by Leo Muray

Spain now holds the Presidency of the EEC until July and for the first time since she joined. This is of considerable significance to almost all Spanish people, because Spain is now accepted in Europe when in the old days the French used to remark that Africa began at the Pyrenees. As Premier Felipe Gonzalez put it in his address last December in Brussels, Spain was now in Europe for the first time in decades. One has to appreciate here that Spain has not had successes on the international stage since the Armada and that after a merciless Civil War in 1936 it remained fairly isolated for 40 years with only a military arrangement with the US to show. General Franco had obtained it to make up for his close association with Nazi Germany when the Blue Division fought in Russia.

Now Spain is a major and equal partner in the EEC and Felipe Gonzalez has confessed in his address that 1992, the year of the Internal Free Market of the EEC, has 'an almost mystical aura' for Spain. Indeed, 1992 is the year. The period of transition in Spain's EEC membership ends then. The Olympic Games are to be held in Barcelona, Madrid is to be Europe's 'Cultural Capital', as Glasgow is this year, there will be the big exhibition in Seville and, of course, it will be 500 years since Columbus set out.

The present EEC Chairmanship is vital for the preparation of Spain's 1992. It must prove successful. This is also because an election is due in 1990. Many people think that Gonzalez will call an earlier election depending on two events: the EEC Summit in Madrid in June and the European elections in the same month.

The Summit must produce results and Gonzalez' Socialist Party must do well in the elections. But Gonzalez and his team also want to demonstrate now that Spain, at long last, is able to play a key role in international affairs and that it is entitled to it, as its distant history is seen to have proved.

Spain has had a democratic constitution for the last 10 years under a King, Juan Carlos I. He proved at the crucial moment of an attempt at a military coup that he can control the situation and hold the country together. Last December the country also got through a 24 hour General Strike, the first since 1934. The issue remains a tricky one because the Socialist U.G.T. Trade Union that, in theory at least, supports the

Socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez, cooperated with the stronger C.C.O.O., the Communist Trade Union, in demanding better wages and working conditions, demands Gonzalez had fervently supported two days earlier in his Brussels EEC address.

Trade Unions in Spain get financial support, up to 40%, from the government, not relying upon their membership fees. But 7.8 million workers walked out. The issue is not settled yet by any means with the three forces engaged, Unions, government and employers, waiting to see what happens next. The net profits of the 297 undertakings in the public sector and the 3857 firms in the private sector doubled in 1987 compared with 1986. It is therefore interesting for other members of the EEC who can expect fierce and effective Spanish competition sharpened after 1992 to know what the demands of the Unions are that have to be met before new negotiations can start. The Unions ask for a 2% restitution of the loss of the purchasing power of the wages lost, as the Unions put it, due to the government's miscalculation in its inflation forecast (quite originally put); an increase of up to 48% in unemployment pay and there is an unemployment rate of nearly 20%; the minimum pension to be raised to the level of the minimum wage; the temporary minimum wage for young people to be dropped in addition to working out a definite plan that will promote the creation of real jobs in dignified conditions and, lastly, the acceptance of the right of civil servants to collective bargaining.

This is now a serious political issue for two reasons. Gonzalez leads the Socialist Party and needs the support of the Socialist Union and for the first time in many years the rival Socialist and Communist Unions are standing together in a major struggle. Gonzalez is facing the threat of a defeat in the coming Euro-elections when Spain is in the Chair.

The Gonzalez government has been doing quite well, with inflation kept at 5.8% and a tourist trade, vital for the country, of around 48 million visitors a year. The Gonzalez government wants to use the six months in the EEC Chair and the fashioning of decisions this involves in the EEC all-round to keep it that way. The lower wages in Spain matter greatly therefore. This is why in practice the Spanish side is careful about the basic features of the great plan of EEC Commission President, Delors, to set up a real structure of a 'Social Europe'. It is not only the proposed Charter of Rights for the employed and a Statute for European companies that is given such a careful look but also the details. The Spanish Minister concerned has clearly indicated that his government is more interested in rules for safety and hygiene at the working place than in setting up firm rules for wages and hours of work. Another issue where the Spaniards are careful is a future, firmly agreed, obligatory, EEC wide standard for the products turned out.

Gonzalez has a safe majority in the Cortes, the Parliament, and faces an opposition on the Right that has just been reformed as the Partido Popular, the Popular Party, under the former leader of the Popular Alliance, Manuel Fraga, a veteran former Minister under Franco and a former Ambassador in London. The newly organised party is just finding

its feet and Fraga has indicated that he intends to withdraw from National leadership to his native Galicia after the coming general election and hand over to his Number Two, Oreja. On the Left there is constant in-fighting in the Communist Party between those who want to keep the link with Gorbachev and those who want to retain what they call 'Euro-Communism'.

Spain, of course, is a country made up of clearly distinct and distinguishable regions or Provinces like the Basque Country, Catalonia and Gonzalez' own Andalusia. In the Basque Country the separatist terrorist underground organisation ETA has just ended a three months' truce after detailed negotiations on a political arrangement with Madrid in Algiers, its base. A new wave of terror around the time of the elections is now expected. Here one of the difficulties is that the Basque Country harbours the old 'smoke stack' industries which are on the decline as elsewhere. As for Catalonia, the advanced traditional industrial land of Spain with its own language and culture, there is a carefully orchestrated game of in-fighting on all bread and butter issues going on. The Spanish Constitution, with its regional assemblies, provides the legal opportunities.

The general public is keen on seeing Spain successful in its EEC Chairmanship. It wants Spain to be given its rightful place in the international set up and granted the respect it feels is its due. Among the international issues Latin America occupies a special place. In his Brussels address Premier Gonzalez said outright that Latin America was nearest to Europe's own terms and values and 'of cardinal strategic importance for the very security of Europe'. While the 'permanent dialogue' with the US and Canada should be continued, the political and economic relations with Latin America should be 'institutionalised'. This means, officials explained, that the EEC should set up as soon as possible a consultative body like that for the ACB, African, Caribbean, Pacific, countries, the so-called Lomé Convention. It should give help, for instance, in re-introducing democracy in Chile and aim at strengthening democracy everywhere in Latin America. One main purpose would be to help the Latin Americans with their huge foreign debt problems. The EEC, the biggest trading and capital unit in the world, had the resources. Spain, I was told, had already given some financial aid to Venezuela that had to stop the interest payments on its foreign debts. A similar policy to that practised in a Lomé Convention should be adopted with firm commitments. It seems that the Gonzalez government wants to see some general commitments emerge from the Madrid Summit.

The Spaniards are very well aware of the fact that Britain and Argentina are at complete odds over the Falklands, just as Spain is basically with Britain over Gibraltar. The Spaniards do not accept the British stance that it is for the Gibraltarians to decide whether to remain British because sovereignty was ceded to Britain and not to the

Gibraltarians in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht. That applies to the Falklands as well as far as the Spaniards are concerned. But they prefer to let matters rest for the moment.

There is a highly embarrassing aspect of relations with Latin America. It is the drug trade. There is a Spanish law of 1983 that permits having small quantities of drugs expressly for one's personal consumption. The drug Barons of Latin America, Colombia, for instance, are using Spain's 20 international airports and scores of small harbours to smuggle hard drugs through Spain to the rest of Europe; 40% of cocaine, for instance, came through Spain in 1987.

There is also open talk that some members of government and some officials in some Latin American countries are not very distant from the drug traffic. Its managers, and this is acknowledged in EEC countries, are equipped with aircraft and electronic intelligence gadgets, and billions of dollars. One cannot therefore exclude some definite awkwardness if a permanent negotiating structure is established with the Latin Americans on the Lomé Convention model.

Madrid, and Premier Gonzalez indicated this, is also keen on the EEC taking recognisable initiatives in the Mediterranean, in the first place in the Arab-Israel conflict. Spain has always emphatically taken the side of the PLO and Mr Gonzalez insists that the PLO is a valid partner in any discussions and that the EEC 'must not disappoint the hopes of those who look to Europe for a balanced initiative'. In other words the EEC should act rather independently of the US. Spain only agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Israel after the decision to join the EEC had been taken. The so-called 'Troika' of EEC Foreign Ministers is always made up of the Minister of the member country that holds the Chair, the one preceding it and the one coming next, in this case Greece, Spain and France which is taking over on the 1st of July. Greece, of course, as the government crisis there has just shown, has had close links with the PLO. The Troika, on Spanish initiative, endeavoured on its trip to the Middle East to give strong support to the Arab governments and the PLO and put pressure on Israel.

Spain is now a member of NATO but Gonzalez had to organise a referendum in 1986 to have it confirmed that membership has public support. He won the referendum. But he had the US agree to remove its 72 F-16 Fighters from the base at Torrejon where US Squadrons had been stationed for more than 30 years. They are being moved to Comiso in Sicily. Negotiations about other US bases in Spain are going on. The Spanish side has affirmed in the latest treaty with the US that the US is 'subordinate to the Spanish Command' there, especially since the Spaniards do not want these bases to be used against any Arab country.

As a member of NATO Spain has declared firmly that it is a 'non-nuclear' member and like Norway it bans the presence of nuclear

weapons. It also takes the French line on cooperation between NATO forces. The Spanish Officer Corps, favoured, of course, under Franco, is keen on having a very modern Army while at the same time maintaining its independence from NATO HQ and cooperating with it.

For these reasons Spain regards its membership of the EEC — and of the Western European Union — as vital in the realm of Defence and Foreign Policy. This because it provides the framework for the 'Second Pillar' of the North Atlantic line-up to become more independent of the US. It is not surprising that Mr Ordonez, the Spanish Foreign Minister, has shown his interest in getting the provisions of the Rome Treaty removed that exclude cooperation of members in defence matters. Spain is determined to remain outside the integrated NATO Command.

In his Brussels address Gonzalez stated fervently that 1992 was the 'point of no return'. The Single European Act (that introduces 1992) could not be questioned since in essence it updated the Rome Treaty itself. Free Trade by itself was not sufficient. In order to share and not to lose, vestiges of national sovereignty have to be yielded and then any contradictions between national and Community interests will disappear. No one had been forced to take part in the EEC enterprise. It was 'inadmissible' that someone should reject or disapprove of the adoption of decisions essential to achieving the European Union. One must not travel by the speed imposed by the slowest. Which member he had in mind is easy to tell.

It is obvious that Spain takes it for granted that the EEC should become a European Union. Spain, he warned, was prepared to move with those who want to advance farthest and as fast as they want to advance. Each member state had to recognize its own inability to influence major international issues in isolation. This view must be seen against the background of Spain's lacklustre history for the last 300 years and this view is balanced by Premier Gonzalez declaring also that for the first time now 'Spain had a future'.

The three essential features of the European Union were economic and monetary union; common citizenship and a common foreign and security policy. This implied harmonisation of the tax systems so that the regulations of free competition cannot be broken. Here it must be remembered that free competition in the continental sense, based on the old pre-revolutionary French tradition, means competition within the framework of rules laid down by the state for all competitors and not free competition in the sense of the Manchester School and its St. Andrews disciples.

As for monetary union, an EEC authority should be established to administer it, obviously with the present European Monetary System somehow in mind. At present Spain, like Britain, is not a member. Spain, it appears, would like a decision on that at the June Summit in Madrid.

The Spanish side, Gonzalez indicated, supports the ideas of Mr Delors, the President of the Brussels Commission, that a Social System must be set up in the EEC with the active participation of both sides of industry.

The main objective of such a dialogue of both sides would be the creation of jobs and the reduction of long term unemployment. This is of special importance for Spain which has a high rate of unskilled workers among its unemployed due to migration from the poor rural areas of Spain's South and West like Andalusia and Estremadura. This is also why Gonzalez stressed the free movement of persons and the right of EEC citizens to vote in their place of residence.

Running through Gonzalez' arguments is the traditional feeling that the EEC must be equipped with powers to intervene and regulate. The view, he said, that the 'mere forces of a free market will bring about harmonisation and corrective effects' is naive. Member governments must have the constitutional power to transfer power to the European Union. A European Legal Area must be created. The June elections for the Strasbourg Assembly were important because it would be the last Assembly with the present powers.

Spain is now through most of its EEC Presidency. Veteran EEC officials say that their civil servants and Brussels Commissioners are doing well, although Marin, whose department includes fisheries, is having real trouble with Britain over Spanish fishermen greatly exploiting loopholes in regulations thus greatly harming British fishermen. Importantly, the Spaniards have not so far exhausted the goodwill granted to new EEC members but it will do Gonzalez personally, and his government, no good if the Madrid summit does not produce visible results on the ground.

The Gonzalez government can claim one impressive advantage, however. It has shown that the 10 year old democratic constitution works. The genuine and friendly cooperation between the King and the Socialist Premier and his government has made an impact. It has created the impression that, for the first time in its troubled history, democracy is there to stay. The Roman Catholic hierarchy, though disturbed by the rapid secularisation of society, has adjusted itself while militant anti-clericalism is on the wane. The constitution provides a fair scope for regional self-government. This is a powerful stabilising factor, even in the Basque Country, when one recalls that once the use of the Catalan language, for example, had been banned. There are some difficulties, of course, in the application and practice of regional self-government with their assemblies; and the powers of the Madrid-directed police is often an issue.

Another positive feature is the practical and emotional rise of women to real equality which is quite new in Spain, in spite of its Queens in the past. This has a lot to do with the tourists from Northern Europe and it has sharpened the desire of ordinary people to adopt a way of life similar to that of the Northern members of the EEC. There will, of course, be disappointment in store. But this is also why Premier Gonzalez confessed that there was 'a mystical aura' around 1992.

[Leo Muray formerly East European Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, now writes for the *Liverpool Daily Post*.]

THE MEDITERRANEAN BETWEEN EUROPE AND AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

by Michael Frendo, M.P., Malta.

Europe and Africa have been tied together through various links, settlement, colonialisation, and, in relation to North Africa and Southern Europe, alternating dominance and intermixture of cultures, peoples and characteristics. In this connection, the Mediterranean and the European and African littoral states have played and continue to play a major role: a role of communication, a role of commerce, a role of peace or conflict, a sea which emphasises the inevitable political, economic, security consequences of geography.

The Continents, and specifically the Southern European and North African states, contrast with each other: while parts of Europe experience a diminishing population and growth in the number of the aged, Africa expects a population explosion which will have marked repercussions on its physical resources and basic needs and services; while Europe, and the Community in particular, feeds and overfeeds its populations and even destroys its produce or encourages laying aside of productive land, Africa suffers endemically from drought and starvation; while Europe benefits from over forty years of peace, Africa carries the weight of years of endless regional wars; while Europe, especially the European Community, moves forward towards closer union, African Unity remains a distant dream; while 'glasnost' warms the coldness of division between Western and Eastern Europe, positions solidify in South Africa in relation to the rest of the Continent.

The contrasts themselves are sources of opportunity for cooperation: economic, political, cooperation for peace and development. The Lomé Convention is surely a tangible example of the great possibilities present, especially because it does not seek to use aid to turn former colonised and subjugated peoples into welfare dependents. It therefore strives for real economic development. This is the way for further cooperation. Cooperation and development assistance which take into account countries' and people's cultural values, searching for progress from the roots and not eradication of cultural identities. It is therefore significant that Lomé III also provides for cultural and social cooperation, a development which must be furthered by the Community and by Europe in general. Indeed this can be another major contribution that the Community, the Council of Europe, Europe in general can attempt to give in the African context: *assistance in preserving and furthering the African cultural heritage which is as essential to development as aid and economic policies.* It is perhaps a contribution which former colonial powers owe in historical debt to Africa since cultural assimilation and dominance logically accompanied and bolstered colonialism and its structures.

The contribution for peace in Africa is an important aspect we must

not disregard. It would be a lost opportunity in the light of the improvement in East-West relations in Europe not to translate that improvement in the context of Euro-Arab-African relations. In this respect the question must be put: What is Europe, what is the European Community in particular, doing to further East-West warming relations into what could be termed 'a greenhouse effect' on coexistence between African states and particularly on European-African relations? The improving East-West relations must be given a North-South dimension in relation to a continent that has often played the battleground of wars by proxy. Certainly, 1992 for Europe must not detract from this North-South dimension: 1992 must not become a phobia, a closing of ranks between existing states, perhaps also tempting a closing of doors to other democratic European states in the Mediterranean. That certainly would not help the North-South dimension. Democratic Europe moreover, and the European Community in particular, in the light of Lomé and of its association agreements with North African Mediterranean States, has the political mission to foster dialogue, negotiation, diplomatic solutions not only in its own and its members' relations with African States but also in conflicts between African States themselves. That would certainly be a contribution for peace, a constructive role for our Continent.

Another point of reference for Europe in its relations with Africa, especially North Africa, is the issue of human rights. Note the developments in Ben Ali's Tunisia and also in Libya where a human rights declaration has been made. Western Europe, and the Community, as a part of the world which has developed most of its human rights mechanisms also on a supranational level, should not only welcome the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of the Organisation of African Unity, but should give full support for the Charter's constructive operation and its growth and strengthening since it came into force in October 1986. In this respect the European Community as a Community which is constituted by member states who all adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights and as an international actor based on respect for human rights, in conjunction with the Council of Europe, should give special support to the Charter-created African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in its dissemination of information about human rights and in its efforts for their protection in Africa. The Community should also encourage European media to develop a more profound and deeper understanding of Africa, its problems and its achievements rather than concentrate on natural or political catastrophes.

In the context of this whole picture, the Mediterranean region is a major factor and embodies within it all the elements of diversity, conflict and need for peace and friendly economic, cultural and political cooperation existing between Europe and Africa. It would be wrong, indeed nonsensical, at this stage of history, to talk of a Community in the Mediterranean which is formed of European and African States with, as yet, different political systems and traditions. What we must promote, however, is the creation of a closer Mediterranean cooperation, a Mediterranean network of functional institutions in areas such as

information, shipping, banking, communications, the environment, twinship and management of towns.

The Community therefore has a special need, in my view, to further its presence, political and strategic, in the Mediterranean which has a regional importance not only as a frontier between Europe and Africa, but also as a major oil route, a vital link of communication between the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic and the Black Sea. The European Countries in the Mediterranean, in particular Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta (the first four Community members, Malta currently an Associate with a declared intention of seeking membership), are the best suited, culturally, geographically, historically, to carry out this task for Europe in Africa through the Mediterranean.

Already these countries — some in their southernmost parts — have historically been intermingled with the Arab and African civilisations and therefore, while European in character, are open by design and geography to African cultures. The Mediterranean is also a meeting place of the two major religions, Christianity and Islam, which characterise the religious map of Africa and therefore here too it can, through the European Mediterranean and the African Mediterranean, be a catalyst for dialogue and tolerance which can radiate to those parts of Africa which even today remain in conflict on religious issues.

The European Mediterranean is therefore the face of Europe towards Africa. In this respect it is all the more important that it be a face of democracy, and a face of peace and friendly neighbourly relations. I feel that my country, Malta, is well suited to carry out this role of being a European actor in the Mediterranean, a European interface with Africa, especially with North Africa. Malta lives every day the reality of the Mediterranean as a sea between Europe and Africa. As a small country and as a country which has consistently belonged to Western European cultures and values, and which indeed played a significant role in defending those values in the last World War, Malta now seeks to play a role of peace in the region and, through its military neutrality, provides a demilitarised, unaggressive face of Europe towards the African peoples. To quote Dr Rudolph Kirchlaeger, former President of Austria, 'The position of respect which the neutral states (of Europe) have been able to earn for themselves rests above all on the stabilising effect they have had on political events.' (*New European*, Vol 1, No 1, Winter 1987-88). As a militarily-neutral European State, Malta can also give its contribution in current times as a stabilising factor in the Mediterranean in European relations — with *all* the states of the North African Mediterranean littoral.

Away from purely national considerations, ignoring the Mediterranean region as a region for cooperation and dialogue would be a dangerous attitude that could itself lead to conflict and serious consequences for Africa, for the Mediterranean, for the European mainland. For Europe, the Mediterranean fails in its mission of peace between the continents if it presents itself exclusively as a soft underbelly or as a hardheaded battering ram. It must be proud and uncompromising in its basic

European humanist values of freedom and pluralist democracy. But it must also be appreciative and open towards other cultures, friendly and forthright in true neighbourly terms. It is a sea of opportunity for peace and prosperity and understanding among nations of different cultures and political systems. An opportunity which both Africa and the European Community cannot miss.

In the words of Fernand Braudel, 'The Mediterranean, as a unit, with its creative space, the amazing freedom of its sea-routes, with its many regions, so different yet so alike, its cities born of movements, its complementary populations, its congenital enmities, is the unceasing work of human hands' *(The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,* Vol II, p 1239). Those same human hands must grasp the opportunities that the Mediterranean presents to the Community and Europe in general in its relations with Africa, once more asserting Europe's lead in developing the structures and relations of prosperity and of lasting peace.

This article represents a paper presented at an International Colloquium, 'The Mediterranean between Europe and Africa', organised by the Council of Local Authorities and Regions of Europe, the European Movement and the European Union of Federalists. (Potenza, Italy, 28-29 October, 1988).

[Michael Frendo is a Member of Parliament, Malta, and a Member of the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe.]

THE WILD CARDS IN THE 1992 PACK

by John Coleman

The idea behind the Single Market of the European Community is simple. It is that if we can all trade more freely we will all be better off, we will have greater choice and the old humdrum, rather boring EEC will really come to life. But there is more to it than just free trade. The EC from its inception was founded on the absence of tariff barriers between its members, which was of course the reason for calling it the Common Market, but barriers to trade of a non-tariff nature remained and the Single European Act aims to get rid of as many of these as possible through a package of nearly 300 regulations which will bring about a high degree of standardisation throughout the Community. Safety standards on electrical appliances, for example, will be the same in all EEC countries so that an appliance made in any one part of the Community can be sold without let or hindrance in any other part of the Community.

On the surface this seems fine but the question has to be asked: who is going to benefit from this wholesale process of standardisation? Will the consumer benefit or is it craftily designed to suit the convenience of the producers and the economies of scale desired by the mega-industries? Is the 1992 plan going to bring choice and variety into the market for the ordinary consumer or is it going to lead to a spate of mergers (which already seems to be very evident) and a few giant producers who will be in a position to dictate the kinds of goods we will buy because of the absence of effective competition? Sir John Harvey Jones, the former chairman of ICI, predicted at a conference organised by the *Financial Times* that half the companies in Europe will go out of business. That in itself is a sobering thought both for business people and their customers. It seems quite possible that as firms go out of business the customer will be left with, not a greater choice but a much more limited one. At the present moment I buy my soap and toothpaste in France when I am there in the summer. I will be told that in principle I will be able to buy the same soap and toothpaste at my local store after 1992 and that I will be saved all the bother of carting back a year's supply with me, but in practice will that be the case? As the giant producers and the giant outlets in the giant Single Market spread across the whole Community, will my favourite soap and toothpaste producers go out of business? I have been had by the same process here at home. Indeed I used to buy my toothpaste here in England. At one time I could buy it in the big stores but then it was thought that there was not a fast enough turnover for them to continue stocking it so I had to go to the small independent chemists to get it. But later the number of small independent chemists began to decrease as the 'Superstores' took over their business. This so reduced the sales that eventually the manufacturers themselves went out of business, not because there was not a demand but because the larger

outlets were not prepared to cater for any but mass demands and fast turnover.

That then is the first danger of the Single Market. It may not mean that I, the customer, have access to the variety of goods produced in the Community which my country has joined. Instead the new giants will tend to cater for the mass markets and produce a sort of 'identikit' soap or 'identikit' toothpaste. They will say that there is not sufficient demand for the kind of soap I want in London to bring it from Hérouville-Saint-Clair. The tendency will be for all the specialities to die out and a cheaper 'common' product to hit the markets throughout the Community.

It is not difficult to imagine in the field of good food French and Italian versions of McDonald's springing up with chains right across Europe and everywhere pushing out of business the small independent restaurateurs who have the secret of French and Italian cuisine in their own lands. In all likelihood we will end up not having real French and Italian food even in France and Italy and be the poorer for it.

Of course, this may be a false scenario. The voice of the consumer may be so powerful in Europe after 1992 that sophisticated and specialised markets are effectively catered for. John Kay, Professor of Industrial Policy at the internationally prestigious London Business School, takes a different view. He thinks that the Commission of the European Community instead of banging its head against brick walls should try and find ways round them. Last year he wrote in the *Daily Telegraph* ('The lasting barriers to a United Europe', 22 April 1988):

> For many years domestic appliances were everyone's classic European industry: the formation of the EEC enabled the huge Italian producers to capture the whole European market. And for a time, this was true. But the market changed as markets do. As machines became cheaper and incomes rose, price ceased to be the principal selling point, and flexible manufacturing meant that economies of scale were no longer important.
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> By the beginning of the 1980's, the great Italian manufacturers — Indesit and Zanussi — were broke. The successful producers — Hotpoint and Creda in England, Thompson-Brandt in France, Bosch in Germany — were those who had adapted their products to meet the characteristics of the different national markets — the French predilection for top-loading machines and the German requirement for equipment that would be undamaged if you should drop the kitchen sink on it.
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> And almost every market displays similar features. International trade in cars has boomed. But it remains true that the Germans cluster at the luxury end of the market, the Italians rate fun ahead of comfort, and the French prefer cars that can accommodate large families, sheep, and ride well on French country roads. Not everyone fits these caricatures, of course, and there is scope for selling a range of models everywhere. Nor need a product designed to meet Italian taste be manufactured in Italy. But it is vital to appreciate that the removal of trade barriers does nothing whatever to make different markets more like each other. What it does is to make different markets more accessible and that is not at all the same thing.
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> Anyone who produces a single product for a single European market runs the risk not of satisfying 320 million customers, but of failing to satisfy any of them. The benefits of 1992 will accrue not to those who cater for the Common Market, but to those who are close to the many different markets that make up the European Community.

Here we see the alternative approach to 1992. Eurocrats, some businessmen and theoretical socialists who hanker after the economic

climate of the 60s and want to gear their production to conditions that no longer exist are like generals who want to base their strategy on the previous war. John Kay is concerned to see that the markets of Europe serve the people of Europe and, of course, put like this almost everyone would say he was right. With this kind of scenario there would not be the big profits that arise from the economies of scale. The profits would probably be altogether more modest and it would not be possible to cream off a substantial proportion of them to finance a 'social Europe'. The socialism of the 60s was very much dependent on the economies of scale of the 60s and the markets have changed. Surely Sir John Hoskyns was right to say that we should concentrate on getting the markets of Europe right first and then look at the social dimension and monetary union. There is always a great deal of wisdom in keeping things simple no matter how much rumpus the bureaucratic complicators make.

The next wild card in the 1992 pack is a broader one. We all know how industry in the United Kingdom since the Industrial Revolution has gravitated towards the heartland of England, leaving the outer regions of Wales, Scotland and Ireland, as well as parts of England itself, severely impoverished and frequently embittered. It was probably not so much a response to markets as the work of cartels out to arrange production for their own convenience. Is there any reason to suppose that the same thing will not happen on a European level? Indeed, it is already happening and it has clearly affected the South-East corner of Britain since joining the European Community in 1972. The so-called 'Golden Triangle' — Milan, Hanover, Paris — has stretched across to touch London and thus further unbalanced the relationship between the regions within the UK. The danger now is that — notwithstanding the fact that a number of Japanese companies are using Britain as a base to establish a foothold in the post-1992 European Community — the process of centralisation will continue to be significantly accelerated as it becomes even easier for firms to locate their production plants at the centre rather than at the circumference of the Community. A new book which has just appeared, *Recruitment in the 90s,* by Professor Herriot, argues that there will be a brain drain to the Continent on account of the Single Market: 'There will not be an influx but an exodus: designers to Düsseldorf, physicists to Freiburg, Computer scientists to Cologne, engineers to Essen and mathematicians to Milan.'

This would seem to be an obvious concomitant of the centralising process. Other factors may come into play such as increased transport costs, labour and housing costs in big centralised conurbations and environmental factors but their significance will not be realised until after the process has taken place and then, of course, the cost of it all will be passed on to the poor European consumer.

This naturally leads on to the next wild card: the burgeoning growth of environmental concern which has become very respectable since the Prime Minister's speech to the Royal Society at the end of last year. Imagine the Channel Tunnel completed, lorry loads of goods are flying all over Europe in volumes never before known from the industrial

centres of the new European megastate. Suddenly it will dawn on everyone that the concentration of pollution in the industrial and populated centres is intolerable. The lorries, belching out fumes — even without lead — are perceived also as intolerable, especially as they thunder through the small roads of the more peripheral member states. The hidden costs of humanity's industrial adventure will be realised by all sections of European society and expensive ways of putting things right will be inevitable at that stage.

It would be wise therefore to consider the environmental costs of 1992 before it actually happens and perhaps a great deal of bad industrial policy can be avoided as well as the enormous cost it involves. It is worth mentioning that the *Director* magazine for January devoted an extremely thoughtful editorial to the subject.

Fraud on the community scene — and attitudes to fraud — is yet another wild card in the pack. The EEC Court of Auditors recently indicated the scale on which it occurred in the Community, especially in connection with the Common Agricultural Policy. Once again John Kay put his finger on the heart of the problem: 'The operation of VAT is to be unified. HM Customs and Excise should treat a VAT invoice from Palermo as they would one from Watford. It is hard to imagine that they will want to refund money on that basis until they are more satisfied then they can be now that VAT was actually collected in Palermo.'

The Commission's answer to the problem of fraud is to increase its own policing powers but this is a poor answer if much of the fraud is a product of the centralisation it is encouraging, or at least is fostered by it.

Another wild card of global importance arises from the prospect of creating what is sometimes called a 'fortress Europe', a European Community in which the member states are not allowed to protect themselves economically but who all share in a single collective process of protectionism in response to the mighty Japanese and US trading blocs. Pressures from countries outside the Community, including the United States, are already causing the EC to make pious declarations about the openness in matters of trade it intends to practise after 1992. The question that must be asked is, does the intense concentration on internal regulation constitute in reality a series of barriers to trade that will severely inhibit free trade? And will the poorer countries, who desperately need to trade, find them much more impenetrable than the rich trading blocs who will have seen to it that they have secured an effective foothold in the Community before 1992? Another outcome might be that the Community will become genuinely open. It will create, perhaps with EFTA and some of the Eastern bloc countries who are now asserting their independence, a *European Economic Space,* a term which Foreign Ministers now readily use. In that event, may not the regulation that the EC has imposed on itself effectively be a straitjacket it will desperately wish to shed? If the Community only makes very expensive lawnmowers with sophisticated noise control, will trading partners in parts of the world where noise control is not so essential want to buy them?

One sometimes wonders what business it is of governments to

standardise anyway, except of course where obvious concerns of health and safety are at stake. Should not consumers, for instance, have the ultimate say in whether they want their purchases measured in yards or metres, inches or centimetres, gallons or litres etc. and shouldn't producers simply be free to respond to the wishes of their customers? It does appear that there is always a hidden desire on the part of producers to influence governments to force consumers to buy their products in ways and according to standards that suit them as producers and it behoves us to be very suspicious about the mountains of standards and regulations that the European Commission is presently piling up in the run up to the Single Market.

The pace which has been set for 1992, many might argue, is the major cause of the problems which beset it. The Commission seemed hellbent on realising a gigantic dream in a very small space of time. Not content with making the Single Market work by 1992, it has attached on to it all the complications of a 'social dimension' and monetary union. The nub of Sir John Hoskyns's argument is that Brussels and all the business communities involved should get the Single Market in the bag and then from a position of strength tackle the 'social dimensions' and the monetary questions.

The inescapable character of the 1992 adventure as it is being approached at the moment is that it is revolutionary rather than evolutionary and may well have all the dangerous qualities of revolution inherent in it. Its most enthusiastic supporters argue that unless the EC goes the whole hog with the project nothing will really happen and the Community will simply die a slow death. But is that really true? The step by step approach may not have the emotional appeal of the grand plan but the pragmatist will certainly argue that it is the way that is most likely to succeed in the longer term.

A couple of examples will illustrate the situation. There is indeed a very worrying problem of trucks being delayed, often for as long as ten hours and sometimes even more, at border crossings. The answer that the 'revolutionaries' come up with is to sweep away the frontiers irrespective of what happens about many of the useful functions they serve. The solution that John Kay has suggested is to do the paper work at the point of production and to have reliable inspectors able to observe the goods as they are actually being loaded, which would have the advantage that the frontier would be no barrier to trade but would remain as a sensible check on drugs, terrorists and rabid animals.

The second example of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut — and some of the 'revolutionaries' seem more interested in swinging the sledge hammer than cracking the nuts — is dealing with the problems of currency exchange. Both businessmen and holidaymakers know what a curse it can be to deal in different currencies. But does it require a revolution in the monetary system to deal with them? Might it not be wiser to simplify the exchange rate mechanisms and crack down on those who profit by making it deliberately difficult?

The conclusion that many have reached through long experience of life

is that the 'revolutionaries' are often motivated more by the desire for power than by any concern for the welfare of the people they profess to be helping. They want grandiose schemes and without them, they claim, nothing will ever get done. It is very easy indeed to use such plans as an excuse for conformity, uniformity and totalitarianism. Democracy does not always bring the fast results but perhaps that is not what really matters. What democracy does is avoid *dissatisfying* too many ordinary consumers, and leaves them within their own limited spheres the genuine freedom they need. Evident action can be a deception. The poet Francis Thompson wrote:

> From stones and poets you may know,
> That which most active is, is that which least seems so.

In his book, *Making Sense of Europe,* Christopher Tugendhat compares the building of Europe with the building of the Swiss confederation. He writes:

> This is partly because the Swiss are a sensible people who can grasp the logic of events, so long as they are not required to do so too quickly. But another essential element in the peaceful and gradual evolution of their political system is that the burden of proof has always lain with the centralisers. It is they who have to show that a useful purpose would be served by an increase in the powers and responsibilities of the central administration. This is no formal matter, as the preamble to the constitution explicitly states that one of the purposes of the constitution is to guarantee the continued existence of the cantons. Consequently a functional case must be made out to show that the cantons and their people will be better off as a result of the centre gaining powers and responsibilities whether they be at the expense of the cantons or new ones that the cantons cannot adequately discharge.
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> If that point needs to be spelt out in the circumstances of Switzerland, a confederation that has evolved over hundreds of years but in which the canton rather than the confederation remains most people's principal focus of loyalty, how much more it needs emphasising in the context of the Community.

[John Coleman is the Editor of *New European.*]

STEP FORWARD MR MANLEY

by Ian Christopher

On the 9th of February 1989 an election was held in Jamaica to determine whether rhetoric or pragmatism would win the day. The main contestants were the Jamaican Labour Party, JLP, led by Mr Edward Seaga, the Prime Minister, and the Peoples National Party, PNP, led by Mr Michael Manley. The outcome was a resounding victory for the PNP. Jamaican voters have sent the JLP packing because improvements in the economy were not translated into the kinds of gains which meant something to the poor.

An overwhelming majority of the Jamaican electorate has voted for the return to power of the PNP. This is a remarkable achievement in that Mr Manley and his party opted for political exile by boycotting the controversial 1983 general election. Some traditional observers of Jamaican politics would prefer to attribute the PNP's victory to the two term limit of popular tolerance of any administration, whether it be PNP or JLP. Yet while it may be a barrier that both have failed to break through, it does not draw away from the fact that the PNP managed to win 44 of the seats to the JLP's 16. This election was a sign that the poor had had enough of smoke screens and wanted something more tangible.

An example of Mr Seaga's smoke screens was his ploy of trying to blind the country with complex statistical information. It was greatly heralded that there was national income growth of some 9% between 1980 and 1987. Yet in spite of this growth since January 1986 Jamaica's per capita output and income are now less than they were in 1983. Despite the relatively modest level of economic improvement in Jamaica they have yet to be felt by most of the voters. This is one of the reasons why a majority of poor Jamaicans decided it was most definitely time for a change.

The outgoing right-wing administration seemed hell-bent on some sort of sycophantic pursuit of Western commendation. This point can be emphasised by the near whole give-away of valuable hotel stock to disbelieving foreign businessmen. The scenario of US based businessmen extolling the virtues of Jamaica as a tax haven, while the entire nation's library service and basic education system falters, is something which should never be repeated.

Michael 'Joshua' Manley is being hailed as the prophet of the poor, but he does inherit from Mr Seaga a crisis where government spending on schools, housing and social benefits have been cut and real wages have fallen.

Mr Manley and the PNP face some formidable tasks. They have inherited a $2.2 billion external debt, together with the challenge of rebuilding export industries after the devastation wrought by Hurricane Gilbert. The economic damage wreacked upon the island by the 180 miles per hour wind will be a staggering US$4.7 billion dollars. These are

constraints which place considerable limitations on the new government's room for manoeuvre.

While the PNP has been careful not to make specific promises in domestic policy, it will nonetheless have to find a way of responding to the wishes of the electorate that something has to be done to improve the health, education and welfare services, services that have deteriorated under the JLP.

Despite the landslide victory of the PNP it is important that the new Prime Minister, Mr Michael Manley, expands upon some of the small successes of the defeated Seaga administration. The JLP did try to solve some of the grave economic problems and they scrupulously did endeavour to put prudence ahead of other considerations in their economic policy decisions. Hopefully, the PNP can continue with this good work.

There was some growth in employment in such areas as tourism, construction, export, manufacturing and services generally. Manley needs to encourage and motivate an increased burst of investment that can spread this momentum of new jobs to wider areas of the economy.

Jamaica is bursting with entrepreneurial energy and talent and is just anxious for the opportunities to enable them to become a thriving industry in whatever market they choose. Mr Manley and the PNP have an opportunity to be midwives of a prolific spawning of entrepreneurial energies that began under Mr Seaga's government but now needs more breathing space to grow and expand.

The new PNP government will seek to eradicate problems such as unemployment and the financial crisis. They believe in one man one vote and that secondary schools should be introduced for poor children. An infrastructure for tourism has been established which is important to the economy and housing schemes. The PNP along with its charismatic leader Mr Michael Manley will try to address the trade deficit, improve its relationship with foreign businesses and, more importantly, develop and reforge links with Washington and Congress.

Mr Manley has said that good relations with the USA are to be given greater emphasis. This is obviously a sensible course, given the importance for Jamaica of the USA connection in innumberable ways of which tourism and trade are the most notable. Yet this does not mean to say that Mr Manley will have to become Mr Bush's poodle.

The PNP does not wish to repeat past mistakes such as the head to head confrontations with the IMF and the World Bank over financial aid agreements or the courting of Castro, despite USA disapproval. Mr Manley, who inspired the nation to work under the theories of democratic socialism, a policy to improve the social and economic conditions of every Jamaican in the 1970s, has become a pragmatist in the late 1980s. The once very radical left-wing PNP along with Mr Manley have moved to the centre and Mr Manley has appointed prudent supporters to his cabinet.

Jamaica can take pride in the maturity of a democracy which ensures that changes of government take place with reasonable order and

stability. What is not a source of pride is the presence of an alarming number of guns and associated violence which caused the deaths of 13 people during the election.

The JLP did have a good innings in the 1980-1989 period but despite some marginal economic growth the party and Mr Seaga did not grasp the fact that the future of Jamaica is dependent upon long term goals rather than short term shallows and that the rewards of the economic growth were only enjoyed by a privileged few.

Realism and honesty must be the foundation of whatever the new government attempts. Yet, whatever the policy objectives and goals that are decided upon, a way must be found to bring the people into making their own contribution, however small, towards policy initiatives and the people should be involved in a dialogue about feasible options and solutions. 'The people' should mean the Jamaican electorate and not just members of the PNP. Mr Manley, by virtue of the election victory, is the man who has been allowed to step forward to lead Jamaica, with the aid of the PNP, into a new and prosperous decade.

[Ian Christopher, a graduate of the University of Kent, is a freelance journalist who writes on Caribbean politics, global affairs and social issues.]

MOSCOW

by Michael Bayer

I spent my birthday in Moscow. It started with a beautiful autumnal morning, standing outside one of the Ministries where we were a little early for our appointment. A Russian came out of the building with a bunch of six red roses, bowed politely and said, 'We wish to give you this on your birthday. It is an honour that you can celebrate it with us in Moscow'. Our interpreter must have told them. It was certainly better treatment than I have come to expect from government departments elsewhere.

Later we met the Minister to sign our contract, and whilst it was a formal ceremony, it was done with a directness and lack of sophistication that seems characteristic of Soviet manners. He spoke about the amount of work to be completed in his country to open it to foreign business and tourism and the potential for participation by foreign firms and foreign finance. After the contract was completed there was another birthday presentation — this time a book of Soviet sporting history.

That evening we went to dinner to celebrate with our Soviet colleagues in a restaurant overlooking the Kremlin. Much friendship, vodka and caviare, with the onion domes framing the view. At two in the morning we were walking through Red Square, a full moon and the Red Flag floating in the night wind. The guards outside Lenin's tomb stood like wax figures to be changed with split second timing by other goose stepping guards every hour. It was a stimulating finish to my first contact with the Soviet Union, and the conclusion of four days of meetings and discussions.

We had come to Moscow to discuss the construction of leisure facilities for foreigners resident in the city. The present expatriate population is largely diplomatic, but they look forward to an increase of about 100,000 within a few years, as business with the outside world expands and it is essential to provide facilities sufficient for these increased numbers. The city is at present acutely short of hotels, restaurants and sports facilities and to meet the future needs will demand external finance and participation — which is where we came in.

Our discussions were entirely constructive. It was easy to speak with total frankness, without fear of upsetting someone, or arousing some prickly nationalistic pride. Conversation was direct, always humorous and totally relaxed. Our interpreter explained to us with patience that whilst we might be surprised at this comparative freedom of speech it was not new to the Soviet. It had been developing for a very long time. As a law student she had written a thesis on a comparison between international law and Soviet law as to the rights of the individual. It was considered daring at the time — but that was twelve years ago.

These impressions of Moscow were very different from my expectations. It seemed that not only was no one interested in shadowing us, but that

they did not have any interest at all, not even a hint of curiosity. It was a bit of a disappointment.

I had started off with much higher hopes of intrigue and adventure. I was told we were to fly Aeroflot and that cheques were not acceptable; but that I was to present myself at an office in Piccadilly carrying £500 in cash and I would be given my ticket. The reception was staffed by three ladies, one of whom interviewed me shuffling through many forms. Eventually she told me my booking was correct and handed me a slip of paper. 'Take this outside in the street', she said, 'and then take the first door on the left and up to the first floor' — which after much leaning on a bell I was able to enter. Another reception and then yet another office with another three ladies each of whom could not have looked more different — a reminder of some of the many tribes of the Soviet Union. There was another interview and more filling in of ledgers. Then she stared me in the eyes. 'You have brought the money?' I looked straight back, 'I have brought £500 in notes'. 'Yes that is the way it must be'. I felt I had passed my first examination and left thinking that this was going to be fun.

Aeroflot was, in fact, fun because I was wined and dined all the way to Moscow and whilst I am not willing to recommend Russian champagne, the rest was most acceptable.

Moscow airport is as satisfactorily gloomy as my expectations could have wished. Dimly lit, full of people and one and half hours standing in a queue whilst a small team of unsmiling customs officers searched through suitcases and went through every pair of underpants. When our small party grouped together again we found we had somehow been identified by the interpreter who had been sent to meet us.

She quizzed us hard as we were driven to our hotel, 'Why are you here? I would like to know so that I can really be in a position to help you'. I answered this with every sort of incomplete information — why should I give away so much to such an obvious spy? I was ashamed to realise later, that this was actually a simple and genuine desire to help. She was a most charming girl who not only understood all the subtleties of our language but could sing any tune from any Fred Astaire film and most other films besides.

We drove into Moscow down wide boulevards, relatively free of traffic. It is a large city, about the same diameter as London, although I cannot swear to the size as I am told that there are no accurate maps because Stalin had a phobia about producing anything that might be of benefit to an enemy. I can only state from my own map which was produced in Budapest and claimed a scale that varied from 1:20 to 1:60 thousand, that Moscow is somewhere between 15 and 30 km wide. Whatever the diameter, it has been laid out on good 1950s' planning principles, streets radiating straight from the centre connecting township communites — all of them housed in row upon row of almost identical tower blocks. It is not a sight to cheer the soul. But the streets are wide, swept spotlessly clean and lined with birch trees. It is a landscape laid out by a city surveyor rather than nature. From this concrete jungle Stalin's special

works — universities and ministerial offices rise as glittering wedding cakes towering into the sky and encased in plaster icing. On closer inspection some of them had wire screens around the first floor to catch the falling lumps of plaster which would otherwise have hurt the pedestrians. The Kremlin appears suddenly near the river, domes and all, plus several old churches and nunneries. Clearly this is a place with a wealth of buildings and history — but for the most part it is concrete tower blocks.

Our hotel was yet another tower block, each floor policed by unsmiling ladies who required a piece of paper in exchange for a key everytime we moved beyond range of our bedrooms. I became quite neurotic about what might happen if I mislaid the paper receipt for my passport and my key. But the feeling of being policed quickly evaporated. It is largely a matter of lack of communication because few speak much English, and none of us spoke any Russian.

The Russian language looks formidable (and I dare say it is) but having once been patient enough to watch 'Russian for Beginners' on the BBC, I had at least learnt something of the alphabet. The extraordinary shapes which are a mixture of English, Greek and Hebrew letters become less extraordinary if you remember that the Russian 'C' is pronounced 'S' and a 'P' is pronounced 'R', and so on. Having learnt the alphabet you find that words are spelt phonetically, and once decoded are often easily recognisable as their French and English equivalents.

However, none of this literary knowledge helps you to have an easier time with the lady in charge of your hotel key. I cracked the problem by speaking in French. The Russian lady did not speak French and neither do I, but it immediately put us on a common level of communication. Things seemed to go much more pleasantly after that.

The days within Moscow were largely filled in getting around. It is not always easy to arrange to be picked up and put down by car and carried long distances across the city — but our Soviet hosts always turned up exactly when they said they would. A great deal of time was also expended in various restaurants, easily identified by a long queue of people standing outside a closed door. As foreigners we were marched straight to the entrance and taken in to be greeted by a Commissionaire who cried 'nyet' loudly, as we swept resolutely past him to find a room full of empty tables.

Food seemed in short supply. I had read that a large proportion of the annual potato crop rots because distribution facilities do not match the ability to get it to the table and this seemed to go for many other basics. Sugar and tea were not always available and a tomato salad appeared simply as a tomato on a plate complete with stalk. A green salad was a cucumber cut in half. On the other hand, Russian starters of a variety of cold meats and thinly sliced sturgeon and other delicacies are delicious. A first course washed down with a bottle of vodka is a meal in itself. What came after was sometimes not as exciting but was also not necessary. Lunch times were long and entirely delightful, but the costs were alarming. There is an official rate of exchange which equates one rouble

to the pound sterling. At this rate, paying forty roubles for a meal tended to lessen my enjoyment. At the unofficial exchange rate of up to ten roubles to the pound — the meal becomes a bargain. The same goes for any other purchase or transaction. Being confined to the official exchange rate makes it a very expensive venture.

I can believe that there is little for the ordinary business traveller or business resident to do in Moscow, stranded in a hotel or tiny flat. No doubt if you are a visitor on an Intourist package you will be entertained in and out of museums and other sites. But for the business visitor it is the Bolshoi or the State Circus. I have since discovered that there is any amount of theatre — state sponsored on stages and with sets which make some of London's productions look provincial. However, theatre in a foreign language has a limited attraction, and I have yet to discover how to acquire a ticket to these fully booked productions, except as a privileged guest.

Our own treat was to be taken to the circus. It takes place in a permanent concrete dome. It is resplendent with whirling lights that make patterns on the roof and has a sawdust ring that can be dropped dramatically from view and appear mechanically a few minutes later as an ice rink. The audience was obviously the ordinary citizen accompanied by children. The acts were either of animals, everything from bears in muzzles to storks and hedgehogs, or of silent athletic jugglers and trapeze artists. The hedgehogs run around the outside of the ring and pop balloons. There is also a chimpanzee that skates on ice — which proves that a chimpanzee can skate, but not very gracefully. It is difficult for a sophisticated visitor to appreciate the charm of bears riding horses — bears that have been seduced into sitting or standing on a saddle in order to lick honey from the horse's neck as they bounce around the ring.

These animal acts are relieved by astonishing gymnastic feats such as people running up thin steel poles and amazing flights on the trapeze. From close up it was very like being back stage at a theatre, with everything a bit worn and patched and dusty. The performers are quite clearly athletes who sweat and grimace with effort like any other human being. There is no make-up other than smiling determination to accomplish extraordinary feats of gymnastics and strength. They quite often fail, but then they shrug and smile and try and try again until they succeed. It has an air of charm, honest dedication and obvious pleasure that the athletes feel at their reception.

These impressions from a first visit, of the rate of change to freedom of expression, and determination to continue in that direction, have been entirely reinforced by subsequent visits and events. I have seen the beginning of a movement which should open up half of the world's population to the other half. Few may have faith in its survival, but I have seen enough, even allowing for my own privileged viewpoint, to think that it is going to last.

[Michael Bayer is a British consultant civil engineer.]

POEMS

by Philip Vann

PRAGUE

40 sleeping chauffeurs
loll in 40 black Skodas
(or are they Ladas)
— parked down two sides
of a Prague desert square.

40 sleeping men,
black-uniformed,
await 40 sleeping, driven bosses
who, meanwhile in the Castle,
shift policy and policy —
for naught.

40 sleeping chauffeurs,
what are your dreams?
Are they black, airless and
stationary
as your limousines?

or do you soar?

EVENING IN PRAGUE

Every evening,
after a hard day's work
in offices,
the elderly couple
watch black and white T.V. in the dark
(to save electricity, though not their eyes).
The screen is a hearth-fire
that does not warm them;
it is the focus
from which their minds wander;
the household god
they don't believe in.

Occasionally he mutters angrily
at a speech on Democracy
by a Party Henchman
in bureaucratic clothing.
She yawns
at a mugging in New York.

All evening they munch away
at potato crisps;

the saltiness reminds
them they are alive.

Then comes bedtime —
and the telepathy
of long-married sleep.

A VILLAGE SCENE

The village street
in the Low Tatras
has old wooden peasant houses,
painted black and white,
some a soothing blue,
with carvings of
stark geometric power.
Old farmers
and their families
live here.
In the courtyards are
inevitable geese, chickens
and rowdy dogs.
A mountain stream
runs down the narrow street
with tiny foot-bridges
all along.
At similar intervals,
on tall wooden poles,
are more recent phenomena:
powerful loudspeakers of steel
like outsize megaphones
(50s' adventure-comic style),
liable to drown the village
at any moment.

They are not there
to recommend the country air.

[Philip Vann is a freelance writer. He visited Czechoslovakia in April and May, 1988, with a British Council Award to do research on twentieth century painting there.]

THE PARTITION OF IRELAND AND ITS AFTERMATH

by Alistair Cooke

> 'It is not we who are dividing Ireland . . . not we who made Party coincide with religious difference. It is a paradox of ours that the only hope of union in Ireland is to recognise the present division'. (Austen Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons on 29th March 1920).[1]

The partition of Ireland, begun by the establishment of Northern Ireland in 1920 and completed in 1921, has often been misrepresented as the only event that really matters in tracing the origin of the modern Ulster problem: the developments over the preceding three hundred years that actually created it are casually flung aside as unworthy of serious attention. This suits the opponents of Ulster Unionism extremely well. It enables them to present Northern Ireland as an entirely artificial creation which only exists because Lloyd George's Coalition Government (dominated by Conservatives) wanted a puppet regime in Belfast through which it could try to influence and manipulate what happened in Ireland as a whole after it had conferred dominion status on twenty-six of the country's thirty-two counties under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. But for this act of British treachery — sometimes described as 'a crime against the Irish people' — there would be no Ulster problem, since up until then it had been 'a thing of the mind only, non-existent in the world of reality', in the words of De Valera.[2]

In this anti-Unionist interpretation of the problem, the solution is simple and clear: Britain must reunite the two parts of Ireland which it should never have put asunder in the first place. Since this argument has been given extensive publicity — and has been presented with infinitely more skill than the Unionist counter-arguments — it has been widely accepted. Indeed, it has been powerfully assisted by Britain itself.

Most of the politicians who were responsible for partition in 1920-1 envisaged it as only a temporary phenomenon: they believed that slowly, but surely, Northern Ireland and the twenty-six county dominion of the Irish Free State (which declared itself a Republic in 1949) would draw together and eventually merge. What that showed is how little they understood the strength and resolution of Ulster Unionism. Yet undoubtedly opinion in Britain today is much influenced by a widespread feeling (conviction perhaps would be too strong a word) that one day the partition of Ireland, which occurred so comparatively recently, will end — though the feeling is so vague that it is not accompanied by any clear view of how, or when, that day will come. This wholly mistaken assumption has been the source of immense harm, and considerable bloodshed.

Criticism of partition has been reinforced by the manner in which the boundary between the two parts of Ireland was drawn. Groups of

militant Irish Nationalists in places like South Down and South Armagh were included in Northern Ireland, and not the Free State. The boundary line itself meanders over some 300 miles and across a great deal of inhospitable country, cutting through communities — and frequently through individual farms and houses — in an apparently arbitrary manner. It has proved a nightmare to the security forces who have been called upon to try and prevent terrorists crossing it.

Furthermore, there has always been a widely held view that a profound mistake was made in including only six counties in Northern Ireland rather than all nine counties (the other three are Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan) of the 'historic' Province of Ulster — itself a British creation. If Northern Ireland had been enlarged in this way, it would have had no more than 56 per cent Protestant majority: but in the six counties there was a 66 per cent Protestant majority. A bigger Northern Ireland would, therefore, have been much more vulnerable to the constant pressure which was certain to be exerted by Irish Nationalists whose one objective was to end partition as soon as possible. That is why Irish Nationalists have always criticised Britain for not creating a nine-county Northern Ireland (ironically the majority of the British Cabinet in 1920-1 would have liked to oblige them). They constantly denounce the six-county settlement as the outcome of an outrageous 'sectarian head count' carried out solely in the interests of the Ulster Protestants. If that had actually occurred, the boundaries of Northern Ireland would have been drawn to exclude as many Catholics as possible, and to include Protestants living in the other three counties. What happened in 1920 was that Lloyd George's Government was unable to persuade the Ulster Unionists to accept a nine-county solution: the Unionists, perfectly understandably, saw no prospect of achieving political stability in such circumstances. 'A couple of Members sick, or two or three Members absent for some accidental reason, might in one evening hand over the entire Ulster Parliament to the South.'[3] There was no point at all in persevering with a scheme that was vehemently opposed by Unionists: for without them it could not possibly work. The only other option offered to the Unionists was a six-county arrangement. That they had no difficulty in accepting.

Two factors above all are crucial to understanding partition. First, no definitive, scientific boundary satisfactory to all parties exists — any more than it does between other countries torn by competing nationalisms (one thinks at once of Eastern Europe). Second, the physical division of Ireland is only a reflection of a much deeper partition. 'The real partition is not on the map, but in the minds of men'. Thus 'the border as a frontier between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland is a very rough and ready attempt to follow the real division of the population'.[4]

If Ireland had not been partitioned, there would have been civil war. In the middle of 1921 Lloyd George's Government suddenly lost the will to defeat the vicious terrorist campaign which the IRA had been conducting for two years in order to try and force Britain to sever all its links with Ireland. Irish Republicans who had been constantly reviled as 'a murder

gang' became overnight negotiating partners with whom the future of the whole of Ireland was to be settled. The new Home Rule Government composed entirely of Unionists, which had now come into existence in Belfast, was strongly pressed by Lloyd George to enter the self-governing Irish State which he intended to create. The answer, of course, was 'No Surrender'. Whereas before the First World War many had been inclined to doubt whether the Unionists would carry out their threats, on this occasion only the Irish Republicans maintained that the Unionists were bluffing — and they were soon taught a sharp lesson when they attempted to bring their characteristic methods of persuasion to bear on the Ulster Unionists. The IRA's campaign in Ulster (June 1920 to June 1922) led to 428 deaths, most of them Catholics.

But if partition was obviously the only alternative to civil war, it was far from self-evident that Northern Ireland needed to be given Home Rule. As has often been pointed out, the Unionists did not want it; they accepted it, in the words of their leader Sir James Craig (later Lord Craigavon) as 'the supreme sacrifice'.[5] Home Rule was thrust upon them by a British Government that had failed to restore order in Ireland, and had reached the end of its tether: looking back over a long history of failures since the 1880s, Lloyd George found the attractions of disengagement from Ireland, North and South, irresistible. As a recent study of these events concluded, 'the setting up of a Northern Parliament meant that Westminster could turn its back on Ulster and let others govern the unruly Province ... [Partition] took Ireland out of the realm of British politics, and it allowed Britain to withdraw from Ireland on her own terms'.[6] As a Cabinet paper noted, the settlement meant 'all Irishmen would be self-governing'.[7]

Northern Ireland's devolved Government was left almost entirely to its own devices. Until its suspension in 1972, it remained under the exclusive control of the Ulster Unionist Party, which never obtained (and indeed did not seek) significant support among the Catholic minority. Almost everyone who has assessed its performance has castigated it for failing to adhere fully to the standards which Britain hoped would prevail. Yet Britain itself did nothing to encourage the growth of non-sectarian, liberal democracy in Ulster, so that the Province could conform more closely to the political traditions of the rest of the country. For Britain had resolved in 1921 to have as little as possible to do with Northern Ireland — withdrawing in effect from part of its own sovereign territory. Whenever Northern Ireland's shortcomings were mentioned, successive British Governments looked the other way. But this did not stop British opinion from cursing the Ulster Unionists for failing to evolve as it would have wished when the current crisis broke out in the late 1960s. Few regimes have been discredited so completely as the Stormont system (named after the district to the east of Belfast where Ulster's impressive, neo-classical Parliament Buildings were erected). It has been excoriated for putting power and privilege exclusively into the hands of Protestants, and for inflicting severe hardships on the Catholic population. Northern Ireland under Home Rule had been compared — quite unfairly — with

South Africa under apartheid.

It is extremely hard to see how harmony and social justice could have been achieved. A completely new beginning would have been needed in Ulster politics. That was never remotely feasible. There was absolutely no possibility in the 1920s (or at any subsequent point) that Protestants and Catholics would fall into each other's arms, weep together over their past differences and pledge themselves to show complete mutual understanding in the future. The old attitudes, hardened over three hundred years of strife, proved impervious to change; after 1921 they were simply adapted and developed to fit the new circumstances. Protestants remained deeply insecure. Their substantial numerical majority in Northern Ireland did nothing to change that, since they were constantly being told that the higher Catholic birth rate would eventually whittle that majority away.[8] The very basis of their beliefs continued to be called in question: as late as 1931 the Roman Catholic Primate of Ireland declared that Protestants were 'not even part of the Church of Christ'.[9] It was perfectly obvious to them that most Catholics were hoping (though not always exactly yearning) that the time would come when Northern Ireland would cease to exist: and there were always some among the minority who were prepared to kill Protestants in order to try and bring that time nearer. Thus 'the Unionist siege mentality was reinforced and Catholics and Nationalists were confirmed in their initial rejection of the new regime'.[10]

If the constitutional Nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland (who represented most of the minority) had wanted to achieve a *modus vivendi,* they could have called for the introduction of power-sharing, and applied systematic pressure on British politicians in order to try and extract it. Not a word was heard from them on the subject; and when power-sharing was first proposed (in rudimentary form) it was a result of an initiative in 1971 by Brian Faulkner, the most outstanding Unionist politician that Ulster has produced. The Nationalists preferred to be seen as the victims of Protestant and Unionist oppression. They were never short of evidence with which to shock the consciences of all those prepared to listen. As a result of their propaganda (handled with much greater skill than Unionist counter-propaganda) Northern Ireland came to be regarded as a place where no Catholic could obtain even elementary justice and fairness.

What actually happened is that each community endeavoured to look after its own — which meant inevitably that it discriminated against the other. Such behaviour occurs in most deeply divided societies; in Ulster (indeed in Ireland as a whole) it had been going on since time immemorial. On the specific issue of discrimination against Catholics, the reality has been fairly summed up by Mr Charles Brett, a former leader of the small Northern Ireland Labour Party (and no friend of the Ulster Unionists):

> 'I do not believe that the minority was actually oppressed by the majority . . . It appears that there is less deliberate discrimination on the part of the Unionist Government than the Nationalists allege: but in the sphere of local government, and in the private

sector, there is far more discrimination than Unionists will admit.'[11]

The way in which that discrimination followed almost inevitably from the nature of Ulster life and politics was described in measured terms, far removed from the inflammatory rhetoric of the Nationalists, by the Cameron Commission, established in 1969 to investigate the origins of the disturbances which started the present crisis:

> 'In large measure the general complaints made to us have traditional and historical roots, arising as they do from the permanent divisions in the community, and represent a protest against the tradition that Protestant and Catholic representatives ought primarily to look after "their own" people. In the past, for example, it was considered natural that a Protestant Council would employ Protestants in all senior posts, and conversely that a Catholic-controlled Council would employ only Catholics'. (*Disturbances in Northern Ireland,* Cmnd. 532 (Belfast), para. 128).

Nevertheless, it was widely believed in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the crisis in Northern Ireland was entirely the fault of the Ulster Unionists who had deprived the minority of some of its basic civil rights. If that had been true, the programme of reform initiated by the Stormont Government itself after 1968 would have contained, and eventually solved, the problem. Unfortunately, the real nature and gravity of the problem were not fully appreciated until the IRA re-emerged in 1969-70 to organise the terrorist campaign which has continued ever since. Then the central issue — the conflict between competing nationalisms and allegiances — was at last laid bare. Surveying the world scene after the First World War, Winston Churchill referred in a famous phrase to the divisions between the people of Ulster, describing 'the integrity of their quarrel' as 'one of the few institutions that have been unaltered by the cataclysm which has swept the world'.[12] Events in Ulster since 1969 have shown the enduring truth of those words.

> 'The optimist view of politics assumes there must be some remedy for every political ill, and rather than not find it, will make two hardships to cure one. If all equitable remedies have failed, its votaries take it as proved without argument that the one-sided remedies which are left must succeed'. ('The great Lord Salisbury', quoted in *The Times,* 11th April 1986).

Where Ulster is concerned, there has not been any shortage of people on the left of British politics ready and willing to fall into the cardinal error described by Salisbury. They simply refuse to drop their unrealistic solutions even when it becomes clear that they will not work. In 1886, for example, the implacable opposition of the Protestants of Ulster to Home Rule failed to deter Gladstone from proceeding with his plans; if anything it made him pursue his doomed policy with even greater

fervour. Today the Labour Party insists that the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland must at some undefined point agree to become part of a united independent Irish state — without having the slightest idea how to obtain the consent of the majority (which it says is essential). Vague references are made to 'removing vetos' and dark hints are dropped about 'persuading' the majority to change its mind. These 'democrats' who would not dream of disregarding the views of the majority in other parts of the world have no hesitation in doing so where Ulster is concerned.

The Labour Party — like the Gladstonian Liberal Party before it — has made the fatal mistake of underestimating the tenacity and resolution of the Ulster Unionist majority. There is little excuse for this. The Unionists over the last century have not exactly been reticent about their intentions and beliefs. Time and again since 1886 (indeed since 1688) they have made it crystal clear just how far they are prepared to go in order to defend their interests. There has always been abundant evidence to support the two central facts about Ulster: that there is (and in modern times always has been) a clear democratic majority of Northern Ireland for sustaining and reinforcing the link with Great Britain, and that there is no majority whatsoever for any alternative set of constitutional arrangements. Yet what is striking about so many comments on Ulster is their underlying assumption that the situation is immensely fluid, and that almost anything might happen. The most unlikely development of all — a move towards Irish unity — is all too frequently presented as the most probable.

Why has Ulster been judged so unsympathetically — and, as a result, misunderstood? Simple antipathy to Ulster Unionism provides much of the answer. The reasons for this antipathy have usually been essentially frivolous. Unionist politicians tend to be regarded as personally rather uncongenial, and grave exception is taken in Britain to the manner in which the Unionists defend their case. Unionism was after all built on a solid, enduring rock of Protestantism; and its conduct and statements all too often reveal its origins. Unionism has never acquired the characteristic style and trappings of a modern movement dedicated to defending a distinct nationality, though that is precisely what it is. Because of this, Ulster Unionism has been widely mocked and derided. These feelings of revulsion stopped British politicians in 1886 and later thinking seriously about the challenge that Ulster Unionism represented. They should have formed clear, clinical assessments about its power and strength. Instead they treated it with contempt.

1886 was the key turning point. It was then that the Ulster Unionists, unable to make any serious impact on British opinion, began to separate themselves from the mainstream of national politics. Their detachment became almost total when in 1920 a Home Rule Parliament which they did not want was thrust upon them. That, however, merely served to heighten still further the feelings of insecurity by which the Protestants had been haunted since the seventeenth century — feelings that can only be overcome by a close and binding relationship with Great Britain.

Opinion in Britain itself meanwhile invented a simple, and apparently infallible, excuse to prevent itself having to think about the problem at all: that it was far too complicated to be understood. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the late Peter Utley pointed out with characteristic eloquence, 'what has been displayed before us has not been some dark, passionate scene compounded of black magic, but a straightforward conflict of easily defensible political ambitions'.[13] The central issues — allegiance and identity — could hardly be clearer.

Much is made of the need for reconciliation and understanding in Ulster itself (and quite rightly so). But the most fundamental aspect of the matter is still unduly neglected — the fact that Ulster has since the 1880s had a British problem. The majority of its people belong to a nation which is reluctant to recognise them, and which frequently seems disposed to regard the non-Unionist minority as more important than they are. The Union, which is validated by history, is the only possible basis for political stability, and within it the British nation must remain predominant while showing the utmost sensitivity towards the non-Unionist minority. The task of defending the nation falls, as always, to the Conservative and Unionist Party. As the Prime Minister reminded the Conservative Conference in 1977, 'what happens in Ulster touches us all; it is part of our country, our United Kingdom. So let the people of Ulster be assured of this: the Conservative Party stands rock firm for the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland'. (Blackpool, 14th October 1977).

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1. Two opinion polls have been carried out by Coopers and Lybrand. They do not suggest a steadily rising tide in favour of change. In the second poll (published in *The Belfast Telegraph,* 4th & 5th Oct. 1988), 57 per cent agreed that the main British political parties should establish organisations in the Province and contest election, compared with 62 per cent last year. In the second poll 16 per cent said they would vote Conservative if they had the chance; 12 per cent would support the Labour Party. In such circumstances the Ulster Unionist Party, now led by Mr James Molyneaux, would remain the dominant political force in the Province: 20 per cent said they would vote for it. This evidence therefore does not suggest that there has been a really significant shift of opinion in favour of the Conservative Party.
2. Patrick Buckland, *A History of Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981), p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 20, quoting an Ulster Unionist spokesman.
4. J. C. Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland* (London, 1952), p. 176; Stewart, *The Narrow Ground,* p. 159.
5. Letter from Craig to Lloyd George, 11th November 1921 (printed in Command Paper, 1561).
6. Richard Murphy, 'Walter Long and the Conservative Party, 1905-1921' (unpublished Ph.D. theses, 1984), p. 409. A copy of this thesis is in the Library of the Conservative Research Department.
7. Ibid., p. 386.
8. Predictions of a clear Catholic majority in Northern Ireland continue to be made. Expert opinion does not bear them out. According to the leading authority on the subject, Dr Paul Compton of Queen's University, Belfast, 'there can be no automatic assumption . . . that Catholics will eventually become the majority community in the

Province' (*Fortnight: an Independent Review for Northern Ireland,* No.192, March 1983). Trends today show that 'the difference in Catholic and Protestant family sizes is narrowing rather quickly', strengthening the grounds for believing that an eventual Catholic majority is 'far from inevitable' (*The Guardian,* 24th January 1986).

9. Quoted in Buckland, *History of Northern Ireland,* p. 67.
10. Ibid., p. 36.
11. Brett, *Long Shadows Cast Before: Nine Lives in Ulster 1625–1977* (Edinburgh and London: John Bartholomew, 1978) p.99.
12. *Hansard,* 16th February 1922, Col. 1270.
13. T. E. Utley, *Lessons of Ulster* (London: Dent, 1975), p. 12.

[Alistair Cooke is Director of the Conservative Political Centre. The above article is basically the final section of his recent pamphlet on Ulster. We thank him and the CPC for permission to reproduce it.]

THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION 1982-1987: VISION AND REALITY

by Tale Omole

> We have progressed in areas of harmonisation such as defence and security, foreign policy; the organ of the Confederation meet regularly i.e. the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. Progress has also been made in communications. There remains the great problem, but on which we should not make haste, but rather act with calm and intelligence because it is a question of the Senegambian people.
>
> President Abdou Diouf of Senegal.
> *West Africa* 10 February, 1986.

> On the Senegambian Confederation, negotiations on the economic and monetary union have now been concluded at the official level and negotiations have already started at the ministerial level. In this way the Senegambian Confederation will contribute its fair share in the area of regional and sub-regional cooperation and thereby enhance the achievement of continental unity, as a long term objective at the social, political and economic levels.
>
> President Dawda Jawara of The Gambia.
> *West Africa* 9 February, 1987.

When the Senegambia Confederation was established in February 1982, five major principles were enunciated as the objectives of the Confederation. These were, the integration of the armed forces and of the security of the two states, the development of an economic and monetary union, co-ordination of policy in the field of external relations, co-ordination of policy in the field of communications and lastly the establishment of joint institutions.[1].

Indeed, given the remote, albeit uneasy, socio-economic and political relations between the two states, and the immediate political and security crisis in the Gambia that led to the intervention of the Senegalese forces, the aforementioned principles that formed the pillar of the Confederation could be said to be necessary for the realisation of an optimal socio-economic and political cooperation and the creation of an impregnable security environment amongst the two states.

However, regardless of the quoted optimistic statements of the two Heads of State about the progress already achieved among the confederate states, the main objective of this article is to examine, with the aid of unfolded evidence, how far the visions that informed the establishment of the Confederation in 1982 have been matched with realities in the past seven years. Given the fact, however, that the Confederation is just seven years old, a period that could be said to be short for any broad-based assessment of a politico-economic organisation like that of the Senegambia Confederation, this article will concern itself with mid-term conclusions.[2] For the purposes of analysis, four issue-areas, viz: security matters, foreign relations, economic/monetary union and

communication matters will be examined.

One of the objectives of the Confederation that gave rise to much supportive and equally adverse commentaries at the establishment of the Confederation was the issue of the integration of the armed forces and security forces of the two states. While some authors like Arnold Hughes, Michael Herland and Jean-Claude Gautron among others, raised the possibility of the integration of the Gambian forces into that of Senegal as a prelude to the occupation and eventual annexation of the former by the latter,[3] President Diouf, like his Gambian counterpart, Jawara, believed that the possibility did not exist as, according to them, the security of Senegal and that of the Gambia are interwoven. It seemed to them best to have an integrated security arrangement.[4] No doubt both the hopes and misgivings of the protagonists and opponents of the issue of the Senegal and Gambia could be said to be justified, given especially the peculiar and turbulent circumstances that led to the establishment of the Confederation in 1982.

However, seven years after the establishment of the Confederation, what actually is the situation on the issue of integration of the armed forces between the two states? Has Senegal annexed the Gambia as some feared, or has the integration of the two states' armed forces been smoothly achieved as some expected? Apart from this, what is the general state of development in the area of economic integration, monetary union, communication and foreign affairs as envisaged by the Agreement establishing the Confederation?

Finally, how far have the visions of 1982 been transformed into concrete achievements over the past seven years? Since the 12th of January 1983 when the draft treaty establishing the integrated armed forces was signed, Senegal has made some major contributions to the training of selected Gambians who underwent military training in various Senegalese military establishments located in Thies, Saint-Louis and Kaolack. Also selected Senegalese military officers have been seconded to the Gambia in order to train on the job Gambian security personnel at centres located at Kartung and Birkama. However, for specialised training of various Gambian professionals in the supply corps, military communications and engineering services, the training is conducted in Dakar by selected Senegalese military officers.[5]

One of the important consequences of the failed *coup d'état* of July 30, 1981, was that the only para-military organisation that was responsible for national security in the Gambia, the Field Force, was disbanded. This was mainly as a result of the proven collusion and complicity of some of its members in the ill-fated putsch. Consequently, in the ensuing general reorganisation, the Field Force was replaced by an entirely Senegalese trained, French structured and French equipped military corps, referred to as the Gendarmerie.[6] The first batch of this Senegalese trained Gambian Gendarmerie was officially handed over to President Jawara in 1986.[7]

Another remarkable development within the integration of security and armed forces is that a specialised squadron of the confederal Gendarmerie,

composed mainly of Senegalese military personnels, now forms the presidential guard that is responsible for the safety and security of the Gambian President. The Maritime Brigade which is also composed mainly of members of the Senegalese Gendarmerie is also charged with the surveillance of military installations at the Gambian ports and of other strategic public buildings in the Gambia.

No doubt a high level of integration of the forces could be said to have been achieved, especially when it is remembered that the Senegalese Gendarmerie stationed in the Gambia are there permanently as part and parcel of the Confederal Armed Forces. This security arrangement, apart from serving as a *force de dissuasion* to any internal subversion especially in the Gambia, will also, as Arnold Hughes has remarked, ensure that there will be 'little prospect of Gambian radicals mounting another coup now; to succeed, a coup will need to take place in Dakar.'[8]

The progress recorded in the matter of the integration of the armed forces of the two confederate states had been achieved at a great financial cost and at the expense of developments in other sectors of the confederal projects. For instance, out of the 4.2 billion CFA confederal budget for the 1983/84 financial year, 83.6% or 3.5 billion CFA was spent on security and defence matters. In the 1984/85 financial year, the confederal budget was reduced to 3.6 billion CFA and spending on defence and security still swallowed up 70% of the total expenditure. Out of the 3.7 billion CFA confederal allocation for 1985/86, over 65% was expended on defence matters.[9] No doubt, the prevailing economic and financial crisis in the two states in the 1986/87 financial year caused the confederal allocation to be reduced to 2.9 billion CFA, yet the defence allocation was more than 50% of the total estimate.[10]

In spite of the concrete progress already registered in the area of integrating the armed forces, one important question to ask is whether the Gambia is still faced with the possibility of being militarily harassed or annexed, as was widely feared at the inception of the Confederation, and especially as it is President Diouf who has the power to declare the mobilisation of the confederal forces in time of crisis.

With regards to developments that have occurred in the areas of security and defence matters since the establishment of the Confederation, it would indeed not be off the mark to say that the possibility of the Gambia being overrun by Senegal is still very remote — and for some good reasons. One, personal relations between Diouf and Jawara are cordial, close and intimate. However, important as this relationship is, it should be underlined that, in politics, the factor of personal relations might become unimportant when serious issues concerning the distribution of power and resources are involved. Secondly, the Senegalese President has strictly conformed with Article I Paragraph 2 of the protocol of the Institution of the Confederation and Article 7 of the Agreement between the confederal states which enjoin the confederal President to consult and agree with the Vice-President on any matters of defence of the Confederation.[11]

In spite of the foregoing, some questions can still be raised with

regard to the inviolability of the territorial integrity of the Gambia by Senegal. What, for instance, would the situation be if personal relations between the two Presidents should become unfriendly? Or what would the situation be if Diouf were replaced by a more ambitious and expansionist President who did not share Diouf's gradualist approach to integration between the two states?

To forestall this kind of eventuality, the Gambia placed before the Senegal and the Gambia Steering Committee[12] in 1985 a resolution on the confederal defence whereby the Gambia requested a major change in the confederal defence arrangements. Until recently, it was the Senegalese President who, as the confederal President, could declare a state of emergency or order a general mobilisation of troops throughout the Confederation, immediately after he might have informed or consulted the confederal Vice-President. The problem, however, is that the Gambian Constitution states that only the President of the Gambia can declare a state of emergency in the country. It is therefore to correct this anomaly and to ensure that the confederal President does not abuse or misuse the confederal Armed Forces, to the disadvantage of the Gambia, that the government in Banjul proposed and got adopted by the Senegambia Steering Committee in 1986[13] that the protocol on the Defence Pact be amended to read that 'the general mobilisation of troops, the declaration of a state of emergency and putting Senegambia troops on alert in the case of war, conflict or threat will be jointly decided by the Presidents of the two confederal states and according to the procedures planned under the Constitution of each country.'[14]

Indeed, apart from the diplomatic crisis and furore caused by the former Senegal High Commissioner in Banjul, Mr Mbaye Mbengue, when he apparently usurped the authority of the confederal President on defence matters, by putting into a state of alert Senegalese troops in Banjul as a result of violent demonstrations against a Senegalese football team on visit to Banjul in March 1985, no other serious incident has since happened to lend weight to a possible abuse of military power by the Senegalese government. Indeed, after this unfortunate incident the Senegalese High Commissioner was summarily retired by President Diouf.

Another area of importance where noticeable achievements have been recorded amongst the two states is in the field of external relations. The protocol on co-ordination of policy in the field of external relations signed on 2nd July, 1982, enjoined the two confederal states, amongst other things, to consult each other and exchange information on matters relating to foreign policy, to endeavour to adopt a common position in the field of external relations, to undertake on behalf of the other diplomatic and consular representation in such state or with such international organisation where the requesting state has not established diplomatic missions, to assist one another in the training of diplomatic personnel and to represent, at the request of the other, one another at any international conference.

At the international level, there is a noticeable and appreciable level of co-ordination and the adoption of a common position by the two states

on international issues, since the establishment of the confederation. For instance, at the 1983 Belgrade Conference on the North-South dialogue, the common position of the two states calling for the repartition of wealth from the northern to the southern states was presented on behalf of the two states by a common spokesman. During the 1982 Falkland war between Britain and Argentina, both Senegal and Gambia not only sided with and endorsed Britain's position in the war, but the two countries also allowed British war planes to make use of their airport facilities on their journey to and from the Falklands. With the Arab Islamic states, the two confederal states have since their confederation adopted common positions and have spoken with one voice on important matters. The two states have also consistently supported efforts made by the Organisation of Islamic States to recover Arab territories occupied by Israel and efforts geared towards finding a solution to the Iraq-Iran conflict. Indeed, when Dawda Jawara was elected in 1985 as President of the Organisation of the Islamic States' Peace Committee that was established to find ways of solving the Iran-Iraq war, it was with the active support of the Senegalese government. Moreover on 25 January, 1984, when Yasser Arafat paid a state visit to Senegal and Gambia, both countries adopted a common declaration supporting the PLO in its conflict with Israel.

On African affairs, the two states have been active and united in the position taken on important contemporary issues. At the 1983 OAU Tripoli II Conference in Libya, the two states led some other countries in bringing the meeting to a deadlock by according recoginition to the delegation led by Hussene Habré and in refusing admission to the delegation led by Goukoni Ouedeh.

On the western Sahara issues the two confederal states were amongst the eighteen African states that did not initially support the admission of the Saharowi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member state of the OAU at the February 1983 Conference. This action by the two countries, supported by a few others, temporarily paralysed activities at the OAU Secretariat and for some time brought an atmosphere of uncertainty to the survival or otherwise of the continental organisation. However, at the November 1983 OAU Conference in Addis-Ababa, it was largely the efforts made by both Senegal and Gambia that led to the adoption by OAU members of a resolution on the western Sahara that called for negotiation between Morocco and the Polisario movement.

On the question of apartheid in South Africa, the two countries have been consistent in their diplomatic and material support not only for the ANC but also for the Frontline States. On the Namibian question, Senegal and Gambia have consistently taken a common stand in their support for SWAPO.

With their immediate neighbours the two states have maintained cordial relations: with members of the Organisation *Pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambia* (OMVG) comprising also Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry. When Senghor was President, relations between Dakar and Guinea Conakry were poor and unfriendly. This was largely a result

of the differences in ideologies of the two leaders, and also a result of the different positions of the Presidents on major Francophone politics of the time. However, during the same period, President Jawara maintained good and cordial relations with Guinea Conakry. However, since the signing of the confederal pact, not only has the death of Sekou Toure and Guinea's new western oriented foreign policy helped in the mending of relations between Dakar and Conakry, President Jawara who has always been friendly with the authorities in Conakry has also served as a *bon interlocuteur* and privileged go-between for the two countries.

Economic and monetary union between Senegal and the Gambia is most of the time described by authors as the corner stone of the Confederation. However, on this question the two states have found it difficult to reach an agreement. This can be compared to other areas like defence, external relations, communication and information where it was easier to sign the protocols. However, it should be pointed out that by 1987 discussions had started at ministerial level on the reports of the commission that was set up in 1984 to work out the modalties for economic and monetary union between the two states. In spite of the discussions going on at high levels between the two states, one finds it difficult to see how such union could be arrived at between Senegal and the Gambia if the general economic crisis, financial insolvency, and the problems associated with the structural adjustment programmes in the two states are not taken into consideration.

In the area of communication and transportation whose protocol was signed on July 28, 1983, much progress has been achieved and vision has been transformed to reality these past seven years. For instance, in 1987 a private Gambian Ferry Boat and Water Transport firm in which Senegalese are shareholders was set up. Moreover, registered vehicles of either state can now stay up to 120 days in either territory instead of the 90 days allowed by the ECOWAS treaty on movement of nationals. Added to this, a number of highways like Banjul-Kaolack Banjul have been extended to reach Dakar. The Farafenni-Basse network of roads has also been extended to link up with Tamba to form the Basse-Velingara-Tabma-Basse Highway. The two confederal states have also decided to replace their different driving licences with a single confederal one.

What then are the lessons for regional political integration since the Senegambian Confederation was established? One, it is clear from the Senegambian example that the issue of political integration amongst independent and sovereign states is still fraught with great difficulties especially when it has to do with either of the states surrendering a bit of its political authority. Why, for example, has the Gambia been reluctant and unwilling to subjugate her national identity to that of Senegal in a monetary and economic union? It is instructive to ask why there has been substantial progress in the field of foreign relations, communication and security matters, areas that do not necessarily challenge the authority of or call the pre-eminence of political élites into question, or demand the delegation of national sovereignty to a supra national organisation. No doubt some visions have become realities since the establishment of the

Senegambian Confederation these past seven years. However, for as long as it is impossible for the two states to pull their economies and monetary policies together in a Senegambian union which is the heart of the Confederation, for so long will the Confederation be an addition to the many ill-fated attempts at political integration in Africa.

NOTES

1. See section 1 clause 2 of the Principles of the Agreement establishing the Senegambian Confederation.
2. All the articles written on the Senegambian confederation have dealt largely with an analysis of the objectives of the confederation and an examination of this possibility or otherwise. This is the case with J-C. Gautron, *La confédération de la Sénégambie. Entre l'union et le Protectorat. Année Africaine* 1982, A. Hughes, 'The Limits of Consociational Democracy in the Gambia' Civilisation Vol. XXXII 2-XXXIII. No. 1 1982-1983 and the J.C. Senghor 'Senegambia: The logical bases for integration' *Africa Quarterly* Vol. XXII, No. !, 1982. This present article is perhaps the only one to attempt a comprehensive examination of developments since 1982.
3. See Arnold Hughes 'From Colonialism to Confederation: The Gambian Experience of Independence 1965-1982' in Robin Cohen (ed.) *African Islands and Enclaves,* Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London, 1983; Michael Herland, *Naissance d'une Confédération: La Senegambie L'Europe en Formation* (249), Juillet 1982.
4. See *Afrique-Asie* No. 246, 17-30 August, 1981 and *Africa* No. 121 September 1981 for the statements made respectively by the two Presidents on the security issue between the two countries.
5. See I. B. Omole, *De la Cooperation a la Confederation: La Sénégambie: Contribution a L'Analyse Régionale en Afrique.* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Institute of Polictical Studies, University of Bordeaux 1, Bordeaux, France, 1986, p.208.
6. *Senegambia Sun,* Monday 21, May 1984.
7. *West Africa,* 7 April 1986.
8. Arnold Hughes, 'Confederation', in Robin Cohen (ed.) *op.cit.*
9. West Africa, 'Senegambia. Four Years of Confederation' 6 January, 1986.
10. *West Africa,* (February, 1987).
11. See Articles I and 2 of the Protocol of the Institutions of the Confederation and Protocol of the Defence and Integration of the Armed Forces of the Confederation. Also, Article 7 of the Agreement establishing the confederation.
12. The Senegal and Gambia steering committee was set up in 1985 'to discuss and advise the Vice-President of the Confederation on technical matters affecting the confederal relationship.' *West Africa* 18 November 1985.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Africa Research Bulletin,* p.8252, November 15, 1986.

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PASSING OF A DEER: THE FATE OF THE SHOU

by B. Seshadri

In the 1960s I had assiduously searched, along the Indo-Sikkimese-Tibetan borderlands, for news of the survival of the magnificent Tibetan red deer, the shou *(Cervus elaphus affinis)*. This deer, commonly known as the Sikkim stag and less commonly as Hodgson's deer, had a historical habitat in the valleys of the Tsangpo or Brahmaputra river and its tributaries south of Lhasa, the Chumbi valley in the salient between Bhutan and Sikkim, and parts of Bhutan and Sikkim. Another, and somewhat larger, race known as Wallich's deer *(C.e. wallichi)*, occurred in the upper Tsangpo and Sutlej valleys in Tibet and the Mustang salient in Nepal. A visual difference between the two races was in the size of the rump-patch, which was larger in Wallach's deer: but, in both, the dark border to the patch and the stripe through it, seen in the hangul or Kashmir stag, the third south-east Asian race of *Cervus elaphus* (the red deer of the Scottish highlands belongs to this group), was virtually absent, and the antlers were longer and more massive than in the hangul and the beam is bent forward at the third tine so as to overhang the face.

I retained an interest in the shou in the intervening years and, more recently, I resumed my quest during the writing of my book on the Indian wild life reserves.

The only direct evidence I had in the 1960s that the shou had lived in the Chumbi valley came from the late Mrs Anne Perry, eldest daughter of Mr David Macdonald who was British Trade Agent from 1905 to 1925, who so graciously presided over the Himalayan Hotel in Kalimpong. Kalimpong had a certain notoriety at that time as a 'spy centre' following the incursion of the Chinese into Tibet and the influx of Tibetan refugees, political intriguers of all nationalities, officials, journalists and eccentrics. But back to the shou. A stag had been shot by a Colonel Renwick of the Remounts at Lingmathang in 1920 or 1921. Mrs Perry was not quite certain which year, but it was a year or two before her marriage in 1922. She went and saw the stag after it was killed, and, as far as she knew, the skin and antlers were sent to the Natural History Museum in London. It was thought by everyone present that the animal was the 'last' shou in the Chumbi valley. Mrs Perry and her father, who was in his late eighties, have been the only people I have talked to who had seen a shou in the flesh.

Mrs Perry's account, I found later, appeared to tie up with an article by Colonel F. M. Bailey titled 'The Largest Deer in British India' in the *Journal of the Bombay Natural History Society* in 1942. According to Colonel Bailey, he saw two hinds and a young one above Lingmotang (obviously the same as Lingmathang) in 1921, and he stated his belief that 'there must have been very few left, and I believe all were exterminated a few years ago . . .' In *Sport and Travel in the Highlands of*

Tibet by Sir Harry Hayden and Cesar Cosson (Richard Cobden-Sanderson, 1927), a narrative of the authors' journey through Tibet in 1927, Hayden described their stalk of a herd of 11 shou in the Tsangpo valley. Cosson shot one, which he thought was a stag, but it turned out to be a hind. 'It was a fine beast, bigger than a red deer, and in very good condition.' The two men saw no shou in the Chumbi valley.

However, in a note dated December 1959, also in the *Journal of the Bombay Natural History Society,* F. Ludlow said that shou were present in the Chumb valley in 1925. He wrote, 'When I was in Gyantse from 1923 to 1926 a few shou inhabited the Chumbi valley in the vicinity of a little plain called Lingmothang. In the winter of 1925, I saw three hinds in this area, but no stags. 'The shou was also reported to occur at this time in the upper reaches of the Ha valley in Bhutan, but even at this early date the animal was said to be on the verge of extinction, and in later years, Raja Dorje, who owned the Ha valley, told me he was convinced that all had been exterminated. In 1933 and 1949, in company of Major G. Sheriff, I traversed Bhutan from west to east . . . but I saw no shou nor did I hear of any, though the country seemed eminently suited to their needs.'

My friend, the late E. P. Gee, wrote in his book, *The Wild Life of India* (Collins, 1964), of a letter he had received from Ludlow and his own assessment of the shou's status: 'Ludlow told me in a letter that he believed that the *shou* had become extinct in northern Bhutan, which he traversed from west to east in 1933 and 1949 in company with G. Sheriff. But in 1962 I heard a report that one had been seen recently in north-west Bhutan, and I am trying to find out some more about this.'

'Ludlow also told me in his most informative letter that the *shou* occurred "in fair numbers" during his visits with Sheriff in 1936, 1938 and winter of 1946-47 to the district of Tsari in south-eastern Tibet. Tsari is where the River Subansiri and its tributaries enter the North-East Frontier Agency of India, so it is just possible that there may be a few *shou* in this part of N.E.F.A. and that this creature may yet be saved from extermination.'

Gee's was the last account of any substance on the survival of the shou. He died in 1969, and when we last met in June 1968, he had no further news of the deer. As for Wallach's deer, even less is known. No record of its sighting after the early part of this century exists.

All we know about the status of the shou in the 19th and earlier decades of this century comes from the writings of British hunter-naturalists, whose books and nature notes are virtually the only sources of knowledge of the wild life in India and neighbouring countries. The books make wonderful reading of unspoilt wildernesses and abundance of animals. It is accepted by Indian wild life experts today that the shou has gone, although the Bombay Natural History Society's *Encyclopaedia of Indian Natural History* (Oxford University Press, 1986) has it that the Sikkim stag 'still occurs, reputedly, in the Tsangpo valley and its tributaries south of Lhasa in Tibet, extending south to the Chumbi valley, the Raidak valley of Bhutan, and Sikkim.'

The reasons for the shou's eclipse remain a mystery. It does not seem to have been vigorously hunted either inside or from outside Tibet, and its habitats remained virtually undisturbed before the Chinese occupation. My renewed quest for it was fruitless: no one knew anything about it and, for the younger generation of the borderlands, it had already become a mythical beast. The deer had quietly slid away into oblivion, without attracting much attention.

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The June number of the *Contemporary Review* includes *Women's Movements in Pakistan* by Francis Harrison, *Countertrade* by B. Narpati, *What's the Big Idea, Then?* by Tony Beamish and *Realism Revisited* by John Elsom.

FIRSTS, LASTS AND SPECIAL NUMBERS: 1. REFLECTIONS ON SOME QUALITY LITERARY REVIEWS 1923-84

by W. J. Strachan

My interest in the subject described in the title began, in fact, with a last. It goes back to my Cambridge days when, prompted by the great Johnsonian authority, S. C. Roberts, I read Dr Johnson's Papers from *The Idler*. I found his valedictory essay with its overtones (April 5, 1760) strangely moving . . . 'Though the Idler and his readers have contracted no close friendship, they are, perhaps, both unwilling to part. There are few things not purely evil, of which we can say, without some emotion of uneasiness, this is the last . . . and the Idler, with all his chillness of tranquillity, is not wholly unaffected by the thought that his last essay is now before him.'

Few literary farewells can have been more touching. Nowadays, alas, reviews tend to fade out in an embarrassed silence; the explanation of their demise must be deduced or sought elsewhere than in a final issue. I have a personal experience: *Blackwood's Magazine,* founded in 1817, enjoyed an uninterrupted run, recorded on sheets enclosed in the issue which published my article, *Henry Moore and his Work,* listing all the back numbers up to that of July, 1978. The words 'Order Form', printed directly below the date quoted above was the only intimation that a near-record sequence extending over a period of 149 years had come to an abrupt close. It was a death without a funeral-service.

My experience of my initial 'first' was in 1923. My father, an omnivorous reader, had taken out a subscription to *The Adelphi,* founded and edited by John Middleton Murry. I was a sixth-former at the time, and, thanks to a relationship inside and outside the classroom with the poet, John Redwood Anderson, and H. H. Abbott, a translator of Anglo-Saxon riddles, keenly interested in this new magazine. *No. 1* opened with 'The Cause of it All', a long — and what seems to me now — tendentious exposition of the review's ethos. One sentence from it is enough to sum it up. 'This magazine is run neither by capital nor charity, but by a belief in life.' As if to prove it, Murry included in this first issue a piece by that believer in life, par excellence, D. H. Lawrence, and, in the event, more ironically, a story by his wife, Katherine Mansfield who died so tragically young: a story, *The Samuel Josephs,* now renamed *The Prelude,* which appears much expanded in the *Collected Short Stories of Katherine Mansfield**. Murry continued to publish her work after her death and unkind critics accused him of 'living on K. M's remains'. *The Adelphi* flourished; it had a definite line and tone which perhaps the heading of and editorial by Murry's successor, George Godwin, 'The Illusion of Progress', indicates. That was in the July/September Number, 1950, by which time I had become a contributor.

Up to the arrival on the scene of *Horizon* in 1939 — the year,

* Penguin Modern Classics 1985

incidentally, in which the original *Cornhill* wound up — the 'midfield', to use an image appropriate to its cricketer-editor, J. C. Squire and 'the Squirarchy' was covered by *The London Mercury*. A monthly miscellany, founded just after the First World War, it published contemporary prose and verse, now known deprecatingly, as 'Georgian'. It was impeccably produced (Westminster Press) and I find myself unable to part with certain numbers and not just 'special' numbers such as No. 100 (1928). This had an enticing list of authors on the 'period style' white label: G. K. Chesterton, Walter de la Mare, Karel Capek (of *The Insect Play)*, C. E. Montague, E. F. Benson (the subject of 'On this Day' March 2, 1940, in *The Times*, as I write) and Sir Edmund Gosse, all 'safe' names. On re-reading the issue, I considered the shortest piece, Gosse's *A Memory of Tourgenieff*, a non-event, wittily related, to be the gem, and a 'must' for any collector of literary anecdotes.

Three consecutive numbers (those of December 1936, January, and February, 1937) under the more discriminating and adventurous R. A. Scott-James, include a fascinating article on The Last Letters of George Moore, a story, typically eerie, by de la Mare and a story by Lady Julia Pakenham (sic). A new feature — portrait-drawing — had begun to add a new dimension to the magazine. The three issues mentioned share between them eight portraits: Granville-Barker, Edward Garnett, Rosamond Lehmann by Sava; David Garnett, Auden and Walter de la Mare by Mervyn Peake; Delius by Evard Munch; Stephen Spender, 1937, by Henry Moore. The latter is particularly interesting in this present year of the poet's 80th birthday. There are in addition original woodcuts and reproductions of paintings by Picasso, Marie Laurencin and — Cecil Beaton — pointing a way that other magazines were to follow.

Cyril Connolly's aim was to publish in *Horizon* only writing of the highest quality, almost regardless of subject or theme, including reportage. *Number 1* (Dec 1939) set the high standard — poems by Auden and Betjeman, reviews by the arch-anthologist Geoffrey Grigson. Poems by Dylan Thomas and Edith Sitwell were published in 1941. Despite the innumerable difficulties — shortages of paper and consequently sometimes of copies (I used to send mine on to Sylvia Townsend-Warner living in a remote Dorset village) and destruction of stores of copies, *Horizon* survived; every copy was prized. As soon as it was possible, Connolly got hold of information about his beloved France: first in Philip Toynbee's informative and perceptive *Notes on the Literary Situation in France* (June 1944) followed by Nancy Cunard's *Letter from Paris*, dealing with the theatre, Sartre's *Huis clos*, journals, the black market and the shortage of vitamins in the children's diet. Incidentally, she put me in touch with the poets of the Resistance I was translating, notably Aragon, Eluard and Pierre Emmanuel.

It is, however, for the special numbers that *Horizon* will always be remembered: *News out of France*, with Connolly's brilliantly recorded impressions of the literary and art scene; the result of his conversations with Max-Pol Fouchet (Camus's friend), the avant-garde poets — Jean Lescure, Francis Ponge, the surrealist wit, Queneau. This was followed by

John Russell on the *Existential Theatre.*

The magazine, *The Windmill* (editor Edward Lane) had serialized Maugham's *Catalonia* in four instalments, but it was left to *Horizon* to devote a whole number to a novel, *The Loved One,* the distasteful subject of human taxidermy, redeemed by Evelyn Waugh's satirical and witty handling.

In *Horizon No. 110,* which published Mary McCarthy's short novel, *Oasis,* Connolly wrote: 'There is something very agreeable in awarding our *Horizon* prize to Mary McCarthy's novel. She is exactly the kind of person we set out to attract . . . She has written the kind of book which *Horizon* exists to further. So let us forget all about *The Loved One,* which like *Candide,* made a universal appeal; we are back in our own, difficult, restricted, *avant-garde* mental climate.' A statement that tells us everything about the author of *The Unquiet Grave* which in the end distracted him from his work for *Horizon.* He bequeathed to posterity a decade of writing of rare distinction. One must bracket with Connolly's name that of Peter Watson, the enlightened millionaire who kept the magazine solvent in times of crisis. My *Horizon* prize would have gone to George Orwell for his *The Art of Donald McGill.* No-one better than the author of *The Road to Wigan Pier* could appreciate the humanity of a public (the same that endured the Blitz) which warmed to the harmless but hilarious vulgarity of the seaside postcard.

During the *Horizon* Years Tambimuttu was publishing issues of *Poetry London* which fostered, albeit sometimes indiscriminately, war-time poetry. He was a great encourager. The last number 'X' was published in volume form with the final variation on the Lyre Bird, this time by Gerald Wilde, on the dust-cover (two variations had been drawn by Henry Moore which I later included in my *Henry Moore: Animals (1983)* with Moore's approval). *Number X* was devoted to 'writers who had never before appeared in print or have not yet appeared in PL.' I was among the latter and amused and flattered to find myself cheek by jowl with poems by Stevie Smith whom I had recently got to know at PEN functions. One moving feature which damped down any elation about one's inclusion was the news, conveyed in Tambi's appreciation of Keith Douglas's poetry, of the poet's death, killed during the Normandy landings. His early poems I had read in *Eight Oxford Poets* in which a pupil of mine, Drummond Allison, also killed in the War, had contributions. Great losses.

In January, 1944, doubtless inspired by the success of *Horizon,* Peter Quenell, a close friend of Connolly's, re-launched *The Cornhill* which Thackeray had launched with a great fanfare, January, 1860: 'Nothing was to be seen but people carrying bundles of the orange-coloured magazine.' Quenell had the backing of John Murray. (One wonders whether his visits to the house in Albemarle Street, frequented by Byron, were responsible for his fruitful obsession with the life and works of that poet.). Quenell could hardly hope to muster a team to rival that of authors whose work graced the Victorian period of *The Cornhill* or even those nearer the time of its closure in 1939, Henry James and Thomas

Hardy. Nevertheless, the cover — a re-designing of its predecessor by John Piper who also contributed an illustrated topographical piece on Norwich — announced exciting names: Max Beerbohm, Elizabeth Bowen, Maurice Bowra, John Betjeman . . .' In fact in his second editorial Quenell chides himself for not having drawn in younger contributors. In that Number, May 1944, however, the contributors are all well-known writers — including Clive Bell, Tom Harrison. etc. There is, however, a welcome contribution from France by Emmanuel d'Astier, *Sept Jours en été* — his impressions of Paris, August 1943, which confirmed our anxiety about a city then a place of shadows and danger, especially for those, like D'Astier, moving around, armed with false papers. As he emerges from Métro station, Victor Hugo, he notes the empty plinth from which the poet's bronze statue had been removed and melted down. The execution of a French patriot, Sully, is evoked . . . *'ennemi des cris et des chants, il a dû marmotter, "Je suis fait . . . mais j'en ai vu assez pour savoir qu'ils sont foutus."'*

Ten years later, happily in a different atmosphere, *Encounter No 1* appeared. The editorial, as yet unsigned, was headed 'After the Apocalypse' referring to the disappearance from the world stage of the trio of villains, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. There are references to problems ahead, *Encounter* was to be a watchful and caring periodical. The dual editorship, Spender, representing Britain, Irving Kristol, the US, announced in a subsequent number, indicates a 'special relationship' which became a feature of a magazine with a declared coverage of 'Literature, Arts, Politics', equally divided in *Number 1:* a generous foretaste of Virginia Woolf's *Diary* (the final set in five volumes was to become the best and most distinguished witness of and comment on the period from 1919 to the writer's suicide, in 1941) In the extract she is amusingly gossipy about George Moore, moving about the loss of Arnold Bennett with whom she had a love-hate relation. France is represented by a piece from an early work by Albert Camus, *The Wind at Djemila,* lyrical hedonism but with already a hint of his obsession with 'the conscious certainty of death without hope'. A section,' What people think', takes care of political and topical items. *Number 4,* January 1954, promise maintained and an issue worth keeping if only for an appreciation of Dylan Thomas by five writers, including his fellow-poets, George Barker and Louis MacNeice. *Encounter* sails on, a survivor, under a new dual command and underwitten by Encounter Ltd. *Bonne continuation!*

1953 also heralded a more literary magazine, a resuscitation of the old *London Magazine,* long defunct, and retaining its name. *No 1* (February) contained a message of goodwill from the contemporary 'Grand Cham', T. S. Eliot who, as ex-editor of *The Criterion,* was making authoritative comments on the running of literary magazines. John Lehmann, already experienced as editor of *New Writing,* responded to Eliot's exhortation that a literary review should promote new writers and be in the best sense (meaning?) international. He included a story by a French writer, Pierre Gascar and 'Letter from New York'. Further literary contents in the

same first number were poems by recent poetic talent, Thom Gunn and Elizabeth Jennings.

The London Magazine maintained this enlightened and predictable course up to 1960 when Lehmann, suffering from what he claimed to be an *aetat* 50 syndrome — my term — felt he might be failing to spot new talent, decided to hand the editorial torch on to Alan Ross (poet, cricketer). Ross must have taken to heart a message well expressed in a line by Auden, 'The vision seriously intends to stay', and piloted *The London Magazine* successfully for a quarter of a century. He made innovations, introducing the occasional populist element, exemplified in Brian Glanville's *The Man behind the Goal* etc., poems by Charles Causley side by side with those of Philip Larkin. He extended the magazine's frontiers to the Antipodes, introducing, for example, two Australian painters, Boyd and de Maistre. He included excellent photographs of what are called 'happenings' and emulated *The London Mercury,* in publishing contemporary portraits, in his case eight full-page portraits by the ace-photographer, Bill Brandt — of luminaries of the literary, art and theatrical world. By this time, 1982/83, issues were beginning to come out in pairs — always an ominous sign. In this case perhaps that The Arts Council funding was no longer sufficient, — to continue the nautical images — to keep The Flying Dutchman of journalism out of port. I was fortunate enough to squeeze in the March 1984 number albeit with my shortest poem and in a not very distinguished issue, except for a fine portrait drawing by Leonard Rosoman of William Sansom, a former contributor to the magazine. However, good news — *The Writer's Handbook* failed to include it in the 1988 edition. *The London Magazine* survives and sails on; Alan Ross deserves an accolade.

No worthwhile literary (or art) magazine vanishes without trace — though I possess a copy of one English art magazine which rivalled the French *Verve* in its splendour that was the First and Last, and survives as a collector's piece. However brief the span of life of a literary magazine, the file copies, singly and collectively, offer an invaluable field for research into past taste and nostalgic enjoyment. They can lead to a reassessment of certain lesser-known authors, the re-discovery of much talented work that has never achieved book-publication. More power to new ventures in the field. 'Without literary magazines', to quote T. S. Eliot's message, 'the vitality of the world of letters is very gravely reduced'.

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Literary Supplement

LANDSCAPE IN LITERATURE

A Writer's America: Landscape in Literature. Alfred Kazin. Thames & Hudson. £15.95.

'The whole country is one vast wood' was an early seventeenth-century traveller's first reaction to the New World. 'The woods are killing us anyway', was Robert Frost's comment on his native New England. From the beginnings, the land has always fascinated American writers. And that land varies immensely, from the creeks and broad, slow-moving rivers of the Tidewater to the mountains, and the rolling waves of golden grain of the Mid-West. But to Americans the land was not just beautiful, and diverse; it was the material out of which countries are made.

Alfred Kazin's commentary on the theme of the preoccupation of the American writer with the land he lives in is fascinating and wide-ranging: from Jefferson, the Enlightenment man on his Indian frontier, with his respect for Nature, for Nature's laws and for Nature's God, to the East Florida wilderness through which the eighteenth-century botanist William Bartram travelled, from Thoreau's nature-worship at Walden Pond to Robert Frost's New England, which he saw not as a sylvan retreat but as rock-hard, where farming was 'getting crops out of granite'. Kazin takes account too of many Souths: from Mark Twain, with Huck and Jim, on the Mississippi, to the similarity of Faulkner's fictional Yoknapatawpha County to the disturbingly similar realities of Oxford, Mississippi; and of other New Englands than Robert Frost's — T.S. Eliot's, Nathaniel Hawthorne's, Ralph Waldo Emerson's Concord and Emily Dickinson's Amherst. The sense of place is a central theme in American literature.

Kazin's prose matches that of the writers he records; at times it is moving, even emotional; in particular he paints some especially vivid portraits. Jefferson at Monticello, looking out on the Blue Ridge, sees America as an ancient wilderness unspoilt by man. Thoreau, visiting Maine in 1846, sees there 'the raw materials of a planet', primeval, untamed and forever untamable Nature'. It was easy for the Founding Fathers to see America as offering a second chance for mankind. It was equally easy for the Puritans of Salem, to whom the wilderness was a place of evil, to see it as the Devil's Kingdom, and a challenge of another kind. The view of Nature protrayed by the Bartrams caught Coleridge's imagination: Kubla Khan was in fact born in the Florida Everglades and in the Cherokee and Creek country.

The Middle West brought another challenge: a sense of infinite distances, 'of blazing light and great weathers', of the sky as 'the complete dome of heaven', 'the unwavering sea of wheat unbroken by the spar of a single tree,' — as caught by Whitman and Willa Cather, by Carl Sandburg and Sinclair Lewis. It is indeed the final theme in Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*, and would be echoed and re-echoed by generations of Mid-Western politicians: 'the virtuous God-fearing place', the valley of democracy constantly being threatened — and worsened — by the wickedness, civic corruption and financial manoeuvres of the greedy boys back East. The effect on America's Garden of Eden of the invasion of money is as valid a theme today as it was to Vachel Lindsey from Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln's town, or to William Jennings Bryan.

Albert Kazin has written a superb and evocative essay on a number of

American authors to whom place is the central theme, to whom landscape is character as well as setting. They range from nature worshippers and Utopians, botanists and artists to realists like Faulkner and Steinbeck, and to those to whom the city not the wilderness-frontier was their place, and their inspiration: Henry James, Dreiser, Hart Crane and Saul Bellow. The publishers have matched his quality with some hundred appropriate and strikingly attractive illustrations.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PLOMER

William Plomer: A Biography. Peter F. Alexander, Oxford University Press. £25.00.

William Plomer lived more lives than one, and Peter Alexander, of the University of New South Wales, Roy Campbell expert, is the first biographer to have scrambled after him. There were three autobiographical volumes, but they left plenty of scope for filling the interstices, and for interpretation. Peter Alexander has fulfilled both tasks most admirably. All Plomer's life, it seems, he suffered, and knew he suffered, from being déraciné. He also adopted a self-wrought mask — inscrutable Plomer vested with aplomb — behind which he wrestled to come to terms with the homosexuality which, for a time, stifled his creative output. Yet another of our '30s and '40s intellectuals is revealed to all the world as he really was — until a chastening experience at Paddington Station in 1943 made him more discreet and even more secretive. He recognised that these truths would have to come out eventually, and, in anticipation, half welcomed the end of pretence. His personal problems appear to have their origin in seduction by a ship's steward at the age of eleven, and in the appalling character of his adventurer father, whose violent rages had to be endured by a wife and family. William Plomer's mother, Edythe, endured sufferings in South Africa (where William was born, in 1903,) which are reminiscent of the earlier environmental experiences of the wives of Darwin and Livingstone, except that she kept on escaping to England, so that William was shuttled back and forth and thus rendered insecure yet self-preservative.

Plomer's life thereafter was a classic search for identity as he slipped in and out of more than his fair share of phases and successes — novelist, poet, story-writer, broadcaster, reader for Jonathan Cape, Bloomsburyite, editor of Kilvert's *Diaries*, librettist of Benjamin Britten operas . . . Once they had tried to make a farmer of him, once he had passionately attacked apartheid in his strong novel, *Turbott Wolfe*, once, with Roy Campbell, he had attacked imperialism through their magazine *Voorslag*, once he had lived in Japan *à la japonnaise*, but, in 1973, he ended his days with one good friend in attendance at 43 Adastra Avenue in Hassocks, near Brighton.

Resolutely, through all this richness, Peter Alexander cleverly and calmly keeps a tight curb on the facts. He also understands Plomer's shifts and changes, his sloughing of skins. When he arrives in the narrative at fresh famous persons, his thumb-nail sketches repel a little in a work of this kind. When he touches on matters which merely brush his theme, he can be less understanding; he completely fails, for instance, to take the point of J.R. Ackerley's relationship with his dog; he stopped 'cruising' because the dog cured his depression. His note on Rosamond Lehmann is misleading — (she) 'was already well known for her first novel, *Dusty Answer* (1927), and her second, *A Note in Music* (1930); the latter attracted attention because of its frank treatment of homosexuality.' But so

did the former! Anyway, here is Plomer's life in full detail, researched to the hilt, not moving, but enlightening.

MOLLY TIBBS

COMPARABLE MAX?

Max Beerbohm and the Act of Writing. Lawrence Danson. Clarendon Press. £19.50.

Lawrence Danson's title wittily prepares the reader for his subject matter. In some respects Max's entire life was an Act. He was alleged by members of his family not to have spoken until he was four years old but when he decided to utter his vocabulary was extensive.

We are often told of the delicacy and limited range of 'the incomparable Max' but the author reminds us that Max was a key figure in a significant period of literary and artistic development. He was not only influenced by his friends but his penetrating eye and pen ranged wittily over the entire period.

There is much to compare here and Lawrence Danson makes the most of it. His scholarly study lacks the charm of Lord David Cecil's biography — such a welter of words and number of footnotes sometimes distracted my attention but I sustained my interest and was richly rewarded. Perhaps Mr Danson's limitations stem from his own admission that he prefers Max's writing to his caricatures. To my mind one has to appreciate the style of the writing by way of the delicate malice and insight of the drawings. Max used the pen to draw long before he was fascinated by words.

However, Lawrence Danson provides the reader with an infinite amount of fascinating information. The book deals with Max the Man and Max the Writer and pays great attention to his method of parody and ironic comment, but as Max the Writer is also the elusive Max Beerbohm the author becomes more often than not 'the central character in the work'. It was inevitable that his ironic views of life should extend to himself and he was less a self-deceiver than many writers. We all wear masks and enjoy the playing but Max chose his style and kept it more or less intact for most of his life.

Mr Danson constantly reminds us that Max Beerbohm is 'an observer and a collector'. The artists, politicians and writers of his childhood and young manhood became 'exhibits in his art'. Indeed the writers he knew inhabit his world.

If Max called parody 'a speciality of youth' the author tells the reader that 'he specialized in it during a life that had neither youth nor age but, as it were, a perfect mimicry of both'.

NONIE BEERBOHM

CULTURE AND ANARCHY

Arnold by Stefan Collini. Past Masters, Oxford University Press. £14.95. Paperback £3.95.

The latest addition to the Past Masters series came out in the year of the centenary of its subject's death. Matthew Arnold joins the few poets who have been admitted to the pantheon, and it is not his poetry that has qualified him for selection. The series deals with 'the thought of leading intellectual figures of the past whose ideas still influence the way we think to-day.' Arnold left no

theoretical system or doctrine; yet Mr Collini claims he 'has become an inescapable, if also oddly nebulous, presence in modern intellectual life.' (p.3)

It was as a poet that Arnold first established his reputation, and the respect he earned by his three slim volumes of verse gave authority to the eleven fat volumes of collected prose which Mr Collini thinks now has most claim to our attention. His place as a minor poet is secure, though he published only one successful long poem. The tone of his poetry is aptly characterised by Mr Collini in a phrase of Arnold's own — 'the dialogue of the mind with itself.' (p.27)

His poetic inspiration ran out in his early thirties. During a long and arduous career as an inspector of schools he kept up a fairly continuous barrage of articles to monthly periodicals. These were later collected into books but bear indelible traces of their origin. As Mr Collini says, they are 'festooned with allusions to long-forgotten controversies'. (p.27) Yet from them later readers have distilled generalisations of perennial interest.

Arnold's manner is part of the attraction. Mr Collini begins with a description of 'the Arnold voice'. It is that of a speaker in a formal debate. He is very conscious of his audience. But he is not trying to persuade it to adopt specific propositions. In a sense, he is always putting the opposition case, trying to get holders of fixed positions to question their assumptions and prejudices. He was a master of polemic. Mr Collini analyses the rhetorical devices he uses.

'It was his work as a critic, more than anything else, that earned Arnold his pedestal among the immortals'(p.46). He started with literary criticism and gradually spread out into criticism of contemporary society.

As a literary critic Arnold has his limitations. 'The classics cast too long a shadow', Mr Collini admits. (p.46) He preferred heroic and tragic poetry, comedy and wit had little appeal for him. He 'almost entirely neglected prose fiction' though 'writing in one of the most abundantly creative ages of the English novel'. (p.66) For a poet he showed a surprising lack of interest in technique. 'He was always better at characterizing *what* effect a work has upon the reader than he was at analysing *how* that effect is achieved'. (p.61) The effect most valued was moral: as Mr Collini puts it, 'the better the poetry, the more effectively it engages our emotions and stirs us to action, and the more, therefore, we become the kind of people that it is morally desirable we should become'. (p.65) He came dangerously near to equating poetry and religion. In voluminous writing on religion, to which Mr Collini gives more attention than it now deserves, Arnold argued that the Bible should not be taken literally but read as poetry, and of poetry he says that its future 'is immense, because in poetry, when it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay'. (p.65)

Arnold asserted that the aim of criticism was 'to see the object as in itself it really is' and to avoid 'ulterior, political, practical considerations.' He did not always practise what he preached, but he was reacting against the political and sectarian partisanship of the main reviewing journals of the time, and compared with them he was 'disinterested' at least in spreading his disapproval rather widely. He thought English intellectual life was parochial and needed opening out to European movements. His own Europeanness did not go much beyond admiration for Goethe and for France, and the French writers he actually discussed were rather minor ones. He was not as immersed in European culture as Browning was. But he did give English complacency a salutory jolt when he called for 'a criticism which regards Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation'.

One function Arnold assigns to criticism is to 'make an intellectual situation of

which the creative power can profitably avail itself'. It does this by propagating 'the best ideas, on every matter which literature touches, current at the time'. It was through lack of such stimulation that most of the productions of 'the burst of creativity in our literature, during the first quarter of this century . . . are doomed . . . to prove hardly more lasting than the productions of far less splendid epochs'. In contrast, Goethe was supported by 'the complete culture and unfettered thinking of a large body of Germans'.

His most important insight was a perception of the reciprocal relationship between literature and culture. 'Literary criticism's most important function is to try books as to the influence which they are calculated to have upon the general culture of single nations or of the world at large'. By culture he seems to have meant the artistic and intellectual climate at any time. He was not using the term as it is often used to-day as the complex of beliefs, values and attitudes of a particular community. He was thinking rather of what we have in mind when we say a person is cultured. He assumes an educated minority which assesses the significance of various kinds of learning. To do so it requires a supply of books interpreting technical publications for the general reader. 'All these works', he says, 'have a special professional criticism to undergo. . . . But they have also a general literary criticism to undergo, and this tries them, as I have said, by one standard — their effect upon general culture'. It is not clear why the 'professional' critics cannot apply this standard or indeed what 'literary' means in this context (Mr Collini simply says, he was using it 'in a very wide sense' (p.55).

Whatever he meant he was obviously moving away from poetry, and indeed when 'culture' is next encountered, in his most durable work, *Culture and Anarchy,* it has taken over the role of criticism, 'a disinterested endeavour to learn and propogate the best that is known and thought in the world'. Culture is also described as aiming at 'a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature'. But his continual emphasis on 'the best that has been thought and said' limits this comprehensive view of perfection. As Mr Collini says, 'in implicitly assigning priority to the literary and philosophical, the phrase represents Arnold's own cultural tastes'. (p.85) Though he practised an art, poetry, with some distinction, he did not include appreciation of the arts among the qualities to be encouraged. Unlike Browning, Ruskin and Morris, he showed little interest in arts other than his own. Even the knowledge he considered desirable was rather restricted. He showed only a nodding acquaintance with the good writing on the science that was available and was greatly influencing culture. (In *Friendship's Garland* he caricatured the teaching of science in Non-conformist academies.)

All-round development was attained by the harmonisation of the two strains in the tradition of European civilisation, the Hellenic (aesthetic and intellectual) and the Hebraic (religious and moral). He did not find much over-emphasis on the Hellenic qualities in the society of his time, but he did find over-emphasis on the Hebraic among the most powerful section of the community, the Philistines, the commercial middle classes. An influential and respectable group of them were Dissenters. Years of inspecting their schools had bred in him revulsion from their drab sanctimoniousness. *Culture and Anarchy* is full of tirades against them, He deplored not only their poor taste and narrow outlook but even more 'their isolation from the main current of thought and culture'. For this they were not to blame. They had been kept out of the universities and state offices by the Established Church, which Arnold supported, although he did not believe its doctrines and was well aware of its defects. Respect for tradition led to defence of privilege.

'With twentieth century condescension,' says Mr Collini, 'we may find that

Victorian society provided Arnold with an altogether too easy target, all earnest humbug and ugly antimacassars'. (p.74) The earnest humbug is his principal target, but the antimacassars make no appearance. Yet Victorian taste seems particularly vulnerable. He has nothing to say about the relations between the arts and contemporary society. To make his points he chose political issues, and his comments are often captious and lacking in interest to later readers. Mr Collini has had to pick his way through a good deal of dead wood to discover what may be of more than passing significance.

It is even more surprising that Arnold hardly refers to education, for it was education that first turned him towards criticism of society, as Mr Collini rightly points out. He bitterly attacked 'payment by results' and knew that schools run by voluntary organisations with meagre government grants could never provide education for all children. He visited France and admired its national system of education. He wished to see a similar system in England. This was the origin of his conception of the state, 'an organ of our collective best sense, of our national right reason', transcending sectional interests — a rather surprising notion for one who thought so poorly of British political procedures and who realised an institution like the French Academy would never work in Britain. His advocacy of a national system of education was his most successful work. When *Culture and Anarchy* was published a Bill, which later became an Act of Parliament, introducing a national system of primary education was being drafted by his brother-in-law, a Dissenter.

Mr Collini's final chapter deals judiciously with the Arnold legacy. Arnold's suggestion of a literary élite monitoring the state of the nation attracted academics nursing 'the large cultural hopes invested in "English" as the successor-subject to Classics, and even as the successor-religion to Christianity' (p.113). The result has been a good deal of dubious history and sociology. People trained in literature are no better equipped than those trained in any other art or science for criticism of society, except insofar as it affects and, is affected by, their own art or science. Arnold's criticisms of the society of his day would have been more effective if he had brought to bear on it his experience in literary criticism and education. His assertion of a relationship between literature and the general intellectual climate of its time remains valid.

BRUCE PATTISON

A LIFE IN POLITICS

Peter Rawlinson — A Price too High: An Autobiography. Weidenfeld. £16.00.

This is a most satisfactory autobiography, thoroughly readable, full of 'inside stories', expressive of a coherent standpoint. Peter Rawlinson's success in the law can be measured by the fact that when he was wondering whether to resign as a Law Officer, he could have made five times as much by returning to the Bar.

His family life has been idyllic. Elaine Rawlinson was described as the most beautiful wife of an M.P. He himself is arguably the best-looking peer of his generation. It is a success story — with a difference. There came a moment when he decided that political life held no future joy and denied his family the right to his company. He was disillusioned by the ambitions all too prominent at the top. (Is it any better at the Bar?). In any case, when he decided to leave the House of Commons, he assumed that a Roman Catholic could not become Lord Chancellor. Later when a Bill was passed to make this explicitly possible, some of us assumed that he would duly attain the Woolsack. How wrong we were! In the age of Thatchersim, it was quite out of the question.

By 1987 'it had been made clear to me that I was not on speaking terms with the "sitting tenant" (of No. 10 Downing Street)'. Some time before, he had offered to undertake some voluntary work and received the astonishing reply through the Cabinet secretary: 'He can expect no preferment from me'. He will no doubt be asked many times how this extraordinary antipathy arose. No answer is provided here.

Where Mrs Thatcher is concerned personalities can never be ignored, but the tall handsome Peter Rawlinson might have been expected to appeal to Mrs Thatcher's feminine instincts. One has not got to look far for a partial explanation. If Mrs Thatcher can be described as the most radical of Conservative notables, Peter Rawlinson must be just about the most traditional. He has clearly been horrified by changes in the Catholic Church of which he is a devout member.

'But church-going in my own Church has become less meaningful when, after the Vatican Council, came the changes to the liturgy that Catholics had followed for four hundred years. Like the pain inflicted upon so many devout Anglicans by the virtual abandonment in certain parishes of the great language of the Prayer Book, the virtual abolition of the Latin mass and the introduction of a new and prosaic rite distressed many of the Catholic laity.' He found that 'suddenly all was changed as if confidence had been lost in the mystery itself.' There has been some reaction: 'the worst excesses of the player priests were curbed, but the Mass has never wholly regained its old magic'.

So with the law. The last chapter is headed: The Decline of the Law Officers, but his criticism goes much wider. We can expect a tremendous onslaught of the proposals of the present Lord Chancellor when they come before the House of Lords.

Some people may find the chapter on 'The Profumo Affair' the most interesting. Peter Rawlinson felt under a strong obligation to defend the memory of the Attorney-General, Sir John Hobson, who it seems was much criticised for his naïveté after the event. Personally however I regret the treatment of Jack Profumo, which lacks compassion, though Peter Rawlinson admittedly pays tribute to his subsequent work for charity. Nor as an Irishman do I feel that he has much understanding of Irish opinion. But by and large it is the account of a distinguished life which modestly brings home to us how the distinction came to be earned.

FRANK LONGFORD

CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM

Capitalism, Communism, and Coexistance. John Kenneth Galbraith and Stanislav Menshikov. Hamish Hamilton £14.95.

'From the bitter past to a better prospect' is the subtitle of this combined study by two distinguished economists, Professor Galbraith of Harvard University and Professor Menshikov who is on the staff of the Communist Central Committee in Moscow, but mainly resident in the United States. The book takes the form of conversations between the two, covering their national economic and social systems and historical backgrounds. The text although pleasantly and easily readable tends inevitably to considerable repetition after two hundred pages of conversation. There is no attempt by one to outbid the other, although naturally each maintains the superiority of his system.

Dr Menshikov stresses the limitations and corruption which permeate the

Russian system of the central planning authorities. 'The important thing is that this kind of system tends to re-create or reproduce deficit conditions'. Nonetheless central planning control remains at the heart of socialism and cannot give way to a free market economy. It is the latter that Professor Galbraith supports as essential to a prosperous and growing economy. On the other hand he acknowledges its defects. For example, its failures to care adequately, and often not at all, for the well-being of the small man.

This volume provides a very useful service in presenting together in a simple form the divergent characteristics of the two systems. As for the future, they have to concede that the two systems will each persist, although with less antagonism.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature. (Oxford University Press. £25.00.) The much loved and constantly used *Oxford Companion* has been produced in a second edition, under the editorship of Margaret Howatson. First compiled and edited by Sir Paul Harvey in 1937, it has been an essential part of every classical scholar's equipment ever since. Its content has now been increased by 30%, many formerly combined references have single entries and new information is included on some political and social matters. All Latin and Greek is translated and all Greek is transliterated so that the knowledge contained in it is accessible to all interested readers, with or without classical languages. The breadth and range of the volume will ensure its survival as a standard reference book for the foreseeable future. Margaret Howatson's prose is lucid and pleasant to read.

Nadine Gordimer. (Routledge. £4.50.) Judie Newman has written an analytical survey of the novels and short stories of the South African writer Nadine Gordimer. The main themes of her stories include racism, the erosion of liberal values, the politics of gender and the problems of a divided society wherever they occur. Also covered are her literary criticism, photography and work in films. As academic critic Gordimer has a particular concern for the form of novels and poems because she feels strongly that a mere imitative art will not serve the community since it is derived from the liberal western tradition of Hellenism and Judaism. This is in line with the radical thinking of the post-structuralist school which includes a high proportion of sociological theory in its literary judgements. The human interest of her novels and stories is, however, their most enduring quality and Judie Newman does full justice to it.

The Problems of Modernity. (Routledge. £30.) The fourth book to be published in the series 'Warwick Studies in Philosophy and Literature' consists of a collection of papers written by some of the most original scholars now working in the area of radical European Philosophy. The theme is aesthetic theory explicated in the work of Adorno and Walter Benjamin, an important interpreter of Adorno's aesthetic. The essays, by different hands but all in some way concerned with a modern or post-modern interpretation of the relation between literature and philosophy, break new ground in the difficult questions raised by abandoning metaphysics Adorno goes into answering questions about more questions: a range of issues is examined from plastic art, literature, language and music to feminism and Judaism.

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'COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET' IN EUROPE: THE ROAD TO 1992

by Nigel M. Healey

THANKS to an expensive television advertising campaign financed by the 'Department for Enterprise', the European Community's '1992' initiative has finally penetrated Britain's collective consciousness, nearly four years after the programme first began rolling. 'Europe's open for business!', the catchy slogan used in the campaign, has become the clarion call of British business, which has at last been stirred into action by the prospect of unbridled, cross-border competition in post-1992 Europe.

However, while the Government has successfully alerted industry and commerce to the coming of the 'single market' in 1992, the means by which the Community intends to achieve this goal is less well understood. The situation is not clarified by the frequently inconsistent statements emanating from, on the one hand, the British Government, and on the other, the Community itself. The former clearly see in 1992 'the vision of a deregulated, free-market, open Europe... driven by consumer choice'[1], while the latter envisage it as a process of economic and political integration, in which power is increasingly transferred to Brussels. In this vein, its chief spokesman on 1992, Mr. Jacques Delors, recently forecast that within a decade '80% of economic, and perhaps social and tax, legislation will be of Community origin'[2].

In an attempt to clear the waters, this article offers an overview of 1992 against the economic and political background of the initiative. It argues that while the ultimate goal of a Europe *sans frontières* may never be achieved, the advances made in the present drive for greater unity are to be welcomed.

The objective of 1992 is to create a 'single', or common, market in Europe, defined by the European Community (EC) as 'an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured'[3]. The United States is a good example of a common market in practice. It comprises fifty states, each with a distinct identity and a considerable degree of autonomy. Yet trade between the different states takes place freely, unhindered by customs formalities at state borders and other 'non-tariff barriers' like different state health and safety regulations and inconsistent technical standards. There is, broadly-

speaking, a common (federally-imposed) legal framework, a common tax and benefit system, a common currency and systems of government procurement and subsidies to industry which are set centrally by a single agency. The result is that a Californian company can sell its products in New York as easily as a Minnesotan company can invest in Oregon or a Bostonian seek employment in Florida. To this goal the EC aspires.

The idea of fusing Europe's national economies into a single market is not a new one; indeed, it was a central objective of the 1957 Treaty of Rome which originally established the EC. But while the Community successfully managed to abolish customs tariffs on internal trade within a decade of its inception, quarter of a century of trying to negotiate away the remaining legal, fiscal and technical obstacles to free movement produced little further progress. Out of sheer frustration, the Community finally made an attempt to revitalise the weary process in 1985, by drawing up a detailed, timetabled programme for the 'completion of the internal market' by 31 December, 1992. The economic benefits of transforming the EC into a single market are outlined by the Community in the specially-commissioned 'Cecchini Report'[4]. It argues that by eliminating the remaining barriers to intra-EC trade, costs — and so prices — will fall. For example, it estimates that frontier delays add approximately 2% to the prices of traded goods at present, while technical barriers account for another 2%. Moreover, once these obstacles are removed, it claims, the resultant increase in cross-border trade and competition will lead to further cost and price reductions as the more efficient producers drive out their less competitive rivals and reap economies of scale. The Cecchini Report calculates that over a period of six to eight years, the fuller exploitation of economies of scale and the gains from intensified competition should add 6% to the EC's gross domestic product, with comparable reductions in retail prices.

The Community believes that a common market in Europe would also serve a longer term, strategic purpose, by creating a market large enough to support EC producers of the scale necessary to compete internationally with the industrial and financial giants of the United States and Japan. In terms of the number of consumers, a common market in the EC (324m consumers) would dwarf those of the United States (246m) and Japan (123m), while in terms of sales volumes, the post-1992 market (£2.5tr) would be almost identical in size to that of the former (£2.6tr) and nearly twice the size of the latter's (£1.5tr). The Community hopes that a unified market will stimulate the emergence of new, pan-European manufacturers from the ranks of today's relatively small-scale national producers which are capable of challenging the might of the overseas mega-corporations.

The structure of the EC, and the division of responsibilities between its key institutions, is complex, but crucial to understanding the process by which the Community's blueprint for a single market must be translated into reality. The Council of Ministers, on which sit representatives of each member government (e.g. finance ministers if monetary or fiscal policy is

being discussed, farm ministers if the subject is agriculture, etc), is the decision-taking body in the Community, with members voting on a weighted basis (e.g. Britain, France, Germany and Italy have ten votes each, Spain has eight votes, etc). It is the Council which must ultimately approve the legislative measures necessary to remove the remaining obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital.

The Commission is the Community's civil service, a bureaucracy of some 12,000 full-time officials. Each department *(directorat générale)* is headed by a commissioner who, although appointed by a member government, is forbidden from acting in accordance with his or her country's national interests: the irritation Britain's former commissioner, Lord Cockfield, caused the Prime Minister is evidence that this arrangement works rather better than might be expected. The Commission has two main rôles: to propose legislation to the Council, which can either be accepted or rejected; and to ensure that decisions, once taken, are executed. The Commission is thus the heart of the Community, pumping new policies designed to promote economic integration into the decision-making process and keeping existing common policies running smoothly.

The third and probably best-known institution, the directly-elected European Parliament, is not a parliament in the British sense at all. It does not take decisions (that power is jealously guarded by the Council of Ministers), nor does it initiate new legislation (that rôle, oddly perhaps, being reserved for the electorally-unaccountable Commission). It is a consultative forum, in which the Commission's proposals to the Council must first be discussed, and its influence is exercised only indirectly to the extent that parliamentarians can persuade government ministers and commissioners to modify or introduce measures during such consultations[5].

It is against this institutional background that the 1992 programme must be viewed. The timetabled package of measures necessary to 'complete the internal market' (the so-called 'White Paper') was drawn up in 1985 by the Commission and sets out approximately 300 separate pieces of legislation designed to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. It identifies three main sources of friction: nationally-inconsistent technical standards, which make products and practices acceptable in one country unacceptable in another; nationally-differing tax and subsidy structures, which distort relative prices and so trade; and finally, 'physical' barriers (i.e. frontier delays), which result in part from the fact that lengthy customs inspections are necessary to check that products crossing national borders conform to the specific technical and fiscal standards of the receiving country. If all the White Paper's proposals are accepted by the Council of Ministers before New Year's Eve, 1992, these obstacles will cease to exist, leaving behind them a single market of 324m consumers.

Cynics point out that the Commission has floated similarly ambitious projects which have come to nought in the past. In 1968, for example, it tabled the notorious 'Mansholt Plan', designed to rationalise European agriculture into larger, more efficient units. Dubbed the 'peasant-killer'

plan by its critics, the opposition of strong continental farming lobbies quickly eroded support for the programme in the Council of Ministers. And again, in 1970, the 'Werner Plan' laid out a timetable for creating, in effect, a common currency in Europe by 1980, a mighty task which faltered almost immediately as member governments came under pressure from their hostile central bankers. Is there any reason to suppose that Project 1992 will not share the same fate as these unfortunate predecessors?

The answer may be yes, for two reasons. The first is that the 1985 White Paper was inspired by a changed atmosphere in the Council of Ministers, with member governments openly calling for a more rapid rate of economic integration. In other words, while the 1985 proposals for a single market technically originated in the Commission, they were largely in response to clear signals from the Council that the time for such an initiative was ripe. The second reason for optimism is that the member governments' enthusiasm for unity led the Council to approve the changes in its voting system embodied in the 'Single European Act', a package of measures recommended by the Commission to hasten progress towards 1992.

Although decisions are nominally taken on a majority basis in the Council, until recently the so-called 'Luxembourg Compromise'— whereby a single member state can veto a tabled proposal on the grounds that it infringes some unspecified 'vital national interest' — has always undermined major initiatives; any broad-based policy almost invariably entails gainers and losers and the losers could always prevent its implementation, even in cases where the Community overall would unambiguously have gained. By accepting the proposals embodied in the Single European Act which provide for the partial suspension of the Luxembourg Compromise, the Council explicitly agreed to settle the vast bulk of the 300 separate legislative measures contained in the White Paper by qualified majority, rather than unanimity, voting[6].

Project 1992 may yet go the way of the ill-fated Mansholt and Werner Plans, however. Although the extension of majority voting to a greater range of issues makes it more politically awkward for a single member to block proposals, in the final analysis the EC is a voluntary 'club' of like-minded countries which would be torn apart were the majority to try and impose their will on a dissenting minority; the Luxembourg Compromise is a recognition of this fact and formal agreements to limit its use will ultimately be revealed as cosmetic if they are ever put to the test. The success of 1992, therefore, lies less in modifying voting procedures and more in maintaining the present spirit of co-operation in the Council, a task which will become increasingly difficult as the 200 measures which remain to be adopted are whittled down to only the most contentious.

Nevertheless, even if only half of those proposals that remain outstanding are finally implemented, the 1992 initiative will have succeeded in making the EC a very different place by 1 January 1993. As noted above, apart from the fairly straightforward, if politically sensitive, removal of physical frontier controls, the Commission's proposals fall into two main

categories: measures to remove technical barriers and measures to eliminate fiscal barriers. It is instructive to examine each group in turn.

The different national legal and technical frameworks which govern market transactions constitute major obstacles to the free movement of products and factors. The sale of goods and services, for example, has traditionally been the subject of extensive government control, with regulations designed to protect the consumer from unscrupulous producers. Centuries of separate political development by the twelve member states have accordingly spawned a dozen mutually-inconsistent sets of legislation regarding technical, health and safety standards, segmenting the EC into small, discrete markets served by small-scale producers. The Commission makes a number of proposals in this area. A radical departure from past practice has been to urge Community-wide recognition of individual national standards wherever possible, rather than trying to force each country to harmonise around a common standard. This approach has only limited application, however, since in some areas there is a danger that mutual recognition will lead to a decline in standards and unwanted convergence on the lowest in the EC (e.g. if British food producers were being undercut by Spanish competitors, who benefited from less rigorous health controls, the Government might come under pressure to lower British standards). To avoid such problems, the Commission proposes greater use of Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome (which allows for harmonisation of standards across the EC) and under the Single European Act, Article 100 may now be used with majority approval.

Freedom of movement of labour is also artificially restricted by the barriers created by differing systems of education and vocational training and, following from these, the differing qualification requirements for various occupations. A dentist or a lawyer trained in Athens, for example, cannot at present set up practice in Bonn on the strength of his or her Greek qualifications. To counter these difficulties, the Commission has established the 'ERASMUS' project, designed to allow students to study in different Community countries, and made a number of proposals for degrees, diplomas and professional qualifications to be recognised throughout the EC, regardless of the country where they were obtained.

Capital movements are also restricted by a plethora of controls. Unlike the UK, some Community countries still operate explicit exchange controls on outward investment. Competition policy, particularly with respect to mergers and takeovers, also varies from country to country, hindering the development of truly pan-European companies. The proposed directive abolishing remaining capital controls was adopted by the Council in June 1988 and the Commission has made a further series of proposals aimed at 'approximating' (i.e. harmonising) national laws governing limited companies, in order to facilitate cross-border co-operation. It suggests a new European Company Statute to apply to public limited companies from two or more member states wishing to formally merge and is seeking a review of national mergers policies by member governments.

Across the EC, national governments tax away from their citizens

approximately 40% of their incomes, spending the money on a wide variety of social and economic programmes. Both the manner in which these huge revenues are raised and the way in which they are dispersed have far-reaching implications for the movement of products, labour and capital. When viewed in this light, the White Paper's proposals for fiscal reform appear modest. The Commission focusses upon only two dimensions of national fiscal systems which militate against a truly common market: different indirect tax rates and bases; and the preferential use of taxes and expenditures (normally in the form of subsidies) to achieve domestic industrial and social objectives.

At present value-added tax (VAT) rates and excise duties vary widely across the EC. VAT rates as high as 38% are charged in some countries (e.g. Italy), while Britain, for example, 'zero-rates' a large number of basic commodities (e.g. housing, food, energy). The divergence in excise duties is even more marked. In April 1987, when the Commission tabled its proposals for the harmonisation of these, Ireland was imposing a tax of £1.39 per bottle of wine (£0.77 in the UK), while in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal wine was duty-free. Denmark levied duty of £1.03 on each packet of cigarettes (£0.57 in the UK), while in Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal, the duty was less than £0.04. So that all products, whether domestically produced or imported from elsewhere in the EC, are subject to the same VAT and duty rates in any given country, the Community as a whole presently tolerates considerable administrative costs, with exports having to be 'de-taxed' as they leave one EC country and 're-taxed' as they are imported into another (this procedure is currently essential if, say, British wine is to be able to compete with Italian wine in the German market). Bringing rates closer together — the Commission has proposed, for example, a basic VAT rate band of 4-9% and a higher rate band of 14-20% — would eliminate the need for such arrangements and is regarded as a prerequisite for the abolition of physical frontier controls.

Another problem arises to the extent that not all goods and services are equally traded, so that by charging different rates of VAT on different commodities, domestic consumption patterns can be twisted in favour of home-produced goods. Many of the VAT-free items in the UK are domestically produced (e.g. it is difficult to buy a house from a German builder or natural gas from a Portuguese supplier), whereas almost all imports except food fall into the VAT net. The same logic applies to excise duties, where the Commission suspects that differential rates are used to preserve consumption patterns which favour home producers. For many years, Britain taxed beer (almost all of which is domestically brewed) more lightly than wine (which is almost all imported).

On the other side of their balance sheets, national governments are also major buyers of goods and services and, whether overtly or covertly, often operate preferential procurement systems which favour their own domestic producers. The fiscal implications of national industrial and regional policies, notably through the use of subsidies to inefficient pro-

ducers, also greatly distort the competitive position of one nation's producers vis-à-vis that of a Community rival. The Commission has accordingly made a number of proposals to tighten up its existing directives on public purchasing and so-called 'state aids'.

As set out in the White Paper, the 1992 initiative is all about 'setting the market free'. By stripping away the remaining obstacles to free trade, the Community believes that the chill winds of cross-border competition will drive out inefficient producers and blow away the monopoly profits currently being enjoyed by many companies in their (now-protected) home markets. To the extent that the strong will survive and grow at the expense of the weak, some parts of British industry will undoubtedly flourish in the new, harsher climate. For example, the British pharmaceutical industry is amongst the most efficient in Europe and is poised to seize market share from less-competitive continental firms; the UK food industry is already highly concentrated and presently prevented from exploiting its comparative advantage in the wider European market by a plethora of restrictions; British companies dominate the European alcohol and tobacco scene and their prospects will be additionally enhanced by the harmonisation of excise duties around a lower, Community-average level. Deregulation should also allow the British financial giants to expand their activities into the rest of Europe and encourage the insurance industry — which has a marked cost advantage over its continental rivals — to invade new markets.

There will, however, be losers. Mechanical and electrical engineering, for example, will almost certainly suffer as the dismantling of non-tariff barriers exposes them to greater import penetration, as may the motor industry, textiles, clothing and a range of other traditional activities in the manufacturing sector. Part of the rationale for a 'social dimension' to 1992 thus stems from a desire to ease the dislocation caused by the contraction of major industries in some member countries, by providing funds for retraining displaced workers.

A more sophisticated case for strengthening the EC's social policy arm as part of the 1992 initiative turns on the likely, longer term impact of a single market on industrial location. The tendency of business and commerce to converge on the so-called 'golden triangle' — south-eastern England, northern France, south-western Germany and the Benelux countries — is already well-established. This is where the major markets are centred and where the industrial and financial infrastructure is most highly developed; operating from a base in, say, Eire or southern Italy is generally less commercially attractive, even though the explicit costs in terms of labour and capital may be lower. Post-1992, the pressure to migrate to the centre and eschew the peripheral regions is bound to intensify as the present obstacles to cross-border relocation are progressively eliminated. To combat this potential difficulty the EC has agreed to provide £33bn aid to the poorer regions between now and 1992, to offset the likely 'imbalances' generated by the drive for a single market.

In recent months, however, some member governments have come to

believe that the social dimension of 1992 should go beyond simply beefing up the EC's industrial and regional policy to cope with the negative side-effects of intensified competition in Europe. Led by the Commission's French President, Jacques Delors, they argue that the position of labour vis-à-vis capital will be weakened by 1992 and that new EC-wide, social legislation will be required to redress the balance. Their suggestions include, inter alia, a 'social charter' guaranteeing workers' fundamental rights and a new company statute forcing firms to accept worker participation, both of which enjoy widespread support amongst member governments where the ideas either fit with the (socialist) politics of the ruling coalition or mesh closely with long-established domestic laws (e.g. Germany and Holland). Only the British Government is unequivocally opposed, claiming that the introduction of new regulations runs counter to the whole spirit of 1992. It remains to be seen whether the growing controversy about the need for new, supranational social legislation begins to sour the present co-operative spirit in the Council.

It is clear that a number of the 300 measures necessary to complete the internal market will not be adopted by the Council before the 31st December 1992 deadline and some will probably never be. Nevertheless, the rolling programme of abolishing obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital in Europe has started better than many commentators dared hope and there does appear to be a new spirit of co-operation and compromise in the air which bodes well for the future. In any case, a truly 'single market' is an unattainable dream in the final analysis, since national markets will always be subject to cultural, social and linguistic barriers which no government can legislate away. Although 1992 will take the EC a lot nearer its ultimate goal, recognising its inherent limitations implies that even if ten or twenty or even 100 of its 300 component pieces of legislation are never implemented, the programme will still have been worthwhile. 1992 is not an 'all or nothing' exercise; rather, every barrier which is negotiated into history and each technical standard which is harmonised represent another step towards making the Community a more coherent, less wasteful place in which to live and work. For that, 1992 is to be welcomed.

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

1. Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at Chatham House, January 1989.
2. Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, speech to the European Parliament, July 1988.
3. European Commission (1985) *Completing the Internal Market*, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Brussels.
4. For an abridged version of the Cecchini Report, see Emerson, M. et al (1988), *The Economics of 1992: The EC Commission's Assessment of the Economic Effects of Completing the Internal Market*, Oxford University Press.
5. The powers of the European Parliament have been slightly extended by the Single European Act, which now allows the Parliament to reject a proposal which the Council has 'provisionally' adopted. The Council can, however, subsequestly overrule Parliament. In this sense, the changes make the European Parliament more like the British House of Lords, but still a long way from being a House of Commons.
6. Voting is on a qualified, rather than simple, majority basis, with 54 of the 76 votes needed for a proposal to be adopted.

COUNTERTRADE

By B. Narpati

WORLD trade started with the age of navigation. By 1460 the Portuguese had reached the rich tropics of Africa and were able to exchange copper, wine, grain and cloth for gold, ivory, spices, etc. This was followed by the Dutch who left European shores with their vessels full of cloths and trinkets and returned from the East Indies laden with spices.

A notable development in recent years has been the growing trend towards countertrade. Countertrade is something which needs to be done rather than spoken about. Everyone agrees that countertrade is here to stay. A traditional form of doing business with the centrally planned economies, and a mandatory one with many developing Third World countries, countertrade in the 1980s is centred on the western industrialised nations.

The term 'countertrade' covers a wide range of international transactions in which exporting is linked contractually to import commitments. These mechanisms include barter, counterpurchase, offset, buyback, evidence accounts and switch trading. Under countertrade arrangements, export sales to a particular market are made conditional upon undertakings to accept imports from that market. Such operations are set up by negotiation and there are hardly any international regulations which govern them.

Countertrade has become a perceptible feature of trade with more than half the countries in the world. Willingness and ability to comply with local countertrade requirements can mean the difference between success and failure in exporting. An initiative in this area can be an important effective marketing tool in such markets.

Countertrade can be a complex, expensive, and uncertain mode of trading. It is growing and fast becoming a fact of international trade. With careful planning some exporters have been able to turn it to their advantage. Countertrade emphasises closed goods-based, reciprocal transactions and somewhat prejudices the long-term advantages from multilateral trade. It replaces the pressures of competition with reciprocity, protection and price fixing. For these reasons the GATT and OECD have expressed concern at the growth of countertrade in recent years.

At practical level, countertrade can be a costly and uncertain mode of trading. It militates against small and medium-sized firms which are not able to bear the additional costs and staff required. There are markets in which accepting an element of countertrade can be the only way of securing export orders.

The resurgence in commodity-based countertrade (particularly in oil), the new countertrade policy being implemented in India and the continued growth of countertrade and offset in the defence market, emphasize the fact that countertrade is becoming an important factor in international

trade. To the vast majority of companies in the world who depend on exports countertrade is simply another aspect in their search for orders.

Countertrade remains unusual in trade between the industrialised countries. The major exceptions have arisen in defence, aviation and large high technology deals. Some European countries (notably Portugal and Greece) have sought counterpurchase in recent years for other large export orders, but only on an ad hoc basis. Australia and New Zealand, which require offset for public sector purchases, are the principal OECD countries with mandatory countertrade requirements. Selective regulations also exist in countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Belgium.

Indonesia was the first LDC to introduce mandatory countertrade requirements and has since been followed by a number of others. Indonesia until recently was able to fund its internal development out of substantial oil revenues. It has now found a formalized system for countertrade as a requisite to generate additional hard currency revenues in the non-oil sector.

Informed estimates of the percentage of countertrade in the world trade total put it between five and fifteen per cent. It is expanding on a massive scale and this increase is threatening EC exports, Glyn Ford (Greater Manchester East, Soc.) told the House (European Parliament, Strasbourg, 20th October 1986).

Replying for the Commission, Stanley Clinton Davis said he welcomed the resolution. It is recognised that countertrade is growing but that it is hard to gauge its extent. A recent study suggests it is 20 per cent of world trade. GATT does not prohibit countertrade and it may be permitting trade flows which would not be possible otherwise, especially for developing countries. So while deploring the adverse effects, few will eschew the benefits to be derived from it.

They are a contravention of the Rome Treaty. The Commission is having a study made though so far there is no evidence of any member state's involvement here. The resolution was adopted unanimously subject to an amendment tabled by James Moorhouse (London South and Surrey East, Dem.).

According to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), countertrade in various forms accounts for one quarter of the global trade. It has assumed greater importance for developing countries because of their worsening trade prospects, deteriorating terms of trade and increasing imbalance in their payments. Countertrade has been accepted as an important means of export promotion in India as well.

Mr. A. B. Buckwell, speaking at a seminar on 'Countertrade', said that this growth of barter and countertrade in the last few years is a reflection of the international debt crisis and a prolonged recession. No longer the exclusive preserve of Eastern Europe, it has come of age. It is becoming a significant component of major contracts worldwide.

In Philips, the Corporate Counter Trade Office is responsible for the

co-ordination of countertrade. Mr. J. C. Schut has managed this office since the 1st of September, 1984. The office is at present engaged in making an inventory of the various possibilities that are important in this respect. Also under study are the trade organisations and the products or commodities with which business can be done. The office is examining what sales channels can be created for all kinds of 'non-Philips' goods. An attempt is being made in co-operation, wherever possible with other companies, to ensure the continuity of these sales channels. (Philips News, Eindhoven, Netherlands. August 1985).

Mr. Schut stresses that for the time being Philips does not intend to create an 'in-house' trading organisation. He feels that in the somewhat longer term they will also be forced to fulfil a trading function: countertrade is not a business for amateurs and that professionals must be used, according to Mr. Schut. All too often, employees in the company still treat countertrade as a hobby.

Creditanstalt's countertrade subsidiary, AWT, expects an increase in countertrade business with CMEA countries. AWT's Consultancy Service on Countertrade (CTC) was established in 1984. CTC acts as a partner, negotiating alongside its client on trade finance and countertrade issues.

Countertrade began in the Eastern European countries after the Second World War. The practice of countertrade has spread and is still spreading. Speculation as to the current size of the market ranges from 8% to 30% to 40%. Growth is difficult to assess because of the tendency of participants to maintain secrecy. The lower figure could perhaps be appropriate for conventional trade. With bi-lateral trade agreements and arms business included, then the 30-40% range is the likely figure.

According to Mr. A. J. Linger, countertrade is inherently an 'ad-hoc' activity (with certain exceptions) and the mechanics vary according to the needs of the individual transaction. With the recent surge of countertrade activity worldwide many corporations are organising themselves to participate in this method of international trade. Surely it is better to accept countertrade and trade than not to trade at all.

More 'countertrade clubs' are being set up, following the one in Vienna. A tentative group in London is the latest among these. It is under the sponsorship of the International Barter and Countertrade Department of Lloyds Bank.

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THE HUNGARIAN ELEMENT

by Leo Muray

THE Soviet Union is now in a period of uncertainty and transition. There is a new and rather unexpected factor. Soviet leaders, Gorbachov and Shevardnadze in the first place, have been warning that *perestroika,* the vital reform programme, may be wrecked by the growing tensions between the various nations and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union (there are over one hundred) and the central government over ethnic issues. This suggests that the Kremlin is basically unable, and unwilling, to exercise control over the East European allies as Stalin, Khrushchev and Breshnev did. In a recent speech in the Ukraine Gorbachov himself announced that the Soviet Union would respect 'the unconditional independence and the full equal rights' of the other Socialist countries and adhere to 'strict non-interference in the internal affairs' of the countries.

Hungary, not surprisingly, has emerged as a test case. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Bogomolov, has stated publicly that a 'multi-party, neutral Hungary' along the Austrian model would represent no strategic threat to the Soviet Union. No Soviet official or leader has ever said anything like that of any Warsaw Pact country. Hungarian officials hint that their country would like to be able to adopt the same attitude and the same relations to the Warsaw Pact alliance that France has with NATO, to be an ally but not fully integrated in the military structure.[1] Indeed, the withdrawal of the first Soviet division from South Western Hungary has started and is about to be completed. The Soviet High Command has had 68,000 men in Hungary for the last 40 years. The withdrawal is a symbolic and not a total one for the time being, it is explained.

Hungary is a test case because the essence of the reforms pushed through now is to separate the 'Socialist Workers Party', the Communist Party, from the government, it was explained, to withdraw from running 'the day to day business' of the country. As the then Foreign Minister, Varkonyi, explained in an address in London recently, the Party no longer claimed 'exclusivity' and had 'exhausted its possibilities' in the last 40 years. A radical reform of the political and economic 'institutional system' was necessary. Yet, only last year it was stated that 'the Marxist-Leninist party of the working class must be the leading power of society in a democratic socialist state'.

Leading officials admit that 'amazing changes' are happening in the political field. The present Parliament has already accepted what is in practice a multi-party system by establishing freedom of assembly and of association. A new law will lay down how formal political parties are to be established and also how they are to be financed. In fact, there are already quite a few parties, like the revived old Social Democrats and the Smallholders. Both parties go back to the Hapsburg monarchy. There

are new political parties as well like the Democratic Forum, claiming 12,000 members. The ruling Communist Party has 600,000 members but is losing them all the time. It had been known for years that most young people joined simply because they wanted to get on.

There are to be elections next year and the new Constitution is to change the role of Parliament. Until now Parliament met just eight to ten days in the year, like the Soviet Parliament. The new Parliament will hold proper sessions every month. There is to be a whole package of new rights including the right to strike, freedom of the press, which is largely already there, freedom of the churches and of religious practice. The ethnic minorities in the country, the Germans in the first place, will have the right to their own institutions.

It is also proposed, but not quite decided yet, to introduce public referendums. This has become a key issue behind the scenes because of the building of the huge dam and power plant on the Danube jointly with the Prague government at Nagymaros, the river being the border there. Hungarian public opinion is passionately opposed to the venture that has already started because it will not work and will destroy the environment. If the new constitution provides for a referendum it is certain that it will be demanded on this issue and the dam project will be broken off. It would be awkward for a new, probably multi-party government to start off with a defeat. It would be awkward too and offend the Czecho-Slovaks if the government did not fight for the dam. Chernobyl has made a lasting impression and big schemes that change the environment are instinctively rejected in Hungary too whether or not they are connected with nuclear power.

The HSWP, the Communist Party, is deeply split and uneasy. The splits are coming out more and more as the reforms are being applied. In April, the 11 member Politburo had to be purged. Four of the members were dismissed and only two of the places filled. The leading orthodox 'ideologian', Berecz, and his chief aide, Lukacs, were dismissed. The change has weakened the position of the Party Secretary-General, Karoly Grosz. The Premier, Nemeth, who has been to Harvard University, is a cautious performer but not a strong leader.[2] The man who has taken the political lead in the unorthodox reform programme, sometimes called the Gorbachov of Hungary, is Imre Pozsgay who has risen through the ranks of the party. He was the first to call the fateful uprising in 1956 publicly a popular movement.

His ally in the Politburo is the chief economic planner, Rezsoe Nyers. He is, in fact, an old Social Democrat. He was responsible for the reforms introduced 20 years ago by Janos Kádár, the old 'Breshnevite' leader who was retired two years ago. For some years the Nyers reforms gave Hungary the highest living standard in the Soviet Bloc. But they are now gone and Nyers re-emerged only when Kádár was got rid of. The success of the reform policy depends on whether Pozsgay and Nyers continue to work together and how they will deal with the Premier, Nemeth. The sources of power are four-fold: the Party, the bureaucracy, the Armed

Forces and the Workers Militia. The Militia, around half a million, is the centre of traditionalist opposition. It will play a key role in next year's crucial elections. There is much talk of the HSWP being split before the elections. This is seen as a warning to the Reformers not to go too far and too fast. Indeed, a small opinion poll has shown that the HSWP can rely on around a third of the vote only in a free election.

It is admitted that support for the present reformist policy depends on whether the programme will bring an early and noticeable improvement in the standard of living despite the rise in unemployment. If it does not, support for the reform programme will fall dramatically within the Party. This would strengthen the orthodox and the men who control the Workers Militia.

The government is engaged in an economic reform programme that would be called traditional in the West but ignores most of the tenets and principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and policy. The present economic structure is officially described as inadequate. The economy is in bad shape. Inflation is around 17%, unemployment is growing and officially 600,000 are living below the official subsistence level. There is a budget deficit of 20 billion Forint, nearly twice the figure worked out previously. Foreign debts amount to 17 billion dollars with debt payments eating up two thirds of foreign earnings needed desperately to buy equipment. Loss-making undertakings have risen by 70 to 265 in 1988. Subsidies to 'smoke stack' industries must be cut. Heavy job losses are accepted as a consequence of streamlining industries in order to compete in Western markets. An 'unemployment fee' was introduced this year, the first in a Soviet Bloc country.

Social tensions and conflicts must be accepted and 'social welfare policy adjusted' when carrying out the reform programme, the report says. It is new to mention and admit not only tensions but also conflicts and it is implied that unemployment has to be treated as a permanent feature. Premier Nemeth confessed in a speech that the government was ready to tackle political conflicts that go with the efforts to restructure and stabilise the economy. The government, he pleaded, was interested in a dialogue. There have been some strikes, among students for instance, who largely support the Democratic Forum. But the Trade Unions have largely held their fire.

The 1989 economic plan is designed to start a 'durable integration' of Hungary's economics into the world market. This is against a fall of consumption by 8%, of real income by 1%, construction by 2% and even food production by 1%. Industry must be streamlined and turned into profitable units to compete on the world market. Foreign firms are encouraged to start joint ventures with no limits on foreign holdings and no restrictions on the transfer of profits. A Stock Exchange is functioning now and banks are dealing more freely. Tourism is being encouraged, Western currency-earning tourism chiefly, of course.

The new Hungarian economic policy is also a serious challenge to COMECON, the Soviet Bloc trade group now negotiating with the EEC.

The reason is a simple one. COMECON trade is barter between the Soviet Union and other partners with prices and production quotas worked out and based on the Soviet currency, the Ruble, that cannot be converted. Prices are worked out in tricky secret negotiations. Since most COMECON members are in serious balance of payments debt trouble with the West and need Soviet oil, theirs is a weak hand. But with *perestroika* in trouble the Soviets had to concede that COMECON will have a convertible currency by 2005 and much is bound to happen by then. The Soviets have always pressed for a more or less strict 'division of work' between the COMECON partners which meant that the Soviets were determining the planning in all member countries and that these had to give absolute preference to producing the goods, raw materials and equipment Soviet planning was interested in. But last July there was only general agreement to 'co-ordinate' the Five Year Plans of members. 'Markets (an un-Marxist-Leninist term) that do not exist cannot be unified' the Hungarian delegate revealed he had told the Russians.

The Hungarians now also want to do away with the present, Soviet designed COMECON accounting system. They only want to export enough to the Soviets to get the fuel they need. There was some blunt speaking. 'When there is a lack of mutually acceptable goods', it was stated, 'the balance of trade must be ensured through reduction of exports'. They want to be paid in convertible Rubles, without quotas, and prices to be based on market values, which means Western. It is stated quite openly that the production of goods designed for the Soviet market will be cut and trade with COMECON will fall. There will be no subsidies for producing such goods. Inevitably, as a consequence, economic long term planning will be restricted.

Here Hungary appears to be on its own. No other COMECON government is likely to be prepared to abolish gradually the 'Command Economy'. The Hungarians say that their relationship with Moscow has changed under Gorbachov. But the changes in Hungary are not, they stress, Gorbachov's doing. They would have happened without him. He supports them, but they would not work in the Soviet Union, especially not the multi-party system. If Gorbachov were to fail, and the Hungarians watch it, their own developments would go on all the same.

Success or failure of the Hungarian reforms, political and economic, are being carefully watched by other Warsaw Pact members, especially how next year's elections under a new Constitution with a multi-party line will affect the control of the country by the HSWP, the Communist Party. Officials say that relations with Czechoslovakia are friendly, though the dam is a worry, as they are with Yugoslavia. Poland, of course, is an ally and the Hungarians hope that they will also get American aid and goodwill, as Poland is getting after Solidarity has been legalised. Relations with East Germany and Bulgaria are 'normal'.

But relations with Romania are getting worse almost day by day. The Hungarians say that they feel the two countries are not on the same continent. The situation of the 2½ million strong Hungarian minority is

getting worse. How much worse it will get depends on when the Ceausescu regime will collapse. The Hungarians are certain that it will. They are careful to say that they will not intervene. But it is plain that, with a democratically elected Parliament and a coalition government, public pressure to do so in the event of clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians will be enormous and will threaten the whole structure of the Warsaw Pact. It has become a problem for the Kremlin too.

As for the Western countries the Hungarians feel that they are having a 'honeymoon' with Austria.[3] There is freedom of movement and a joint Budapest-Vienna exhibition will be held in 1995. Preparations are already in hand. In October there will be a special Hungarian exhibition, a 'Cultural one', at the Barbican in London. There has been, since the time of Cromwell, a 'Public School' run on English lines until the Communist take-over at Sarospatak, in the valley where the Tokay wine is grown. The Hungarians rely on a steady improvement of relations with all Western countries and hope that sooner rather than later they will, in practical terms gain a position similar to that of Austria, especially if they succeed in loosening their trade ties with the Soviet Union and COMECON. That will depend largely on Gorbachov's success or failure. By 1991 the Hungarians think they will know.

One has to go back in Hungary's history to assess adequately its present role. The Hungarians are incomers so to speak, really Magyars, descendants of six warlike tribes from somewhere beyond the Urals. You can see their mythical chieftains on fierce chargers sculpted in a monument on Budapest's main square. They have their own non-European language, somehow related to Finnish. They have been Christians for a thousand years. But, significantly, they have the strongest Protestant communities in Eastern Europe, Lutheran and Calvinist. The Protestants were the leaders against the Hapsburgs. The Protestants feel strongly about the link with Western Europe. Hungarians feel that they are an élite nation, like the British and French.

They had a turbulent history and a very old National Diet where debates were held in Latin until the 19th century. They were, and still regard themselves as, a nation of noblemen. At the time of the 1848 revolution, one in 14 was listed as a nobleman compared with 1 in 353 in Austria itself. Most of them (there were 466,000 at the time of the final treaty with the Hapsburgs in 1867) belong to the lower gentry class but it was shown in their names in the noblemen's list, published every year until 1944, that there were five basic titles of nobility. The top-ranking Counts and Princes owned huge estates and one of them, Prince Eszterhazy, still owns some in the Burgenland, now Austria, that was once a region of Hungary.

In the last period of the Hapsburg Empire, Hungary shared power with the Austrians and often had more power than they. This feeling, that it is an ancient nation, used to rule, while, at the same time, occupying a key strategic place in Europe separating the Western Slav nations, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians from the Southern Slavs, has given the Hun-

garians a feeling of self-confidence. This was shown at the requiem mass held for the last Queen of Hungary, the Empress Zita of Austria, held in the ancient St. Mathews Church. Her son, Dr. Otto von Habsburg with his family, was there. All the upper crust of the nobility turned up in their colourful ancient Court apparel for everyone in the street to see.

With the constitution, the Soviet bloc type flag and national emblem and coat of arms are also to be changed back to the flag and ancient coat of arms. But here is the problem: should the old crown of St. Stephen, the king who turned the Magyars into Christians in the year 1000, with its famous twisted cross remain on top of the coat of arms? The reformers and the public want it. Curiously it was the dismantled Kádár regime, regular Marxists/Leninists that pleaded with Washington for years to get the St. Stephens Crown back. It had somehow fallen into American hands in the chaos at the end of the war. It is now in a museum in Budapest.

One is assured that Dr. Otto von Habsburg, 75 and a member of the Strasbourg EEC Assembly, representing Bavaria, can come and go as he pleases. He speaks fluent Magyar and is sought after by people in the streets. This does not worry the Communist officials. He is somehow a symbol of a freedom of choice, not more and not less. One reason is that the present leadership wants freedom of choice to introduce a working 'Socialist Market System' without having to obey the rules of the Soviet Bloc. Any success, even a modest one, will put new force and new arguments into the movement of Reformers in all other Soviet Bloc countries, just as failure will harden the line of the ruling Traditionalists, say in Czechoslovakia or East Germany, not to mention the arguments it will produce one way or the other in the constant in-fighting in the Kremlin.

NOTES:

1. The Warsaw Pact expires in 2004, but the official German language *Budapester Rundschau* stated in its last issue that a member could prove 'that the international and political situation has changed in such a way as to make the treaty irrelevant'.
2. Nemeth had to get rid of six key Ministers: Finance, Industry, Agriculture, Planning, Education and Foreign Affairs, and replace Party officials with technocrats. The only 'new' politician is Gyula Horn in the Foreign Ministry who has demanded far-reaching changes and deplores the failure of 'democratic socialism'. Nemeth now hopes to survive until the elections.
3. The real 'Iron Curtain', 218 miles of barbed wire and alarm posts along the Austrian border, is now being torn down with 150 media people invited to watch the start. An official pleaded that the removal signified the end of an era and hoped such a system would never be needed again. The other 'Iron Curtains' remain

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[Leo Muray, East European correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* 1947-1951, later became Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Liverpool Daily Post* and now contributes a weekly diplomatic column.]

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN PAKISTAN

by Frances Harrison

THE success of Benazir Bhutto in the November elections last year in Pakistan should be a cause for rejoicing amongst the women's movements of the country. Pakistan is now the first Islamic country to have a woman leader. Benazir remains Prime Minister despite the proclamations of right wing religious leaders declaring it 'un-Islamic' for a woman to be head of state. Even though the opposition has tried to disqualify Benazir on the grounds of her sex, she has claimed that she has never felt discriminated against by men.

Benazir's coming to power has caused a lull amongst the women's movements of Pakistan as they wait to see what, if any, changes she will effect to improve the status of women. Sadly there is no feeling that the struggle is over now that a more benign government is in Islamabad. Benazir's party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) has a women's wing which was active in the elections, but it made no appeal to women voters on the issue of their rights. Instead it concentrated on registering female voters and transporting them to polling stations. Although women constituted 45% of the electorate, the level of awareness amongst the majority of women of the need to demand equal rights is so dismally low that none of the political parties needed to promise serious attempts to help women. Some parties guaranteed to further women's rights within the purview of Islam, whilst still committing themselves to 'the supremacy of Islamic laws' which have had the effect of legalising discrimination against women (see *Contemporary Review*, January 1989). This was more of an appeal to men on the issue of curtailing women's rights than to women. Traditionally women who vote are thought to follow the instructions of their men. Only a better literacy rate amongst women will ensure that they exercise their political right to vote independently.

The 1988 elections saw more women candidates fighting seats than ever before, but like Benazir they have remained pragmatically silent on the oppression of women. Although women voted in separate polling booths in every constituency, the Election Commission claimed it had not recorded women's votes separately and could not reveal how women tended to vote. Instead the Lahore Election Commission Press Officer defensively assured me there had been no rigging of the polls whatsoever, even though I had not enquired about this. One opinion poll at the time of the elections suggested that only 8% of those who voted for Benazir's PPP did so because they thought it would do away with President Zia's policies. Under President Zia's régime Pakistan became probably the only country in the modern world to remove women's constitutional rights, but it seems unlikely that this was a criterion in voting. Of those who opposed Benazir and voted for the main opposition party, the IJI, as many as 24% did so because it was led by a strong man and 33% because they thought it to be more Islamic than the PPP. Religion and

an unwillingness to have a woman leader seem to have influenced voting more than any desire to curb Zia's Islamisation programme which has caused the position of women to regress.

The most prominent women's group, the Women's Action Forum (WAF) has concentrated its efforts on protesting against Zia's Islamic laws, which instead of enforcing high moral standards of conduct for both sexes have facilitated the abuse of women. Although Benazir has signed the WAF charter calling for the abolition of the notorious Hudood Ordinance, under which 90% of women in jails are convicted, there is considerable doubt as to whether she will actually abolish it. President Zia's eighth amendment to the Constitution, framed originally by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, protects the Hudood Ordinance. Changing the eighth amendment is Benazir's first priority, but for other reasons: the amendment was designed to give the president (then Zia) greater powers and diminish those of the Prime Minister (then Junejo, whom Zia arbitrarily dismissed in May 1988). WAF is lobbying together with the PPP to obtain a two thirds majority in the National Assembly and opposition dominated Senate which is needed to change the Constitution, in the hope that Benazir will keep her word about abolishing the Hudood Ordinance. One woman lawyer active in WAF told me: 'the government is hiding behind the eighth amendment so as not to change the Hudood Ordnance'. If Benazir really cared about the women languishing in jail under this law, there is something she could do to help them right now: ensure that bail is available to women. Many of the charges under the Hudood Ordinance are false: 33% of the charges brought between 1980 and 1987 in Pakistan were subsequently dismissed as false. However, women who are charged with sexual offences, whether wrongly or rightly, are put in police custody and it has been estimated by one lawyer that 40% of women in police stations are raped whilst in custody. At present bail for sexual offences, or Zina, is not automatically granted to a woman, but if Benazir were to reduce the maximum prison sentence for the offence from ten to six years then bail would be automatic, providing the surety could be raised, and women would escape both the police harrassment and the social stigma of police custody.

Benazir came to power with her hands tied behind her back. Even if she did get the eighth amendment abolished, which looks increasingly unlikely, Benazir may well prefer to anger the small élite of women in groups like WAF than play into the hands of the opposition who are denouncing the PPP for having a woman leader and being un-Islamic. Indeed the powerful, conservative religious leaders have demonstrated their rabble rousing powers in the Salman Rushdie controversy. So far all Benazir has done to affect women is issue a directive to all government departments asking female employees not to shake hands with men in public.

The abolition of discriminatory Islamic laws has been the main target of women's agitation. If Benazir did abolish them, there is some speculation that this would deprive the women's movement of its main target and

thrust. WAF, for example, is deeply divided on other aims, although it claims to have no political affiliations but a wish for democracy. It has no concerted and shared idea of how it will attempt to alter social attitudes. Islamic laws do institutionalise inequality between men and women but more pernicious is class oppression. One former member of WAF criticised the group saying that the women who run it would never let their ayahs or servants form a union to demand higher wages because their feminism stopped short of anything against their own interests. WAF has been criticised by right wing conservatives as a group of Westernised, affluent upper class women. Consequently it has been dismissed as unrepresentative of the majority of women in Pakistan. The Left also criticises the women's movement on the grounds that it is élitest and merely a diversion from the primary struggle for a socialist Pakistan, where such problems would not exist.

All these criticisms have some validity, but ignore the situation in Pakistan and demean the brave efforts of some of the women in WAF, rather than encouraging them to extend the scope of their agitation. In Pakistan it is only the relatively affluent and educated women who have the time and awareness to organise a women's movement. WAF claims to have moral support from a number of working class women and has at times joined forces with trade unions and women working in the brick kilns outside Lahore. However, as one WAF founder member told me, they cannot take the responsibility for bringing working class women out on the streets to form mass public demonstrations, because the police would have no qualms about using force against them and when in jail or police stations they would stand to lose a great deal more than a more prosperous woman and would have no servants to take care of their children. WAF protests against the Hudood Ordinance on their behalf, for not one single woman from the upper middle classes has been convicted under this law. 99% are from the labouring classes and 80% of those are illiterate. As one WAF member said, 'The Hudood Ordinance makes no difference to us'. The WAF women are of a class that makes them immune to the consequences of such legislation in practice. That they take the risks and trouble to protest against the laws is all the more to their credit.

WAF has taken out demonstrations on to the streets during Zia's time, but the largest demonstration has only ever been of the order of about 150 women maximum and sometimes there are said to be more riot police than women demonstrating. Certainly the probability of being beaten up by the police, tear gassed and lathi charged must put off many women sympathetic to the cause. Interviewing a representative spread of women in a slum area of Lahore's old city, I found none of them had ever heard of WAF or any other women's organisation, the Hudood Ordinance or any other Islamic law affecting women adversely. These women were more concerned with their family's economic adversity and conservative social attitudes which forced them to live in purdah, locked within the four walls of their small houses. It is these two evils: class oppression and

social attitudes to which the women's movement should direct its attention now.

The problem for WAF is that it is internally divided on such issues. Some women feel legal equality is the end of the battle; others believe radical social change is called for. The paradox lies in the fact that the comfortable circumstances which enable such women to devote their energies to the women's movement derive from their indirect economic exploitation of both women and men of a different class. By concentrating on a less controversial subject — Islamic laws — this paradox has never been squarely confronted. Even the question of religion remains debated. A few feminists believe that equality can only be achieved once religion is excluded from discussion, for even an enlightened interpretation of the Quran cannot provide for the full emancipation of women. Others merely seek a liberal and progressive reinterpretation of a woman's status in Islam. WAF's public stance is that Islam has been used to oppress women. One committee member admitted that it would simply be impolitic for WAF to call itself a secular organisation for it would alienate too many women; instead she said 'we can use religion too'. WAF sees itself as differing from Western feminists, in that it works within the boundaries of Islam, despite regarding the roots of patriarchy in Pakistan as closely linked to religion.

One organisation that works with rural women (who form the majority of Pakistan's women, 72%) at a grassroots level, unlike WAF at present, is the Family Planning Association of Pakistan. The main obstacle the family planning workers find to their work in rural areas is ignorance and prejudice. Most of the women believe that contraception is un-Islamic and a sin to use because children are a gift from God. In order to combat this prejudice the organisers have brought out a book in Urdu proving, by quotation from the Quran that birth control is not un-Islamic or forbidden by Islam. Since literacy is so low amongst women this is more of an attack on male attitudes. The Family Planning Association, which was founded as a charitable organisation in 1978, has in all 728 voluntary and unpaid grass roots workers in 55 different areas. It makes valiant efforts to educate rural women, not merely in contraception but also in aspects of general medical health and increase women's consciousness of their status. An Income Generating Scheme has also been started in twelve locations, funded partly by Oxfam, which is designed to assist women in starting small businesses, suited to their local area, by giving them advice, encouragement and a repayable loan of 500 rupees (about £16) in order to start it off. The FPA also holds poster making sessions amongst rural women to educate them about the equality of women. It has also produced some popular cassette tapes which educate through songs and theatrical sketches and are used in the villages. The work of this organisation is sadly limited by its size and resources, so that in 1986 they estimated that their efforts resulted in averting a total of 26,888 births, which hardly makes a dent in a population of 83 million growing at an annual rate of 2.9%. Increased efforts on the family planning front,

to counter Pakistan's population problem, and in educating women are the only hope for raising women's awareness of their needs and rights and equipping them to form and express political opinions.

Another group is the Business and Professional Women's Club, again composed of mainly upper middle class women. This group focuses its attentions on providing hostels for working women and also provides flood relief. At the moment the Business and Professional Women's Club is trying to build a hostel to be run solely by women in Faisel Town, with a legal aid centre, creche, adult literacy courses and much needed refuge for single, working women and their children. However, it is coming up against severe problems in obtaining funding for this venture.

A newer, specifically feminist group is Simorgh, the Women's Resource and Publication Centre, a collective run by four women in Lahore, who are also active in WAF and the Family Planning Association of Pakistan. This is a group that very few people have ever heard of. It has produced a long statement of its ideological standpoint in English, which would mean nothing at all to the average Pakistani woman. It aims to publish women's fiction and aid research into women's studies. In March 1987 it organised a visit to Lahore by a Morrocan feminist scholar to talk on women in Muslim history. It did hold a national youth workshop in 1986 to discuss women's status but only 45 people attended. If WAF is criticised for its élitist membership, then Simorgh, if any one had heard of it, could well be criticised for its relatively élitist aims of research and discussion which exclude the bulk of Pakistani women.

Although foreign aid packages do include some development programmes for women, these are often mismanaged in practice. One project for Craft Development amongst rural women, sponsored by Holland to further women's participation in cottage industries, contracted foreign consultants to set up the programme. Fifty per cent of the aid money went to the consultants to pay their fees and expenses for three months at the Hilton Hotel. A United Nations sponsored programme for Pakistani women entrepreneurs in Karachi was also ill-devised. Already successful business women were entertained at a conference for a week at a five star hotel to be lectured at by experts from foreign universities, such as the Harvard Business School, on how to run their businesses. One woman who had been on the course said the advice proffered failed to account for the different circumstances within which they operated in Pakistan, where even to have a telephone installed in an office neccessitates bribing the official. She said the lecturers were totally unaware of this and consequently everyone wasted their time.

The gradual economic development of Pakistan might be thought to erode traditional attitudes towards women, but this has not so far been the case. Economic prosperity does diminish the burden of work on women, but in some cases this can only increase their oppression. In the wake of the advances in agricultural methods in the Punjab, many women have been withdrawn from the workforce and confined to their homes in purdah, as a status symbol. Many of these women have described their

new lives as like being locked up in a prison. Previously their labour had been essential for the survival of their families and so their movement had been unrestricted. In particular, picking cotton had been the exclusive domain of women, for which they had been paid in kind with one twentieth of the cotton they had picked. Women could then barter their share of cotton which gave them a small degree of much prized economic freedom, now lost. Economic development alone is not the answer to Pakistani women's problems.

All the women's groups in Pakistan constitute a fragmented, but essential women's movement in its early stages. The work the groups do must not be undermined, but primarily lacking is a consciousness amongst ordinary women of the rights and equality they are owed. Without mass female awareness, there is no hope of combatting prejudiced social attitudes effectively.

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The July number of the *Contemporary Review* includes *The Debate on the French Revolution* by William Fortescue, *The Crisis of Liberalism in Colombia* by Christopher Abel and *Realism Revisited* by John Elsom.

THE SIEGE, DEFENCE AND RELIEF OF DERRY: APRIL-JULY 1689

by J. J. N. McGurk

ONE does not have to be historically minded to become aware that this summer is the tercentenary of the most notable siege in the history of these islands. The events of that year in Irish and British history have become part of the historical consciousness in a way in which the past lives on into the politics of the living present. The annual celebration of the defence and relief of Derry and of a siege that lasted one hundred and five days, the longest in British history, have kept those memories ever green — though the colour of that cliché is of course politically incorrect! The fame of the Apprentice Boys who defiantly slammed shut the gates of Derry on 7 December 1688 and the heroism and self-sacrifice of the defenders will of course live on as long as such qualities are regarded as virtues. In an oft cited sentence, Lord Macaulay wrote of the event in his celebrated history: 'Five generations have passed away and still the wall of Londonderry is to the Protestants of Ulster what the trophy of Marathon was to the Athenians.'[1]

Macaulay has never been attributed with the gift of prophecy — and no sound historian would aspire to the rôle of prophet — yet, in the context of the last twenty years, since the troubles began in Ireland in 1969, the siege of Derry may be distinguished from all other historical sieges in that it never ended. Stubborn defiance and radicalism as traits of the Ulster character have been much studied; the roots lie in the colonial siege mentality of the early planters and settlers; something too of it all may be found in the Scottish Presbyterianism of the 17th century, and the covenanting spirit. The conflicts of the 16th and 17th centuries provided evidence aplenty to sustain Protestant fears and, at times, panic at the possibility of a Catholic Irish resurgence and revenge. The massacre of Protestants in the 1641 rebellion, and the earlier siege of Derry in 1649 were still living memories for many in the reign of James II, the last Catholic monarch of England and Ireland. And to the literate classes the writings of Sir John Temple in 1646 of the massacres of 1641, a work which went into eight editions by the beginning of the 19th century, provided an account of history which helped to aggravate Protestant insecurity. An early eighteenth century edition of Temple's writing has a frontispiece exhibiting cruelties inflicted by Catholics on Protestants, and, despite the revisionism of our own times, his work is often cited as an authority even though its position is that of a partisan pamphlet rather than a historical treatise.

A more immediate and practical factor in the enduring siege mentality in Derry is seen by some historians and commentators in the very topography of the area; the Creggan and the Bogside are after all now known world wide. The Bogside was and is the western and vulnerable flank of the city where unsubdued Gaelic Ireland threatened the walls of

the plantation city. Only Protestants at first were allowed to dwell within those famous walls because they were a minority in a predominantly Catholic population in the seventeenth century. As is well known from the work of the late Professor T. W. Moody on the Ulster Plantations, the London-derry plantation was never a purely Protestant settlement because the early undertakers and servitors could not fulfil all the terms of their original contracts. A cursory glance at maps of Derry, and London-derry as it became, shows how the plantation development meant that the city and liberties grew up on the Co. Donegal side of the River Foyle, a county wherein Catholics are the majority and yet the County of Londonderry, created out of the earlier area of Coleraine and north Tyrone, is one of the most Protestant counties of the north of Ireland.[2] The official name of both city and county has been Londonderry since 1613 but Derry has continued to be used by most people throughout Ireland to describe the city. There is much to be said for using the word Londonderry to denote the *county,* an area which had no single Irish name before the city of London's connection with it through the Jacobean plantations.

The siege, defence and relief of Derry would become the great epic of Protestant history, folk-lore and mythology in which, time, and the re-telling in song and story, would iron out the contradictions, simplify a complex series of episodes and leave a heightened dramtic version of events remote from actuality. In Orange tradition it is of course Derry's walls, not Londonderry's, that became the symbol of the 'no surrender'. To understand why there was a siege there in the summer of 1689 in the first place and its historical significance in the second place it is necessary to look at the background to the events and to place them in their proper context.

It is more the siege literature of novel, poetry and drama, and the commemorative re-enactments of the key events in the siege that perpetuate the distinctive Ulster Protestant perception of the events of 1689. That now is characterised by a due deference 'to the ashes of our fathers and the altars of our Gods' and by an obligation to the present generation to hand on intact the legacy of 'freedom, religion and laws' won by the sacrifices of the defenders of 1688/89-91 in the Jacobite/Williamite wars.[3] Furthermore, this corpus of literary material perpetuating the memories of the siege and relief of Derry occasionally rises above the local and particular to indicate, in reformation terminology, that it is the historic mission of the Protestant people in its universal struggle against tyranny and Popery to fight the good fight against evil and for the principles of freedom and liberty. Macaulay, the great English Whig historian, did not initiate this interpretation of the siege but his powerful advocacy placed the events in Derry of 1688/89 on a parallel with the Battle of Marathon, so that Derry had an equal importance in the general history of the growth and development of liberty and civilisation. As is so often the case in Irish historiography the Protestant community just as much as the Catholic appeals to the dead generations' achievements as immutable

standards and to whom a moral and emotional debt is periodically owed; in such a manner is the dead past paralleled and injected into the living present to the utter bewilderment of the unhistorical and unimaginative mind. More seriously to contemporaries, the enemy is still there, so that any new social, or political re-alignments, any new way of re-interpreting these past events, will be regarded as a compromise, a sell-out of ancestral achievements, or a throwing away of the legacy of the liberty for which they gave their lives to hand on to what would be an ungrateful and guilty generation. In such a mentality historical emotional guilt becomes a real factor in the present.

The myths, contradictions, inconsistencies and simplifications in the history of the famous siege are no more than one would expect to find accruing around any account of human heroism and dogged determination against the odds. While modern revisionism does not ignore or denigrate noble deeds and high ideals, nevertheless the critico-historical approach to the context and to the sources can provide a new understanding of the historical origins of the present tensions, and yet, sadly in the present context enlightenment does not always lead to tolerance. The point can be made more immediately through the mouth of one of the characters created by the novelist, Nathaniel Wiseman in his *The 'Prentice Boys who saved an Empire: a Tale of the Siege of Londonderry* (1905):—

> a clergyman addressed a public meeting within the walls rightly pointing out to the Defenders that they were rebels against lawful authority. In historical fact, it was Bishop Hopkins who did just that—for James II had not by then left England. He warned them: 'They who resist a king fight against God... 'tis laid down in the Bible that—' 'Well put, my Lord, good sermon that; but we can't attend to it now', shouted a voice from the crowd. No Preaching. No Red Shanks. No Popery. The Protestant City of Londonderry for ever'.

Strictly speaking then the Derry Defenders of December 1688 when the Apprentice Boys shut the gates were in rebellion against their lawful king in proclaiming the cause of the usurper William of Orange. This is why they were at first divided in their course of action and why Bishop Hopkins and later Governor Robert Lundy abandoned the city; both were not therefore traitors—as in Presbyterian legend—but merely defeatists. Lundy escaped from the city in disguise with a load of thatch on his back. He became the scapegoat for all the doubts of the defenders, his effigy is annually burned by the Apprentice Boys of Derry with the appropriate acclamations of 'No Surrender'. The Presbyterians however should have welcomed James II's policy of toleration for non-conformists especially after the strict repressive policy of the Anglican church in Charles II's reign. But the circumstances of the siege enabled the Presbyterians to settle their differences with the Established Church against the common enemy, Popery and arbitrary government.

If we look at the siege as it really happened, and this can be done from at least four contemporary accounts, wherever the writers are content to record the events without embellishment, the reader soon becomes aware that the whole incident, or series of incidents, was not intended to be part of the Catholic-Protestant conflict.[4] English readers at the time had a regular flow of information and propaganda in broadsheets on the scenes

of action in Ireland and eye-witness accounts of participants in the Jacobite/Williamite wars. Is it an accident that the two Irish Jacobite histories of the war remained unpublished until the nineteenth century?[5] In O'Kelly's 'parallel history' James II is named *Amasis,* William, *Theodore,* the Pope is 'the Delphic High Priest', Louis XIV is *Antiochus,* England is *Cilicia, Macaria,* an ancient name for Cyprus meaning 'blessed', therefore Ireland, by association with the *insula sacra* or The Holy Island of the Golden Age. Some later Jacobite apologists like Hilaire Belloc and later Sir George Petrie have contended, as a counterblast to Macaulay which raises the gorge of modern defenders of Derry's walls, that the whole episode was a blockade and minor siege and set of skirmishes and sallies around Derry rather than the herculean last stand inspired by religious faith of Protestant legend.[6]

A more up to date historical judgement by A. T. Q. Stewart in his rightly acclaimed *Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster 1609-1689* (1978) says there is an element of truth in the above version, pointing out how the defenders were given a very long time to organise themselves, and every opportunity to reverse their decision so that in fact a reading of contemporary accounts leaves the impression that the siege was imposed on the royal forces by the defenders, and, that when it came to the point of honour for James II's commanders to take Derry, they relied more on a blockade of the Foyle to starve the city into surrender rather than storm the walls and gates. Military historians, mainly Jacobite, have also stressed the inadequacy of the besieging army, which was raw and undisciplined and under an uninspiring command as well as lacking siege guns and the proper engineers' tools for raising a siege of a walled city. Maumont, the French general, was killed early on in a skirmish so that the command fell on Richard Hamilton, who had no experience of siege warfare and who got on very badly with the French officers. French dispatches naturally show their writers in a favourable light and blame the Irish for any disasters. Jacobite accounts leave the impression that James's forces did little more then than establish a blockade across the Foyle and demolish a number of houses with mortar fire from across the water, while traditional Protestant accounts stress the heroic ordeal against overwhelming odds inspired by religious faith.

Like all contradictions in historical sources there is an element of truth in both sides of the story. In the general historical context, the siege of Derry was but one episode in a war which James II fought in Ireland to recover his throne with the aid of the French. From the Irish Catholic viewpoint there was interest in James II as a means of getting the land settlement altered and the position of the Catholic church secured. From the Irish Protestant angle, alarms grew in panic proportions; the gates were shut against new garrisons in Derry and Enniskillen; county associations of Protestant gentry were formed throughout Ulster, and in the north and west of the province those that could not escape into England and Scotland made for the only fortified places in Protestant hands in Ulster: Derry and Enniskillen. The flight of James from England to

France and the English revolution of 1688 brought Ireland into the European orbit in a war in which William of Orange was the key figure in resistance to the grandiose territorial designs of Louis XIV against the empire, Spain and the Dutch republic. Pope Innocent XI played the major rôle in forming an anti-French League by the treaty of Vienna, hence William III's victory over James II at the Boyne on the 1st of July, 1690, marked a signal success of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV and was duly solemnized with a *Te Deum* in the Vatican in thanksgiving for the victory. The war as a whole had therefore a much greater significance than its Irish context would lead one to believe. In Irish it is called *'Cogadh an Dá Rí'*, the war of the two kings, *Rí Séamus agus Rí Liam,* and less politely in Irish, King James II is frequently referred to as *Séamus a Chaca,* doubtless because he let so many people down.

The consequences of the Williamite/Jacobite war in Ireland from 1688 to the Treaty of Limerick in 1691 were momentous; they confirmed the end of the Stuart dynasty in England and established a Protestant succession. And, for all that, William III did not have to fight a single battle on English soil. However, it is not without constitutional historical interest that Parliament has met every year without fail since 1689 and, yet, William III, in signing away the Crown's remaining prerogatives for the sake of supplies for his French war, may be seen as either the betrayer of the English monarchy or in the words of the Bill of Rights as 'the glorious instrument of delivering this Kingdom from popery and arbitrary power'.[7]

Again, in the European context, the war in Ireland was fought with international armies on both sides — a French general was killed outside the walls of Derry, General Schomberg at the Boyne, and General St. Ruth at the battle of Aughrim on the 12th July 1690, the more definitive Williamite victory than the Boyne a fortnight earlier. But in the Irish context the war was a conflict between protestant and catholic, planter and planted or native and colonist; and, it was the last great stand when both were fairly evenly balanced; both sides have enshrined their achievements in ballad, dance and pipe music. 'Lillibullero' may then have been the equivalent of 'top of the pops', but it is said to have whistled a king out of three kingdoms. The celebrated 'Sash', however, in protestant balladry could not possibly have been worn at 'Derry, Aughrim, Enniskillen and the Boyne' because in strict historical accuracy the Orange Order was not founded until over a century later than the Williamite victories. And these were naturally matched by Catholic memories of Patrick Sarsfield's defence of Limerick, Athlone and Sligo which called forth as much valour as had the siege of Derry, particularly in the first siege of Limerick on August 27, 1690.

Derry, however, endured the greater hardships and got the better publicity. The Derry Defenders found a forceful leader in the Rev. George Walker whose diary of the three months siege is a graphic record of courage and sufferings, but his account was challenged and supplemented from the Presbyterian side by John Mackenzie.[8] The latter, a contem-

porary witness of the siege, reckoned that among the defenders the Presbyterians were fifteen to one; later historians, like Thomas Witterow in his account of 1873, give the more sober estimate of ten to one.[9]

Throughout the duration of the siege from April to July 1689 the two sections of the Protestant garrison, faced by a common danger, sank their religious differences for the protection of their lives and in support of William of Orange. Apparently each garrison had an Episcopalian and a Presbyterian minister attached as chaplain and the cathedral was used by both parties for worship, the Episcopalians used it in the mornings and the Presbyterians in the afternoons of the Sabbath. Joseph Aickin, a contemporary poet, caught, in dreadful verse, this ecumenical aspect of the siege:—

> The Church and Kirk do thither jointly go
> In opposition to the common foe.
> The Church and Kirk did jointly preach and pray,
> In St. Columba's Church most lovingly;
> Where Dr. Walker to their great content
> Preached stoutly 'gainst a Popish Government.[10]

By June 1689 the Jacobite blockade of the Foyle had reduced defenders to near starvation; they were subsisting in Walker's account on horse flesh, dogs, cats, rats and mice, salted sides, tallow and starch. Under July 27, Walker reckoned the garrison was reduced to 4,456 men and the prices of some of the commodities mentioned are given; a cat fetched 4s. 6d and a rat 1s. 0d, and a pound of horse flesh sold for 1s. 8d. Walker wrote: 'We were under so great necessity, that we had nothing left unless we could prey upon one another. A certain Fat Gentleman conceived himself in the greatest danger, and fancying several of the Garrison lookt on him with a greedy Eye, thought fit to hide himself for three days.'[11]

On the 4th of June the Jacobites made a last determined effort to capture the entrenchments on Windmill Hill. Though valiantly led by Colonel Butler, son of Lord Mountgarrett, they were repulsed with the loss of about 400 either killed or wounded while Butler and six officers were taken prisoner. From the Jacobite viewpoint it was better that starvation should do its work; from then on the siege became a blockade which lasted about six weeks. Before relief came, James's Lithuanian General, Rosen, rounded up all Protestants within a ten mile radius of the city and drove them under the walls to force the defenders to take them in, knowing they could not both feed them and continue the siege. Their reply was to put up a gallows to hang all prisoners if those under the walls were not freed. James II, who ever had a proper regard for the laws of war, condemned Rosen's brutality and the trapped were let go but not before the strongest were smuggled in to help the defenders.

The desperate straits of the starving garrison were heightened by the sight of the masts of the English relief ships in the distance on Lough Foyle. Captain Kirk had about 30 ships with provisions, and a brave messenger brought the good news to the city. But Kirk, fearing the batteries at Culmore Fort and the boom across the river further upstream, did not venture to leave the Lough. He would not act until he had explicit orders to help the garrison, and when he finally did move, the risk to his

ships had greatly increased. However, on 28 July, six weeks since they arrived in the Lough, two merchant ships, the *Mountjoy* commanded by a native of the city of Derry, Micaiah Browning, and the *Phoenix* approached the boom escorted by the gun frigate, the *Dartmouth.* The latter engaged the shore side batteries and the *Mountjoy* sailed on to the boom and although it cracked and broke, the *Mountjoy* grounded. Five aboard the ships were killed, the most memorable being the captain of the *Mountjoy,* Micaiah Browning, shot in the head at the moment his ship smashed the boom. Browning deserves to be perpetually remembered as the true saviour of the city. As the Jacobite soldiers ran to board her, the *Dartmouth's* guns repulsed them and the *Mountjoy* was re-floated. Meanwhile, the *Phoenix* had gone through the boom so that by night the three ships had anchored at Derry quayside unloading provisions for the famished city.

Macaulay's account, which has helped to mould the Ulster Protestant view of events tells us: 'the bonfires shone bright along the whole circuit of the ramparts. The Jacobite guns continued to roar all night; and all night the bells of the rescued city made answer to the guns with a peal of joyous defiance.'

After three days of heavy bombardment the relieved citizens and defenders of Derry saw in the distance, in Macaulay's account, 'the long column of pikes and standards retreating up the left bank of the Foyle towards Strabane'.[12] The siege had lasted fifteen weeks and its failure for James marked the beginning of his decline. Had he taken Derry, William III's task of driving James out of Ireland would have greatly prolonged the war.

An early nineteenth century history of the siege by the Rev. John Graham is not without contemporary relevance for he has a description of the first centenary celebrations of the siege when Derry's citizens of all creeds took a civic pride in its heroic past. He tells us how on the dawn of the 7th December 1788 drums beating, bells pealing, and the firing of cannons used in the siege heralded in the dawn. The Crimson Flag flew from the Cathedral. The Dean preached inside. The great oratorio *Judas Maccabeus* with an appropriate emphasis on its great melody "Tis liberty, dear liberty alone' was performed *con gusto* after the Dean's sermon, while at the meeting house the Rev. Mr. Black gave a suitably resounding oration to the Presbyterians. *HMS Porcupine,* appropriately decked out, entered the harbour to a gun salute. In the afternoon the Apprentice Boys and some 'of the lower class of citizens' went through the streets re-enacting with much humour the burning of Lundy's effigy in the market place. Graham's description of the evening's civic dinner deserves fuller citation:

> The Mayor and members of the Corporation, the Protestant clergymen, the officers of the Army and Navy, the Roman Catholic clergymen of the City, the gentlemen of the country, the Volunteers, citizens, scholars and apprentices dined together in the Town Hall. Orange was the predominant colour on this occasion, and as such was worn by the Roman Catholic Bishop, Clergy and People, the latter manifesting equal enthusiasm and pleasure in the commemoration of the event with their fellow Protestant citizens.[13]

Later events would, however, soon obliterate the non-sectarian celebrations of the siege, especially those surrounding the 1798 rebellion, the founding of the Apprentice Boys Society in 1823, and the periodic and fierce riots in the city during the Fenian movement, all of which would help to give future celebrations their now more familiar and, sadly, divisive form.

The bonfires, marches, parades and songs are deep in the psyche of every Ulster childhood experience, and are still the signals of victory and defeat of friend and foe; primitive spectacles that few but Ulster people find understandable in a late twentieth century context. They are still the most dominant memorabilia of the siege of Derry. The annual re-enactments of the seizure of the keys of the city, the shutting of the gates and the ritual burning of Lundy's effigy with fireworks on its back in the market place are now perpetuated by the Apprentice Boys of Derry; the parent clubs are within the city's walls, but there are branches throughout Ulster, England, Scotland and America. Only those initiated within the celebrated walls are allowed full membership. Before Catholic Emancipation, the Apprentice Boys erected in 1826 an eighty-one foot high pillar, a Doric column in Portland stone after the design of James Henry, capped by a statue of the Rev. George Walker, the Governor of Derry during the siege. It was situated at a point overlooking the Bogside, a veritable 'watchman in Sion' — in 1973 an IRA bomb demolished it. Within the walls stands the Appentice Boys Hall, built in 1873 and much in evidence is their emblem, the Crimson Flag or Badge, commemorating 'the bloody flag of defiance' of Colonel Michelburne, the leader of many sallies, which in 1689 flew from the Royal Bastion and from the Cathedral. Inside the Cathedral along the trophies of the siege is a dead shell; it was by means of this shell that General Hamilton sent in his surrender proposals, one of many efforts to get the garrison to give up. As usual the reply which would echo down the centuries was 'No Surrender'.

NOTES:

1. Lord Macaulay, *History of England*, ii (1855), 584.
2. The ancient Gaelic name was *Doire Galgach*, the oak wood of the fierce warrior, and in the Christian era because of its connection with St. Columkille or Columba, it was often called Derry-Columbkille. Its importance was chiefly ecclesiastical until the Elizabethan conquest when, under Lord Mountjoy, Sir Henry Docwra settled a garrison there in 1600. The present writer has long researched Docwra as the founder of modern Derry.
3. In a recent issue of the *Linen Hall Review*, Sam Burnside reviewed the literary materials relating to the siege and relief of Derry, 'No temporising with the foe'.
4. Some contemporary accounts of the siege are: —
   (i). George Walker's, *A True Account of the Siege of London-Derry* (September 1689).
   (ii). John Mackenzie, *A narrative of the Siege of Londonderry* (1690) which challenges Walker's.
   (iii). George Storey, *A True and Impartial History* (short title) (1691). As a regimental chaplain in William III's forces, Storey's bias is not in question.
   (iv). *Good News from Londonderry in Ireland* . . . a full and true relation of a great and signal victory . . . most happily obtained over the French and Irish Papists, June 7, 1689.
   (v). Mackenzie's, *Walker's Invisible Champion Foyl'd* (1690). One wonders if he intended the pun!

5. Charles O'Kelly, *The Destruction of Cyprus*, or
   (i). *Macariae excidium* (Dublin 1850). Persons and places are all distinguished in classical forms, but the whole account is anti-Tyrconnell for betraying Ireland in the interests of England.
   (ii). The second Jacobite version is in ms. called 'A light to the Blind' but published as *A Jacobite narrative of the War in Ireland 1688-1691* (Dublin 1892).
6. H. Belloc, James II (1928), 244-245.
   Sir Chas. Petrie, 'The Jacobite War in Ireland, 1688-1691' in *New English Review*, XV, No. 1 (July 1947).
7. J. J. N. McGurk, 'What was Great and Glorious about 1688?' in the *English Catholic Ancestor*, No. 6, August 1988.
8. See Note No. 4.
9. Thomas Witherow, Derry and Enniskillen in the Year 1689 (1873). In his introduction Witherow writes: 'The writer does not conceal that he writes from an entirely Protestant standpoint, but he has endeavoured to look at the matter with the eye of an historian, and to deal out even-handed justice to all'.
10. Joseph Aickin, *Londerias* cited *passum* in Hampton's *Siege and History of Londonderry* (Derry 1861).
11. G. Walker's *Diary of the Siege of Derry* (4 ed. 1895), p.61.
12. The relief of Derry is still best read in Macaulay's, *History*, ii, 583 ff. but it is also given generous treatment in Cardinal D'Alton's, *History of Ireland*, iv, 401-406.
13. J. Graham, *A History of the Siege of Londonderry* . . . (Dublin 1829), 286-287.
14. For a good historical map of the Siege see Note 11 facing p.492, in Vol. III of *The New History of Ireland* edited by Moody, Martin and Byrne. (Oxford 1976).

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VALUE FOR MONEY IN LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF SCHOOLS: YET ANOTHER REPORT

by Brian W. Bell

IN view of forthcoming plans for the Local Management of Schools it seems no coincidence that the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, in a recently published report, have come up with a checklist of ways to measure school standards. Though the Institute admit that their proposals lack what they themselves call 'hard edged objectivity', they do insist that these guidelines, drawn up by their own education officers, would be 'useful'. Useful perhaps, but I suspect that such a timely report would in itself be useful in other respects too. Local Management of Schools, still often referred to as Local Financial Management, by its very title seems to suggest the need for an expertise not perhaps readily possessed by the average Comprehensive or large Primary school and therein lies a clue to the Institute's involvement.

As the Institute knows, school costs and budgets in their totality are not made up of peanuts although, to all intents and purposes, budgetary requirements under Local Management of Schools proposals (except for those who 'opt out') will be 'on the fringe' as it were. In other words, although a school's total budget may well be of the order of one million pounds for a typical Comprehensive depending on size, much of that sum will be taken up in fixed costs such as buildings, rent, rates, salaries, leaving a 'fringe' budget of perhaps as much as a quarter of a million to be serviced. Though 'on the fringe', one quarter million annually seems not to be a large amount, it isn't the pocket money capitation that schools and governing bodies have been used to administering in the past. Reason again perhaps for an oblique reminder from the Institute that there is a need for professional advice on the accounting and administration of such sums.

The Institute, possessing members who already work as accountants in local government, obviously has the best interests of everyone at heart. Their expertise in local financial management matters cannot be bettered nor can their experienced involvement be discarded on a whim but, as the Coopers and Lybrand Report on Local Management of Schools states, 'For goods and services of a contract nature the relationship (between schools and Local Education Authorities) can be envisaged as a customer/contractor one, with the school (as customer) having the facility to choose the source and the level of service it requires'. Thus it would appear that schools have the option of buying say, for example, Local Education Authority accountancy services or of using an accountant of their own. Reason, naturally, for the Institute's suddenly high profile in educational matters.

Accountants account for things, money primarily, but they also have a rôle to play in an advisory capacity too, advising on the best use of available financial and material resources, the best value for money. No

wonder, then, that the Institute seeks to produce a checklist of standards by which value for money can be assessed, and best assessed perhaps by their members rather than by outsiders. The Report, sensationalised by the national press with talk of reports on teachers over and above, incidentally, those teacher appraisal proposals already under negotiation, includes references to teacher punctuality, their ability to maintain discipline and very importantly their sense of humour — and, let's face it, nothing is more important to a teacher than his/her sense of humour, humour in the teaching profession so often being the difference between sanity and suicide.

The Report also mentions standards, staff levels, costs, cash contributions from parents, links with industry, links with parents as well as levels of commitment on the parts of parents, teachers and pupils. There is also, it seems, tacit acknowledgement that education has moved along the path from being a pure public service, albeit in need of some measure of accountability, to a pure business in every sense of the word. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy have every right to suggest ways for the education business to become more efficient and accountable — there seem these days to be few more worthwhile things than efficiency and accountability — because education, always in the public domain, has become even more so. What remains to be seen is whether the Institute and indeed the Government too help turn education and schools into community profit and loss balance sheets by using Local Financial Management as a measure of school success.

Local Management, particularly Local Financial Management, may make schools better, it may not, but 'better' is a strange word meaning one thing to one person, something different to another. There are so many terms of reference when discussing successful schools that it is unlikely that a true consensus of what makes a 'good school' will ever be reached. If that consensus is finally reached however, I, for one, hope that 'profitability' is not one of the criteria used in judgement.

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WHAT'S THE BIG IDEA, THEN?

by Tony Beamish

DURING the Liberal Party's last annual conference in 1987, Hugo Young suggested in the *Guardian* that they, and by extension their SDP partners with whom they were considering a merger, lacked a Big Idea. The suggestion was greeted with derision by many of the two parties' activists, who were quite confident that Liberalism and Social Democracy — however they might be defined — were Big enough for them, and for everyone else too. Nevertheless, there does seem to be general agreement on the present need for a New Idea, although I am not sure that Big is quite the right word for it.

It is clear that New Ideas are necessary because the world keeps changing. In this article I suggest that while changes to our physical environment (including both the natural and man-made) and our social environment are happening all the time, continuously and fairly smoothly, our personal and especially our institutional response to change only occurs at fairly long intervals. This is because, most of the time, change can be accommodated within our current frame of reference; we can cope with the 'real world' without actually having to rethink our Ideas.

But this begs the question: 'What sort of Ideas are we talking about?' In this context, I am discussing Ideas in the sense of 'the factors — other than our instincts — which affect our behaviour'. First we have the moral influences or values; these constitute the most fundamental group of Ideas. They are not quite immutable, although shifts in Values usually take place very slowly.

The current need for new Ideas is connected, but not exclusively, with shifts in Values. For we actually live and behave in a real physical world, which is much too large and complex to comprehend and which is changing more rapidly than ever before. Certainly we cannot refer to the whole world, or consider the consequences of our actions on it, every time we decide to do anything. Life is, as they say, too short.

We are therefore forced to use mental maps and pictures of the world, which we consult as necessary; these maps are learnt in childhood, not modified very much thereafter, and (by most people) filed away in their subconscious minds. The need for new Maps is urgent, because most of the ones in common use are seriously out-of-date. Maps constitute a second category of Ideas, which together with the Values form the 'psychological environment' in which we make our day-to-day decisions, directed towards some Objective.

Both social and individual Objectives normally remain constant, but they are not necessarily the same for all individuals within a group, nor for all groups in a society. The main current Objective is personal and social 'economic growth' — that is, materialist Values chartered on Industrial Maps.

Finally, the range of actions open to us is limited, in practice, to those

which seem possible and desirable when we look at our maps. This group of Ideas can be summarised as Policy Options; it is the least abstract and the most 'useful' category of Ideas, and the one which comes to mind most easily.

We are thus considering four categories of Ideas: Values, Maps, Objectives, and Policy Options. It is very easy to get them confused, and I suspect that Hugo Young and the Liberal activists were not talking about the same kind of Idea. Most political discussion centres around Policy Options; in this article I want to discuss Objectives, with reference to the latest Maps and shifts in Values.

Our Maps may be modified a little as we grow older and as the world changes around us, but we are very reluctant to make changes to our Objectives. Many people in fact neither consult their maps nor change their objectives at all; even politicians rarely do so. But, as Christopher Hollis once said: 'It is the job of the politician to describe what is happening, and to persuade people to vote for the inevitable'. This apparently cynical remark is another way of saying that politics is not only about the plotting of courses and the management of change; it is also about reading and interpreting the latest maps which are available — and above all it should be about the choice of Objectives.

Every so often it becomes apparent that the world does not fit our conceptual Maps in some respect; this is not, as a rule, due to some sudden easily identifiable change, but to the cumulative effect of all the changes which have taken place since our current Maps were prepared. At these critical periods, a new Map of our environment becomes necessary so that new Policy Options can be formulated. It is my contention that the world has changed so much since the beginning of the Industrial Era that we are being forced to change our primary social Objectives as well.

Neither Maps nor Objectives are normally prepared by the politicians themselves; the maps of the natural world are the product of scientists and technologists (the names of Copernicus, Descartes, Newton, Darwin and Einstein spring to mind). Such Maps are, of course, Value-free; but they may indicate possible Objectives and Policy Options.

Latterly the political economists (Adam Smith, Marx, and Keynes being the three giants) produced new Maps of the economic world; they incorporated Value judgements in their writings, and prepared Policy Options. However, the Map of Adam Smith was itself so startlingly new that a major Objective — 'economic growth' — which appeared on it for the first time has now become part of our culture; in fact, his Idea was the Biggest of them all.

The Industrial Society can be likened to a ship launched by Smith. Marx was primarily concerned with the well-being of all the ship's company; he was in no doubt about the ship's direction. He was just as keen on materialistic rewards as Smith, and his Policy Options were intended to equalise the distribution of those rewards. Those of Keynes, on the other hand, were essentially designed as Stabilisers and Rudder for the ship,

which served their purpose very well — so long as the Objective, which he described as 'solving the economic problem', was still out of reach — and so long as the ship did not destroy the ocean!

Keynes himself was enough of a visionary to realise that 'the economic problem' was within sight of solution — he anticipated, in 1928, a voyage of 100 years. But the ship's momentum has already carried it into uncharted waters; not only has Industrialism now provided the means of easy affluence for all, but it has under-estimated its own impact on the physical world. It is now vital that we discard our old maps, and pay attention to any new one which seems to reflect the real world of today more accurately; but it is surely even more important that we abandon the Industrial Imperative.

The three economic Big Ideas I have mentioned, although they differ in certain very important ways, are all essentially concerned with maximising production. But as J. K. Galbraith has pointed out, we no longer seek to maximise output for its own sake. 'We value the production process more for the sake of the employment and the incomes which it generates than for the product itself.'

This paradox is at the root of our economic instability; not only is the search for labour efficiency forcing people to seek other ways of fulfilling themselves, but their material wants have to be stimulated artificially. The advertising industry no longer has as its primary purpose the information and education of the citizenry (if indeed it ever had); its purpose is to persuade them to want, and to buy, the output which is no longer needed for itself, and which is increasingly being produced without their help.

This attitude I call the Industrial Imperative. It is expansionist in every sense. It really has proved to be the Big Idea to end all Big Ideas. For if much of the production process is unnecessary, even anti-social, and if it is (a) using up finite non-renewable resources, (b) exploiting the renewable ones faster than they can in fact renew themselves, (c) causing irreversible damage to the environment, and (d) out of control, then the sooner we abandon it the better. I suggest that it must now be replaced by what might well be called the Small Idea; it has already come to be known as The Green Perspective.

New questions are indeed beginning to be heard: are all new devices in fact better than the old? should efficiency mean only saving labour costs? would it be such a dreadful thing deliberately to put constraints on Trade, so as to protect not our own industries, but the global ecosystems on which we all depend? can our individual attempts to inherit the earth before someone else gets it really ensure that everyone will end up richer? and can the real world stand the strain? Negative answers to these questions are beginning to appear, and the Small Idea has already begun to take shape.

It is not associated with any particular individual, as are the ideas of Marx and Keynes, but much of the credit for its development must be given to Fritz Schumacher, whose book *Small is Beautiful* provided the perfect slogan. Perhaps because of this, the 'conventional wisdom' has

been very selective in its response; and, true to form, the political parties have been slow to adapt.

But they are failing to increase their support, which to me shows the poverty of their ideas. The public has a more up-to-date picture of the real world than the politicians, and is no longer willing to be fooled; for the time being it may well vote for one of the previous choices out of inertia, but it will not switch its support to any other party, large or small, until it is convinced that such a party has Policy Options which make sense in the perceived world.

I do not think it is possible now to devise Policy Options directed towards the Objective of economic growth which are plausible, feasible, and desirable; and the Objective itself is being re-examined. It is no exaggeration to say that we are currently living through a period of re-adjustment of our ideas comparable to the ferment of the Age of Reason; the difference is that we are being forced to do it more quickly. The very successes of the Industrial Age are leading to critical breakdowns in every sphere of activity, and it is not only the natural world which is showing the strain; society and the economy are themselves becoming increasingly unstable.

The conservative parties in America and Britain, working in a two-party system, are not merely slow to adopt new ideas; they have actually dusted off the Maps of Adam Smith, and his Policy Options too! They obviously believe (as he did not) that the physical world is infinite, and that if we find ourselves in difficulties this can only be because our ship isn't going fast enough.

The British Labour Party has two Policy Options, both called Socialism. The so-called hard Left clings to Marxism, seeing all political problems in terms of the class struggle, and distrusting the market as a way of resolving them. It is concerned very largely with the public ownership, or at least with the centralised planning and regulation of the means of production and exchange. The rest of the Labour Party, like the US Democrats, clings to the Keynesian Idea, and is thus part of the Social Democratic consensus which also includes the Owenites, the 'Centrist' elements in the SLD, some of the nicer Tories, and indeed the greater part of society. The Labour Party may be trying to resolve its internal ambiguity by seeking new Policy Options, but it does not seem to be looking at a new Map, let alone choosing a new Objective.

So it is clear that the old Big Ideas all have their supporting political parties. The question now is whether the Small, Green Idea will be taken up seriously by any of them, or will have to depend entirely on the Green Party itself. Possibly the turmoil in the 'centre parties' — including the mainstream of the Labour Party — will eventually result in the formation of a new group, genuinely directing all its Policy Options towards a new Social Objective — the Green Idea. If this turns out to be the SLD, then Hugo Young's criticism will have been answered.

I still believe it is more likely to be the SLD than any other group; Dr. Owen and the Liberal rump are not at all likely to come up with a new

Big Idea; they know they have one (each), and believe that if they can dress up their favourite in sufficiently attractive new clothes, the public will rush to its support. They can be left out of the reckoning, because they (like the new Yuppie Labour Party) are only different kinds of conservatism. In fact the so-called 'middle ground' is full to over-flowing with people trying to re-furbish their old Big Ideas; and some of them are, I fear, to be found in the 'Establishment' of the SLD. But if these Centrists restrict their thinking to 'Keynesianism', 'Liberalism', 'Social Democracy', and the 'social market', we can wave good-bye to the Small Idea (or any other New Idea) this side of the millennium.

For it was surely the belief that 'Liberalism' was all that was needed which knocked out the old Liberal Party 60 years ago; it was Labour's touching faith in 'more of the same' which made them redundant 25 years ago; and it was the attempt to keep the Keynesian consensus alive which killed the Liberal-SDP Alliance.

Where does the Green Party come in? Obviously, it has the New, Small, Green Idea as its *raison d'être;* and it stands a much better chance of surviving than any of the other 'new' parties of the past 50 years, because its Idea is not only new but is seen to be relevant; there is a lot of sympathy for the Green Party, but, given our voting system, it has no electoral credibility. Also I think it is significant that the only two new parties to have achieved office in this country in the past 150 years (the Liberal and Labour parties themselves) both actually grew out of previously existing groups; they did not, like Minerva and the Green Party, spring fully armed from the heads of their progenitors. But they eventually succeeded because they took over much of the existing conventional wisdom, while recognising the need for a new social Objective. The Liberals were the result of a painful merger between the Whigs, the Radicals and the Peelite Tories; and the Labour Party developed from the Fabian Society and the Workers' Representation movement (which was itself supported by many Liberals!).

The Green Party is not only handicapped by our electoral system, as were the Labour Party in its early days and the Liberal Party once Labour had achieved credibility; it is also, as Labour was, perceived as a 'single-issue' party and is thus automatically suspect in our still pluralist society. Could it ride to success on the back of the SLD, as Labour did on the Liberals? This seems unlikely, because the SLD will not be caught the same way again. And here I come full circle, to Hugo Young's criticism of the Liberals a year ago. Has the SLD really got a new social Objective?

Well, it still has its two old Big Ideas — both of them a combination of timeless Values and out-of-date Policy Options based on the Industrial Imperative. 'Social Democracy', whatever its origins, has now come to mean a belief in a 'mixed economy', in which a basically free market (the Smith bit) is regulated by a modicum of state intervention (the Keynesian bit) combined with some public ownership of economic institutions (the Marxist bit). 'Liberalism' is now not so much an economic theory as a political philosophy, Economic Liberalism having been hi-jacked by Mrs.

Thatcher and the New Right. But it does include both economic and political elements; and it is perfectly possible to be a liberal Tory, a liberal socialist, certainly a Liberal Democrat!

The question raised by Hugo Young is still in the air. Will the SLD accept the 'Schumacher' bit without reservations — replacing the maximisation of production as the primary social objective by stabilisation and sustainability? It is my firm conviction that it should; for if it does not, then the only hope that remains is the tiny Green Party, which in the nature of things will take much longer to achieve a parliamentary presence — let alone the possibility of office.

There is a chance that the SLD will change its Objective; parts of it have already done so — Simon Hughes being the most obviously green MP. The Green Democrats had an enormous success at the party conference in Blackpool this year; its individual members are being consulted more and more often — about economic and other policies as well as 'Green issues'. But there is still a powerful conservative wing in the party biassed towards the conventional objective of economic growth, even though new maps are being used and some very imaginative Policy Options are being devised.

It may be that public opinion simply cannot accept such a Small Idea as I have outlined. But the SLD must grasp the nettle, and gamble on becoming the party of the smaller, greener future. For if it does not, not only will it finally lose its way and run into the sand; more tragically, the Small Idea wil be set back for years.

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CHARLOTTE BRONTË IN BRUSSELS: 'THE PROFESSOR' AND 'VILLETTE'

by Donald Williams Bruce

IN pursuance of a foolhardly scheme to set up a school in their father's parsonage, Charlotte and Emily Brontë decided in 1842 to improve their French at the Pensionnat Heger in Brussels. Charlotte was then nearly twenty-five years old, *a ripe time of life,* as she said herself, to be a schoolgirl, but the sisters were mostly taught individually, according to his own waspish methods, by the Principal, M. Heger, who quickly recognised Charlotte's ability and asked her to teach English at the school instead of paying fees for her board and tuition. Charlotte was already in love with M. Heger, although earlier she had described him as 'choleric and irritable as to temperament, a little black ugly being' with the face of 'an insane tom-cat'[1]. She was ready enough to return to the school without Emily in the following year as a salaried English Mistress, although the salary was fixed, with Belgian prudence, at a low sum. She could have earned more in England. Unfortunately for Charlotte, M. Heger was married to the owner of the school, like himself a devout Catholic, whom he rejoiced in making pregnant as often as possible. Charlotte's hopeless devotion to M. Heger was the pivot of her life. Her experiences in Belgium were sublimated into two of her novels, *The Professor*, completed in 1846 but not published until 1857, two years after her death; and *Villette,* published in 1853.[2]

It may be that the publishers who rejected *The Professor* were more helpful than it seemed at the time, since Charlotte Brontë was induced to rework the story more successfully in *Villette.* It is hard to surmise what whim possessed her, or what miscalculation led her astray, when she made the hero of *The Professor* its narrator: she who had never known any man informally, apart from her reclusive father and the brother she openly deplored. Daringly and hilariously she attempts even male eroticism:

> Frances went into an inner room to take off her bonnet and she came back a model of frugal neatness, with her well-fitting black stuff dress, so accurately defining her elegant bust and taper waist (*The Professor*, ch. 19).

Lucy Snowe, the heroine and narrator of *Villette,* which is largely autobiographical, supports herself by teaching English in a girls' school in the Rue Fossette: really the Rue Isabelle, now demolished, in the Old Town of Brussels, downhill from the Rue Royale and near the Place du Grand Sablon. Two squares and a few lanes have survived the grim modernisation of that part of Brussels. There Lucy falls in love with her fiery but warm-hearted colleague, M. Paul Emanuel, to whom she becomes betrothed in spite of the painstaking stratagems of Mme. Beck, the owner and headmistress of the school. Paul Emanuel buys Lucy a small school of her own, out in the faubourgs, before sailing to Guadaloupe, where he must spend three years on a dependant's business. At the end of the novel she,

a good steward, has expanded the school and is awaiting his return, although there is more than a hint on the final page that he has been lost in a storm at sea. 'Leave sunny imaginations hope', Lucy wistfully writes:

> Let it be theirs to conceive the delight of joy born again fresh out of great terror, the rapture of rescue from peril, the wondrous reprieve from dread, the fruition of return. Let them picture union and a happy succeeding life (*Villette*, ch. 42).

In the main, the school in the Rue Fossette is the Pensionnat Heger, Paul Emanuel is M. Heger, Mme. Beck is the increasingly suspicious Mme. Heger and Lucy is Charlotte Brontë, all as perceived by herself.

The conclusion of *The Professor* is flat, but happier than that of *Villette*. William Crimsworth teaches English in a boys' school adjoining the girls' school where in the later novel Lucy Snowe also teaches English. The window of his room overlooks the garden of Mme. Beck's establishment, a feature important in *Villette*, where Paul Emanuel sometimes uses it as a study and a spy-hole for observing what happens in Mme. Beck's garden after school-hours. In his absence notes are passed through it to Ginevra Fanshawe, one of Mme. Beck's pupils. The two schools, like the two novels, interlock. In fact, the Athénée, the outstanding boys' school in Brussels, overlooked the Pensionnat Heger, and Constantin Heger, like Paul Emanuel, divided his time between the two. Crimsworth also crosses the boundary to give lessons at the girls' school. There he meets and captivates a Protestant Anglo-Swiss pupil-teacher called Frances Henri, who is a Lucy Snowe observed from the outside instead of the introspective narrator of *Villette*. In *The Professor* the proprietress of the girls' school, Mlle. Reuter, mistrustful and untrustworthy, is Charlotte Brontë's preliminary sketch for the mischievously detailed portrait of Claire Heger as Mme. Beck in *Villette*, for which Mme. Heger never forgave her. Crimsworth is an uneasy conflation of Paul Emanuel and Lucy Snowe, which entails an awkward change of pitch in the narrative voice, since the womanish Crimsworth is obliged to assume a male stance in his courtship of Frances Henri.

Crimsworth, in spite of his token masculinity, is akin to Lucy Snowe in many respects and, not far behind Lucy, akin to Charlotte Brontë. He moderates his expectations for fear of disappointment, as Lucy constantly does in *Villette:* 'I was in no danger of encountering severe disappointment; from this the moderation of my expectations guaranteed me' (*The Professor*, ch. 1). Like Lucy, he curbs any signs of emotion. He cannot bring himself to ask his benefactor, Hunsden, any questions or show an eager curiosity: *if he chose to explain, he might* (*The Professor*, ch. 6). Utterly proper, he is flustered when the principal of his school tries 'to excite ideas and wishes in my mind alien to what was right and honourable' (*The Professor*, ch. 11). He partakes of Lucy's habitual anxiety: 'I went to bed, but something feverish and fiery had got into my veins which prevented me from sleeping much that night' (*The Professor*, ch. 12). Repressed himself, like Lucy Snowe, he represses Frances Henri too, just as Lucy represses Ginevra Fanshawe. He regrets that Frances is so elated

by his praise of one of her compositions in English that he *had not time to check her triumph by reproof* (*The Professor*, ch. 16). His appearance, like Lucy Snowe's, is unenticing. Mlle. Reuter's mother compares him, with his spectacles on, to an owl. (She drops into Flemish in doing so, which shows that Charlotte Brontë took the trouble to learn a little Flemish.) He concedes that, short of actual deformity, *I had no point of a handsome man about me* (*The Professor*, ch. 20). He shares Lucy Snowe's harrowing dreams. There is a moral cruelty about him, as there is in Lucy Snowe. He coerces Frances Henri and searches out her faults, as Lucy coerces Ginevra Fanshawe and is constantly on the watch for her failings. But where Lucy Snowe and William Crimsworth flow together most copiously is in their animosity towards the Belgian people: their country, their society and their religion.

Charlotte Brontë herself considered the Belgians *singularly cold, selfish, animal and inferior* and the Catholic Church *a most feeble childish piece of humbug* (W.&S., I, 267). Here speaks the pride of Haworth, daughter of an Ulster Protestant and a Cornish Methodist, herself insular and bigotted. Crimsworth, travelling from Ostend to Brussels, through the glories of Bruges and Ghent and the landscapes of Memling and van der Weyden, sees only damp and flatness, *a grey, dead sky; wet road, wet fields, wet house-tops:*

> It continued fair as long as daylight lasted, though the moisture of many preceding damp days had sodden the whole country; as it grew dark, however, the rain recommenced, and it was through streaming and starless darkness my eye caught the first gleam of the lights of Brussels (*The Professor*, ch. 7).

He notes the conflict between Flemings and Walloons. A Flemish chambermaid, *her physiology eminently stupid*, answers his French surlily in Flemish (*The Professor*, ch. 7). As well as that, the Belgians cannot make tea properly (*The Professor*, ch. 19).

He dislikes the Belgian boys at M. Pelet's school as much as Lucy Snowe dislikes the Belgian girls at Mme. Beck's. They are thickset, moon-faced young Flamands in blouses:

> Their intellectual faculties were generally weak, their animal propensities strong... Such being the case, it would have been truly absurd to exact from them much in the way of mental exertion; having short memories, dense intelligence, feeble reflective powers, they recoiled with repugnance from any occupation that demanded close study or deep thought... I offered them but one alternative — submission and acknowledgement of error, or ignominious expulsion (*The Professor*, ch. 7).

Crimsworth's insularity is at times crass. When the mother of his French headmaster invites him to tea to discuss business, he suspects that the old lady may intend to seduce him: 'Surely she's not going to make love to me... I've heard of old Frenchwomen doing odd things in that line... They generally begin such affairs with eating and drinking, I believe' (*The Professor*, ch. 8). Who is here philistine, Mme. Pelet or this son of the West Riding? He takes the gracious manners of the Belgian girls to be 'precocious impurity' and blames it on 'Romish wizard-craft' (*The Professor*, ch. 12). His intolerance extends beyond their religion to their country. In his female pupils he discerns:

> that deformity of person and imbecility of intellect whose frequency in the Low Countries would seem to furnish proof that the climate is such as to induce

> degeneracy of the human mind and body (*The Professor*, ch. 12).

The British girls at Mlle. Reuter's school are awkward and dowdy ('stiff, silent, decently behaved, ill-dressed British girls') but Crimsworth describes these likenesses of Lucy Snowe in enamoured terms:

> Their characteristics were clean but careless dress, ill-arranged hair (compared with the tight and trim foreigners), erect carriage, flexible figures, white and taper hands, features more irregular, but also more intellectual than those of the Belgians, grave and modest countenances, a general air of native propriety and decency; by this last circumstance alone I could at a glance distinguish the daughters of Albion and nurslings of Protestantism from the foster-child of Rome (*The Professor*, ch. 12).

The advantages his British girls possess are strange: negligence, rigidity, flabbiness, pallor, bony features and a prim demeanour. Charlotte Brontë endows both William Crimsworth and Lucy Snowe with her own Victorian truculence.

Insolently she renames Belgium *Labassecour* (the back yard) and calls Brussels *Villette* (the hamlet). Mme. Beck's school is in the Rue Fossette (Little Ditch Street). Admittedly, Baudelaire once referred to Brussels as 'the ridiculous capital', but not with the same antagonism, since he regarded French-speaking Belgium as an appendage to the Parisian culture which Charlotte Brontë reprobated as a corrupting influence. Crimsworth soon perceives that his headmaster, M. Pelet, 'had all a Frenchman's, all a Parisian's notions about matrimony and women'. Crimsworth suspects 'a degree of laxity in his code of morals' (*The Professor*, ch. 8).

Like Crimsworth, Lucy Snowe passes through Ostend, Bruges and Ghent, ignoring everything but the cold and the rain:

> Somewhat bare, flat and treeless was the route along which our journey lay; and slimy canals crept, like half-torpid snakes, beside the road; and formal pollard willows edged level fields, tilled like kitchen-garden beds. The sky too was monotonously gray (*Villette*, ch. 7).

The details she does observe betray that strange attention to trivial objects which often accompanies a tense experience; such as the paving stones outside Mme. Beck's school after she has rung for admission:

> I fixedly looked at the street-stones, where the door-lamp shone, and counted them, and noted their shapes, and the glitter of wet in their angles (*Villette*, ch. 7).

At Mme. Beck's school, established in what she calls 'this land of convents and confessionals', Lucy Snowe believes 'a subtle essence of Romanism pervaded every arrangement' (*Villette*, ch. 14). 'Each mind was being raised in slavery.' Father Silas, the priest in the confessional she later seeks out, traces her to the school, where he takes her religious direction upon himself: 'Hereupon I was put through a course of reading — that is, I just glanced at the books he lent me' (*Villette*, ch. 36). She prefers the Bible she keeps under her pillow:

> God is not with Rome, and, were human sorrows still for the Son of God, would he not mourn over her cruelties and ambitions, as once he mourned over the crimes and woes of doomed Jerusalem? (*Villette*, ch. 36).

She is convinced that the Belgians hate the English: 'for it is curious how these clowns of Labassecour secretly hate England! She in turn derides the clowns: 'I believe it would take two Labassecourien carpenters to drive in a nail' (*Villette*, ch. 41). For all that, Lucy falls in love with a Belgian who is as vehemently Catholic as she is Evangelical and provokes

her to her remark about 'these clowns of Labassecour' by denouncing Englishwomen's slovenly dress . . . their insufferable pride, their pretentious virtue' (*Villette,* ch. 29). The incident is partly humorous. M. Paul is vexed because Lucy has apparently forgotten his name-day, whilst she is waiting to give him his presents in private, since they are more personal than the bunches of flowers everyone else has given him: a watch-strap she has embroidered in keeping with his flamboyant taste; and an initialled box for the bonbons he is so fond of. Sombre though *Villette* is in the main, it has plenty of humour (a quality rare in Charlotte Brontë), especially in the characterisation of M. Paul. The love-story of Lucy Snowe, like that of Frances Henri in *The Professor,* is a study in that womanly submission which Charlotte Brontë at least claimed to come naturally to herself.

Lucy Snowe is afflicted both from without and from within. Externally, she is an orphan, moderately well educated but penniless, with no certain chance of earning a living: a respectable Roxana or Moll Flanders thrown upon the world. Internally, she is deeply neurasthenic and self-doubting, the prey of anxiety, hysteria and despair; constantly and watchfully introspective; equally vigilant in repressing what she calls *the strong native bent of the heart* (*Villette,* ch. 17). She holds nightly conversations about her conduct with such personifications as Reason (*Villette,* ch. 21). Like Crimsworth, she persistently alludes, in assessing her experiences, to characters in the Old Testament. Jonah and Habbakuk, Jael and Sisera, Baal and Dagon figure largely in her self-investigations. She is well versed in the gloomier passages of the Bible kept under her pillow.

In a letter of 1852, Charlotte Brontë wrote of Lucy Snowe:

> I consider that she *is* both morbid and weak at times; her character sets up no pretentions to unmixed strength, and anyone living her life would necessarily become morbid. It was no impetus of healthy feeling which urged her to the confessional for instance; it was the semi-delirium of solitary grief and sickness (W.&S. IV 18).

She refers to the crisis in which Lucy Snowe, left lonely and desolate at the school during the summer holidays ('in solitary confinement', as one of her friends puts it) enters the confessional of a suburban church just for the sake of having someone to talk to. She tells the priest that she is a Protestant but, in the priest's words, 'pours her heart out'. He offers to instruct her in the Catholic faith, but she quietly evades his persuasions, and glides away:

> Did I, do you suppose, reader, contemplate venturing within that worthy priest's reach? As soon should I have thought of walking into a Babylonish furnace (*Villette,* ch. 15).

It is significant that Charlotte Brontë herself went to confess at St. Gudrun's Cathedral in Brussels in 1843, and that the priest attempted to convert her. Probably her state of mind was akin to Lucy Snowe's at the time, with the addition that she was infatuated with a married man.

As the story progresses, and especially after she has fallen in love with Paul Emanuel, Lucy becomes more tolerant of individual Catholics, whilst still deploring the Catholic Church as an institution. She explains why she entered Father Silas's church:

> Any solemn rite, any spectacle of sincere worship, any opening for an appeal to

> God was as welcome to me then as bread to one in extremity of want. I knelt down with the others on the stone pavement (*Villette*, ch. 15).

Of Father Silas, devious though he later proves to be, she writes: 'He was kind when I needed kindness; he did me good. May Heaven bless him!' (*Villette*, ch. 15). Early in her acquaintance with M. Paul she perceives that 'the self-denying and self-sacrificing part of the Catholic religion commanded his soul' (*Villette*, ch. 19). M. Paul, impatient, fervently Catholic, easily offended and enraged but rapidly appeased, dictatorial, eager in all his projects, 'this waspish little despot', as Lucy calls him, corresponds to Charlotte Brontë's description of M. Heger. M. Paul is Lucy Snowe's salvation. M. Heger was Charlotte Brontë's downfall. *Villette* is a monument to Charlotte Brontë's defeated wishes.

Always watchful, M. Paul is aware of Lucy's disturbed and turbulent personality. 'I scarcely know anyone, Miss Lucy,' he says, 'who needs a friend more absolutely than you; your very faults imperatively require it. You want so much checking, regulating and keeping down' (*Villette*, ch. 31). With a glint of the humour which is seldom absent when she writes about M. Paul, she reflects:

> This idea of 'keeping down' never left Mr. Paul's head; the most habitual subjugation would, in my case, have failed to relieve him of it . . . I listened to him, and did not trouble myself to be too submissive; his occupation would have been gone, had I left him nothing to 'keep down' (*Villette*, ch. 31).

Yet these disrespectful words show how Lucy was opening herself to him. She liked being 'kept down'.

'At the present time,' Max Nordau sourly remarked during the last years of the nineteenth century, 'when the writing of novels has become almost a female handicraft, the authoresses continue to reproduce the time-honoured image of the ideal woman, simply because they have not the strength to rise above tradition and think originally'[3]. Charlotte Brontë's heroines do not bely what Nordau claimed. They are meek, submissive and reticent: ideal women, in their passivity, from a man's point of view. Did she lack 'the strength of mind to rise above tradition', or was she that sort of woman herself? In a letter of 1842 she says that she likes to obey orders rather than to give them: 'It is natural to me to submit, and very unnatural to command' (W.&S., I 260).

M. Paul rules, or overrules, her from the start, when she reluctantly consents to act, at the last moment and with barely time to learn her lines, in a school play. He rehearses her, although fuming at her ineptitude until she partly satisfies him, then locks her in an attic to study her part. He comes across her in an art gallery, seated alone before a picture of a vast half-naked Cleopatra and, shocked, rushes her to a corner of the room, where he places her in a chair facing a series of daubs of a woman's life, from virginity to widowhood (*Villette*, ch. 19). He catches her at a concert at which she is wearing not her usual drab clothes, but a borrowed pale pink dress, and accuses her of wearing a scarlet gown: 'Pink! Pink!' she indignantly exclaims (*Villette*, ch. 28). The comedy of this exchange is twofold. Lucy is utterly in accord with M. Paul in preferring women to wear unobtrusive clothes; whereas M. Paul always dresses in the most vivid colours. The peacock accuses the peahen of vainglory. Lucy's

acceptance of his jurisdiction over her clothes suggests not merely subjection but servility, yet, equivocally, she enjoys his displeasure.

He is vexed when he cannot find as many faults as he wishes in her French exercises: 'for he liked me to commit faults: a knot of blunders was sweet to him as a cluster of nuts' (*Villette*, ch. 30). Never is he so benign as when Lucy accidentally breaks his spectacles:

> Difficult of management so long as I had done him no harm, he became graciously pliant as soon as I stood in his presence, a conscious and contrite offender (*Villette*, ch. 28).

The truth is that he is delighted when Lucy, put at a disadvantage, is in his power, although he exercises that power magnanimously.

Lucy's submission stops short of the amorous enjoyment of pain, although she is not offended when M. Paul, thinking her foolish, pulls one of her ears, 'imperially menacing the other'. She does not protest but 'did not venture to challenge the repetition' (*Villette*, ch. 32). In *The Professor* Charlotte Brontë goes further. Frances Henri is thrilled by the erotic cruelty of William Crimsworth after their marriage. In order to improve her English, he forbids her to talk to him in French:

> Talk French to me she would, and many a punishment she has had for her wilfulness. I fear the choice of chastisement must have been injudicious, for instead of correcting the fault, it seemed to encourage its renewal (*The Professor*, ch. 25).

Crimsworth's moral cruelty has already been considered. One must also notice its sexual manifestation, which may have attracted a possible masochism in Frances Henri and her genesis in the fantasies of Charlotte Brontë. Crimsworth is clearly sadistic in his treatment of Mlle. Reuter during her inexplicable infatuation with him, when he receives 'incense from an attractive and still young worshipper':

> I felt at once barbarous and sensual as a pasha. I endured her homage sometimes; sometimes I rebuked it. My indifference or harshness served equally to increase the evil I desired to check (*The Professor*, ch. 20).

Already whilst Frances is still his pupil, he threatens her over a mistake 'for which, mademoiselle, if you were a child, I should certainly devise some slight punishment' (*The Professor*, ch. 17). He enjoys reproving her, and she enjoys his reproofs:

> she would at last raise her eyes and give me a certain glance, sweetened with gaiety, and pointed with defiance, which, to speak truth, thrilled me as nothing had ever done (*The Professor*, ch. 19).

Having married her, Crimsworth curbs her vivacity, when it is too much for him, simply by grasping her:

> the provocative smile quenched in the expressive brown eyes, and a ray of gentle homage shone under the lids in its place. I had seized a mere vexing fairy, and found a submissive and supplicating little mortal woman in my arms (*The Professor*, ch. 25).

M. Paul is more engaging as a character partly because he is an enamoured portrait of M. Heger, with possibly a slight touch of Thackeray, whom Charlotte Brontë worshipped but was sometimes shrewishly rude to, which amused him.[4] 'I think, however long I live,' she wrote to a friend a few days after leaving the pensionnat in Brussels, 'I shall not forget what parting with M. Heger cost me' (Gérin, 254). The Hegers promised to keep up the connection, but that was prevented by the imprudence of the letters she sent M. Heger from England (Gérin,

278-82). He soon gave up answering them, punctilious though he was in writing letters of encouragement to his former pupils. How was he, devoted to his wife and their five children, to answer what amounted to love-letters? He remained silent.

What could Charlotte Brontë expect? She had worked herself into a situation for which there was no resolution, no exit, apart from M. Heger's continued but tantalising comradeship. Mme. Heger was sure of her husband. All she feared was that Charlotte Brontë's adulation of him might cause a scandal at her school. She was not the jealous Mme. Beck so maliciously well-characterised in *Villette*; only a calm businesswoman, glad to accept Charlotte Brontë's resignation when Charlotte Brontë, purposely deprived of M. Heger's company, decided to return to England. She kindly, and no doubt thankfully, saw her off at Ostend.

The ending of *Villette* leaves it to the reader to decide what happened to M. Paul, although the hints of disaster are too strong to create much doubt. Lucy Snowe assigns it to cheerful fantasists to suppose that M. Paul returned safely through the tempest. Charlotte Brontë's father wanted the novel to end happily, 'as he disliked novels which left a melancholy impression on the mind', but Elizabeth Gaskell comments:

> the idea of M. Paul Emanuel's death at sea was stamped on her imagination, till it assumed the distinct force of reality; and she could no more alter her fictitious ending than if they had been facts which she was relating.[5]

M. Paul is overwhelmed by the waves on his voyage home to Lucy Snowe, just as M. Heger slips, beyond Charlotte Brontë's recall, into the waters of matrimony.

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Literary Supplement

JANE ELLEN HARRISON

Jane Ellen Harrison: The Mask and the Self. Sandra J. Peacock. Yale University Press. £14.95.

Where do unattached female dons go at Christmas time? Such questions rarely vex the heedless undergraduates who eat in Hall under the portraits of the women who prepared the way for them. There is now and increasingly, however, an interest in lives of achieving women. Jane Ellen Harrison (1850-1928), Newnham College's classics fellow, was Virginia Woolf's academic ghost — 'on the terrace, as if popping out to breathe the air, to glance at the garden, came a bent figure, formidable yet humble, with her great forehead and her shabby dress' — at 'Fernham' College, in *A Room of One's Own*. Her biography needed to be written. It is, in fact, surprising that such an interesting hoard of papers should have lain so long unbroached in Newnham's archives, in the small strong-room 'approached by stooping through an Alice-in-Wonderland door of a size appropriate for a seven-year-old'. Two previous attempts there have been, each, it seems, by rival surrogate daughters; Hope Mirrlees abandoned the project, but left notes, and Jessie Stewart managed a brief sketch — *Jane Ellen Harrison: A Portrait from Letters* (to Gilbert Murray), which appeared in 1959. There were inherent difficulties in assembling a biography — the family history was disjointed in parts, and there had been an episode of Burning the Letters, but these are not uncommon circumstances, and Sandra Peacock, who is assistant dean of the graduate school at Emory University, in America, has not been inhibited.

This is a very fine, intellectual biography. Sandra Peacock has a genuinely original and enquiring mind. It is quite a shock, though, to find that the underlying framework throughout the masterful synthesis of life and work is Freudian. This kind of biography is not yet a commonplace in England. Probably, here, one's expectations would have been of a middle-of-the-road dissertation on women's education, and on the Cambridge Ritualists. However, Jane Harrison's personal history particularly lends itself to Freudian interpretation. Her mother died after giving birth to her, and her father eventually married the woman who had been Jane's governess. Raw Freudian passages such as 'Jane had good reason to construct such a loving memory of her mother. Her death had allowed her daughter to have her father to herself, and guilt over such an effortless Oedipal victory drove her to create an image of a mother good enough not to punish Jane for having won' should not deter the middle-of-the-road reader. Moreover, Jane Harrison herself studied Freud, and, as she wrote, although she was 'at first ... sickened' by 'the ugliness' of Freudian theory, she 'struggled on, feeling somehow that behind and below all this sexual mud was something big and real'.

After the first shock of the Freudian bias, a second surprise is the extent to which Jane Harrison was troubled and clinically neurotic. Even the beautiful Augustus John portrait which graces the jacket of the biography apparently reflects prostration and depression caused by the 'Francis-Frances affair': Francis Cornford, much younger, whom she loved, married Frances Darwin,

her special pupil, after Jane herself had made the introduction. And so, in her classical and anthropological writings, she used her work to make sense of her personal experience. 'She brought her own past to bear on the ancient past.' Thus, for example, she 'recast society in a matriarchial model.' Her gender influenced her writings. Actually, though, she preferred the intellectual company of men, and the only feminist issue that interested her was the matter of degrees for women. She was deeply upset by the storming of Newnham's gates by male undergraduates in 1921. She was obviously an inspiring teacher, and her centrality in the Cambridge Ritualists, who sought the ritual origins of religion, literature and philosophy, is newly argued by Sandra Peacock.

The author's 'American-ness' shows only in unknowable nuances: although she has texts for her misunderstanding, there is not such a clear-cut North-South divide in England as she imagines, nor has she entirely grasped the subtleties of the grades of the middle classes. Her lame, physical description of the charms of Newnham College stems from her greater interest in things of the mind than in her surroundings. Sylvia Plath liked the statue in the gardens.

MOLLY TIBBS

POST-WAR IN THE ANTARCTIC

Falklands Aftermath. Major General Edward Fursdon. Heinemann (Leo Cooper). £12.95.

Whether it is possible to talk about the aftermath of a war which only one party has ended, is a moot point. But certainly the current cessation of hostilities has brought unprecedented prosperity and development to the Falkland Islands.

General Fursdon, with his double angle of Sapper and Defence correspondent for the *Telegraph*, brings a brisk and professional eye to the first stages of change during 1982-3 — in particular the lethal and technical work of mine clearance. He describes in vivid detail the huge engineering project for airway extension (before the 1985 Mount Pleasant complex). There were agonising days with no contact left to the outside world; there was the weather. Troops worked non-stop and in shifts. But they were so keen they had to be forcibly stopped during one bad snow storm, and they completed the runway ahead of schedule. Maybe, those who begged the Treasury and the FO without avail in the seventies, for just a small subsidy, for just a few more yards of runway to make the Islands independent of Argentinian transport control, can be permitted a wry smile. It would have been so much cheaper too. But like the Bourbons, the FO never seems to learn. General Fursdon points out that the same grudging parsimony has been evident over fishery development. Not until 1987 did the Islanders get their 150 mile fishing zone. Till then they watched helplessly and angrily while trawler fleets from Japan, the USSR, Taiwan, Spain, Poland and other countries depleted their stocks in a free for all in one of the world's largest unregulated fisheries. Now at last revenue from fishing licences is a substantial bonus for the Islands, and could have been long ago.

General Fursdon pays generous tribute to the first military governor of the Islands at the end of hostilities, David Thorne. His energy earned him the affectionate nickname of 'Jumping Bean' by the troops. But it was a carefully

planned energy. General Thorne had to balance carefully the immediate need to defend the Islands, with the longer term need to live with the Islanders; and the ratio of 4,000 troops to 1,800 natives was not an easy problem even, or because of, prosperity and immigration.

The story of South Georgia and the Antarctic factor are not forgotten in this survey. Perhaps a second book from General Fursdon will place the Islands in that all important strategic perspective.

MOLLY MORTIMER

HORIZON AND CYRIL CONNOLLY

Friends of Promise: Cyril Connolly and the World of Horizon. Michael Shelden. Hamish Hamilton. £15.95.

Resurrexit Palinurus. From the unquiet grave the fat man wildly signals to be let out. Mr. Shelden, his sensitive medium, paging Mr. Not-So-Smartiboots from that Grand Tour from whose bourn no traveller normally returns, conjures forth — like Dr. Dee, Queen Elizabeth's Merlin — to the wail of sirens and the thud of bombs — the shades of Connolly and his cohort from beyond the blue horizon. But which of his many daemons, the several incarnations assumed by Cyril Vernon Connolly in his coruscant passage across the literary firmament, comes through, answers the necromancer's trumpet? The Georgian boy, subsequent target of the enemies of promise, and the twenties and thirties denizen of the rock pool, remain behind the veil. We are concerned with the coronal years of the son of the conchological major. Although his existence spanned the decades from 1903 to 1974, it was in the incendiary-lit and doodlebug-punctuated forties, the time of the Second Great Fire of London, that he made his contribution to literary history, editing *Horizon,* the monthly numbers of which stack neatly into the decade 1939-1949.

There is skill — and pathos — in Mr Shelden's evocation of those years of, and friends of, promise, fulfilled. The almost unbearable nostalgia flickering in the falling leaves about *The Unquiet Grave,* the ghostly play and lost players of *The Condemned Playground.* Even the remembered triumphs of discovery — Denton Welch, Alun Lewis, Rollo Woolley, William Sansom, Julian Maclaren-Ross, Angus Wilson, George Orwell — seem tinged and etiolated with sadness. Through it all, Palinurus waddling along in thick black overcoat and dark suit with a leather briefcase under his arm. Cyril, Janus-faced in love, tortured by possession, and loss, of his alternating goddesses, Jean (first wife) and Diana; comforted in his self-secured insecurity by Lys Lubbock. Suffering, like a baby with wind, perpetually from an embraced *Angst* — defined as 'an awareness of the waste of our time and ability, such as may be observed among people kept waiting by a hairdresser'. Regularly threatening the amatory blackmail of suicide, but when it finally comes to the bitter pill bottle, the unbiteable bullet, the easeful gas-tap, 'not ending' as undignifiedly as the many who dare not kill themselves for fear of what the neighbours will say. Writing masterpieces — and none the less masterpieces — by weekly or monthly instalments. Fashioning heady bouquets of other men's flowers, picked from the grubby tin shelves of waiting review copies in the *Observer,* and later the *Sunday Times,* office.

When Mr. Shelden's book ends, Connolly is left with nearly a quarter of a century more of this-is-where-I-came-in style life to go. There will be three

decennary stocktakings — *Ideas and Places* (1935), *Previous Convictions* (1963) and *The Evening Colonnade* (1973). Reprinted pieces. There will be, on a personal level, the necessary anguishings recorded of 'Pop' by wife-mother No. 2, Barbara Skelton (*Tears Before Bedtime*, 1987), and, as the long shadow of the evening colonnade falls across his path, the ultimate joys of Deirdre, third wife — and widow. He achieved, too, his physical immortality in a daughter, Cressida, and a son, Matthew, namesake of the conchological major.

When it comes to the final literary stocktaking, it will not be as the seminal novelist which he loved to dream — on lazy, sunlit shores and when the cicadas fell silent and the nights turned cold — of being, but as a literary journalist of the first-water, the counterpart on this side of the Atlantic of Edmund Wilson, that he will be pinned and labelled. And that is no bad thing. In his beginning was his end. In his failure was his success. Commemorating Bunny Wilson, who embarked on the mystery tour just two years ahead of him, Cyril unknowingly penned his own evaluatory epitaph . . . (he was) 'a passionate, sensual Johnsonian polymath'. Mr. Shelden has written a first-rate book. Palinurus-Connolly has arisen full vested in splendour.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

THOMAS HARDY'S LETTERS

The Collected Letters of Thomas Hardy, Vol. 7. ed. R. L. Purdy and M. Millgate. OUP. £29.50.

This concluding volume covers the last two years of Hardy's life. The final letter, less than three weeks before his death, was written to one of his staunchest friends, Edmund Gosse, on Christmas Day 1927 and shows his characteristically dry humour undimmed when he describes himself as 'living on butter-broth and beef tea, the servants being much concerned at my not being able to eat any Christmas pudding, though I am rather relieved'.

Inevitably the main harvest of substantial correspondence has been garnered in the preceding six volumes, but this is a worthwhile gleaning. With failing eyesight and increasing frailty Hardy could no longer maintain the flow of handwritten letters and cards that had been his customary practice: to lighten the burden he made pencilled drafts, to be typed by a secretary; or deputed his wife to reply suitably. Brevity, limited to the immediate topic, became the rule.

Even so, there are details of more than passing interest. A letter from a fellow-author, John Meade Falkner, praising 'Time's Laughingstocks', inspires an expansive reply in which Hardy speaks of his reading *Ecclesiastes* 'only this morning' and commenting that the most recently fashionable poets were 'not more advanced, more modern, than the writer of this book was'. A seeker of biographical details that might identify Jude in *Jude the Obscure* as a self-portrait is brushed off with the assurance that 'Speaking generally there is more autobiography in a hundred lines of Mr. Hardy's poetry than in all the novels'. Approached by the BBC for permission to broadcast excerpts from *The Dynasts* Hardy writes 'I am not aware if a charge is usually made in these cases, and do not wish to make any' — an indication of how completely the printed word still commanded the attention of authors. In his dealings with publishers and editors Hardy's business sense continued to be as alert, as professional, and at times as magnanimous as ever. The topic of the hanging of a woman that he witnessed as a youth of sixteen recurs again in a letter to Lady Pinney who had provided him with further information. Although he

protests his shame at having been an onlooker there is an undeniable fascination in his recall of 'what a fine figure she showed against the sky as she hung in the misty rain, and how the tight black silk gown set off her shape as she wheeled half-round and back'.

In additional sections the book brings together letters that were not available for placing chronologically in the earlier volumes, a few undated ones and fragments, and notes of editorial corrections and amplifications throughout the series. Finally — and most welcome — there is a full index covering the entire enterprise and therefore adding greatly to the scholarly usefulness of the earlier volumes which suffered from a lack of indexing. Seen in their completed form the seven volumes must be hailed as a towering achievement. The editors have imposed a rigorous discipline on their task and, in so doing, have set a standard which is all the more admirable at a time when so much publishing looks for easier options and short cuts.

DESMOND HAWKINS

FRIEND TO HENRY VIII

Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk (1484-1545). S. J. Gunn. Basil Blackwell. £32.50.

'Charles Brandon has been at times an elusive quarry', writes the author at the beginning of this important biography. It seems strange indeed that a figure who loomed so large at the court of Henry VIII, who lasted so long, and enjoyed such an intimate friendship with his king, should be so little documented. Brandon was physically very like his master, and in physical sport, they shared the same tastes. Brandon certainly anticipated, and in some ways outdistanced Henry VIII in his matrimonial entanglements. Both king and duke were exceedingly fair, and had the same curly, golden hair, the same steel-grey eyes, planted on either side of an aquiline nose, somewhat too small for the breadth of a very large face. In youth and early manhood, owing to the brilliancy of their pink and white complexions, they were universally considered extremely handsome, but with the advent of years they became abnormally stout, and vainly tried to conceal their fat, wide cheeks and double chins with beards and whiskers!

How well this describes them both, almost as brothers; here indeed lies the key to Brandon's curious anonymity. For he was like a brother, a mirror image of the king. No-one summed it up better than an envoy in 1513, when Brandon wishes to present himself to Margaret of Austria, the Governess of the Netherlands: 'He is a second king, who does and undoes'. When he married the king's favourite sister, Mary Tudor, in 1515, his ambition must have seemed complete, but others have fallen from loftier pinnacles. Brandon did not fall, and here perhaps is the second piece of the curious picture he presents to posterity. He was a survivor, perhaps an opportunist, but he knew the magic touchstone: loyalty above all to the king. He thus endured the reign of nearly forty years, dying at (for those days) the very advanced age of sixty-one, just eighteen months before the king he so resembled. Yet right to the end he was active and influential, and his death was keenly felt.

S. J. Gunn obviously has had an interest in this fascinating and elusive personage since his youth; since he first saw perhaps Walt Disney's film *The Sword and the Rose* in 1953, in which Brandon is the central character, and which, despite the scholarly and deep nature of the book and its research, is

mentioned on the first page. Through extensive use of archive material, the author has built up a tapestry of Brandon's possessions in land and manors which formed a necessary power base to any magnate in the sixteenth century. Yet it did not long survive. His two sons by his fourth wife, (the redoubtable Katherine Willoughby, destined to be a greater figure than her husband), so charmingly and touchingly portrayed by Holbein, did not long survive him, and the Dukedom of Suffolk passed to his son-in-law, the worthless Henry Grey, and to his daughter, Frances Brandon, whose gross sensuality and insensitivity so resembled her father and her uncle, Henry VIII.

There are some surprising omissions. Charles Brandon was indeed related (though not closely) to Henry VIII through at least five different lines and he himself was descended from King John, from the Princes of Wales, from Henry III of England and from Louis VIII of France. He was not a man of lowly descent by any means, and his flirtation with Margaret of Austria, 'Caesar's daughter', was not the mésalliance it might have seemed. What clouded the picture was that he had emerged a poor relation, and in a very real way was a self-made man, with all the arrogance and self-assertion that sometimes entails.

S. J. Gunn mentions too only briefly Brandon's part in the engagement with the French Armada which crossed the Channel in 1545 and resulted in the loss of the *Mary Rose*. Brandon was in charge of operations to try and raise her, virtually his last public act.

In the last century a most enterprising archivist and genealogist, Emily Sarah Holt, a great contributor to *Notes & Queries*, wrote a most important Historical Appendix to her novel, *The Harvest of Yesteryear*, which merits a large footnote in The Complete Peerage to explain Brandon's matrimonial imbroglios.

To anyone interested in Tudor history and biography, especially drawn from scholarly sources, this is an impressive work. It is a pity the price excludes it from so many.

Perhaps Brandon should have the last word. He was aware of how he had had to struggle to achieve. After his marriage to the king's sister legend has it that he commented on it in the verse:

Cloth of gold, do not despise
Though thou be matched with cloth of frieze
Cloth of frieze be not too bold
Though thou be match'd with cloth of gold

As others have found, marriage to a princess is not an unmixed blessing.

MICHAEL L. NASH

SHORTER REVIEWS

Barbara Pym (Macmillan Modern Novelists, £20.00, paperback £6.95.) In a perceptive study of the novels of Barbara Pym Michael Cottsell has succeeded in explaining how it has come about that her stories of English domestic life have begun to be read with enjoyment and admiration by readers of all ages both here in the UK, and equally in the USA. In 1963 her work was suffering rejection on the grounds that it was not sufficiently contemporary: she thought the reason for the rejection could be attributable to her mundane subject-matter for it was not about 'men and Americans'. It was only after 1977, when Philip Larkin and David Cecil discovered that for both of them, in different ways, Barbara

Pym was expressing a particular kind of malaise in the period after the second world war, that critics and publishers began to take serious notice of the novels set in a recognisably English middle-class environment. The subtlety of her sexual comedy and her historical sense has now been valued highly by discerning readers. Michael Cottsell's study shows her narrative form to be sophisticated and perfectly adapted to its purpose of describing the despair of age and the ebullience of youth.

Guerrillas in Uniform (Hutchinson, £16.95.) The exciting account given here of Churchill's setting up of private armies in the Middle East and the war against Japan, 1940-45, is written by Eric Morris. He is well suited to the task for he is an International Affairs Consultant and Political Analyst, particularly interested in security and counter terrorism. Controversies necessarily arose at the time and after, in relation to these private armies: to many they were credited with ensuring victory in unlikely fields of conflict, to others they hindered the main thrust of orthodox armies, becoming a law unto themselves in some ways. Especially was this true of Orde Wingate's famous Chindits whose expeditions were, Morris argues, a total waste of resources and largely a product of the Brigadier's vanity. The author challenges the accepted view of many brave groups and shows them to have been misguided, if much publicised after the final Allied victory.

The Club: the Jews of Modern Britain (Constable, £15.00). There is no single Jewish community in Britain today, says Stephen Brook, who has written a clear, comprehensive account of their origin, religion and chief geographical locations. There are three major groups in this country who are likely in any case to differ amongst themselves on religious belief, on observances and on the status of women: but they are all conscious of 'belonging' in spite of their widely differing backgrounds and degrees of sophistication. Their origin may divide them as well as the terms of their religion, but they do not, as Christians might, talk about 'sects' in the various synagogue organisations. Even so, there is a deep rift between the three branches of Judaism: the more fundamentalist Orthodoxy has revived and its adherents regard the merely Orthodox with mistrust whilst the milder Reform and Liberal Jews are disapproved of by both the former groups. The author adds a further dimension to his eminently readable book by considering Judaism, and also feminism amongst Jewish women, in an international perspective. He makes some unusually interesting comparisons between British and American Jews, showing that in the artistic fields of stage and cinema in the USA Jews are noticeably successful. Jews are represented in many professions in the UK such as stockbroking, the law and property development but appear much less in the armed forces, manufacturing industries or, strangely enough, high street banking. As a Jew himself the author is entitled to grumble a little when, in interviewing other Jews, he feels that they could work harder and 'do better' in certain fields of endeavour.

Berlin Days 1946-1947 (Macmillan, £12.95.) The author of *Last Waltz in Vienna* has produced a graphic chronicle of his return to Germany immediately at the end of the Second World War. An Austrian Jew by birth, he volunteered for a posting to Berlin with the British Army of Occupation. He tried to discover how degeneration into bestiality came about in so cultured a nation. He gives a vivid picture of the confused city.

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